Richard Edward Senge vs Janeth Richard Tui (DC. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 21678 OF 2025) [2026] TZHC 2995 (5 June 2026)

THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA DODOMA SUB- REGISTRY AT DODOMA DC. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 21678 OF 2025 (Originating from Civil Application Case No 8427 of 2025 in the Juvenile Court of Singida at Singida) RICHARD EDWARD SENGE ................................................... APPELLANT VERSUS JANETH RICHARD TUI ........................................................... RESPONDENT JUDGMENT Date: 5th June 2026 MASABO, J.:- The respondent instituted an application before the Juvenile Court of Singida at Singida ("herein to be referred to as "the trial court") seeking maintenance, medical expenses, school fees and uniforms for three children sired by the appellant. In support of her application, she submitted that he was cohabiting with the appellant as a married couple from 2015 and they were blessed with three issues who were on the date of the application, aged 9, 7 and 5 years, respectively. In 2022, they separated after the appellant abandoned her and the children and he deliberately neglected his maintenance roles and left her to single-handedly maintain the children. That, in 2025, she referred the matter to the Social Welfare Office and the appellant was ordered to provide a monthly maintenance fee of TZS 200,000/= but he never complied. She claimed further that the appellant is a government employee working for gain as a teacher. He also possesses vocational skills whereby he works as a roofer and house painter, hence capable of maintaining the children. Thus, he has the financial ability to maintain the children compared to her, as she only earns TZS 10,000/= per week from her laundry work. The appellant, while admitting that the children are under the respondents custody and that he works as a primary school teacher in a government school, he maintained that his financial ability is modest. He also submitted that after Page 1 of 8

being employed as a teacher, he stopped working as a roofer or painter. Thus, he solely depends on his salary, which is just modest. He prayed to be granted custody of the three children, claiming that the respondent is unemployed and is not in a better position to take good care of the children. After hearing both parties, the trial court found merit in the application and granted it. It ordered the appellant to provide a monthly maintenance to the tune of TZS 200,000/= and to cater for health insurance and school expenses for the three children who were then aged 9, 7 and 5 years, respectively. He was, in addition, ordered to pay a debt of TZS 260,000/= owed to a shop, to repay a loan of TZS 200,000/= and water bills for arrears to the tune of TZS 176,000/=. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred this appeal armed with the following grounds of appeal, one, the trial court erred in law and fact to determine the matter without giving the appellant the right to be heard; two, the trial court erred in law and fact to decide the matter in favour of the respondent by considering weak and contradictory evidence; three, the trial court erred in law and fact to determine the matter of the appellant who was requesting custody of his children and four, the trial court erred in law and fact in considering the amount of child maintenance that was higher than the appellant's income. At the hearing of this appeal, the appellant was represented by Mr. Ndimbo, learned advocate, while the respondent appeared in person. Before addressing the merits of the appeal, Mr. Ndimbo abandoned the third ground of appeal and proceeded to argue the remaining grounds of appeal, starting with the first ground of appeal that the appellant was fundamentally denied his right to be heard. He argued that during the trial, the appellant had explicitly informed the trial court of his strained economic situation and his sole Page 2 of 8

reliance on his employment salary but the trial court completely ignored this fact and did not consider it in its final determination. On the second ground, Mr. Ndimbo submitted that the trial court erred in entering a ruling for the respondent based on weak and contradictory evidence. He reasoned that when a court issues a maintenance order, it must critically evaluate the economic status of both parents, a duty that the trial court abdicated. Instead, it ordered him to pay TZS 260,000/= to an unspecified shop and TZS 200,000/= for an unspecified loan while there was absolutely no proof of the existence of the shop, the items purchased and the identity of the person who advanced the TZS 200,000/= loan. On the fourth ground, Mr. Ndimbo submitted that the monthly maintenance fee of TZS 200,000/= was excessively high and completely disproportionate to the appellant's actual monthly income of TZS 290,000/=. He maintained that the trial court failed to balance this obligation against the appellant's other competing social responsibilities, which included paying medical bills and caring for his ageing parents. He concluded by stating that the appellant was only in a position to afford TZS 100,000/= per month. In rebuttal, the respondent strongly opposed the appeal. She narrated that before approaching the trial court, the matter had been handled by the Social Welfare Office, where the appellant explicitly and voluntarily agreed to pay a maintenance fee of TZS 250,000/= on the condition that she should desist from visiting his home village. She stated that she fully complied with this condition, yet the appellant only paid the full amount for the first month, followed by a meagre payment of TZS 39,000/= after which he entirely declined to pay. On the appellant's actual income, the respondent maintained that, other than working as teacher, the appellant works as a primary school teacher, the appellant actively works in masonry work, and he employs other people. Thus, Page 3 of 8

