Mwajuma Abdulrahamani vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 32733 of 2024) [2026] TZHC 2928 (2 June 2026)

1 THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA DAR ES SALAAM SUB - REGISTRY AT DAR ES SALAAM CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 32733 OF 2 024 (C/f Criminal Case No.203 of 2023 in the District Court of Kinondoni at Kinondoni ) MWAJUMA ABDULRAHAMANI ......................... …………. APPELLANT REPUBLIC ................................ ...................... … ……… RESPONDENT JUDGMENT Date of Last Order: 18 - 5 - 2026 Date of Judgement: 2 - 6 - 2026 B.K.PHILLIP, J Aggrieved by the judgment of the District Court of Kinondoni at Kinondoni, the appellant herein lodged this appeal on the following grounds . i) That the l earned t rial Magistrate of Kinondoni District Court erred in l aw to hold that the appellant’s act of questioning the validity and authenticity of Exhibits P4, P5 and P6 was an afterthought without regard to the fact that the documents were not proved to the satisfaction of the court that they were genuine documents signed by the late Gideon Danson Mghamba.

2 ii) That , the l earned t rial Magistrate of Kinondoni District Court erred in l aw to have double standards in admitting documentary exhibits alleg ed to belong to the l ate Gideon Danson Mghamba by admitting those from the p rosecution side and refusing to admit those sought to be tendered by the appellant on account that the documents ought to be tendered in court by the administrator of the estates o f the late Gideon Danson Mghamba. iii) That the l earned t rial Magistrate of Kinondoni District Court erred in law in refusing to admit in evidence the Bank Payment Slip sought to be tendered by the appellant on the ground that the same was a Banker’s Book. iv) That, the l earned t rial Magistrate of Kinondoni District Court erred in l aw and fact for failure to consider the dubious character of the c omplainant (PW5) surrounding this case before believing her story , which was nothing but lies, an afterthought and fu ll of egoism aiming to swindling the estate of the late Gideon Danson Mghamba in exclusion of other lawful heirs of the late Gideon Danson Mghamba.

3 v) That the learned trial Magistrate of Kinondoni District Court erred in law and fact for being biased agains t the appellant in favour of the complainant (PW5) and the 2 nd respondent to the detriment of the appellant for reasons well known to the trial Magistrate. Mr Benedict Bagiliye represented the appellant in this appeal and at the trial court, whereas the learned State Attorney Winifrida Ouko appeared for the Republic . The appeal was disposed of through written submissions. Before reviewing the parties' arguments, let me provide a brief background to this appeal to understand better the discussion that follows . The a ppellant herein was charged with the criminal offences jointly with one Hassan Said Malangali, who was the 2 nd accused in the trial Court , not a party in this appeal . The y stood charged with two counts , to wit; 1 st count; Forgery ; c ontrary to section s 33 3 ,335(a) and 337 of the Penal Code . T he particulars of the offence w ere; Mwajuma Abdul - Rahman and Hassan Said Malangali on diverse dates between 26 th April 2013 and October 2014 within the City and Region of Dar es Salaam with intent to defraud or deceive did forge a Marriage Certificate bearing entry number B0977464 purporting to show the existence of marriage contracted between Gideon Danson and Mwa juma Abdulrahmani , the fact they knew

4 not to be true . 2 nd Count; Forgery ; c ontrary to section s 33 3 ,335( d (i) and 337 of the Penal Code . T he particulars of the offence w ere : Mwajuma Abdul - Rahman and Hassan Said Malangali on diverse dates between 26 th April 2013 and October 2014 within the City and Region of Dar es Salaam with intent to defraud or deceive , did forge a signature in a Marriage Certificate bearing entry number B0977464 purporting to show the existence of a marriage contracted between Gid eon Danson and Mwajuma Abdulrahmani, the fact they knew not to be true . In proving its case, the prosecution paraded six (6) witnesses and tendered nine (9) documentary exhibits to support its allegations against the accused persons. The a ppell ant called four (4) witnesses and tendered nine (9) exhibits , seeking to raise doubt in the prosecution's case. The 2nd accused person had only one witness and did not tender any exhibits . After a full trial , the Court found the appellant herein guilty as charged and convicted her , and sentenced her to pay a fine of Tshs. 2,000,000/ = or serve three (3) years imprisonment in default. Mr Hassan Said Malangali was acquitted. The a ppellant opted to pay a fine to secure her freedom but was dissatisfied with her conviction for the charged offences, hence this appeal. Submitting the 1 st ground of appeal, Mr Bagiliye argued that the

