Thobias Focus Kantelu vs Republic (Misc. Criminal Application No. 7359 of 2026) [2026] TZHC 3044 (9 June 2026)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (TANGA SUB-REGISTRY) AT TANGA MISC. CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7359 OF 2026 THOBIAS FOCUS KANTELU ............................................................. APPLICANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC .......................................................................... RESPONDENT RULING 03 rd & 09 th June, 2026 M. J. CHABA, J. This ruling arises from a complaint and request contained in a letter dated 7 th May, 2026 lodged by the Applicant, Thobias Focus Kantelu, through his learned advocate, Mr. Edson Kilatu, seeking my recusal from further conduct and determination of the present application. However, the complaint first came to the attention of this Court on 1 st June, 2026 when the application was called on for necessary orders. It is noteworthy that on 6 th May, 2026, both learned counsel for the Applicant and the learned State Attorney appearing for the Respondent-Republic appeared before the Court and, by consensus, agreed that the application be disposed of by way of written submissions. The application, which seeks an extension of time within which to file both a notice of intention to appeal and the intended appeal, had been filed under a certificate of urgency. Page 1 of 21

On that date, namely, 1 st June, 2026, counsel for the applicant informed the court that he had previously filed a letter requesting the presiding Judge to recuse himself from hearing and determining the instant application. Upon initially searching the e-CMS system, neither the Court nor the Court Clerk was able to locate the said letter. Thereafter, further efforts were made to trace the alleged letter, but to no avail. However, on 2 nd June, 2026, the letter was eventually traced in the e-CMS system. Consequently, this Court considered it prudent to summon the parties through Court summons and convene a special hearing on 3 rd June, 2026 in order to afford both sides an opportunity to be heard on the complaint before any determination could be made, particularly bearing in mind that the application had already been scheduled for necessary orders on 18 th June, 2026. At the hearing, Mr. Edson Kiiatu, learned advocate, appeared for the applicant, while Mr. Paul Kusekwa, learned State Attorney, appeared for the Respondent-Republic. The complaint is principally founded upon two grounds. First, that in Misc. Criminal Application No. 4112 of 2026, which was filed on 25 th February, 2026 and determined on 5 th March, 2026, and which had previously been handled by this Court, the ruling was allegedly delivered on a date different from that expected by the Applicant and his learned counsel. According to the applicant's counsel, whereas they expected the ruling to be Page 2 of 21

delivered on 30 lh March, 2026, the same was instead delivered on 5 th March, 2026, thereby occasioning prejudice to the Applicant. Secondly, it is alleged that during the proceedings conducted on 6 th May, 2026 in the present application, this Court made certain remarks and observations which demonstrated apparent bias and a predetermined position regarding matters arising in the instant application. According to advocate Edson Kilatu, the Court's inquiries concerning the Applicant's failure to comply with the orders granted in Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 4112 of 2026 created an impression that the Court had already formed an adverse view regarding counsel's conduct, particularly that he had been negligent in failing to take the necessary steps to comply with the orders previously issued by the Court. Mr. Edson Kilatu, further contended that the explanations given by the Court concerning the circumstances surrounding the delivery of the ruling in the previous application reinforced the Applicant's apprehension that he might not receive a fair and impartial hearing in the present proceedings. In support of the complaint, he relied on Article 13(6)(a) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (as amended), and cited, among other authorities, the decisions in Luxury Apartment Ltd vs. Edward Wilson Ngwale and Others (Miscellaneous Land Application No. 59 of 2023) [2024] TZHC 2278, particularly at pages 7 and 14 and Vidyadhar G. Chavda vs. Pravinchandra G. Chavda (Civil Revision No.7 of 2016) [2017] TZCA 197 (9 February 2017) particularly at page 18. Page 3 of 21

Conversely, the Respondent-Republic opposed the complaint. Through the learned State Attorney, it was submitted that the remarks complained of were nothing more than ordinary judicial observations made in the course of proceedings and in the exercise of the Court's case management functions. It was argued that no conflict of interest, personal interest, hostility, prejudice, or any other circumstance capable of demonstrating either actual or apparent bias on the part of the Court had been established. The learned State Attorney therefore urged the Court to reject the request for recusal on the ground that it was devoid of merit. I have carefully considered the complaint, the submissions advanced by both parties, the authorities cited, and the entire record of the proceedings. The issue falling for determination is whether the grounds advanced by the Applicant establish a sufficient basis for the presiding Judge to recuse himself from hearing and determining the present application. The law governing judicial recusal is well settled. Judicial impartiality constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of the administration of justice. Article 13(6)(a) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (as amended) guarantees every person the right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial Court or tribunal. Equally settled is the principle that justice must not only be done but must also manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. See - the famous English case of R vs. Sussex Justices, exparte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 [1923] ALL ER Rep 233). Page 4 of 21

