Josepha Edward Chami vs George John (As Administrator Of The Estate Of Late Paulina Edward Chami) (Land Appeal No. 000000128 of 2026) [2026] TZHC 2960 (4 June 2026)

THE JUDICIARY OF TANZANIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AT ARUSHA LAND APPEAL NO. 000000128 OF 2026 JOSEPHA EDWARD C H A M I................................COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF VERSUS GEORGE JOHN (AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE PAULINA EDWARD C H A M I)................................RESPONDENT / DEFENDANT JUDGMENT MAHIMBALI, J This appeal arises from the judgm ent and decree of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Arusha at Arusha (hereinafter referred to as "the trial tribunal") delivered on 21st October 2025 in Land Application No. 05 of 2021 . The facts giving rise to this appeal are, for the most part, not in dispute. The appellant and the late Paulina Edward Chami were wives of the late Edward Chami, who died on 5th October 1991. Following his demise , Probate and Administration Cause No. 03 of 1999 was instituted before the Primary Court of Longido. In those proceedings, both the appellant and the late Paulina Edward Chami were appointed administrators of the deceased's estate. The record reveals that upon administration of the estate, the Probate Court distributed the deceased's landed properties between the two widows. The appellant was allocated three Page. 1

houses, while the late Paulina Edward Chami was allocated two houses situated on a parcel of land measuring approximately 55 metres in length and 35 by 15 metres in width. Subsequently, the late Paulina Edward Chami passed away on 8th February 2001. Following her death, the 1st respondent, George John, was appointed administrator of her estate in Probate and Administration Cause No. 1 of 2001 before the Primary Court of Longido. The respondents' case before the trial tribunal was that the late Paulina Edward Chami and, thereafter, the 1st respondent as administrator of her estate, peacefully occupied the portion of land allocated to her until the year 2017 when the appellant allegedly encroached upon the property by approximately three metres and erected a residential structure together with a chicken coop thereon. In her defence, the appellant denied the alleged encroachment and maintained that the entire property belonged to the estate of the late Edward Chami and had not been lawfully distributed. She further asserted that she occupied the property solely in her capacity as administrator of the deceased's estate. During the proceedings, however, she acknowledged that her daughter resided on the disputed portion and had undertaken developments thereon. Upon hearing the parties and evaluating the evidence adduced, the trial tribunal found in favour of the respondents. It held that the disputed portion formed part of the property allocated to the late Paulina Edward Chami and that the appellant had unlawfully encroached upon it. Consequently, the tribunal ordered the appellant and all persons claiming through her to vacate the disputed land, demolish the structures erected thereon, and permanently refrain from interfering with the respondents' possession and occupation thereof. Page. 2

Aggrieved by that decision, the appellant lodged the present appeal, originally founded on five grounds which, for purposes of convenience, may be summarized as follows: (i) That the trial tribunal erred in law and fact by assuming jurisdiction over a dispute concerning property allegedly forming part of an estate whose probate proceedings remained pending before the Primary Court of Longido; (ii) That the trial tribunal failed to properly evaluate the evidence on record and consequently arrived at an erroneous decision; (iii) That the trial tribunal failed to distinguish between the appointment of administrators and the filing of an inventory in probate proceedings, thereby reaching an erroneous conclusion regarding ownership of the disputed property; (iv) That the trial tribunal failed to properly consider the appellant's evidence and wrongly treated her as personally liable rather than as an administrator of the estate; and (v) That the trial tribunal failed to read and explain the application to the parties as required by law. At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Efraim Kisanga, learned Advocate, appeared for the appellant, while Mr. Ismael Shallua, learned Advocate, appeared for the respondents. The appeal was disposed of by way of written submissions. During the hearing, the appellant abandoned the fifth ground of appeal and proceeded to argue only the remaining four grounds. Having carefully considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for both parties, together with the record of appeal and the proceedings before the trial tribunal, I am of the considered view that the central issue for determination is whether this appeal is meritorious. In resolving that issue, I find it appropriate to determine the 1st, 3rd and 4th S H jC jjs Page. 3

grounds of appeal together, as they are inextricably linked, while the 2nd ground of appeal shall be addressed separately. With respect to the 1st, 3rd and 4th grounds of appeal, the appellant principally challenges the jurisdiction of the trial tribunal and contends that the disputed property remained part of the estate of the late Edward Chami, whose probate proceedings were allegedly still pending before the Longido Primary Court. It was therefore argued that the dispute ought to have been adjudicated by the Probate Court rather than by the District Land and Housing Tribunal. The law is settled that jurisdiction is the lifeblood of every judicial proceeding. A court or tribunal must first satisfy itself that it possesses jurisdiction before embarking upon the adjudication of any dispute brought before it. In CRDB Bank PLC v. Lusekelo Mwakapala , Civil Appeal No. 143 of 2021 [2023] TZCA 17637, the Court of Appeal aptly observed that: "It is worth noting that the question o f jurisdiction is crucial and must be determined by the court or tribunal at the earliest opportunity. Jurisdiction is everything, without which a court has no power to determine the dispute before it. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for continuation o f proceedings." The question that therefore falls for determination is whether the dispute before the trial tribunal concerned the administration of the estate of the late Edward Chami or whether it was a land dispute arising after the distribution of that estate. A careful examination of the record reveals that the disputed property formed part of the estate of the late Edward Chami, which was administered in Probate and Administration Cause No. 03 of 1999 before the Longido Primary Court. It is equally undisputed that both the appellant and the late Paulina Edward Chami were appointed administrators of the deceased's estate. More importantly, the Probate Court proceeded to distribute the estate Page. 4

