Telezia Budoye vs Kadra Mauridi and Others (Land Appeal No. 11994 of 2025) [2026] TZHC 2901 (3 June 2026)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA SUMBAWANGA SUB - REGISTRY LAND APPEAL NO. 11994 OF 2025 (From Land Application No. 21 of 2023 in the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Mpanda at Katavi) TELEZIA BUDOYE …………………… .... … . …………………………………. APPELLANT VERSUS KADRA MAURIDI …………………………… .. ……………………….1 ST RESPONDENT MAWAZO BONIYAGA@MAWAZO PONIYAGA........................2ND RESPONDENT DAUDI NCHUMUYE................................................................3RD RESPONDENT JUDGMENT MWENEMPAZI, J. The dispute arose in Application No. 21 of 2023 before the District Land and Housing Tribunal of Mpanda, where the applicant, Kadra Mauridi, sued Daudi Nchumuye, Mawazo Boniyaga, and Telezia Bodoye to recover a residential plot located in Ka palang ao Area, Kazima Ward, Mpanda Municipality. The applicant contended that the disputed property belonged to h im , as he had lawfully purchased it from the 1 st Respondent. H e therefore sought a declaration of ownership and recovery of possession.

2 During the hearing, the applicant called three witnesses, including himself. He testified that he bought the disputed land from the 1st Respondent and that the sale was conducted before the Village Executive Officer of Kapangao. The 1st Respondent (Daudi Nchumuy e) acknowledged that he was authorized to sell, and the third respondent denied having authorized him. The applicant also tendered a sale agreement (Exh. K1 ) as evidence. The 2 nd respondent testified as SU1 and stated that he also purchased the disputed l and from the 3 rd respondent, Telezia Bodoye. The latter testified that she did not authorize the sale of the disputed plot, as stated in a statement issued by Baraka Simon, who testified as SU2. The trial tribunal, after evaluating the evidence, found tha t the applicant is the lawful owner of the disputed land, having lawfully purchased it from Daudi Nchumuye. The 2 nd Respondent was also found to have made a lawful purchaser of the plot adjoining that he purchased together with the disputed plot that had earlier been sold to the applicant. According to the record , the 2nd respondent had already developed another plot. Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the District Land and Housing Tribunal of Mpanda, delivered on April 17, 2025, the appellant, Telezia Bodoye, lodged the present appeal before the High Court at Sumbawanga.

3 In the Memorandum of Appeal, the appellant challenges the Tribunal's decision on five grounds. The grounds of appeal may be summarized as follows:

1. Misjoinder and lack of locus standi – The Tribunal allegedly erred in law by entertaining the application despite evidence that the first respondent had instituted the suit on behalf of a deceased person's estate without being its administrator.
2. Failure to observe mand atory pre - trial procedures – The Tribunal is said to have erred in law and fact by hearing the dispute without proof that mediation before the Ward Tribunal had been conducted and admitted into evidence as required by law.
3. Failure to observe the mandatory legal requirement of a locus in quo visit.
4. Improper admission and reliance on Exhibit K - 1 – It is argued that the Tribunal wrongly relied on Exhibit K - 1, which allegedly formed the foundation of the applicant's case, despite its improper admission into evidence.

4 5. Decision against the weight of evid ence – The appellant further contends that the Tribunal erred in law and fact by allowing the application despite the evidence on record being insufficient to support the findings made. Accordingly, the appellant prays that the appeal be allowed ; the Trib unal's judgment and decree be quashed and set aside; the appellant be declared the lawful owner of the disputed land; and costs of the appeal be awarded. At the hearing of the appeal, the parties were in Mpanda, and the hearing proceeded via virtual court. The appellant was absent, but represented by Mr. Laurence John Advocate, and the 1st and 3rd Respondents were present and unrepresented . The 2nd Respondent was absent despite being served, and proof of service has been filed in the e - Case Management System. Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Laurence John, argued all five grounds of appeal in turn and urged the Court to quash and set aside the District Land and Housing Tribunal's decision. Regarding the first ground of appeal, counsel submitted that the disputed property formed part of the estate of the late Simon Nchumuye. He contended that the Tribunal acknowledged this fact in its judgment , yet