The doctrine of recusal exists to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice and to prevent situations in which a reasonable and informed observer may apprehend that a judicial officer may not bring an impartial mind to bear upon the issues falling for determination. On the other hand, the generally accepted criterion for judicial disqualification is the existence of a reasonable apprehension of bias. Over time, different formulations have been employed by Courts in determining whether such apprehension exists. These formulations include "a high probability of bias", "a real likelihood of bias", "a substantial possibility of bias", and "a reasonable suspicion of bias". Notwithstanding the differences in phraseology, the underlying principle remains the same, to wit, the apprehension of bias must be reasonable and must be held by fair minded, informed, and objective persons who have properly acquainted themselves with the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. [See - Locabail (UK) Ltd vs. Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451; [2000] 3 LRC 482]. Therefore, the test is not whether the Applicant personally believes that the Court may be biased, but whether a reasonable, fair minded, and informed observer, having considered all the relevant circumstances, would apprehend that the Court might not determine the matter impartially. Having set out the applicable legal principles governing judicial recusal and the test for determining whether a reasonable apprehension of bias has been established, I now turn to examine the complaint before me and determine Page 5 of 21

whether the grounds advanced by the Applicant are sufficient to warrant my recusal from further conduct and determination of the present application. The authorities relied upon by the counsel for the applicant recognise those principles. For instance, in Luxury Apartments Limited vs. Attorney General & Others (supra), the learned Judge (the late JHK. Utamwa, J., as he then was) undertook an extensive review of authorities from the Court of Appeal of Tanzania and this Court, thus observed that two approaches emerge from the jurisprudence relating to judicial disqualification. The first requires recusal where there exists a real possibility of bias. The second recognizes that, in exceptional circumstances, a judicial officer may nevertheless recuse himself or herself in the interests of justice and public confidence even where actual bias has not been established. However, significantly, the learned Judge (the late JHK. Utamwa, J.), first found that the complaint before him lacked merit and did not satisfy the established legal test for recusal before ultimately electing to step aside because of peculiar circumstances obtaining in that case. Similarly, the Court of Appeal decisions discussed therein, including Zabron Pangamaleza vs. Joachim Kiwaraka & Another [1987] TLR 140; and Registered Trustees of Social Action Trust Fund & Others vs. Happy Sausages Ltd & Others [2004] TLR 224, underscore the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice while at the same time recognizing that recusal cannot be founded upon speculative, irrational or unsubstantiated fears. Page 6 of 21 (L'-

Reverting to the matter at hand, when the application came before the Court for necessary orders on 6 th May, 2026, I was duty bound, in my capacity as the trial Judge, to seek clarification regarding the Applicant's apparent non- compliance with the orders previously issued by this Court. As correctly observed by learned counsel for the Applicant, the ruling delivered on 5 th March, 2026 granted the Applicant an extension of time and expressly directed that both the Notice of Intention to Appeal and the Intended Appeal be filed within fourteen (14) days from the date of delivery of that ruling. The inquiry made by the Court was therefore intended solely to ascertain the status of compliance with the said orders and to facilitate the proper administration of justice. It was neither intended to cast aspersions upon the applicant or learned counsel, nor to prejudge any issue arising in the present application. For the sake of clarity and ease of reference, and in order to place the Applicant's complaint in its proper context, I deem it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of the proceedings from which the letter seeking my recusal from further conduct and determination of the instant application ostensibly stems. I quote: ..... Mr. Edison KHatu, Adv., For the Applicant: My Lord, it is for mention. However, we are ready to proceed with the hearing of the Application. Mr. Pau! Kusekwa, SA For the Respondent-Republic: My Lord, that indeed, is the position. I propose the matter be disposed of through written submissions. Mr. Edison KUatu, Adv., For the Applicant: Page 7 of 21

