Ayubu Mawela and Another vs Fraide Frela (Criminal Appeal No. 1946 of 2026; Criminal Case No. 32 of 2025; PC CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 7780 OF 2026) [2026] TZHC 2984 (4 June 2026)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA SUMBAWANGA SUB-REGISTRY AT SUMBAWANGA PC CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 7780 OF 2026 (From the decision of the District Court of Sumbawanga in Criminal Appeal No. 1946 of 2026; original Criminal Case No. 32 of 2025 in Primary Court of Sumbawanga at Kaengesa) AYUBU MAWELA ……………… ……….. ……… .. ..… …… ….………….1 ST APPELLANT EDWIN MAWELA …………….… ..…….…… …… …….. …. ……………2 ND APPELLANT VERSUS FRAIDE FRELA ……………… …… ……….. …………… …… ……………… RESPONDENT JUDGMENT MWENEMPAZI, J. This is a second appeal. The appellants, Ayubu s/o Mawela and Edwin s/o Mawela, were charged before the Primary Court of Sumbawanga District, sitt ing at Kaengesa, with the offenc e of assau lt causing actual bodily harm, Contrary to S ection 241 of the Penal Code, Cap. 16 R.E. 2023. They denied the charge, and the matter proceeded to a full trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court acquitted the appellants because the prosecution failed to p rove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The respondent, who was the complainant before the trial court, was dissatisfied and appealed to the District Court of Sumbawanga. The District Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, convicted the appe llants,

2 sentenced each to thirteen months ’ imprisonment, and ordered each appellant to pay the respondent compensation of TZS 500,000/=. The appellants are now before this Court, challenging the District Court ’ s decision on six grounds. In essence, they co ntend that the first appellate court improperly reevaluated the evidence, misapprehended the trial court ’ s basis for acquittal, treated contradictions in the prosecution ’ s evidence as minor, erroneously held that the charge was proved beyond a reasonable d oubt, imposed an illegal sentence, and made an unlawful compensation order. Having considered the record and the grounds of appeal, I am of the view that the central issue is whether the first appellate court improperly interfered with the acquittal enter ed by the trial court. Because this is a second appeal, this Court is generally concerned with matters of law. However, where the first appellate court is alleged to have failed to re - evaluate the evidence properly, misapprehended it, or reached conclusion s unsupported by the record, this Court is entitled to interfere. The first and fourth grounds may conveniently be considered together. The complaint is that the District Court misdirected itself by holding, beyond a

3 reasonable doubt, that the appellants a ttacked the respondent, and consequently that the charge was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It is settled that in a criminal case the burden of proof rests throughout with the prosecution. The accused person is under no duty to prove his innocence. It i s also insufficient for the prosecution to show that the accused persons were present at the scene or that the complainant sustained injuries. The prosecution must go further and prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that each accused person participated in th e unlawful assault and caused the injuries complained of. In this matter, the District Court appears to have treated the appellants ’ presence at the scene and the respondent ’ s injuries as sufficient proof of the charge. With respect, that was a misdirectio n. Presence at the scene, without a clear and credible account of each appellant ’ s specific role, could not, by itself, sustain a conviction. The District Court was required to re - evaluate the whole evidence and satisfy itself that it established each appe llant ’ s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Its judgment does not demonstrate such analysis.

4 The second ground concerns the District Court ’ s understanding of the trial court ’ s judgment. The District Court held that the trial court acquitted the appellants onl y because of a variation in the evidence concerning the weapon used in the alleged attack. That conclusion does not appear to be a proper appreciation of the trial court ’ s reasoning. The trial court ’ s concern was broader than the weapon allegedly used. It was considered whether the respondent had proved that he was attacked by the appellants as charged. It also considered the absence of a material independent witness who was said to have witnessed the incident. The first appellate court, therefore, narrowed the trial court ’ s reasoning and treated the acquittal as resting on a single minor contradiction. That was an error. Once the trial court found the prosecution ’ s evidence insufficiently reliable, the District Court was required to clearly identify where t he trial court went wrong and why the evidence, when properly evaluated, proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. It did not do so. The third ground concerns contradictions in the prosecution's evidence, particularly regarding how the respondent was at tacked. The District Court held that variations in the weapon used were minor and did not go to the heart of the case. Not every contradiction is indeed fatal. Minor discrepancies

5 may be disregarded where the substance of the prosecution's case remains int act. However, contradictions become material when they affect the identity of the assailant, the manner of attack, the weapon used, or the participation of the accused persons, where they form part of the particulars. In this case, the charge sheet describ ed how the respondent was allegedly attacked. However, the evidence was inconsistent regarding the manner of attack and the weapons allegedly used. The contradiction was therefore not merely peripheral. It affected the very narrative of the assault and the role allegedly played by the appellants. The District Court ought to have considered whether, despite those inconsistencies, the remaining evidence was cogent enough to support a conviction. Instead, it dismissed the contradiction as minor without suffici ent analysis. That approach was unsafe. The fifth ground challenges the sentence of thirteen months ’ imprisonment. Because I have found that the conviction was not safely entered, the sentence cannot stand. Even without that finding, the complaint raises a serious issue. The District Court, having reversed an acquittal from the Primary Court, was required to ensure that any sentence imposed was within the trial court ’ s powers and supported by law. Its sentencing order was brief

6 and failed to sufficiently ex plain the legal basis for imposing a term of thirteen months ’ imprisonment. The sixth ground concerns compensation. The District Court ordered each appellant to pay TZS 500,000/= in compensation. The appellants argue that, under the laws applicable in Prim ary Courts, the respondent could be compensated only up to TZS 100,000/= if compensation were legally available, and that, in any event, there was no evidence to justify compensation. I agree that the compensation order was problematic. A compensation orde r must be grounded in law and supported by evidence. The District Court did not explain how it arrived at the figure of TZS 500,000/= for each appellant, nor did it identify any evidence supporting that amount. The order was therefore not properly justifie d. In the final analysis, I find merit in the appeal. The District Court failed to re - evaluate the evidence properly. It misapprehended the basis for the trial court's acquittal of the appellants, wrongly treated material contradictions as minor, and concl uded guilt without showing that the prosecution had proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction was therefore unsafe.

7 Consequently, the appeal is allowed . The District Court ’ s conviction is quashed; the thirteen - month imprisonment sentence imposed on each appellant is set aside; and the compensation order of TZS 500,000/= against each appellant is also set aside. The Primary Court ’ s acquittal is hereby res tored. It is so ordered. Dated and delivered at Sumbawanga, this 4 th day of June, 2026 T.M. MWENEMPAZI JUDGE