5 only evidence that would at least be relied upon by the p rosecution in proving its case would be that of PW3, one E.9955 S.M Faustine Emmanuel Mashauri, who introduced himself as the handwriting expert. The appellant does not dispute PW3’s testi mony, much is desired on the documents which were sent to PW3 for comparing the signatures of Gideon Danson , now deceased . (Hereinaft er shall be referred to as “ the deceased”) He pointed out that PW3 testified that the documents he used to compare the late Gideon’s signature were handed to him by PW6 , one WP 4265 D/SGT Deodatha, the investigat or . PW6 testified that the documents she ha nded over to PW3 were received from PW5, one M onica Amani Msuya, the c omplainant in th is case . The documents submitted by PW5 to PW6 , which were finally handed over to PW3 , were : a marriage certificate (Exhibit P4), alleged to be between Monica Msuya and Mghamba GD, celebrated through the Islamic Religion ; a letter to open a bank account (Exhibit P5) and a Memorandum of Association of Hanskin Company ( Exhibit P6 ) . Mr Bagiliye went on to argue that , on its face, the validity of Exhibit P4 is doubtful. The names of the parties contracting the marriage appear as Msuya Monica and Mghamba GD, while there is no deed poll proving that the names appearing on the certificate (Exhibit P4) as Mghamba GD are the same as the names of Gideon Danson in Exhibit P3, the marriage certificate in dispute whose signature was being

6 compared . He contended that it is settled law that where names in two written documents appear to be different, those names cannot be said to belong to the same person in the absence of a d eed p oll . To support his argument , he cited the case of Catherine Honorati Vs CRDB & 2 Others, Civil Appeal No.304 of 2019, in which the Court of Appeal held as follows; “ In the present appeal, marriage certificate which is the basis of the relation between the appellant and the third respondent has the names of HONORATI BIASHARA JOHN LYOMBE, whereas, the mortgage deed has the names of HONORATI JOHN KILAWE.Obviously, these are two different names. These two names appearing in two different documents, cannot b e overridden by the oral account of PW1, PW2, and PW3. We therefore find the trial court correctly held that HONORATI JOHN KILAWE is not the same as HONORATI BIASHARA JOHN LYOMBE.” Mr Bagiliye raised a concern that Exhibit P4 was not sent to the Registra tion, Insolvency and Trusteeship Agency (“RITA”) for verification to determine whether it appeared in the register . In all the testimony of PW5, there is nowhere she said to have been a Muslim who could contract an Islamic marriage with Mghamba GD, as she told the court that she is

7 a Christian and was sworn and not affirmed before testifying in court. Mr Bagiliye was of the view that the prosecution had a duty to bring in court the Registrar of Marriages, one Salum Mintanga, who issued Exhibit P4, and the witnesses to that marriage, namely Ibrahim Msangi and Bakari Saidi, whose names appear in Exhibit P4. T hese discrepancies raise a lot of doubt about the prosecution's case, and the appellant's act of questioning their validity and authenticity cannot b e taken and said to be an afterthought at all , contended Mr Bagiliye. Furthermore, Mr Bagiliye argued that it was also not in dispute that PW5 has been vigorously contesting the Probate and Administration cases pertaining to the administration of th e deceased’s estate in the Primary Court of Kawe, the District Court of Kinondoni, and this court, where she produced in court various marriage certificates between her and the deceased . To support his argument, he referred this court to Exhibit D5 collec tively. Mr Bagiliye faulted t he prosecution for failing to account for its failure to use the same marriage certificate ( Exhibit D5 Collectively ); instead , she used Exhibit P4 for the first time, which had never been shown or used in any of the complaints/applications related to Proba te and Administration cases filed in court by PW5, in which she lost all the cases. He insisted that the failure to account for the use of different

8 marriage certificates (Exhibit D5) when comparing the deceased’s si gnature raises so much doubt about the prosecution's case . A s to the validity of the letter to open a bank account ( Exhibit P5 ), it was Mr Bagiliye’s contention that one cannot write a letter to the bank to open a bank account and yet remain with it. If Ex hibit P5 was a copy of the letter submitted to the b ank, then it would bear the bank’s stamp to show that the same had been received by the b ank and a copy remained with the maker , which is not the case herein. Exhibit P5 was not obtained from the bank and has nothing showing it has ever come from the bank. No person/Prosecution witness from the bank was called to testify whether the letter was from the bank. Mr Bagiliye criticised the Memorandum of Association of Hanskin Company (Exhibit P6) because it was obtained not from the Business Registration and Licensing Agency (BRELA) but from PW5 . It was alleged to have been signed by G ideon Danson Mghamba, but it does not bear Brela’s stamp . It appears to have been signed by a n advocate, but th at advocate was not called by the prosecution to testify in court as to whether he had ever witnessed Gideon Danson Mghamba sign it. Moreover, Mr Bagiliye pointed out that Exhibit P6 indicates that it was signed by the deceased’s relative s, namely S alimi G ideon Mghamba,