5 upheld the transfer of the property. Counsel argued that only a duly appointed legal representative or administrator of an estate has the legal authority to dispose of estate property. Consequently, any sale by a person lacking such authority is null and void and cannot pass title to a purchaser. In support, counsel relied on Eliminata Masinda and Anoth er v. Masweti Masinda and Another , Civil Appeal No. 491 of 2023 [2026] TZCA 153, in which the Court of Appeal emphasized that a lawful administrator must undertake dealings with estate property . He further cited Hafidhi Ramadhani Mambosasa (Administrator o f the Estate of Ramadhani Juma Mambosasa) v. Hamisi Ramadhani Mambosasa , PC Probate Appeal No. 18751 of 2025 [2026] TZHC 1242, where the High Court reaffirmed that a person who lacks authority over an estate cannot pass a valid title to another person. Cou nsel , therefore, maintained that the purported seller had no title to convey to the purchaser. On the second ground of appeal, counsel challenged the mediation process preceding the institution of the suit. He submitted that section 3(4) of the Land Disput es Courts Act, Cap. 206 R.E. 2023 requires land disputes to undergo mediation before the Ward Tribunal , before the District Land and Housing Tribunal can entertain them . According to counsel, some interested

6 parties were not involved in the mediation proce ss, and the certificate of reconciliation was never formally admitted into evidence. He argued that this omission deprived the Tribunal of jurisdiction. To support that contention, counsel relied on Patrick William Magubo v. Lilian Peter Kitali , Civil Appe al No. 42 of 2019 [2022] TZCA 441, and Isabela Barandagiye Ruvuza v. Ezekia Kazosi , Land Appeal No. 22650 of 2025 [2026] TZHC 426, both of which emphasize the importance of complying with the statutory mediation requirements before a land dispute may proce ed before the Tribunal. With respect to the third ground of appeal, counsel complained of procedural irregularities during the visit to the locus in quo. He acknowledged that a site visit is not mandatory in every case but argued that once the Tribunal ele cts to conduct one, the applicable legal procedures must be observed. In support of this proposition, he referred to Nizah M.H. v. Gulamal Fazal Jan Mohamed [1 9 80] TLR 29. Counsel submitted that during the site visit, evidence was received from witnesses w ho had not first been sworn, contrary to the law. He relied on Kimonidimitri Mantheakis v. Ally Azim Dewji & Others , Civil Appeal No. 4 of 2018 [2021] TZCA 663, wherein the Court of Appeal underscored the necessity of administering an oath before

7 receiving testimony at a locus in quo . Counsel further argued that the Tribunal failed to prepare and read a proper summary of the proceedings conducted at the scene and did not allow the parties to confirm its accuracy. He also complained that the proceedings continued despite the absence of an advocate who had previously appeared for one of the parties, without any indication on the record that the advocate had formally withdrawn from the matter . In support of this complaint, counsel cited Avit Thadeus Massawe v. Isdor Asenga [2020] 1 TLR 128 and contended that these irregularities vitiated the proceedings. Regarding the fourth and fifth grounds of appeal, counsel challenged the admissibility and evidentiary value of Exhibit K - 1, the sale agreement. He argued that the document was admitted without the requisite endorsement, signature, and stamp of the Chairman, contrary to legal requirements. He relied on Bilauli Buge @ Abdallah Buge v. Hamisi Sha uri , DC Civil Appeal No. 20 of 2017 [2018] TZHC 2083, where the court held that a lack of proper endorsement affects the authenticity of an exhibit. Counsel further submitted that the agreement had not been stamped for stamp duty purposes and therefore oug ht not to have been admitted into evidence. He relied on Bakari Mhando Swanga v. Makuyuni Village Council , Land