I have no objection. Court: Upon perusing the present application, which was filed under a certificate of urgency, I have noted that I recently had occasion to deal with a similar application died by the same Applicant on 27th February, 2026 and registered as Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 04112 of 2026. In that application, the Applicant, Thobias Focus Kantelu, through his learned counsel Mr. Edison Kiiatu, appeared before this Court seeking an order for extension of time within which to file a Notice of Intention to Appeal and the intended appeal arising from Traffic Case No. 26872 of 2025, between the Republic and Thobias s/o Focus Kantelu, originating from the District Court of Handeni, at Handeni. I further recall that, there being no objection from the Respondent- Republic through learned State Attorney Ms. Rehem a Mgeni, this Court granted the orders sought by the Applicant. As reflected in the ruling dated 5th March, 2026, the Court extended time and directed that both the Notice of Intention to Appeal and the intended appeal be filed within fourteen (14) days from the date of delivery of that ruling. The ruling was delivered in the presence of learned State Attorney Ms. Rehema Mgeni and yourself, Mr. Edison Kiiatu, advocate. Having highlighted the foregoing in a nutshell, I would now wish to hear from learned counsel for the Applicant on what actually transpired. Mr. Edison Kiiatu, can you assist this Court by explaining why you and your client failed to comply with the orders contained in the ruling delivered on 5th March, 2026? In particular, I would like you to address the Court on why the Notice of Intention to Appeal and the intended appeal were not filed within the fourteen (14) days granted by this Court, and why the present application, fled on 3rd April, 2026 under a Certificate of Urgency, approximately sixteen (16) days after the expiry of the prescribed period on 18th March, 2026, seeks substantially the same reliefs as those already granted in Misc. Criminal Application No. 04112 of 2026. Kindly assist the Court on what circumstances prevented compliance with the earlier orders of the Court. M. J. Cha ba, J. 06/05/2026 Page 8 of 21

Mr. Edson KHatu, Adv: My Lord, it is true that the Applicant seeks reliefs similar to those sought in Misc. Criminal Application No. 04112 of 2026. However, the ruling in that matter was delivered without notice being given either to me or to my client. Furthermore, upon perusal of the ruling, it appears that while it bears the date of 5th March, 2026, it indicates that it was delivered on 9th March, 2026. This discrepancy created confusion on our part. Be that as it may, I pray that the Court proceeds in accordance with the procedure earlier agreed upon by the parties, namely, that the matter be disposed of through written submissions. Mr. Paul Kusekwa, SA: My Lord, even on our side we are equally surprised by the conduct of the Applicant and his learned counsel. The Respondent-Republic did not oppose the previous application, and consequently the Court granted the Applicant the reliefs sought. For reasons best known to themselves, the Applicant failed to comply with the orders he had successfully obtained from this Court. The result is that the Applicant has now returned before the same Court seeking identical orders. In our considered view, such conduct is unacceptable in law and amounts to a dear abuse of the court process. Indeed, it borders on contempt of court. I humbly submit. Mr. Edson KHatu, Adv: My Lord, as I have already submitted, the ruling was delivered without notice being given either to myself or to my client. Furthermore, the inconsistency regarding the dates appearing on the ruling contributed to the confusion surrounding the timelines for compliance. I also recall that the Court had initially directed that the ruling would be delivered on the 30th day of March, 2026, and not on the 5th day of March, 2026 as reflected in the ruling. I humbly submit. Court: Upon hearing learned counsel for the Applicant and carefully considered the reasons advanced for the failure by both counsel and his client to comply with the orders of this Court contained in the ruling dated 5th March, 2026 and learned State Attorney, lam of the considered view that, as an officer of the Court, Mr. Edison KHatu had a duty to promptly bring to Page 9 of 21

the attention of the Court any confusion or inconsistency so fe/t regarding the dates appearing in the ruling, though there is a single typo error indicating that it was delivered on the 9th March, 2026 instead of 5th March, 2026. In my view, if indeed there existed any discrepancy in the dates, the same would amount to nothing more than a typographical error, which is minor in nature and curable in law. Such an issue could have been brought before the Court for clarification without the expenditure of considerable time or effort. Be that as it may, and in accordance with the parties' earlier agreement, this Court shall proceed to issue the necessary scheduling orders for the disposal of the present application, bearing in mind that the same was or has been filed under a certificate of urgency. I so order. M. J. Ch aba, J. 06/05/2026 Order:

1. Appellant to file his written submission in support of the application on or before 13/05/2026.
2. Respondent-Republic to file reply thereto on or before 20/05/2026.
3. Rejoinder (if any) be filed by the Applicant on or before 27/05/2026.
4. Mention on 1/06/2026 at 09:00 a.m. M. J. Cha ba, J. 06/05/2026" End of quote. In light of the foregoing proceedings, from which the letter seeking my recusal from further conduct and determination of the instant application ostensibly stems, and applying the legal principles discussed hereinabove to the facts of the present matter, I find that the complaint advanced by learned counsel for the Applicant does not disclose any objective facts capable of Page 10 of 21

establishing either actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Court. A careful examination of the record reveals that the entire complaint emanates from judicial observations and inquiries made by the Court during the proceedings conducted on 6th May, 2026. The record further demonstrates that the Court merely sought clarification regarding the relationship between the present application and Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 4112 of 2026, particularly in view of the orders that had already been granted in the earlier application. As already observed, the ruling delivered on 5 th March, 2026 granted the Applicant an extension of time within which to file both the Notice of Intention to Appeal and the Intended Appeal, and expressly directed that the same be filed within fourteen (14) days from the date of the ruling. It was therefore both proper and necessary for the Court, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to inquire into the status of compliance with those orders when the present application came before it for necessary orders. In my considered view, such inquiries were neither unusual nor improper. They were made in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings and for the sole purpose of obtaining clarification on matters appearing from the record. They did not, by any stretch of imagination, amount to evidence of bias, prejudice, hostility, or a predetermined position against either the Applicant or his advocate Edson Kilatu. Page 11 of 21

It is a fundamental aspect of adjudication that a Magistrate or Judge may ask questions, seek clarification, test legal arguments, and inquire into factual matters presented by the parties. Such judicial engagement is intended to facilitate the proper determination of disputes and cannot, without more, be construed as evidence of bias or prejudgment. Likewise, the fact that the Court responded to concerns raised by learned counsel regarding the previous application and sought to clarify matters appearing on the record cannot, by any objective standard, be construed as demonstrating prejudgment of the issues arising in the present application. A judicial officer does not become biased merely because he explains procedural matters appearing on the record or addresses concerns raised by a party during the course of proceedings. More importantly, the counsel for the Applicant has failed to demonstrate the existence of any personal interest, relationship, hostility, pecuniary interest, conflict of interest, or any extraneous consideration capable of displacing the presumption of judicial impartiality. Nor has any evidence been placed before the Court suggesting that the Court has approached the matter with a closed mind or has predetermined any of the issues falling for determination. It follows therefore that, the complaint is founded exclusively upon dissatisfaction with judicial remarks and inquiries made in the course of proceedings. Such remarks and inquiries, being part and parcel of the Court's adjudicative and case-management functions, cannot, without more, constitute a valid basis for recusal. Page 12 of 21

The dangers of allowing such tactical applications were eloquently articulated by the Court of Appeal in Blueline Enterprises Limited vs East African Development Bank (Civil Application No. 21 of 2012) [2013] TZCA 2332 (16 May 2013), where the Court addressed the issues of forum shopping, testing the waters, personal knowledge, and tactical delay in recusal applications, holding at pages 5 to 6 that: "...To us, the ingenuity displayed by Prof. Fimbo, so far smacks of forum shopping. If he genuinely doubted the impartially of any or all of the panel members, he would not have fronted his client to test the waters in the first place. Furthermore, he ought to have specifically requested for the recusal of Justices Kimaro and Rutakangwa on the ground raised belatedly, first of all before the appeal was heard or belatedly, in the notice of motion or in his letter of 11th April, 2013 and in the worst scenario, in his oral submission while seeking a reference to a Full Bench. This is all because going by the record, this fact was within his personal knowledge even before he lodged the appeal. That he never did so, he should not been heard to complain now. We concede that right-minded people demand justice to be rooted in confidence but the same group abhors what appears to be forum shopping in search of justice. " Applying the principles enunciated in Blueiine Enterprises Limited vs. East African Development Bank (supra) to the matter at hand, 1 find that Page 13 of 21

