Geita Gold Mining Limited vs Joseph Msobi Dede (Land Case No. 6206 of 2026) [2026] TZHC 3007 (9 June 2026)

Page 1 of 20 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA GEITA SUB - REGISTRY AT GEITA LAND CASE NO. 6206 OF 2026 GEITA GOLD MINING LIMITED .....................................................PLAINTIFF VERSUS JOSEPH MSOBI DEDE……………….. .............................................DEFENDANT RULING Date of last Order: 05/06/2026 Date of Judgment: 09 /06/2026 MWAKAPEJE, J.: This ruling arises from a preliminary objection raised by the defendant in their written statement of defence, asserting that the plaintiff has instituted this suit prematurely, without exhausting all available remedies mandated by Sections 22(e), 119(1), and 121 of t he Mining Act, Cap. 123 R.E. 2019 ( now section s 52 (2) (e) , 150(1), and 152 , respectively, R . E. 2023 of the said A c t ) and by Rule 3 (1) of the Mining Dispute Resolution G.N. No. 323, published on 16 April 2021, thereby rendering the suit incompetent. The preliminary objection was argued orally. The p laintiff was represented by Mr. Faustine Malongo, Advocate, and the d efendant by Mr. Heri Kayinga, Advocate. As the objection concerned the jurisdiction of

Page 2 of 20 this Court, everything else, as a matter of principle, had to stop pending its determination. In support of the preliminary objection, Mr. K ayinga submitted that the suit had been instituted prematurely as the p laintiff had failed to exhaust the dispute resolution mechanisms established under the Mining Act before approaching this Court. Counsel argued that a careful reading of the plaintiff's pleadings revealed that the dispute arose from activities allegedly taking place within the plaintiff's licensed mining area and was therefore governed by the provisions of the Mining Act. He referred the Court to paragraphs 3, 4, 5 , and 6 of the plaint, wherein the plaintiff alleges that the defendant unlawfully entered the plaintiff's mining licence area, erected structures therein, and thereby interfered with the p laintiff's exploration activities, occasioning substantial financial loss. Counsel submitt ed that the p laintiff seeks, among other reliefs, declarations relating to the alleged trespass, damages arising from the alleged interference with h er operations, and compensation for losses allegedly occasioned by the d efendant's acts. According to couns el, the allegations in the plaint disclose a dispute concerning mining operations within a licensed area and therefore fall within the statutory framework established by the Mining Act.

Page 3 of 20 Mr . Kayinga further argued that the Parliament has enacted a specific d ispute resolution regime governing disputes arising from mining activities. In that regard, he referred the Court to section s 150 and 152 of the Mining Act , and Regulation 3 of the Mining Disputes Resolution Regulations, Government Notice No. 323 of 2021. He submitted that those provisions confer jurisdiction upon the Mining Commission to inquire into and determine disputes arising between persons engaged in prospecting or mining operations and third parties in relation to matters specified under the Act. Counsel contended that, when the averments in paragraph 6 of the plaint are read together with the provisions of section 150 of the Act, it becomes apparent that the dispute falls within matters that the Parliament intended to be determined by the Min ing Commission in the first instance. He argued that the law provides a complete mechanism for addressing such disputes and that recourse to the High Court is available only on appeal after the remedies provided under the Act have been exhausted. It was fu rther submitted that section 152 of the Act envisages the involvement of the High Court only after the Mining Commission has rendered a decision and a party remains dissatisfied with that decision. According to counsel, the statutory scheme demonstrates the Parliament 's intention that disputes of the nature disclosed in the p laint should first be

Page 4 of 20 dealt with by the specialised body established under the Act before the intervention of the courts. Counsel also argued that the Mining Commission possesses jurisd iction not only over disputes relating to mining operations but also over issues concerning compensation and the relationship between licence holders and persons occupying or using land within licensed mining areas. In that regard, he submitted that one of the questions arising from the pleadings is whether a holder of a mining licence may proceed with mining - related activities when issues concerning land occupation and compensation remain unresolved . He maintained that such questions fall squarely within t he expertise and jurisdiction of the Mining Commission. To support his submissions, counsel relied on the decisions in Commissioner General, Tanzania Revenue Authority & Another v Minto Ltd , Civil Appeal No. 62 of 2022, T2 CA 348 (14 June 2022); Jovin Veda stus Mutagabwa and Others vs Sotta Mining Corporation Ltd and Others (Miscellaneous Land Application No. 21477 of 2025) [2025] TZHC 8043 (24 October 2025) ; Tanzania Revenue Authority vs Tango Transport Company Ltd (Civil Appeal No. 84 of 2009) [2016] TZCA 84 (27 October 2016) ; and Monica Lusombagija Mkali (As the Administratrix of the Late John Gervas Kumalija) vs The