9 Gideon’s son , F aidhun Hassan Mghamba, Dady Hassan Mghamba, and Ibrahim Hassan Mghamba , but the p rosecution summoned none of them to testify in court as to whether they ever saw G ideon Danson Mghamba signing Exhibit P6. Mr Bagiliye was of the strong view that the failure by the prosecution to call any of the persons who appear in Exhibit P6 to testify in court that they saw the deceased signing it raises serious doubt about the prosecution's case and the validity of the docu ments submitted for comparison of the signatures . Q uestioning its validity and authenticity by the appellant cannot be taken and said to be an afterthought at all as found and held by the trial court. Furthermore, Mr Bagiliye questioned why PW6, the investigator , did not go to the deceased's office to obtain documents for signature comparison, rather than using the documents obtained from PW5, the complainant. He contended that it is settled law that the signature being compared must be proved t o the satisfaction of the court that such signature was signed by the person who signed the disputed. To support his argument , he referred this court to section 81 (1) of the Evidence Act Cap 6 R.E 2023 , which provides as follows: “ In order to ascertain w hether a signature, writing or seal is that of a person whom it purports to have been written or made, any

10 signature, writing or seal, admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the court to have been written or made by that person, may be compared with the one which is to be proved." Mr Bagiliye argued that this court cannot satisfy itself that the Exhibits P4, P5 and P6 were signed by the deceased and are proper documents to be compared with the signature in Exhibit P3, without looking at the behaviour of PW5 who, having attended the clan meeting in which the deceased brother was allowed by apply for being appointed as t he administrator of the deceased estate but she ( PW5) decided to apply for appoint ment as the adminstratrix of the deceased estate using a letter from the local government. Mr Bagiliye contended that PW5 colluded with judicial officers and obtained a le tter of administration of the deceased estate, and was of the view that no wonder he forged the signatures in Exhibits P4, P5 and P6, which were used for comparison with the signature in Exhibit P3. With regard to the 2 nd ground of appeal, Mr Bagiliye argued that the t rial court had double standards in making its decisions. I t refused to admit in evidence two Fire - Arm Licenses to impeach the demeanour of PW5, who had told lies in court that the deceased had one Fire - Arm of his own and that the other belonged to the employer, when in fact it was not

11 true, and the deceased’s air tickets and passport on the ground that the documents being of the deceased person the only person who could tender the same as exhibits in court was an administrator of t he estate of the deceased’s estate. But the trial court admitted in evidence exhibits P4, P5, and P6, alleged to have been signed by the deceased, which were tendered by PW5, who is not the administrator of the deceased’s estate, after she lost all cases she filed . Mr Bagiliye maintained that by admitting only the document tendered by PW5 into evidence , the trial court showed a clear bias against the appellant. With regard to the 3 rd ground of appeal, Mr Bagiliye argued that the ordinary pay - in slip issued to clients after depositing money in the Bank does not form part of the Banker's Book. The Bankers' books are those defined under section 82 of the Evidence Act , which are in the custody of the Bank, and such cannot be tendered in evidence by any other person save for bank officers . He contended that the trial court erred in treating the ordinary pay - in slip as a banker's book .He went on to argue that it was an error for the trial court to refuse admitting the pay - in slip on the ground that it is a banker's book which ought to be tendered by a bank offic er only which denied the trial court an opportunity to see that the appellant was in fact married to the deceased and that even PW5

12 knew it as her (PW5) children were living with t he appellant . T he appellant used to pay school fees for PW5 ’s children after been given the school fees by the deceased. PW5’s refusal to recognize the appellant as the deceased’s wife was nothing but an afterthought . T he deceased’s relatives, one of wh om testified as DW1, and the appellant’s relative, who testified as DW2, both stated clearly that the appellant was the deceased’s lawful wife . With regard to the 4th ground of appeal, Mr Bagiliye argued that it was PW5 ’s testimony that her docum ents were stolen, but she admitted she had never reported the matter to the police. PW5 did not tell the trial court how her documents were stolen and why she did not report the incident to the police. T here is a lot to be desired in PW5’s testimony, for s he was telling nothing but lies, contended Mr Bagiliye . Furthermore, Mr Bagiliye argued that it was PW5’s testimony that her husband had always been with her and that they had never separated. H e pointed out that if PW5’s aforesaid assertion is true, why could she not tell the trial court how the deceased’s passport, air tickets and all other important documents were with the appellant ? . Also, Mr Bagiliye contended that PW5 also lied that the house in which the appellant lives belongs to her as she acquired it with the deceased, but she could not