the Applicant's conduct bears a striking resemblance to the conduct deprecated in that decision. The Applicant's grievance concerning the alleged discrepancy relating to the delivery date of the ruling in Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 4112 of 2026 was a matter well within his personal knowledge and that of his learned counsel from as early as 5th March, 2026 or soon after the delivery of the ruling which was decided in favour of the Applicant herein. Curiously, no complaint was raised when the ruling was delivered. Equally, no issue was taken when the present application was filed on 3rd April 2026. Nor was the matter officially brought to the attention of the Court when the application came up for necessary orders on 6th May, 2026 and the parties, by consensus, agreed that it be disposed of by way of written submissions. It was only thereafter that the complaint was raised, notwithstanding that the facts upon which it was founded had long been known to the Applicant and his learned counsel. It was only after this Court, in the exercise of its duty, queried the Applicant's failure to comply with the orders of the Court and raised the specter of abuse of process, that the Applicant suddenly deemed the Court biased. This sequence of events confirms that the Applicant was 'testing the waters,' content to proceed so long as no inquiry was made into his conduct, but resorting to a request for recusal the moment the Court sought to hold him to account. By failing to raise this objection at the earliest opportunity, the Applicant has engaged in the very forum shopping and tactical delay Page 14 of 21

deprecated by the Court of Appeal, and he ought not to be heard to complain now. Be that as it may, I have also carefully considered the authority of Luxury Apartments Ltd vs. Edward Wilson Ngwale & Others (supra) heavily relied upon by learned counsel for the Applicant. With due respect, I find that the circumstances of that case are materially distinguishable from those obtaining in the present matter. A careful reading of the decision reveals that the learned Judge first found that the complaint levelled against him lacked merit and did not satisfy the established legal test for recusal. It was only thereafter that he elected to recuse himself under what he described as the second school of thought, namely, in the interests of justice and for the purpose of preserving public confidence in the administration of justice. Particularly, the decision to recuse was influenced by peculiar circumstances prevailing in that case, including the delay in the delivery of a ruling, the loss of confidence expressed by one of the litigants, the availability of several other Judges who could conveniently take over the matter, and the fact that the proceedings had already been concluded by way of written submissions and could therefore be reassigned without occasioning prejudice to the parties. The learned Judge expressly stated: "For the above reasons, I hold that the ground supporting the application for my recusal is short of merits and does not fit the test set by the CAT in the first school of thought. For this sole finding, I would have refused to disqualify myself as prayed by Page 15 of 21

the first respondent. But for the prevailing circumstances in this matter at hand, I am compelled to resort to the second school of thought... " In my considered view, the foregoing passage is of particular significance because it demonstrates that Luxury Apartments Ltd vs. Edward Wilson Ngwale & Others (supra) is not authority for the proposition that every allegation of loss of confidence on the part of a litigant automatically necessitates the recusal of a judicial officer. Rather, the decision affirms that recusal remains a matter of judicial discretion, even where the complaint is found to be devoid of merit and incapable of satisfying the established legal test for disqualification. I have also carefully considered the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Zabron Pangamaleza vs. Joachim Kiwaraka & Another (Supra) and Registered Trustees of Social Action Trust Fund & Others vs. Happy Sausages Ltd & Others (supra), both cited in Luxury Apartments Ltd vs. Edward Wilson Ngwale & Others (supra). The significance of those authorities lies in their affirmation of the fundamental principle that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done. However, they do not dispense with the equally important requirement that any apprehension of bias must be objectively reasonable and founded upon ascertainable facts. As already observed, it is necessary to distinguish between a genuine apprehension of bias arising from objective facts and circumstances, and a party's subjective dissatisfaction with judicial remarks, observations, or inquiries Page 16 of 21

made in the ordinary discharge of judicial functions. While the former may, depending on the circumstances, justify recusal, the latter ordinarily does not. I have likewise considered the decision in Vidyadhar G. Chavda vs. Pravinchandra G. Chavda (supra). The principle emerging from that authority is that the administration of justice must inspire confidence in litigants and the public alike. However, the decision does not establish that every allegation of loss of confidence automatically necessitates the recusal of a judicial officer. The controlling consideration remains whether a reasonable, fair minded, and informed observer, having objectively considered all the relevant facts and circumstances, would conclude that there exists a real possibility that the judicial officer concerned may not determine the matter impartially. In my considered view, the present matter falls far short of satisfying that threshold. The circumstances relied upon by the Applicant disclose no objective basis upon which a reasonable and informed observer could conclude that this Court is incapable of bringing an impartial mind to bear upon the issues falling for determination. Rather, the complaint is founded upon the Applicant's dissatisfaction with judicial inquiries and observations made in the ordinary discharge of adjudicative and case management functions during the proceedings. I further observed that during the hearing of the complaint viva voce, learned counsel for the Applicant, Mr. Edson Kilatu, on several occasions appeared to depart from his role as counsel and advanced submissions in a manner suggesting that he, rather than his client, was personally aggrieved by Page 17 of 21