Page 5 of 20 Registered Trustees of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) & Another (Civil Case No. 28739 of 2024) [2025] TZHC 435 (24 February 2025) . Counsel submitted that those authorities establish the principle that where t he Parliament has established a specialised forum for the resolution of disputes, parties must first exhaust the remedies available within that forum before approaching the courts. He argued that a court cannot assume jurisdiction over a dispute where jurisdiction has been expressly conferred on an other statutory body, and that any proceedings conducted without jurisdiction would be a nullity. For those reasons, counsel urged the Court to find that the p laintiff had approached the Court prematurely without first exhausting the remedies available und er the Mining Act and consequently to strike out the suit with costs. In reply opposing the preliminary objection, Mr. Malongo submitted that the d efendant's objection was founded upon a misinterpretation of section 150 of the Mining Act and the Mining Dis putes Resolution Regulations. Counsel argued that neither the Act nor the Regulations applied to the dispute before the Court and that the d efendant's reliance upon those provisions was therefore misplaced.

Page 6 of 20 Counsel submitted that section 150(1) of the Mini ng Act identifies the categories of disputes that may be determined by the Mining Commission. According to him, the section principally concerns disputes between persons engaged in prospecting or mining operations , either among themselves or between such p ersons and third parties. He argued that while the Plaintiff is engaged in mining activities, the d efendant is not engaged in prospecting or mining operations and therefore does not fall within the category of persons contemplated by the section. Developin g that argument further, counsel submitted that the d efendant had improperly sought to characterise himself as a third party within the meaning of section 150(1). Referring to the definitions of the term "third party" contained in Black's Law Dictionary , 1 0th Edition, and the Cambridge Dictionary , counsel argued that a third party is generally understood to be a person who is not one of the principal parties to a dispute, transaction or legal relationship but whose interests may nevertheless be implicated therein. He submitted that the present disp ute involves only two principal parties, namely the p laintiff and the d efendant, and does not involve any third party as contemplated by section 150(1) of the Act. Counsel further submitted that the Court ought to interpret section 150 according to its pla in and ordinary meaning. In support of that

Page 7 of 20 proposition, he relied on Joseph Khenani vs Nkasi District Council (Civil Appeal No. 126 of 2019) [2023] TZCA 17921 (11 December 2023) , in which the Court emphasised that where statutory language is clear and una mbiguous, it should be accorded its ordinary meaning. Counsel argued that a proper reading of section 150 demonstrates that the provision does not cover disputes of the nature presently before the Court. It was further argued that the Mining Disputes Resol ution Regulations cannot be interpreted independently of the parent Act. Counsel submitted that Regulation 3 merely implements section 150 and cannot enlarge the jurisdiction conferred by the statute itself. Consequently, if section 150 does not apply to t he present dispute, the Regulations equally cannot provide any basis for sustaining the preliminary objection. Counsel also challenged the applicability of section 152 of the Act, arguing that the provision applies only to appeals arising from matters alre ady determined under the statutory framework established by the Mining Act. According to him, since the present dispute does not fall within section 150, section 152 likewise has no application. Without prejudice to the foregoing submissions, counsel argue d that the subject matter of the suit does not fall within any of the disputes specifically enumerated under section 150(1)(a) to (d). He submitted that

Page 8 of 20 the cause of action disclosed in the p laint is one of trespass and unlawful erection of structures with in the p laintiff's licensed area without consent. According to counsel, the dispute does not concern the boundaries of a mineral right area, competing claims relating to water rights or mining infrastructure, assessment of compensation under the Mining Act , or any other prescribed matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Mining Commission. Counsel further submitted that the d efendant had sought to introduce issues relating to compensation and construction of a dam , which do not form the basis of the p l aintiff's claim. He maintained that the Plaintiff's claim is for damages arising from trespass and unlawful interference with his rights as a licence holder and not for compensation under the Mining Act. For that reason, counsel argued that the authorities relied upon by the d efendant were distinguishable from the present matter. Accordingly, counsel urged the Court to find that the dispute was properly before the Court and to dismiss the preliminary objection for lack of merit, with costs. In rejoinder, Mr. Kayinga maintained that learned counsel for the plaintiff misconceived both the language and purpose of section 150 of the Mining Act. Counsel argued that the section expressly contemplates

