Case Law[2026] TZHC 3043Tanzania
Fairtrans Marine, Trading And Forwarding S.A.E vs Da Yang Bai He (Miscellaneous Commercial Application No. 11777 of 2026) [2026] TZHC 3043 (9 June 2026)
High Court of Tanzania
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
(TANGA SUB-REGISTRY)
AT TANGA
MISCELLANEOUS COMMERCIAL APPLICATION NO. 11777 OF 2026
(Arising from Commercial Case No. 11720 of 2026)
FAIRTRANS MARINE, TRADING AND FORWARDING S.A.E
(Suing for Maritime Liens and Claims in Rem) ..... ........................ APPLICANT
VERSUS
DA YANG BAI HE (IMO 9618513)
(Ship and Seagoing Vessel)...... ..... ....................... ........ ..........RESPONDENT
RULING
29 th May & 09 th June, 2026
M. J. CHABA, J.
This Ruling has its genesis in an application made viva voce by Mr.
MohamedZameen Nazarali, learned counsel for the Respondent, on 29th May,
2026, in the course of resisting the Applicant's prayer for extension of the
Holding Order pending the inter-partes hearing and determination of this
Application. The said prayer was advanced by learned counsel for the Applicant,
Mr. Nafikiel Mwamboma, who appeared together with Mr. Boaz John Mabula,
learned advocate.
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Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon due consideration of
the Applicant's prayer for extension of the subsistence of the Holding Order
pending the inter-partes hearing and determination of this Application, this
Court, on 29th May, 2026, found merit in the prayer and accordingly granted the
same. Thereafter, the Court adjourned the delivery of its interlocutory ruling on
the Respondent's viva voce application seeking leave to file a Supplementary
Affidavit to 11th June, 2026.
Following the making of the aforesaid oral application, the Court considered
it appropriate to determine the same by way of this Ruling.
In brief, the substance of the Respondent's prayer and submissions, which
have given rise to this ruling, is as follows.
When the application was called on for necessary orders on 29th May 2026,
learned counsel for the Respondent, Mr. Nazarali, after opposing the Applicant's
prayer as earlier stated, proceeded to seek leave of the Court to file a
Supplementary Affidavit. The purpose of the proposed Supplementary Affidavit
was to clarify issues raised in the Applicant's Affidavit in Reply to the
Respondent's Counter-Affidavit, particularly the discrepancies relating to the
names appearing in Paragraph 7.4 of the Respondent's Counter-Affidavit and
Paragraph 13 of the Applicant's Affidavit in Reply to the Respondent's Counter
Affidavit. According to learned counsel, the intended Supplementary Affidavit
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was meant to provide additional information and evidence necessary for the
proper determination of the substantive matter.
The counsel submitted that, as reflected in Paragraph 7.4 of the
Respondent's Counter-Affidavit, it is stated and explained that "New Unite
Marine" is a bareboat charterer. However, in the Applicant's Affidavit in Reply to
the Respondent's Counter-Affidavit, counsel for the Applicant challenged the
reference to "New Unite Marine", contending that the certificate relied upon
shows that, "Jiangsu Xingiian Shipping Co. Ltd" is the relevant entity.
Mr. Nazarali further submitted that, the filing of a Supplementary Affidavit
would place the Respondent in a better position to explain the relationship
between "Xingiian Shipping" and "New Unite Marine". In that regard, he
asserted that, "New Unite Marine" is the English name used by Xingiian
Shipping and explained that it is common practice for Chinese nationals and
companies to adopt English names when dealing with persons whose origins are
not Chinese. He therefore urged the Court to note that, Exhibit DYBH2 already
bears the seal of Xingiian, which, in his view, supports the explanation sought to
be advanced through the intended Supplementary Affidavit.
On the other hand, counsel for the Applicant jointly and vigorously opposed
the prayer from the very outset. In their brief but focused reply submissions, Mr.
