Nurdin Jackob Mganga vs Rosemary Laurent Mgalya (MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO.23016 OF 2025) [2026] TZHC 2998 (5 June 2026)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA DODOMA SUB - REGISTRY AT DODOMA MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO.23016 OF 2025 (Arising from the Decision of the Juvenile Court of Dodoma in Juvenile Civil Application No. 15572 of 2024) NURDIN JACKOB MGANGA ............................................................. APPLICANT VERSUS ROSEMARY LAURENT MGALYA ....................................................... RESPONDENT RULING 8/5/2026 & 5/6/2026 MASABO, J; The applicant has moved this court by way of a chamber summons filed under section 131(1) and (2) of the Law of the Child Act, Cap 13 R.E 2023. He is seeking an extension of time within which to appeal against a ruling of the Juvenile Court of Dodoma dated 21 st July 2025. The application is supported by the applicant's affidavit from which the following factual background is discerned. The parties cohabited as a married couple and were blessed with three children aged 9, 4 and 3 years, respectively. After a breakdown of their union, the respondent moved the Juvenile Court, praying for custody of the three children and for their maintenance. The application ended in her favour. All three children were placed under her custody with visitation rights to the respondent who was ordered to contribute a monthly maintenance of TZS 100,000/=. The applicant was aggrieved. He intended to appeal to this court, but the prescribed statutory period for filing his appeal lapsed before he took the necessary steps. Hence, the present application in which he is Page 1 of 5

beseeching the court to enlarge the time to enable him to exercise his right to appeal. Pursuant to the order of this court, the respondent was served, but she did not file a counter affidavit, and when she appeared in court, she submitted that she did not intend to object to the application. In support of his application, the applicant who was unrepresented, predicated her prayer on the ground of illegality of the decision intended to be challenged. He submitted that, the Juvenile court's proceedings were marred by procedural irregularities as they were conducted in the absence of a social welfare officer contrary to section 99(1) (d) of the Law of the Child Act and rule 85 of the Law of the Child (Juvenile Court Procedure) Rules, 2016. The anomaly, he argued, was fatal and consequential, as it entailed that the matter was decided without a proper assessment of the best interests of the children. He further argued that such irregularity amounts to good cause for extension of time as it affected the legality and fairness of the decision. In support of this position, he cited the case of Mohamed Salum Nahdi v. Elizabeth Jeremiah (Civil Reference No. 14 of 2017) [2019] TZCA 168. He also faulted the Juvenile Court for its contribution to his delay as it did not furnish him with the ruling timeously. He submitted that despite his diligent efforts to procure the same, the ruling was furnished to him on 21 st August 2025. He prayed the court to invoke the provision of section 19(2) of the Law of Limitation Act, Cap 89 R.E 2019, by excluding the period between the date of delivery of the ruling on 21 st August 2025, and the date he finally Page 2 of 5

received the copy of the ruling. He supported his submission with the case of Registered Trustee of Marian Faith Healing Centre @ Wanamaombi versus Registered Trustee of Catholic Church Sumbawanga Diocese (Civil Appeal No. 64 of 2006) [2010] TZCA 256 TANZLII and prayed that the delay be excused and he be allowed to file the appeal. Section 131(1) of the Law of the Child Act provides that a party intending to appeal to this court against a decision of a juvenile court must lodge his appeal within 14 days. The period may be enlarged by this court upon a good cause being demonstrated. The discretionary powers for extension of time by this court can only be exercised upon the court being satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated a good cause warranting the extension of time. Even in uncontested applications such as the one at hand, the extension of time will not be granted as a matter of right. The applicant must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that his delay in filing the application was for a good cause. For a good cause to be said to have been demonstrated, the applicant must demonstrate that the delay is not inordinate, he must account for all the time of delay, and must demonstrate that the delay did not result from his inaction, negligence, or apathy in the pursuit of the right he intends to pursue. Leave for extension of time may also be granted if the court is satisfied that there is an important point of law, such as the illegality of the decision he intends to challenge (see Mantle Kwaangw vs Daniel Gileksa (Civil Application No. 73 of 2025) [2025] TZCA 752 (25 July 2025) TANZLII, Lyamuya Construction Co. Ltd v. Page 3 of 5

Soard of Registered Trustees of Young Women's Christians Association of Tanzania (Civil Application No. 2 of 2010) [2011] TZCA 4 TANZLII, Ngao Godwin Losero v. Julius Mwarabu (Civil Application No. 10 of 2015) [2016] TZCA 302 TANZLII, and Idrisa R. Hayeshi vs Emmanuel Eunami Makundi & Others (Civil Application No. 272/08 of 2024) [2025] TZCA 840 TANZLII). The decision, intended to be challenged if the present application succeeds was delivered on 21 st July 2025. Thus, as per section 131(1) of the Law of the Child Act, the applicant ought to have lodged his appeal by or before 4 th August 2025. As per the record, he filed the instant application on 3 rd September 2025, which is approximately 44 days from the date of the impugned decision. This time is not inordinate, and it is therefore excusable if good cause is demonstrated, and the applicant has fully accounted for the days of delay. Accounting for the delay, the applicant deponed in paragraph 8 of his application that, in spite of several efforts to obtain the ruling, he was not timely furnished with the same. It was furnished to him on 21 st August 2025, after the 14 days within which to file the application had already lapsed, and he has submitted that, if this time is excluded, his delay will be excusable. The ruling of the Juvenile Court appended to the chamber summons supports this assertion. It shows that it was furnished to him on 21 st August 2025. Page 4 of 5

Section 19(2) of the Law of Limitation, Cap 89 R.E 2023 permits the exclusion of the time during which the applicant was waiting to be furnished with a copy of the decision to be challenged. It provides for the manner of computation of time and explicitly states that the period required for obtaining a copy of the decree or order intended to be appealed against shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation. Borrowing a leaf from this general law of limitations, it is fair and just that the time spent by the applicant waiting to be furnished with a copy of the ruling; otherwise, I will condemn him for a wrong he did not commit. Now, when the time between 21 st July 2025 and 21 st August 2025 is excluded from the computation of the duration of delay, there will remain 14 days. Thus, when he filed the instant application on 3 rd September 2025, he was well within time. In the foregoing, I am satisfied that the applicant has fully accounted for the delay and he has sufficiently demonstrated that the delay was with a goodcause. Having found the applicant to have fully accounted for the delay, I will not dwell on the alleged illegality as the finding above disposes of the application. Consequently, I allow it. Leave is granted to the applicant to lodge his application within 10 days from today. The matter having emanated from juvenile court does not attract costs. DATED and DELIVERED at DODOMA, this 5th day of June 2026. J.L. MASABO JUDGE Page 5 of 5