Page 9 of 20 disputes involving persons engaged in prospectin g or mining operations and third parties who are not so engaged. According to him, the defendant, being a person not engaged in prospecting or mining operations, falls squarely within the category of third parties contemplated by the Act. Counsel submitted that the p laintiff's attempt to exclude the d efendant from the operation of section 150 was contrary to both the language and purpose of the provision. He argued that the Act was intended to provide a comprehensive mechanism for resolving disputes arising from mining activities, including those involving surface rights holders and other persons not directly engaged in mining operations whose rights and interests may be affected by such activities. With regard to the nature of the dispute, counsel reiterate d that paragraph 6 of the p laint raises issues relating to mining infrastructure, including the construction of a dam, which are expressly contemplated under section 150(1)(b) of the Act. He further maintained that issues relating to compensation and the c onsequences of mining activities also fall within the Mining Commission's jurisdiction . In his view, the Mining Commission possesses both the technical expertise and statutory mandate necessary to inquire into such matters in the first instance.

Page 10 of 20 Counsel concluded by reiterating his submission in chief and urging the Court to uphold the preliminary objection and to strike out the suit as having been instituted prematurely. Having considered the pleadings and submissions by the rival parties, the question for determination is whether the preliminary objection is meritorious. The starting point must invariably be the question of jurisdiction, for jurisdiction is the foundation upon which judicial authority rests. Without jurisdiction, a court cannot take one further step in a matter. It is trite that jurisdiction is a creature of statute and cannot be conferred by the consent, acquiescence, or conduct of the parties. In Shyam Thanki &Others Vs. New Palace Hotel [1971]1EA 199, it was held that: “Since Courts are creatures of statutes and their jurisdiction is purely statutory, parties cannot consent to crown the Court with jurisdiction it does not possess . ” Equally settled is the principle that any decision rendered by a court acting without jurisdiction is a nullity, however well reasoned it may be. See Fanuel Mantiri Ng’unda vs. Herman M. Ng’unda, Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1995 (unreported), where it was explic itly provided that: “The question of jurisdiction for any court is basic; it goes to the very root of the authority of the court to adjudicate upon cases of a different nature. In our considered view, the question of jurisdiction is so fundamental that the courts must, as a matter of practice, on the face of it be certain and assured of their

Page 11 of 20 jurisdictional position at the commencement of the trial. This should be done from the pleadings. The reason for this is that it is risky and unsafe for the court to p roceed with the trial of a case on the assumption that the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the case. For the court to proceed to try a case based on assuming jurisdiction has the obvious disadvantage that the trial may well end up in futility as null and void on grounds of lack of jurisdiction when it is proved later as a matter of evidence that the court was not properly vested with jurisdiction . ” The Court is therefore under a duty to satisfy itself, at the earliest opportunity, that it is proper ly seized of the matter before embarking upon an inquiry into its merits. Similarly, i n Commissioner General, Tanzania Revenue Authority & Another v Minto Ltd (supra) , it was observed that “………., since the jurisdiction of courts is a creature of legislation, even if the court is confronted with a compelling situation demanding speedy resolution, it must initially satisfy itself if it is vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the matter placed before it.” Applying the foregoing authorities to th e instant matter, the defendant's objection is predicated on the contention that the suit was instituted prematurely before this Court. According to the defendant, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the Mining Commission under sections 150 and 15 2 of the Mining Act, Cap. 123 R.E. 2023, read together

Page 12 of 20 with Regulation 3(1) of the Mining Disputes Resolution Regulations, Government Notice No. 323 of 2021. The plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains that the suit is properly before this Court because th e cause of action is founded on trespass and on the unlawful erection of structures within the plaintiff's Special Mining Licence area without the p laintiff's consent or authority. It is therefore the Plaintiff's position that the dispute falls outside the statutory dispute resolution framework established under the Mining Act. The resolution of that controversy calls for an interpretation of sections 150 and 152 of the Mining Act. In doing so, the Court is guided by the cardinal principle that Acts of Parl iament must be interpreted strictly according to the express letters of their respective clauses. This principle was aptly stated in Joseph Khenani v Nkasi District Council ( supra ), that: “……., because statutory interpretation is a common territory in judicial proceedings. It leaves no room to personal whims, when the letter of the law is unambiguous. If we must justify our statement, it has been made by the Court in more occasions than one . In Chiriko Haruna David v. Kangi Alphaxard Lugora & Two Others, Civil Appeal No. 36 of 2012 cited in National Bank of Commerce v. Commissioner General Tanzania Revenue Authority , Civil Appeal No 52 of 2018 (both unreported), the Court stated the following regarding statutory interpretation: - " We wish to observe here by way of emphasis, even if it is at the expense of repeating ourselves, that one of the