8 Case No. 27303 of 2023 [2026] TZHC 1970, where the court emphasized the legal requirement that agreements be duly stamped. Counsel contended tha t once Exhibit K - 1 is excluded from the record, the respondents' case would collapse for want of evidence. He also argued that although the Tribunal's judgment referred to the third respondent acting under a power of attorney, the alleged power of attorney was never tendered in evidence. In support, he cited Alex Kolonard Simbeye v. Dilu Upule Shimbi (Administrator of the Estate of the Late Upule Shimbi) , Land Appeal No. 27436 of 2023 [2024] TZHC 7659 . He maintained that the Tribunal improperly relied on un proven authority. Counsel therefore urged the Court to allow the appeal, nullify the Tribunal's proceedings and judgment, and award costs to the appellant. The first respondent opposed the appeal in its entirety and maintained that the Tribunal's decision was correct. He submitted that Telezia Bodoye , the sale of the property after direct ing the applicant to deal with Daudi Nchumuye, whom they recognized as the estate's manager . According to the first respondent, Daudi Nchumuye had been customarily appointe d by the family and later became the estate's administrator. He therefore contended

9 that the purchaser acquired a valid title through the transaction and that the first ground of appeal lacked merit. Concerning the second ground, the first respondent submi tted that a certificate from the Ward Tribunal had been obtained after the defendants failed to appear and that the certificate was tendered in evidence before the Tribunal. He therefore maintained that the mediation requirements had been satisfied. Regard ing the third ground, the first respondent stated that he attended the locus in quo pursuant to the Tribunal's directions but did not record the proceedings. He argued that any complaint about how the proceedings were recorded could not be attributed to hi m. Regarding the advocate's absence, he maintained that all parties had been informed of the site visit date . Regarding the fourth and fifth grounds, the first respondent submitted that the proper procedure was followed in admitting the documentary evidenc e and that the required stamps were present on the documents. Although he acknowledged that the Tanzania Revenue Authority had not verified the document for stamp duty, he insisted that the grounds lacked merit and should be dismissed.

10 The third respondent likewise opposed the appeal and supported the Tribunal's judgment. On the first ground, he maintained that family members had appointed Daud Nchumuye under customary arrangements to manage the estate property and that the purchaser consequently acquired a valid title to the property by virtue of the sale. In relation to the second ground, the third respondent submitted that all mediation procedures were properly followed. According to him, the Ward Tribunal issued the requisite letter after Telezia and the other parties failed to enter an appearance, and the relevant evidence was adduced before the Tribunal. He therefore argued that all statutory requirements had been satisfied. With respect to the third ground, the third respondent denied that any procedural irregularities occurred during the proceedings in the locus in quo . He asserted that witnesses testified only after taking the requisite oath, that a summary of the proceedin gs was prepared and read to those present, and that signatures were duly recorded to indicate attendance . He further explained that the advocate ceased participating after the parties attempted to settle the dispute, and he maintained that all witnesses at tended the site visit and that the appellant's allegations were untrue.

11 On the fourth and fifth grounds, the third respondent maintained that all procedural and evidentiary requirements were met and that there was no basis to disturb the Tribunal's finding s. He accordingly prayed for dismissal of the appeal. In reply, learned counsel for the appellant reiterated the submissions made in chief. He insisted that at the time of the impugned sale, the third respondent had not been appointed as the estate's legal representative or administrator and therefore lacked capacity to dispose of the property. Counsel argued that if such authority had existed, the relevant document would have been tendered in evidence before the Tribunal. He therefore maintained that the s ale was invalid and again urged the Court to allow the appeal and grant the reliefs sought in the memorandum of appeal. Having carefully considered the record of appeal, the judgment of the District Land and Housing Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions advanced by the parties, I find that the appeal may conveniently be determined through the following issues:

1. Whether the proceedings before the District Land and Housing Tribunal were competent and conducted in accordance with the law.