13 tell how the appellant managed to have access to it and live therein. PW5 told the court that the house was occupied by tenants, but she could not identify who the tenants were or who rented the house . With regard to the 5 th ground of appeal, Mr Bagiliye argued that the prosecution failed to prove the charges against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. He contended that i t is undisputed that the 2nd accused person, who signed the marriage certificate alleged to have been forged, is the licensed registrar of marriages, as was clearly identified by PW2, one Jean Barongo, an officer from RITA. When cross - examined, PW2 admitted that the Marriage Certificate was from RITA, but that the registrar had not filed returns for the said marriage certificate; thus, it was not registered . PW2 added that a registrar of marriages may contract a valid marriage, but if he does not file the returns, the certificate will not be registered , even though the marriage was validly contracted. Mr Bagiliye insisted that PW5 was not a credible witness and her testimony ought not to be relied upon by the court . To support his argument , she cited the case of Mussa Mwaikunda Vs Republic [2006] TLR 387 . Furthermore, Mr Bagiliye argued that the evidence adduced in court proved that PW5 had separated from the deceased. DW1 told the trial court that PW5 had separated from the deceased. His testimony was

14 supported by DW4, the deceased’s friend, who testified that the appellant herein was the only person the deceased introduced to him as his wife. Mr Bagiliye insisted that as per the evidence adduced during the trial, PW5 emerged after the deceased’s death. She was not living with the deceased. The ap pellant was known to the deceased’s relatives as the deceased’s wife. During the trial, neither the 2nd accused nor the prosecution accounted for their failure to tender the book from which Exhibit P3 was obtained , despite having summoned an officer from R ITA (PW2) to testify in court. He contended that this is not by accident, but rather well calculated to hide the truth from the court . In punching more holes in the prosecution's case, Mr Bagiliye submitted that , Mr Hassan Said Malangali, the 2 nd accused before the trial Court testified that , he gave the marriage certificate in question to Salim Natepe, who was a friend of his boss Muft Simba, whereas PW6 testified that the Mr Hassan Said Malangali told him t hat he issued the marriage certificate to him after being deceived by Salim Natepe because he believed him as he was his friend. Mr Bagiliye insisted that the testimony of Mr Hassan Said Malangali, the appellant’s co - accused, should not be accorded weight. The law is that evidence of a co - accused must be corroborated. He contended that in the case in hand, the testimony of

15 the 2 nd accused was not corroborated by any witness. To support his argument, he cited the case of DPP Vs A.C.P. Abdallah Zombe & 8 others [2017] TLSLR 182. Furthermore, Mr Bagiliye pointed out that the prosecution was duty - bound to prove its case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.To fortify his argument, he cited the case of Marando Suleiman Marando Vs Serikali ya Mapinduzi Zanzibar [1 998] TLR 375 . Mr Bagiliye went on to argue that the prosecution's failure to sue Salim Natepe raises many doubts about the prosecution’s case. In conclusion to his submission, Mr Bagiliye beseeched this court to allow this appeal. In rebuttal, r esponding to the 1 st ground, the learned State Attorney argued that the learned trial magistrate did not err in law in holding that the appellant failed to challenge the authenticity of exhibits P4, P5, and P6 and that the efforts made by the appellant wer e an afterthought. The proceedings clearly reveal that the prosecution tendered the said documents through competent witnesses in accordance with section 135 of the Evidence Act, Cap 6, and they were admitted in the trial court as exhibits without any obje ction from the defence counsel . He contended that once documentary evidence is properly produced and admitted by the court, its evidential value becomes part of the record