Page 13 of 20 cardinal rules of construction is that courts should give l egislation its plain meaning ." [Emphasis supplied] For ease of reference, section 150(1) of the Mining Act provides: “The Commission may inquire into and decide all disputes between persons engaged in prospecting or mining operations, either among themselves or in relation to themselves and third parties other than the Government not so engaged , in connection with - (a) the boundaries of any area subject to a mineral right; (b) the claim by any person to be entitled to erect, cut, cons truct or use any pump, line of pipes, flume, race, drain, dam or reservoir for mining purposes, or to have priority of water taken, diverted, used or delivered, as against any other person claiming the same; (c) the assessment and payment of compensation pursuant to this Act; or (d) any other matter which may be prescribed.” [Emphasis supplied] A close examination of th at provision reveals two important jurisdictional components. The first component concerns the category of persons involved in the dispute , while the second concerns the nature of the subject matter. Both elements must exist before the jurisdiction of the Mining Commission can properly be invoked. The foregoing interpretation is further reinforced by Rule 3(1) of the Mining Disputes Resoluti on Regulations, Government Notice No. 323 of 2021, which provides that:

Page 14 of 20 "Subject to section 119 of the Act, the power to inquire into and decide all disputes between persons engaged in prospecting or mining operations shall be vested to the Executive Secretary." Although the Regulation was enacted pursuant to section 119 of the former Mining Act, cap. 123 R.E. 2019, that provision is substantially reflected in the current section 150 of the Mining Act, Cap. 123 R.E. 2023. The Regulation does not create jurisdiction; rather, it operationalises the statutory mechanism established by the Act by designating the Executive Secretary as the officer through whom the Mining Commission exercises its mandate. In that regard, I agree with learned counsel for the plaintiff that subsidiary legislation cannot enlarge the jurisdiction conferred by the parent statute. Nonetheless, when read together with section 150, Rule 3(1) unmistakably demonstrates the statutory intention that disputes falling within the am bit of the Act should, in the first instance, be determined through the institutional framework established under the Mining Act rather than by direct recourse to the courts. In addition, the Act identifies the categories of persons and subject matters wit hin the Mining Commission’s jurisdiction, while the Regulation identifies the office responsible for exercising that jurisdiction. The two provisions are therefore complementary and must be read together as part of the same legislative framework.

Page 15 of 20 The princ iple requiring parties to first exhaust the remedies provided by statute before approaching the courts has been consistently affirmed by our courts. See Tanzania Revenue Authority vs Tango Transport Company Ltd ( supra ), Commissioner General, Tanzania Revenue Authority & Another v Minto Ltd , (supra) , Jovin Vedastus Mutagabwa and Others vs Sotta Mining Corporation Ltd and Others ( supra) and Monica Lusombagija Mkali (As the Administratrix of the Late John Gervas Kumalija) vs The Registered Truste es of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) & Another ( supra) . In Tanzania Revenue Authority vs Tango Transport Company Ltd, it was observed that: “ In our respectful view, these constituted specific forums for the adjudication of any tax dispute or liability (See, Korta Company Ltd and New Musoma Textiles Ltd. cases (supra). These legal avenues had to be first exhausted by the respondent, whose assistance he neither sought nor attempted to seek before recourse to a civil Court and if warranted. ” [Emp hasis supplied] Turning to the first jurisdictional component under section 150, namely the category of persons involved in the dispute, I agree with learned counsel for the defendant that the provision is not confined solely to disputes between persons wh o are all engaged in prospecting or mining operations. The phrase “ either among themselves or in relation to themselves and third parties other than the Government not so engaged”

Page 16 of 20 plainly extends the Commission’s jurisdiction to disputes involving mining o perators and persons who are not engaged in mining activities. To hold otherwise would render the phrase "and third parties other than the Government not so engaged" redundant, contrary to the settled principle that every word used in a statute is presumed to have been deliberately included and , where possible, must be given meaning and effect. I am therefore unable to agree with Mr. Malongo’s submission that the d ef endant cannot qualify as a third party merely because he is not engaged in prospecting or mining operations. The words “ not so engaged ” expressly refer to persons who are not engaged in such activities but whose rights or interests become involved in dispu tes arising from them. While I agree with counsel that the dictionary definitions cited from Black’s Law Dictionary and the Cambridge Dictionary accurately describe the general meaning of the term “ third party ,” statutory language must, however, be interp reted within its legislative context. Within the context of section 150(1), a third party is a person who is not engaged in prospecting or mining operations but whose rights or interests intersect with those of a mining operator. In that sense, the defenda nt squarely falls within the category of third parties contemplated by the Act. The Court must next consider whether the dispute falls within the subject matter specified under section 150(1). A review of the pleadings

