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Case Law[2026] TZHC 3053Tanzania

Charles Kalokola vs John Kaji Guma and Another (Land Appeal No. 20914 of 2025) [2026] TZHC 3053 (9 June 2026)

High Court of Tanzania

Judgment

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA SUMBAWANGA SUB – REGISTRY AT SUMBAWANGA LAND APPEAL NO. 20914 OF 2025 (Originating from Land Application No. 17 of 2024 of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Tanganyika at Katavi ) CHARLES KALOKOLA..…………………………………………… …. ………..APPELLANT VERSUS JOHN KAJI GUMA …………………………………………..… …. ……1 ST RESPONDENT MAGRETH MALENDEJA …………………………………… …. ….…. 2 ND RESPONDENT JUDGMENT MWENEMPAZI, J Being dissatisfied and aggrieved by the decision and decree of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Tanganyika at Katavi (Trial Tribunal), the Appellant, Charles Kalokola, has preferred the present appeal before this Court , challenging the entirety o f the said decision on points of law and fact. Briefly stated, the facts of the matter are that the first respondent purchased a parcel of land measuring 40 acres from the leadership of the Government of Itofu Hamlet, Igalula Village, in the year 2012. He paid TZS 400,000/= and was issued a payment receipt acknowledging the payment .

2 As for the second respondent, she purchased a 50 - acre parcel of land from Shabani Soke in 2011. The said transaction was conducted in the presence of the Chairman of Itofu Hamlet. The respondents prayed before the trial Tribunal for a declaration that the disputed land belongs to the first respondent to the extent of 40 acres and to the second respondent to the extent of 50 acres; that the applicant be ordered to vacate the suit land; and that costs of the suit be awarded to the respondents. The appellant denied all the claims and contended that the Government of Igalula Village allocated him the disputed land in accordance with the village procedures. He prayed that the appl ication be dismissed with costs. After a full trial and a visit to the locus in quo , the trial tribunal was of the view that the disputed land is not situated at Itofu Msolyalya. The evidence adduced established that the area known as Msolyalya is located at Itimba, and that the Village Government exercised due caution to ensure that land occupied by indigenous residents and other persons was not allocated to third parties.

3 From the evidence on record, the trial tribunal granted the application with costs, and the respondents herein were declared the lawful owners of the disputed land. However, the appellant was advised to report back to the Village Government to be shown the actual land allocated to him at Msolyalya. Being dissatisfied and aggrieved by the whole of the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Tribunal, the Appellant has preferred the present appeal before this Court , challenging the said decision. The appeal is anchored on three grounds, namely;

  1. The Trial Tribunal erred in law and fact by relying o n inconsistent and contradictory evidence adduced by the Respondents and their witnesses regarding ownership of the disputed land.
  2. The Trial Tribunal failed to properly consider the Appellant ’ s evidence that he lawfully acquired the suit land from the Vill age Council upon compliance with all requisite procedures.

4 3. The Trial Tribunal failed to appreciate the legal implications of the non - rejoinder of the necessary parties, particularly the Village Council from whom the Appellant purchased the land. Consequen tly, the Appellant prays for orders of this Court declaring him the lawful owner of the suit land together with costs of the appeal. On the hearing date, the appellant and the respondents appeared for themselves as they had no legal representation. However, the appellant sought leave of this court to have the matter heard by way of written submissions. The respondents did not object to the appellant ’ s prayer, and this court granted the leave sought and set the filing dates, which both sides adhered to . In compliance with the said direction, the Appellant did file the written submissions in support of the appeal, and in arguing for the fi rst ground of appeal, he stated that the Trial Tribunal erred both in law and fact by relying on inconsistent and contradictory evidence adduced by the Respondents regarding ownership of the disputed land. He argued that the First Respondent merely produce d a single - page document purporting to show the allocation of 40 acres of land, which, according to the respondent, was

5 insufficient to establish lawful ownership or to prove that the Village Council followed proper procedures in granting the land. It was further submitted that, unlike the Respondents, the Appellant tendered several relevant documents , including minutes of the Village Land Committee, payment receipts for the 50 acres, and a letter of acceptance issued by the Village Council, all demonstrating compliance with the prescribed procedures for acquisition of village land. He further contended that the Trial Tribunal failed to evaluate the evidential value of those documents properly . It was further submitted that the Second Respondent produced a sale agreement relating to the purchase of a wetland (mbuga) measuring twelve acres, whereas the di sputed property before the Tribunal concerned dry land measuring approximately ninety (90) acres. The Appellant therefore argued that the evidence adduced by the Respondents was contradictory, unreliable, and incapable of proving ownership of the disputed land. In support of the contention that the burden of proof lies upon the party asserting a legal right, the Appellant cited the case of Francisca Mbakileki vs Tanzania Harbours Authority (Civil Appeal No. 71 of 2002) [2004] TZCA 162 (29 April 2004) wherei n the Court reiterated the principle that whoever desires a court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability

6 dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. Regarding the second ground of appeal, the Appella nt submitted that the Village Government or Village Council was a necessary party to the proceedings before the Trial Tribunal since the Appellant allegedly acquired the suit land from the Village Council after following all mandatory procedures and paying the requisite fees. He argued that failure to join the Village Government occasioned prejudice to the proper determination of the dispute and rendered the proceedings defective. In support of that argument, the appellant urged this Court to revisit the de cisions in Abdulatif Mohamed Hamis vs Mehboob Yusuf Othman & Another (Civil Revision No. 6 of 2017) [2018] TZCA 25 (1 August 2018), and Haruna Shamte vs Saleh Ally Salum & Another (Civil Appeal No. 274 of 2023) [2025] TZCA 834 (7 August 2025), where the co urts emphasized the importance of joining all necessary parties in a suit. In conclusion, the Appellant submitted that the Trial Tribunal improperly relied on weak and contradictory evidence and consequently reached an erroneous decision. The Appellant the refore prayed for this Court to allow

7 the appeal in its entirety, quash and set aside the Judgment and Decree of the District Land and Housing Tribunal in Land Case No. 17 of 2024, award costs of the appeal, and grant any other relief deemed fit and just b y this Court. In reply to the submissions advanced by the Appellant, the Respondents jointly opposed the appeal and supported the decision of the Trial Tribunal in its entirety. In their submission, they stated that the Trial Tribunal did not err either i n law or fact by relying on the evidence adduced by them, contending that the evidence was clear, consistent, and sufficient to establish the Respondents ’ ownership of the disputed land. It was argued that the Respondents sufficiently explained to the Trib unal how they acquired the land in dispute, namely, that one portion was purchased, while another was allocated to them by the Village Government. About the Appellant ’ s complaint that the First Respondent relied on a single - page document, they submitted th at the responsible village authority issued the said document. Therefore, its evidential value could not be diminished merely because of its brevity or form. They further argued that what is

8 material is not the quantity of documents produced but rather the authenticity and contents thereof, particularly whether the document originated from the competent village authority. They then argued that the disputed land , measuring ninety (90) acres, comprised two portions: twelve acres that had been purchased and th e remaining acreage allegedly allocated by village leaders, thereby making the total acreage in dispute. It was therefore maintained that the evidence tendered by the Respondents was adequate and properly supported the findings and conclusions reached by t he Trial Tribunal that the Respondents were the rightful owners of the land in dispute. In response to the second ground of appeal concerning non - joinder of the Village Government, the Respondents submitted that the Village Government was not a necessary p arty to the proceedings. They argued that had the Trial Tribunal considered the Village Government to be a necessary party, it would have exercised its powers to order its inclusion in the proceedings. It was further contended that it is within the powers and discretion of the Tribunal to determine whether a matter can properly proceed in the absence of a particular party. They submitted that the authorities cited by the

9 Appellant were distinguishable from the present case since the facts therein did not co rrespond with the facts of the instant appeal. In conclusion, the Respondents prayed for this Court to uphold the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Tribunal and dismiss the appeal with costs on the ground that there was neither an error of law nor fact comm itted by the Trial Tribunal in reaching its decision. Upon a careful reconsideration of the entire record before this Court, the proceedings conducted by the Trial Tribunal, the documentary exhibits tendered by both parties, the findings made after the vis it to the locus in quo, and the rival submissions advanced by the parties herein, I now proceed to determine whether the present appeal has merit. At the outset, it is a settled law that an appellate court ought not to interfere with the findings of fact m ade by a trial court or tribunal unless it is shown that such findings were based on no evidence at all, were reached upon a misapprehension of the evidence, or that the trial court acted on wrong principles of law. This principle was aptly stated in the c ase of Pangea Minerals Ltd vs Gwandu Majali (Civil Appeal 504 of 2020) [2021] TZCA 414 (26 August 2021) , where the Court held that an appellate court