16 unless challenged through cross - examination or contrary evidence. Once the prosecution produced the documents through its witnesses and the defence failed to challenge them effectively, the trial court is entitled to rely on them. The a ppellant did not raise any serious challenge to the authenticity of the documents at trial, nor did she produce any evidence to demonstrate that the deceased's signatures were forged. The learned State Attorney maintained that it is a settled principle of law that he who alleges must prove. Therefore, the moment the appellant claimed that the signat ures in the disputed document were genuine, the burden shifted to the a ppellant to substantiate the allegations that the documents were not lawfully obtained. To support his stance , he cited the case of DPP V Lucas Mwakisombera [1999] TLR 156 . Moreover, the learned State Attorney pointed out that the law provides that documents produced by a competent witness and admitted as exhibits become valid evidence unless rebutted by credible evidence. He strongly argued that, in the case at hand , the a pp ellants failed to rebut or discredit the prosecution evidence relating to Exhibits P4, P5, and P6.He cited the case of Abdallah Rashid Namkoka v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 206 of 2016 (unreported), to support his argument. On Mr Bagiliye’s co ncern that there was a discrepancies in the names of the deceased in the documents used to for comparison of the

17 signatures, t he learned State Attorney argued that the law in Tanzania does not make it mandatory for a person to execute a d eed poll merely because names appearing in documents differ. A deed poll is only necessary where formal and intentional changes are made to a person's name and seeks legal recognition of that new name in official records. The absence of a deed poll does not automatically invalidate documents where the identity of the person can otherwise be established through evidence. To support his argument , he referred this court to the case of Nassoro Haji Mohamed V s Republic [1992] TLR 129 and DPP Vs Lucas Mwakisombera (supra) . Th e learned State Attorney was emphatic that during the trial, the appellant failed to produce any genuine or legal authority showing that the absence of a d eed p oll rendered the documents invalid or that s he was prejudiced by its absence . From the court’s r ecord, there is nowhere indicating that the appellant claimed that the said exhibits were false or forged to defraud. In response to the 2 nd ground of appeal, the learned State Attorney argued that the records show that the trial court magistrate's decision to admit the prosecution's documentary exhibits while rejecting the appellant's documents was based on proper grounds for exhibit admissio n . The document s tendered by the prosecution were duly proved

18 and relevant to the case. The a ppellant's documents, however, lacked proper authentication and were correctly rejected. During the trial, the appellant had an alternative avenue for having her d ocuments admitted, such as by calling the administrator of the deceased’s estate. Also, the learned State Attorney maintained that it is on record that PW5 proved before the trial Court that the deceased had two firearms, one of which had been stolen duri ng the funeral, and the matter was reported at JWTZ. Moreover, it is a trite law that a document can be tendered in court by competent witnesses, meaning that someone who can testify to its authenticity and contents. The records show that the trial court’s decision to admit the prosecution’s documentary exhibits while rejecting the appellant's documents was based on proper procedural requirements for admission of exhibits . The document s tendered by the prosecution were duly proved relevant to the case , wher eas t he a ppellant's documents lacked proper authentication and thus were correctly rejected , contended the learned State Attorney . The appellant was not a competent witness to tender in evidence the documents that were rejected by the trial court because t he appellant was not the maker of the air ticket and passport she wanted to tender in evidence, so she hadn't any knowledge on the said documents and she didn't prepare the same, To support his arguments he cited the case of DPP Vs Shida Manyama @ Seleman

19 Mabuha, Criminal Appeal No.285 of 2012 ( unreported) . With regard to the 3 rd ground of appeal, the learned State Attorney argued that the a ppellant misdirects herself on the relevant legal provision, particularly the Evidence Act. He contended that under section 84 of the Evidence Act, a bank slip is among the bankers' books, a proof of which may be given by an officer of a bank. He pointed out that section 86 of the Evidence Act prov ides that proof of a copy of the bank pay - in slip shall be given by a person who has examined the copy against the original entry, and may be given orally or by affidavit. Under these circumstances , the a ppellant was not a qualified person to tender the b a nk pay - in s lip in court as required by law, and the court would not have admitted documents lacking legal validity. He maintained that this ground of appeal has no merit and prayed for its dismissal. Regarding the 4th ground of appeal, the lear ned State Attorney argued that the trial magistrate did not err in law or fact in accepting and relying on the complainant's (PW5) testimony. The al legations of unfaithfulness levelled against PW5 merely constitute speculation by the a ppellant not support ed by evidence . The complainant never depicted any dubious character or ulterior motive. He pointed out that it is a settled principle of the law that the credibility of witnesses is primarily a matter