Mwamboma was the first to address the Court. He invited this Honourable Court
to be guided by the decision of the Court of Appeal of Tanzania in Charles
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Christopher Humphrey vs. Kinondoni Municipal Council, Civil Application
No. 456/17 of 2021 [2024] TZCA 277, particularly at page 11, on the
circumstances under which leave to file a supplementary affidavit may properly
be granted.
He went on to argue that counsel for the Respondent had failed to
demonstrate any sufficient basis warranting the grant of leave to file a
Supplementary Affidavit. In particular, no explanation had been offered as to
whether the matters sought to be clarified were new matters or matters that
were not within the Respondent's knowledge at the time of filing the Counter
Affidavit. According to him, the application was merely premised on the need for
"clarification" and, therefore, failed to meet the applicable legal threshold
governing the filing of a Supplementary Affidavit.
He concluded by urging the Court to be guided by the authority cited
hereinabove before seeking leave of the Court to invite his learned colleague, Mr.
Boaz, to make further submissions and observations on the matter.
For his part, Mr. Boaz submitted that the Applicant strongly opposed the
Respondent's application for leave to file a Supplementary Affidavit. He argued
that, the law is settled that a Supplementary Affidavit is an exception rather than
the rule and constitutes a mere indulgence granted by the Court, not a right
available to a litigant as of course. According to him, the doctrines of a single
affidavit and full and frank disclosure require parties to place before the Court all
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material facts within their knowledge at the earliest opportunity. He further
submitted that a Supplementary Affidavit is intended only to introduce genuinely
new facts, newly discovered evidence, or unforeseen matters which could not
reasonably have been presented earlier. It is not a mechanism for curing defects,
rectifying omissions, explaining inconsistencies, strengthening a weak case, or
filling gaps in an affidavit already filed.
He contended that the matters sought to be clarified concerned deficiencies,
irregularities, and inconsistencies already exposed by the Applicant in the Reply
Affidavit, including omissions appearing in Annexure DYBH-1. These, he argued,
were matters that had always been within the Respondent's knowledge at the
time the Counter-Affidavit was sworn and filed, and therefore could not qualify
as new matters or subsequently discovered evidence capable of justifying the
filing of a Supplementary Affidavit.
To buttress his submissions, Mr. Boaz cited several judicial authorities
which, according to him, consistently affirm the principle that a Supplementary
Affidavit may only supplement a proper and existing affidavit and cannot be used
to rectify defects or omissions therein. Among the authorities cited were Charles
Christopher Humphrey & Others vs. Kinondoni Municipal Council
(supra); Rahel Kazimoto vs. Mwajabu Yusufu Mtambo and Another (Civil
Application No. 10 of 2007); Method Kimomogoro vs. Board of Trustees
TANAPA (Civil Application No. 1 of 2005) [2005] TZCA 207 (6 July 2005); and
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Registered Trustees of St. Anita's Greenland Schools (T) & Others vs.
Azania Bank Limited (Civil Application No. 168 of 2020) [2022] TZCA 334 (9
June 2022).
He submitted that, these authorities uniformly hold that leave to file a
Supplementary Affidavit will only be granted where the applicant demonstrates
the existence of newly discovered matters and provides good and sufficient
reasons explaining why such matters were not included in the original affidavit.
Likewise, learned counsel referred the Court to persuasive authorities from
South Africa, which affirm that the filing of further affidavits is an indulgence
granted only in exceptional circumstances and upon a satisfactory explanation
demonstrating the absence of mala-fides or culpable remissness. These
authorities included Yves Sauveur Accolla vs. Tommaso Sboro and the
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (Case No. 024263 of
2022, Gauteng Division, Pretoria); Distell Limited vs. The Commissioner for
the South African Revenue Service (Case No. 16910 of 2009, North Gauteng
High Court), at pages 4-5; and Standard Bank of South Africa vs.
Sewpersadh 2005 (4) SA 148 C at 154.