Page 17 of 20 reveals that the plaintiff, as holder of Special Mining Licence No. 45/99, alleges that the defendant has unlawfully entered the licensed area, erected structures thereon, obstructed exploration activities, and interfered with the intended expansion of the Tailings Storage Facility (TSF). The defendant, on the other hand, claims lawful occupation and beneficial rights over the surface land and avers that he executed valuation and access documents in favour of the plaintiff in connection with the plaintiff’s mining activities. Those pleadings r eveal a dispute concerning the interaction between mining rights and surface rights within a licensed mining area. The dispute is therefore not a simple contest between strangers but one arising from competing claims relating to the occupation, use and enj oyment of land affected by mining operations. I agree with learned counsel for the plaintiff that the mere existence of a dispute between a mining licence holder and a third party does not automatically bring the matter within the scope of section 150. The dispute must additionally relate to one of the subject matters specified under paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (d) of the provision. However, upon examining the p laint as a whole, I am unable to accept the contention that the claim is purely a trespass.

Page 18 of 20 The plaintiff expressly alleges interference with exploration activities and the expansion of the Tailings Storage Facility. A Tailings Storage Facility is an integral component of mining infrastructure, and disputes concerning its construction, expansion or u tilisation bear a direct relationship to section 150(1)(b), which expressly refers to dams, reservoirs and similar structures used for mining purposes. The dispute also raises issues concerning the coexistence of mining rights and surface rights, matters t hat frequently involve compensation and other questions falling within the Commission’s statutory mandate. In determining jurisdiction, the Court must look beyond the label attached to the cause of action and examine the substance of the dispute disclosed by the pleadings. Viewed in that manner, the alleged trespass is inseparably connected to the plaintiff’s mining operations, the defendant’s occupation of the land, and the plaintiff’s intended expansion of mining infrastructure. In these circumstances, t he dispute therefore falls within the framework contemplated by section 150(1) of the Mining Act. Having reached that conclusion, the legal consequence is inevitable. Section 152 of the Act provides the avenue through which a party aggrieved by a decision rendered under the statutory dispute - resolution framework may approach the High Court by way of appeal. The provision presupposes a prior determination by the Mining Commission and therefore contemplates

Page 19 of 20 the involvement of the High Court only after the mec hanisms established under section 150 have been exhausted. Accordingly, in disputes falling within section 150, the jurisdiction of the High Court is appellate rather than original. To permit parties to bypass the Mining Commission and approach the Court d irectly would defeat the legislative intention underlying sections 150 and 152 and render the statutory framework otiose. On failure to exhaust available remedies, i n Salim O. Kabora vs TANESCO Ltd & Others (Civil Appeal No. 55 of 2014) [2020] TZCA 1812 (7 October 2020), it was expressly stated that: “….. where a certain law provides for a specific forum to first deal with a certain dispute, a resort to it first is imperative before one seeks recourse to court. Where that is not observed, the attendant court's decision is rendered a nullity.” [ Emphasis supplied ] Similarly, in Commissioner General, Tanzania Revenue Authority & Another v Minto Ltd , (supra) , it was held that: “ In view of what we have endeavoured to discuss, the High Court embarked on a nullity, having wrongly assumed jurisdiction which was expressly ousted by the prescribed specific forums established under the Tax Administration Act and the Tax Revenue Appeals Act . It erroneously crowned itself with jurisdiction that it did not possess in entertaining and determining the responde nt's application for extension of time to apply for leave to pursue prerogative orders. In the circumstances, the High Court proceedings and the resulting ruling cannot be spared.” The principles enunciated in those authorities apply with equal force to th e present dispute. The Mining Act establishes a specialised dispute -

Page 20 of 20 resolution mechanism and vests the Mining Commission with primary jurisdiction over disputes falling within section 150(1). Having found that the present dispute concerns a mining licence holder and a third party in relation to matters arising within a licensed mining area and connected with mining operations, the plaintiff was required to first invoke that mechanism before seeking recourse to the Court. In the final analysis, I am satisfi ed that the dispute falls within the statutory mandate of the Mining Commission under section 150(1) of the Mining Act. Consequently, this Court lacks original jurisdiction to entertain the matter at this stage. The suit was instituted prematurely and is t herefore incompetent for failure to comply with the mandatory dispute - resolution procedure established by law. Accordingly, the preliminary objection is sustained, and the suit is hereby struck out with costs. It is so ordered. DATED at GEITA , this 09 th day of June 2026. G.V. MWAKAPEJE JUDGE