the remarks and inquiries made by the Court. Whether this was deliberate or for reasons best known to himself, learned counsel repeatedly focused on his dissatisfaction with inquiries that merely sought clarification as to why he and his client had failed to comply with the orders contained in the ruling delivered on 5 th March, 2026. At times, the counsel made submissions from the Bar that strayed beyond the principal complaint and ventured into matters not directly relevant to the issue of recusal. Upon being queried by the Court on certain aspects of his submissions, he promptly withdrew some of the allegations previously advanced, particularly those relating to the alleged existence of two different rulings in Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 4112 of 2026, the complaint that the ruling had been delivered on 5th March, 2026 instead of the scheduled date of 30th March, 2026, and the assertion that remarks made by the Court during the proceedings of 6th May, 2026 demonstrated apparent bias or a predetermined position regarding matters arising in the present application. Counsel thereafter tendered an apology to the Court. Further, when queried as to whether the Court had erred by delivering the ruling earlier than the date indicated in the scheduling order, advocate Edson Kilatu responded that although he appreciated the Court's decision to deliver the ruling earlier, he maintained that notice of the change ought to have been given to the parties. In his view, such notice remained necessary notwithstanding the earlier delivery of the ruling. Page 18 of 21

In my view, that concession substantially weakened a significant part of the factual foundation upon which the complaint had originally been anchored. I also note that the counsel correctly pointed out that the ruling delivered on 5 th March, 2026 contained a typographical error, namely, the reference indicating that the ruling had been delivered on the 9 th day of March, 2026 instead of 5 th March. 2026. I readily accept that observation. However, as I endeavoured to explain during the proceedings relating to the previous application, and as is apparent from a holistic reading of the ruling itself, the existence of such a clerical error did not deprive the Applicant or his counsel of the opportunity to bring the matter to the attention of the Court so that appropriate corrective measures could be taken. Indeed, had the apparent error been promptly brought to the attention of the Court, the necessary steps could readily have been taken to rectify it in accordance with the law. The error was manifest on the face of the record and was neither of such a nature nor magnitude as to prevent the Applicant and his learned counsel from seeking clarification or correction before resorting to further proceedings. In the final analysis, and for the reasons already given, the question remains whether the present matter falls within the principles established in Luxury Apartments Ltd vs. Attorney General & Others and Vidyadhar G. Chavda vs. Pravinchandra G. Chavda (supra), upon which learned counsel for the Applicant placed considerable reliance. In my considered opinion, it does not. Page 19 of 21

Having carefully examined the factual matrix of the present complaint against the principles articulated in those authorities, I am unable to discern any similarity of substance between them and the matter presently before me. In both authorities, the Courts were concerned with preserving public confidence in circumstances capable of creating an objective appearance of partiality. Here, however, the Applicant's grievance stems entirely from judicial remarks and inquiries made in the ordinary discharge of judicial functions. No evidence has been adduced demonstrating personal interest, hostility, conflict of interest, prejudgment of issues, or any other circumstance capable of displacing the presumption of judicial impartiality. The authorities relied upon by learned counsel are therefore clearly distinguishable and do not advance the Applicant's case. Accordingly, I find that the Applicant has failed to establish any legal or factual basis warranting my recusal from hearing and determining this application. The complaint and request for recusal are therefore dismissed. The application shall proceed before this Court in the ordinary course. It is so ordered. DATED at TANGA this 09 th day of June, 2026. M. J. CHABA JUDGE Page 20 of 21

Court: Interlocutory Ruling delivered under my hand and the Seal of the Court in Chambers this 09th day of June, 2026 in the presence of the Applicant, Thobias Focus Kantelu, his learned advocate Mr. Edson Kilatu and Ms. Ferida Nyika, learned State Attorney for the Respondent-Republic. M. J. CH ABA JUDGE 09/06/2026 Court: Rights of the parties to appeal to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania is fully explained. Page 21 of 21