Moreover, Mr. Boaz contended that in the instant case, the Respondent's
counsel had neither identified any new fact nor provided a satisfactory
explanation as to why the matters now sought to be introduced were omitted
from the Counter-Affidavit. Consequently, he argued that the application was
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contrary to the established legal principles governing supplementary affidavits
and appeared to be nothing more than an attempt to repair and strengthen the
Respondent's case after its weaknesses had been exposed. He further
maintained that, granting the application would occasion prejudice to the
Applicant by permitting the Respondent to retrospectively cure fundamental
defects in the Counter-Affidavit, thereby conferring upon it an unwarranted
procedural advantage. According to him, such a course would encourage
piecemeal litigation, delay the proceedings, and undermine the principles of
procedural fairness.
Mr. Boaz further submitted that a party seeking leave to file a
Supplementary Affidavit must demonstrate the existence of exceptional
circumstances, such as newly discovered facts, fresh evidence, or unforeseen
matters arising after the filing of the original affidavit. Equally important, the
applicant must furnish a satisfactory explanation as to why such matters could
not, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been included in the
original affidavit.
He argued that the Respondent had failed to satisfy any of those
requirements. In his view, no new fact, fresh evidence, or subsequent event had
been identified. Likewise, no explanation had been offered as to why the matters
now sought to be introduced were omitted from the Counter-Affidavit despite
having been within the Respondent's knowledge at the material time.
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The counsel went on to submit, with considerable emphasis, that Courts
have consistently frowned upon the suppression of material facts and attempts
to remedy deficiencies through subsequent affidavits. In support of that
proposition, he referred the Court to the persuasive decision in Kusha Duruka
vs. State of Odisha (Criminal Appeal No. 303 of 2024), wherein the Supreme
Court of India emphasized that, a litigant who approaches the Court without full
candour and withholds material facts abuses the judicial process and is
undeserving of the Court's discretionary relief.
He further insisted that granting the Respondent's application would
occasion serious prejudice to the Applicant. In particular, it would permit the
Respondent to circumvent the established principles governing supplementary
affidavits, cure fundamental defects in the Counter Affidavit after those defects
had already been exposed, and secure an unwarranted procedural advantage.
According to him, the matters sought to be "clarified" were not proper subjects
of supplementation but rather constituted an attempt to reconstruct and
strengthen the Respondent's case through fresh explanations and additional
assertions.
He argued that allowing such a course would encourage piecemeal
litigation, undermine procedural discipline, delay the determination of the
substantive application, and occasion manifest unfairness to the Applicant by
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compelling him to respond to matters which ought to have been disclosed at the
earliest opportunity.
In conclusion, Mr. Boaz rested his submissions on the position that the
Respondent had failed to establish any exceptional circumstance warranting the
exercise of the Court's discretion in its favour. He therefore urged the Court to
dismiss the application for leave to file a Supplementary Affidavit with costs.
In rejoinder, Mr. Nazarali conceded that counsel for the Applicant had
vigorously opposed the Respondent's application for leave to file a
Supplementary Affidavit and had undertaken extensive research on the issue. He
candidly acknowledged that, unlike his learned friends on the opposite side, he
had not enjoyed the benefit of adequate time to prepare a comprehensive
response to the numerous authorities cited in opposition to the application.
Be that as it may, counsel humbly maintained that the Respondent's prayer
for leave to file a Supplementary Affidavit was meritorious and ought to be
granted. According to him, the sole purpose of the proposed affidavit was to
clarify certain matters and place before the Court material facts relevant to
issues raised in the Applicant's Affidavit in Reply to the Respondent's Counter
Affidavit. He argued that, should leave be granted, the Applicant would suffer no
prejudice, as he would be afforded full liberty and opportunity to respond
thereto. In support of that proposition, the counsel sought reliance on the
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decision in Charles Christopher Humphrey vs. Kinondoni Municipal
Council (supra).
With regard to the remaining authorities relied upon by the counsel for the
Applicant, Mr. Nazarali submitted that they were distinguishable both on their
facts and on the circumstances under which they were decided and were
therefore of limited assistance to the present application. As for the South
African decisions cited, counsel argued that, while they may possess persuasive
value, they are not binding upon this Honourable Court.