12 2. Whethe r the Tribunal properly evaluated the evidence and correctly concluded that the disputed property lawfully belonged to the purchaser. Regarding the first issue, whether the proceedings before the District Land and Housing Tribunal were competent and condu cted in accordance with the law, the appellant's challenge is threefold. First, it is argued that the disputed property was part of the estate of the late Simon Nchumuye and that Daudi Nchumuye lacked legal authority to dispose of it because he had not bee n appointed administrator of the estate. Second, it is contended that the statutory requirement of mediation before the Ward Tribunal was not met. Third, it is argued that the proceedings during the visit to the locus in quo were procedurally defective. Regarding the complaint concerning the administration of the estate, I have carefully examined the record and the judgment appealed from. The Tribunal expressly addressed the question of ownership and the circumstances surrounding the sale. The Tribunal ac cepted evidence that Daudi Nchumuye acted with the knowledge and authority of the family members, and that the purchaser dealt with him as the person entrusted with managing the family property. The Tribunal further found that the purchaser entered into

13 po ssession and developed the property in the bona fide belief that the seller possessed authority to sell. The appellant has strongly relied on the authorities of Eliminata Masinda and Another v. Masweti Masinda and Another and Hafidhi Ramadhani Mambosasa v. Hamisi Ramadhani Mambosasa to support the proposition that only a duly appointed administrator may lawfully deal with estate property. That proposition is indeed a correct statement of law. However, the decisive question in the present appeal is not merel y whether Daudi Nchumuye held letters of administration at the material time, but whether the Tribunal's findings on the surrounding facts and the purchaser's status can properly be faulted in light of the evidence before it. The Tribunal found that the pu rchaser acquired the property after dealing with a person openly recognized by family members as managing the estate, and that the purchaser had no notice of any competing claim. The Tribunal further relied on authorities protecting bona fide purchasers an d concluded that the purchaser's interest deserved protection. Unless shown to be based on no evidence or a misdirection of law, an appellate court should be slow to interfere with such findings.

14 Regarding mediation, the appellant argues that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the reconciliation certificate from the Ward Tribunal was not formally admitted into evidence. I have considered this argument with concern. The record, however, shows that the dispute had been referred to the Tribunal after rec onciliation efforts failed. Both the first and third respondents maintained that the certificate was tendered before the Tribunal and that the statutory procedure had been followed. More importantly, the appellant has not shown that the dispute bypassed th e Ward Tribunal altogether or that the Tribunal assumed jurisdiction without any prior mediation. The authorities cited by the appellant emphasize compliance with section 3(4) of the Land Disputes Courts Act. They do not establish that every irregularity i n proving mediation automatically nullifies proceedings when there is evidence that the matter had, in fact, passed through the Ward Tribunal mechanism. Section 13(4) of the Land Disputes Courts Act, Cap. 216 R.E.2023 provides as follows: “ Notwithstanding subsection (1) , the District Land and Housing Tribunal shall not hear any proceeding affecting the title to or any interest in land unless the ward tribunal has certified that it has failed to settle the matter amicably:

15 Provided that, where the ward tribunal fails to settle a land dispute within thirty days from the date the matter was instituted, the aggrieved party may proceed to institut e the land dispute without the certificate from the ward tribunal .” In the circumstances of this case, the certificate was issued after the 3rd respondent (the appellant herein) refused to enter an appearance despite being summoned. The dispute was taken t o the Ward Tribunal on the 3 rd April, 2023, and a certificate was issued on the 17 th April, 2023. Therefore, having read the provision quoted above and the record of this case, I am not persuaded that the alleged omission deprived the Tribunal of jurisdiction. Turning to the locus in quo, the appellant complains that witnesses were not sworn, that no summary of proceedings was prepared, and that the proceedings continued in the absence of an advocate. I have examined the record and find that these allegations are not supported by sufficient evidence. The third respondent specifically maintained that witnesses were sworn, attendance was recorded, and a summary was prepared and read aloud. More significantly, the appellant has not demonstrated what pr ejudice

