Jane Edward Kaaya vs Charles Mosses Kaaya (Civil Application No. 32527 of 2025) [2026] TZHC 3070 (9 June 2026)

The Judiciary of Tanzania IN THE HIGH COURT OF UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AT ARUSHA CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 32527 OF 2025 JANE EDWARD KAAYA ............................................................. APPLICANT Versus CHARLES MOSSES KAAYA..................................................... RESPONDENT (From the decision of the High Court of Tanzania, Arusha Sub registry) (Hon. A. Z. BADE, J) Dated on 29th September 2025. in Criminal Appeal No. 17845 of 2024 RULING 29th May & 9th June, 2026 F.H. MAHIMBALI, J. The applicant, Jane Edward Kaaya , has moved this Court seeking an order for extension of time to enable her file a Bill of Costs out of time arising from the judgment delivered in Criminal Appeal No. 17845 of 2024 by Hon. Bade, J. on 29th September 2025. 1

The application is supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant wherein she depones that her failure to file the Bill of Costs within the prescribed statutory period was occasioned by illness. Specifically, she avers that she was suffering from a skin hypo-pigmentation disorder (Vitiligo), which necessitated continuous medical treatment and restricted her mobility. In support of that contention, she annexed a medical document marked "AJ2". The application is opposed. The respondent filed a Counter-Affidavit disputing both the competency and merits of the application. It was further averred that in Criminal Case No. 159 of 2022, from which the appeal originated, there were two accused persons, one of whom was the biological mother of the applicant. At the hearing of the application, Mr. Gorisha Ngoka, learned Advocate, appeared for the respondent, while the applicant prosecuted the matter under legal aid and had instituted the application in forma pauperis. By consent of the parties, the application was disposed of by way of written submissions. In support of the application, the applicant submitted that illness constitutes a recognized and sufficient ground for extension of time where 2

it is demonstrated that the illness prevented a litigant from taking the necessary procedural steps within the prescribed period. Relying on various judicial authorities, she argued that her medical condition incapacitated her from pursuing taxation proceedings and that immediately upon recovery she took prompt steps to institute the present application. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary point of law challenging the competency of the application. He submitted that the affidavit in support of the application was incurably defective because the names appearing in the Chamber Summons differed from those appearing in the supporting affidavit. According to counsel, the discrepancy created uncertainty as to the identity of the applicant and rendered the entire application incompetent. On the merits, counsel submitted that the applicant had failed to establish sufficient cause for the delay. He argued that although paragraph 5 of the affidavit referred to treatment at Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre (KCMC), the annexed medical document was issued by Nkoaranga Lutheran Hospital on 16th December 2025. In counsel’s view, the inconsistency cast doubt on the authenticity and reliability of the explanation advanced by the applicant. 3

He therefore urged the Court to strike out the application on account of the defective affidavit or, in the alternative, dismiss it for failure to establish sufficient cause. In a brief rejoinder, the applicant maintained that the discrepancy complained of constituted a mere irregularity which neither prejudiced the respondent nor affected the substance of the application. She emphasized that the respondent clearly understood the nature of the application and had fully responded to its merits. She therefore prayed that the preliminary objection be overruled and the application granted. I have carefully considered the Chamber Summons, the affidavit in support thereof, the Counter-Affidavit, and the submissions advanced by the parties. The principal issue for determination is whether the applicant has demonstrated sufficient cause to warrant extension of time for filing the Bill of Costs out of time. Before addressing that issue, it is necessary to determine the preliminary objection raised by the respondent regarding the alleged defectiveness of the supporting affidavit. 4

It is true that there appears to be an inadvertent interchange of the names of the parties in portions of the Chamber Summons and supporting affidavit, resulting in the respondent being referred to as the applicant and vice versa. However, courts are enjoined to distinguish between defects which go to the root of proceedings and those which amount merely to procedural irregularities. A careful reading of the application leaves no doubt whatsoever that Jane Edward Kaaya is the person who instituted the present proceedings. The affidavit clearly sets out her grievance, the facts relied upon, and the relief sought. Equally important, the respondent correctly identified the applicant and filed a comprehensive response addressing both procedural and substantive aspects of the application. No prejudice has been demonstrated to have been suffered by the respondent as a result of the anomaly complained of. The courts have consistently discouraged reliance on technical defects that do not occasion prejudice or impede the administration of justice. In the circumstances of the present case, I am satisfied that the discrepancy 5

amounts to a curable irregularity and does not affect the substance or competency of the application. The preliminary objection is therefore overruled. Turning to the merits, the law is settled that extension of time is an equitable remedy granted at the discretion of the Court. The discretion, however, must be exercised judicially upon satisfactory explanation for the delay. One of the recognized grounds for extension of time is illness. Nevertheless, it is not sufficient merely to allege illness; the applicant must demonstrate by credible evidence that the illness actually prevented compliance with the prescribed time limits. The Court of Appeal in Granitech (T) Company Limited v. Diamond Trust Bank Tanzania Limited and Four Others , Civil Application No. 447/16 of 2021, [2023] TZCA 17470, citing with approval Justo Ally v. Lucas Komba and Another , Civil Application No. 484/17 of 2019, [2020] TZCA 354, observed: "At the outset, I agree with Mr. Nguleema that sickness can serve as sufficient ground for the Court to enlarge time. However, there 6

must be a medical report to prove the sickness and it must be explained how the alleged ii/ness contributed to the delay." Likewise, in Nyanza Road Works Limited v. Giovanni Guidon , Civil Appeal No. 75 of 2020, [2021] TZCA 396, the Court emphasized that where sickness is relied upon, it must satisfactorily explain the entire period of delay. Similarly, in Pastory J. Bunonga v. Pius Tofiri , Miscellaneous Land Application No. 12 of 2019 (unreported), the Court stated that sickness can constitute good cause only where it is proved on a balance of probabilities that the illness reasonably prevented the applicant from taking the necessary legal steps within time. In the instant case, judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 17845 of 2024 was delivered on 29th September 2025. The applicant's explanation is that immediately after the judgment she fell ill and remained under medical care. The medical document annexed as Exhibit "AJ2" indicates that the applicant was undergoing treatment for skin hypo-pigmentation disorder (Vitiligo) and had been referred from KCMC to Nkoaranga Lutheran 7

Hospital. The document further reveals that she was under treatment between 28th September 2025 and 15th December 2025 and was required to avoid direct exposure to sunlight and attend scheduled clinic sessions. I find no contradiction in the fact that treatment was administered at Nkoaranga Lutheran Hospital following referral from KCMC. On the contrary, the annexure reasonably supports the applicant's explanation. The chronology of events is also significant. The treatment period substantially overlaps with the period during which the Bill of Costs ought to have been filed. The present application was lodged on 22nd December 2025, shortly after the applicant's medical condition improved. In my considered view, the applicant has satisfactorily accounted for the delay. The medical evidence produced sufficiently demonstrates that her illness materially impeded her ability to pursue taxation proceedings within the prescribed period. I am therefore satisfied that sufficient cause has been established. In the result, I find merit in the application. Accordingly:

1. The application for extension of time is hereby granted. 8

2. The applicant is granted leave to file and serve her Bill of Costs out of time.

3. The Bill of Costs shall be filed within fourteen (14) days from the date of this ruling.

4. Given the nature of the application and the circumstances of the parties, each party shall bear his or her own costs. It is so ordered. Dated at Arusha this 09th day of June, 2026. F.H. Mahimbali Judge 9