the maintenance fee was perfectly reasonable, especially since the appellant had abandoned his paternal duties for a long duration, forcing her to single handedly cater to the children's necessities. Regarding the financial liabilities, she clarified that it was the appellant himself who had directed them to secure supplies from the shop on credit with a promise to pay, but he later reneged. Regarding the TZS 200,000/= loan, she submitted that the appellant had requested her to borrow that sum on his behalf to fund his farming activities, and when the matter was before the trial court, the appellant openly admitted that he owed that specific amount. She prayed that the appeal be dismissed so her children could secure their legal rights. In a brief rejoinder submission, Mr. Ndimbo reiterated that there was no tangible proof documenting the loans within the trial court's record and the award of TZS 200,000/= was therefore, unjustified. While conceding that the appellant was both a teacher and a mason, he rejoined that the appellant had ceased his masonry operations. Having carefully evaluated the record of appeal alongside the submissions of both parties, I will now proceed to determine the three grounds of appeal, starting with the first ground. In this ground, the appellant has lamented that he was implicitly denied his right to be heard as the submission he made during the trial was ignored. A review of the lower court record reveals that the appellant, being the respondent before the trial court, had an opportunity to reply to the submission made by the respondent herein. In its ruling, the trial court summarised his submission alongside the respondent's submission. While it may be true that in its analysis of the submissions the court did not thoroughly evaluate his submission and the verdict did not align with his desire, the lamentation that he was denied the right to be heard is far-fetched and without merit. Abrogation of the right to be heard would raise where, as stated in Didas Page 4 of 8

Jumatatu Silayo vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 2022) [2024] TZCA 1169 TANZLII, a court completely shuts its eyes to pleadings or fails to afford a party an active forum to speak, which is not the case in point, as the appellant fully participated and the court did not completely shut its eyes to his pleadings. Consequently, the first ground of appeal fails. Regarding the second ground on proof of the debt of TZS 260,000/= owed to a shop, and the TZS 200,000/= loan, I have found a glaring irregularity in that both were not part of the pleadings. The application filed by the respondent on 10th April 2025 was exclusively on maintenance. Her prayers were for a maintenance fee of 100,000/= per child, making a total of TZS 300,000/=, and for medical, school fees, uniform and clothes. It is totally silent about the loan and the debt owed to the shop. The introduction of these two claims in the course of the hearing and their award by the trial court amounted to a fundamental departure from pleadings and offended the rule against departure from pleadings, which binds the parties and the court to the pleadings and prohibits any departure save with a leave of the court. Restating this principle in Barclays Bank T. Ltd vs Jacob Muro (Civil Appeal 357 of 2019) [2020] TZCA 1875, TanzLII, the Court of Appeal held thus: "We feel compelled, at this point, to restate the time-honoured principle of law that parties are bound by their own pleadings, and that any evidence produced by any of the parties which does not support the pleaded facts or is at variance with the pleaded facts must be ignored..." Elucidating the rationale of this principle, the Court cited with approval a passage from an article titled " The Present Importance of Pleadings, "authored by Sir Jack I.H. Jacob and first published in Current Legal Problems (1960) at p. 174, where he remarked that: "As the parties are adversaries, it is left to each one of them to formulate his case in his own way, subject to the basic rules of pleadings .... For the sake of certainty and finality, each party is Page 5 of 8