16 was caused by the alleged irregularities or how the outcome of the case was affected. The law is settled that not every procedural irregularity is fatal. An appellate court must be satisfied that the irregularity caused a miscarriage of justice bef ore nullifying proceedings. In the present case, the appellant has not shown that any alleged defect in the conduct of the locus in quo prejudiced her case or influenced the Tribunal's ultimate findings. Accordingly, I find that the proceedings before the District Land and Housing Tribunal were substantially conducted in accordance with the law and that the objections raised under the first issue are devoid of merit. Regarding the second issue, whether the Tribunal properly evaluated the evidence and correc tly concluded that the disputed property lawfully belonged to the purchaser, the appellant's principal attack focuses on Exhibit K - 1, the sale agreement. It is argued that the exhibit lacked proper endorsement and was not duly stamped for stamp duty, and t herefore ought not to have been admitted into evidence. It is further argued that, if the exhibit is excluded, the respondents' case collapses.

17 I have considered these submissions. The law undoubtedly requires documentary exhibits to be properly admitted a nd, where applicable, to comply with stamp duty requirements. Nevertheless, the record shows that the Tribunal's findings were not based solely on Exhibit KM - 1. The Tribunal also considered oral testimony from several witnesses regarding the sale, possessi on of the property, family members' conduct, and the circumstances under which the purchaser entered into occupation. The Tribunal also relied on evidence that the purchaser took possession openly, developed the property, and occupied it for a considerable period without challenge. The Tribunal was therefore entitled to assess the totality of the evidence rather than the sale agreement in isolation. As regards the alleged absence of a power of attorney, the Tribunal's judgment does not show that its decisio n turned exclusively upon that document. The Tribunal's central finding was that the purchaser acquired the property from a person whom the family had clothed with apparent authority and that the purchaser acted in good faith without notice of any defect i n title. The Tribunal further relied on the principles governing bona fide purchasers . It cited authorities recognizing the need to protect innocent purchasers who

18 acquire property for value and later develop or occupy it. Refer Stanley Kalama Masiki vs. C hihiyo Kuisia W/O Nderingo Ngumuo[1981] T.L.R. 14 3 and Philemon Vanai Saiteru Mollel vs William Titus Mollel and Another (Civil Application No.372/02 of 2022) [2024] TZCA 1322 (8 February 2024). After my own evaluation of the evidence, I find no basis to i nterfere with that conclusion. An appellate court may interfere with findings of fact only where such findings are unsupported by evidence, based on a misapprehension of evidence, or where the trial court acted on wrong principles. In the case of Thomas s/ o Peter @ Chacha Marwa vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 553 of 2015) [2019] TZCA 413 (8 November 2019) , the Court , citing with approval the case of Alfeo Valentino v. the Republic , Criminal Appeal No. 92 of 2006(unreported) , wherein it was held that: “ We understand that this is a second appeal. The law on the duty of this court in an appeal of this nature is well settled. It is now well established that the Court rarely interferes with concurrent findings of fact. An appellate court can only interfere w ith a finding of fact by a trial court where it is satisfied that the trial court has misapprehended the evidence in such a manner as to

19 make it clear that its conclusions are based on incorrect premises; see Salum Bugu v. Mariam Kibwana , Civil Appeal NO. 29 of 1992(unreported) . ” None of those circumstances has been demonstrated in the present appeal. The appellant has essentially invited this Court to substitute its own view of the evidence for that of the Tribunal. That is not the function of a first appe llate court where the findings complained of are reasonably supported by the record. I am therefore satisfied that the Tribunal properly evaluated the evidence before it and was justified in concluding that the purchaser's interest in the disputed property deserved protection. In the final analysis, I find that none of the grounds of appeal has merit. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the proceedings before the District Land and Housing Tribunal were incompetent or that the Tribunal misdirected i tself either in law or in fact. The evidence on record supports the findings reached by the Tribunal , and there is no justification for appellate interference.

20 Accordingly, the appeal is hereby dismissed in its entirety with costs . The judgment and decree of the District Land and Housing Tribunal of Mpanda in Application No. 21 of 2023 are hereby upheld . I t so ordered accordingly. Dated and delivered at Sumbawanga , this 3 rd day of June, 2026 T.M. MWENEMPAZI JUDGE