Finally, counsel submitted that the clarification sought was neither intended
to cure a defective affidavit nor to introduce an entirely new case. Rather, it
related to the discrepancy in the names referred to in Paragraph 7.4 of the
Respondent's Counter Affidavit and Paragraph 13 of the Applicant's Affidavit in
Reply to the Respondent's Counter Affidavit. According to him, the proposed
Supplementary Affidavit merely seeks to explain that, in the People's Republic of
China, it is common for business entities to operate under both English trade
names and corresponding Chinese names. He contended that, this explanation
bears directly upon the issue raised by the Applicant and is necessary to assist
the Court in arriving at a just and informed determination of the matter.
Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having given
due consideration to their rival submissions both in support of, and in opposition
to the prayer under consideration, the task now falling for determination is
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whether the Respondent has satisfied the established legal principles governing
the grant of leave to file a supplementary affidavit.
From the outset, I find it imperative to ascertain the nature and substance
of the Supplementary Affidavit which learned counsel for the Respondent seeks
leave to file in response to the Applicant's Affidavit in Reply to the Respondent's
Counter-Affidavit. Such an inquiry is necessary because the propriety of granting
leave depends, to a large extent, on the purpose for which the intended
Supplementary Affidavit is sought to be introduced and whether it falls within the
legally recognized parameters governing such affidavits.
In Charles Christopher Humphrey vs. Kinondoni Municipal Council
(supra), the Court observed at page 11 that:
" Notably, a supplementary affidavit is similar to a regular
affidavit, but it is made to support or supplement an existing
valid affidavit not otherwise. It is intended to add more
details by providing additional information or evidence to
support a case in a legal matter".
In order to appreciate the nature of a supplementary affidavit, it is useful to
revisit the meaning of an affidavit itself. In D.B. Shapriya and Co. Ltd. vs.
Bish International BV (Civil Application No. 53 of 2002) as was quoted in the
case of Mabi Auctioneers (T) Ltd. vs. NBC Holding Corporation (formerly
Consolidated Holding Corporation), Civil Application No. 176 of 2004 [2005]
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TZCA 255 (26 August 2005), at pages 4-5, the Court of Appeal defined an
affidavit as follows:
"Affidavit has been defined as a written document containing
material and relevant facts or statements relating to the
matters in question or issue and sworn by the deponent
before a person or officer duly authorized to administer any
oath or affirmation or take any affidavit. It follows from this
definition that an affidavit is governed by certain rules and
requirements that have to be followed..... "
Reverting to the matter at hand, it is now settled that leave to file a
supplementary affidavit may only be granted where two essential conditions are
satisfied. First, the proposed affidavit must seek to introduce new facts,
information, or evidence which were not within the knowledge of the deponent
when the original affidavit was sworn and filed. Secondly, the applicant must
furnish good and sufficient reasons explaining why such matters were not
presented earlier. Even then, the Court must be satisfied that the admission of
the supplementary affidavit will not occasion prejudice to the opposing party.
[See - Charles Christopher Humphrey vs. Kinondoni Municipal Council
(supra)].