10 should not interfere with the exercise of discretion of a lower court unless it is satisfied that the court misdirected itself in some matter and as a result arrived at a wrong conclusion. In the instant appeal, the Appellant faults the Trial Tribunal principally on three fronts : alleged reliance on contradictory evidence, failure to evaluate the Appellant ’ s evidence properly , and non - joinder of the Village Council. I shall consider them together , since they concern the propriety of the findings reached by the Trial Tribunal. About the first complaint, the Appellant argued that the Respondents tendered cont radictory and insufficient evidence regarding ownership of the disputed land. However, upon perusal of the record, this Court finds that the Trial Tribunal properly evaluated the evidence before it and reached a reasoned conclusion. The record demonstrates that the First Respondent produced documentary evidence of the village authority's land allocation, as well as evidence of payment. Equally, the Second Respondent produced evidence relating to the acquisition of part of the land through purchase from one Shabani Soke in the presence of village leadership. More importantly, the Tribunal did not

11 rely solely on documents; it also considered oral testimony and observations made during the visit to the locus in quo. The Trial Tribunal specifically found that th e disputed land was not situated at Itofu Msolyalya as alleged by the Appellant, but rather that the area known as Msolyalya is situated at Itimba. The Tribunal further found that the Village Government had exercised caution in not allocating land already occupied by indigenous residents and other persons. Those findings were based on evidence adduced during the trial and observations made at the locus in quo. This Court finds no inconsistency of such magnitude as would render the Respondents ’ evidence unre liable or incapable of sustaining the judgment. The alleged contradiction regarding the twelve acres and the larger portion of land was sufficiently clarified by the Respondents in their submissions and evidence , which showed that the disputed land compris ed different portions acquired through different means. The Trial Tribunal was entitled to believe that evidence. It is further evident from the record that although the Appellant produced village documents, including minutes and payment receipts, the Tria l Tribunal did not arbitrarily reject those documents . Rather, the Tribunal

12 considered them alongside the entirety of the evidence and reached the conclusion that the Appellant had been shown or allocated a different area from the land occupied by the Resp ondents. That is why the Tribunal advised the Appellant to report back to the Village Government so that he could be shown the actual land allocated to him at Msolyalya. This Court finds no error in that reasoning. On the complaint regarding burden of proo f, I fully agree with the principle cited by the Appellant in the case of Francisca Mbakileki vs Tanzania Harbors Authority (supra) that he who alleges must prove. However, in the present matter, the Respondents discharged that burden to the satisfaction of the Trial Tribunal through oral evidence, documentary exhibits, and the findings made during the site visit. Concerning the issue of non - joinder of the Village Council, the Appellant contended that the proceedings were defective for failure to join the Village Government from whom he allegedly acquired the land. I am unable to agree with that contention. The law regarding non - joinde r of parties is now well settled. A suit cannot be defeated merely because a person who could have been joined was

13 omitted, so long as the court can effectively and completely adjudicate upon the issues in controversy between the parties before it. This pr inciple is embodied under Order I Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, [Cap. 33 R.E. 2023]. It is to be borne in mind that each case is determined according to its circumstances. According to case law, not all cases where necessary parties were not joined w arrant striking out or dismissal. Guided by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Stanslaus Kalokola vs Tanzania Building Agency & Another (Civil Appeal No. 45 of 2018) [2019] TZCA 412 (6 November 2019) , there are exceptions to the provisions of rule 9 of Order 1 of the Civil Procedure Code (supra). It is reproduced hereunder: “9. A suit shall not be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non - joinder of parties, and the court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the right and interests of the parties actually before it. ” [Emphasis added]

14 In the present case, the dispute before the Trial Tribunal concerned ownership and occupat ion of the land in question between the Appellant and the Respondents. The Village Government was not claiming ownership of the suit land , nor was any substantive relief sought against it. The Tribunal was therefore competent to determine the dispute based on the evidence presented by the parties before it. I have also considered the authorities cited by the Appellant regarding the necessary parties. However, the facts in those authorities are distinguishable from the instant matter because the absence of t he Village Government herein did not occasion any miscarriage of justice or render the proceedings incapable of determining the real dispute between the parties. In the circumstances of this case, I find that the Village Government was not such an indispen sable party. Having revisited the evidence of record and the findings of the Trial Tribunal, I am satisfied that the Trial Tribunal properly directed itself on both the facts and the law. The findings reached were supported by evidence on record , and this Court finds no basis warranting interference with those findings. Consequently, I find that the appeal lacks merit.

15 In the event, this appeal is hereby dismissed in its entirety with costs to the Respondents. It is so ordered. Dated and delivered at SUMBA WANGA this 9 th day of June 2026. T.M. MWENEMPAZI JUDGE

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