among the beneficiaries. The relevant portion of the decision, tendered as Exhibit P1, demonstrates that two houses were allocated to the late Paulina Edward Chami, while the remaining three houses were allocated to the appellant. The significance of that order extends beyond the mere appointment of administrators. The Probate Court conclusively determined the beneficial interests of the parties in the estate and distributed the properties accordingly. Upon such distribution, the beneficiaries acquired proprietary rights over the respective properties allocated to them. Consequently, any subsequent dispute relating to occupation, possession, boundary encroachment, or interference with those properties ceased to be a probate matter and became an ordinary land dispute cognizable by the land courts established under the law. I am therefore unable to agree with the appellant's contention that the absence of an inventory rendered the distribution ineffective or prevented the vesting of ownership rights in the beneficiaries. An inventory is essentially an administrative document prepared for purposes of identifying and accounting for estate assets. Its absence does not invalidate a judicial order through which a competent probate court has already distributed the estate among the beneficiaries. To hold otherwise would be to elevate procedural formalities above substantive justice and undermine the finality of lawful judicial determinations. In my considered view, once the Probate Court distributed the estate, the parties became lawful owners of the respective properties allocated to them and were thereafter entitled to sue or be sued in their personal capacities in respect of those properties. The dispute before the trial tribunal was therefore not a dispute concerning the administration of the estate of the late Edward Chami. Rather, it concerned an alleged encroachment by the appellant upon a portion of land that had already been allocated to the late Paulina Edward Chami and subsequently came under the administration of the 1st respondent as administrator of her estate. Page. 5

Accordingly, I find that the trial tribunal properly exercised jurisdiction under section 36(1)(a) and (b)(2) and (3) of the Land Disputes Courts Act, Cap. 216 R.E. 2023. The argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that only the Longido Primary Court retained jurisdiction over the dispute is therefore misconceived and devoid of legal foundation. Equally untenable is the argument that the appellant ought to have been sued in her representative capacity as administrator of the estate of the late Edward Chami. The claim before the tribunal was not directed against the estate of the deceased but against the appellant personally as the person alleged to have encroached upon the respondent's land. In those circumstances, the Probate Court had no jurisdiction over the dispute. The 1st, 3rd and 4th grounds of appeal consequently fail. Turning to the 2nd ground of appeal, the appellant faults the trial tribunal for allegedly failing to properly evaluate the evidence and, in particular, for relying on Exhibit P1 in reaching its decision. It is settled law that an appellate court will generally not entertain issues that were neither raised nor canvassed before the trial court, unless such issues involve pure points of law capable of being raised at any stage of the proceedings. See Elisa Moses Msaki v. Yesaya Ngateu Matee [1990] TLR 90 and M/S Ilabila Industries Ltd & 2 Others v. Tanzania Investment Bank & Another, Civil Application No. 179 of 2004 (unreported). Having carefully perused the record, I find that the complaint now raised regarding Exhibit P1 was neither raised before nor determined by the trial tribunal. The appellant did not object to the production or admission of the exhibit, nor did she challenge its authenticity, admissibility, or legal effect during the trial. To the contrary, the appellant's own pleadings, particularly paragraphs 4, 5 and 9 of the Written Statement of Defence, acknowledge the existence and effect of the probate proceedings from which Exhibit P1 originated. S H jC f c Page. 6

Furthermore, the decision embodied in Exhibit P1 was never challenged by way of revision, appeal, or any other lawful process. It therefore remains valid, binding, and effective. In these circumstances, the attempt to impeach the evidentiary value of Exhibit P1 for the first time on appeal can only be regarded as an afterthought. I have also independently examined the record and am satisfied that the trial tribunal properly evaluated both the oral and documentary evidence placed before it. The evidence clearly established that the disputed portion of land formed part of the property allocated to the late Paulina Edward Chami under the Probate Court's distribution order and that the appellant subsequently encroached upon that land. The findings reached by the tribunal were therefore firmly grounded in the evidence on record and cannot be faulted. The 2nd ground of appeal is accordingly devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. In the final analysis, I find no merit in any of the grounds of appeal. The appeal is therefore dismissed in its entirety, and the judgm ent and orders of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Arusha at Arusha in Land Application No. 05 of 2021 are hereby affirmed. However, bearing in mind the relationship between the parties and the nature of the dispute, I consider it ju st and equitable that each party bears his or her own costs of this appeal. It is so ordered. Dated at ARUSHA this 4th of June 2026 . Page. 7

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