Armed with the foregoing principles, I now turn to the central controversy in
the present application. According to learned counsel for the Respondent, the
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purpose of the intended Supplementary Affidavit is to clarify the contents of
Paragraph 7.4 of the Respondent's Counter-Affidavit and to address the
discrepancy raised in Paragraph 13 of the Applicant's Affidavit in Reply to the
Respondent's Counter Affidavit. For ease of reference, I reproduce the relevant
portions hereunder:
Paragraph 7.4 of the Respondent's Counter-Affidavit states that:
"The Vessel is registered under a bareboat charter. The Certificate
of Registration of Bareboat Charter identifies Yangtze United
Financial Leasing Co., Ltd. as owner and New Unite Marine Co.,
Ltd. as bareboat charterer. Accordingly, New Unite Marine Co.,
Ltd. is also the manager of the Vessel. A copy of the said
certificate is exhibited hereto marked 'DYBH-1', forming part of
this Counter-Affidavit. "
Paragraph 13 of the Applicant's Reply Affidavit:
"Paragraph 7.4 is disputed. When read together with DYBH-1, it
reveals a discrepancy. DYBH-1 shows that the ship owner/lessor is
Yangtze United Financial Leasing Co., Ltd., while the charterer is
'Jiangsu Xing Han Shipping Co., Ltd. ' and not New Unite Marine
Co., Ltd. I further state that certain English words appear to have
been intentionally deleted from DYBH-1. "
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A careful reading of the foregoing averments reveals an apparent
inconsistency regarding the identity of the bareboat charterer, namely, whether
it is Jiangsu Xinglian Shipping Co. z Ltd, or New Unite Marine Co., Ltd, However,
the mere existence of such an inconsistency does not, without more, justify the
filing of a supplementary affidavit.
The rationale underlying a supplementary affidavit is not to afford a litigant
an opportunity to cure defects, reconcile inconsistencies, strengthen a weak
case, or provide explanations concerning matters already within the deponent's
knowledge at the time of filing the original affidavit. Rather, the law permits such
an affidavit only in exceptional circumstances where genuinely new facts or
evidence have emerged and where their admission is necessary to assist the
Court in arriving at a just determination of the dispute.
In the instant case, the explanation which the Respondent now seeks to
introduce is that, "New Unite Marine" is the English name of "Jiangsu Xinglian
Shipping Co., Ltd.," and that it is common practice in China for companies to use
both Chinese and English names when dealing with international parties. In my
considered view, this is not a newly discovered fact. It is information which, by
its very nature, was within the Respondent's knowledge when the Counter
Affidavit was sworn and filed.
The difficulty confronting the Respondent is that no satisfactory
explanation(s) has been offered as to why this information was omitted from the
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Counter-Affidavit in the first place. Equally unexplained is why the alleged
relationship between Jiangsu Xinglian Shipping Co., Ltd., and New Unite Marine
Co., Ltd., was not disclosed earlier if it was indeed material to the Respondent's
case.
It is manifest from the record that the Respondent was fully conversant with
the particulars of the vessel namely, Da Yang Bai He (IMO No. 9618513), which
forms the subject matter of these proceedings. In those circumstances, it is
difficult to accept that the facts now sought to be introduced only became
relevant or known after the filing of the Respondents Counter-Affidavit.
Viewed objectively, the proposed Supplementary Affidavit appears intended
not to introduce newly discovered facts but rather to explain and reconcile an
inconsistency identified by the Applicant in the Respondent's existing evidence.
Such a purpose falls outside the recognized scope of a supplementary affidavit.
The law does not permit a party to withhold known facts and thereafter seek
leave to introduce them only after deficiencies in his case have been exposed by
the opposing party. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the omission,
the application falls short of the legal threshold required for the grant of leave.
Accordingly, and without labouring the point any further, I find no merit in
the Respondent's prayer for leave to file a Supplementary Affidavit. The
application does not satisfy the established legal principles governing the
exercise of the Court's discretion in such matters.
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In the result, the oral application for leave to file a Supplementary Affidavit,
made by learned counsel for the Respondent following the filing of the
Applicant's Affidavit in Reply to the Respondent's Counter-Affidavit, is hereby
dismissed.
Given the nature of the application and the circumstances of the case, I
make no order as to costs. Order accordingly.
DATED at TANGA this 09th day of June, 2026.
M. J. CH ABA
JUDGE
09/06/2026
Court:
Ruling delivered under my Hand and Seal of the Court in Chambers this 09th day
of June, 2026 in the presence of Mr. Boaz John Mabula, learned counsel for the
Applicant and Mr. MohamedZameen Nazarali, learned counsel for the
Respondent.
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M. 1 CHABA
JUDGE
09/06/2026
Court:
Right of the parties to appeal to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, is fully
explained.
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