bound by his own pleadings and cannot be allowed to raise a different or fresh case without due amendment properly made. Each party thus knows the case he has to meet and cannot be taken by surprise at the trial. The court itself is as bound by the pleadings of the parties as they are themselves. It is no part of the duty of the court to enter upon any inquiry into the case before it other than to adjudicate upon the specific matters in dispute which the parties themselves have raised by the pleadings. Indeed, the court would be acting contrary to its own character and nature if it were to pronounce any claim or defence not made by the parties. To do so would be to enter upon the realm of speculation." In the present case, therefore, the respondent was bound to confine her submission to what she had pleaded in the application. By introducing new claims, she departed from the pleadings, and the court was duty-bound to correct her by disregarding the points she had improperly raised through her submissions. In the foregoing, the second ground is allowed based. On the quantum of the maintenance fees, the applicant has complained through the third ground of appeal that the monthly fee of TZS 200,000/= which he was ordered to pay, is excessive and disproportionate to his monthly earnings of TZS 290,000/=. In our jurisdiction, maintenance of children is a joint enterprise to which the couple must jointly undertake, irrespective of who has custody. Section 8 of the Law of the Child Act, Cap 13 R.E 2023, explicitly states this duty. To assist the court in executing the daunting task of determining the appropriate maintenance fees, section 44(1) of the same Act sets out a list of factors for consideration by the court when determining the appropriate maintenance fees. The factors include the income and wealth of both parents, an impairment of the earning capacity, if any, other financial responsibilities, the cost of living in the area where the child is resident, and the rights of the child. Page 6 of 8

These factors being factual, require evidence to ascertain. Implicitly, therefore, before issuing a maintenance order, the court must invite the parties to bring evidence to assist it in determining the appropriate quantum of the fees. The court is also mandated under section 45(1) of the same Act to commission a social inquiry on the status of the parents before issuing an order of maintenance. Aware of this, the trial magistrate commissioned a social inquiry, which was conducted by Juma Y. Mbwambo, a Social Welfare officer at Singida Municipal Council. His report, filed in court on 23/7/2023, demonstrated that when sent to the Social Welfare Office in 2025, the appellant voluntarily offered to pay a maintenance fee of TZS 200,000/ but he deliberately defaulted. By then, the appellant was already employed as a primary school teacher, and his salary was TZS 295,000/=, while on the other hand, the respondent's average earning per week is 10,000/=. In the end, it recommended a monthly maintenance fee of TZS 120,000/=, payment of school fees, and provision of the school equipment, clothes and health insurance cover. The trial court's decision does show how the learned magistrate considered the above factor and did not explain the departure from the recommendation made in the social inquiry. He instead confined his reasoning to the duty of the father to provide for his children as enshrined under the Law of Marriage, Cap 29 R.E 2023 which, in my firm view, ought to have been considered in conjunction with the above provisions of the Law of the Child Act. Stepping into the shoes of the trial court, having considered the submission by the parties and the social inquiry report, I am of the view that, while it is crucial to draw a balance between the survival of the children and that of its parents, the recommended amount of TZS 120,000/= translating into a monthly fee of TZS 40,000/= for each child, is too minimal and incapable of catering for their life necessities. The fact that the appellant had previously agreed to pay a sum of TZS 200,000/= when he was already in employment and earning the same Page 7 of 8

salary presupposes that he has the means, and his lamentations are an afterthought. I will nevertheless give him the benefit of the doubt and slightly reduce the amount payable from TZS 200,000 to TZS 180,000/= meaning that for each child, he will pay a monthly maintenance fee of TZS 60,000 per child. The amount shall be payable from 21/7/2025, the date when the trial court delivered its ruling. Accordingly, the appeal partially succeeds to the extent above. And, save for the payment of the debt owed to the unspecified shop and repayment of the loan, which are hereby quashed and set aside, the other order shall remain intact. For the sake of clarity and avoidance of confusion, it is ordered that:

1. The appellant shall pay a monthly maintenance fee of TZS 180,000/= for all three children. The amount shall be payable from 21/7/2025, the date when the trial court delivered its ruling.
2. In addition to the monthly maintenance fee, the appellant shall pay school fees for all three children and provide them with school materials, uniforms and medical insurance coverage.
3. The order for payment of the debt owed to the unspecified shop and repayment of the loan are quashed and set aside.
4. There are no costs. DATED and DELIVERED at DODOMA this 5 th day of June 2026 L. MASABO JUDGE Page 8 of 8