20 for the trial court, which has the advantage of seein g and hearing the witnesses testify. An appellate court will rarely interfere with such findings unless it is shown that the trial court misdirected itself or acted on no evidence. Furthermore, the learned State Attorney contended that the app ellant's claim that the complainant fabricated the story to swindle the estate of the late Gideon Danson Mghamba was not supported by credible evidence at trial. Mere allegations without proof cannot displace credible testimony that was accepted by the tri al court. The trial court properly evaluated the evidence on record and was satisfied that the complainant's testimony was credible. The appellant failed to demonstrate any misdirection in the trial court's evaluation of the evidence. To support his argume nt , he cited the case of Selemani Hamis Vs Republic [1980] TLR 130 . The learned State Attorney was of the strong view that the prosecution proved the offences charged against the appellant to the standard required by the law. He prayed for the dismissal of this ground of appeal. With regard to the 5 th ground of appeal, the learned State Attorney submitted that this ground of appeal is vague, unsubstantiated and devoid of merit. The a ppel lant has failed to demonstrate any instance on record

21 of the learned trial magistrate acting with bias or partiality during the trial. The allegations of judicial bias must be supported by clear cogent evidence showing that the court acted unfairly or prej udicially against one of the parties. Mere assertions without pointing to a specific act or omission on the part of the trial court cannot suffice , contended the learned State Attorney . He pointed out that it is on record that the trial magistrate accorded both sides equal opportunity to present their respective cases, including cross - examination of witnesses and presentation of defence evidence. There is nothing in the record indicating that the trial court acted in a manner that was prejudicial to the a pp ellant. He went on to argue that the arguments raised by Mr Bagiliye in this ground of appeal are mere speculation and repetition of what has been stated in the previous grounds of appeal . He maintained that the offence of forgery against the a ppellant was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, since the prosecution's evidence met all the principles of law stipulated in the case of DPP Vs Shida Manyama (s upra ) . Additionally, the learned State Attorney submitted that the allegations of bias are misconceived and lack any factual legal foundation. The allegation is baseless and unsupported by the records. A ll key witnesses in this case were credible , and the appellant failed to discredit their testimony during cross - examination . Re l ying on the cas e of

22 Goodluck Kyando v. The Republic (2006) TLR 363, he contended that it is a trite law that all witnesses, unless otherwise stated , are entitled to credence . In conclusion to his submission, he implored this court to dismiss this appeal in its entirety. In rejoinder , Mr Bagiliye reiterated his submission in chief. He contended that Exhibits P4, P5, and P6 were criticised by the appellant during the hearing, but the trial court did not properly deal with the appellant’s criticisms . He maintained that failure to compare the deceased’s signature from reliable and credible documents signed by the deceased in his normal course of business created serious doubts on the prosecution's case , which ought to have been interpreted in favour of the appellant . He insisted that the prosecution had the burden of proving the case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt, but failed to do so . To support his arguments, he cited the cases of Salum Said Kassim vs DPP, Criminal Appeal No. 122 of 2024, and Amos s/o Alexander @ Marwa vs The Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 513 of 2019 (both unreported). Having dispassionately analysed the rival arguments from Mr Bagiliye and the learned State Attorney, let me proceed with the determination of the merit of this appeal. T he first ground basically criticises the prosecution for using the marriage certificate with registration No.

23 B00103425 , a letter for opening a bank account and Memorandum of Association of Nanskin Company Ltd ( Exhibits P4, P5 and P 6 , respectiv ely ) for comparison of the signature in the disputed marriage certificate No.B0977464 ( Exhibit P3). The arguments raised by Mr Bagiliye fault the police investigation, in which Exhibits P4, P5, and P6 were sent to the handwriting expert (PW3) for compari son of the signature to determine whether the deceased’s signature in marriage certificate No. B0977464 was forged. which was in possession of the appellant . Mr Bagiliye contended that the documents sent to the handwriting expert (PW3) were not appropriate for use in the investigations. T he investigators were supposed to use documents signed by the deceased in the normal course of his business. It is worth noting that the documents used by the deceased in his ‘normal course of business ’ are numerous and inc lude those the police used in their investigation, namely Exhibits P4, P5, and P6 . A memorandum of Association of a company, signed by the deceased and a letter to open a bank account, signed by the deceased, are among the documents used by the deceased in the normal course of his business . W ith due respect to Mr Bagiliye, it is not correct to discredit Exhibits P4, P5, and P6 without adducing any tangible evidence to support such a claim . I agree with the learned State Attorney that the appellant produced no evidence in court

24 to show that the documents used were not genuine or forged. For instance , no evidence was produced in court by the appellant to show that the Company mentioned in Exhibit P6 never existed or that the deceased’s signature therein was forged. Mr Bagiliye’s concern that the prosecution did not summon any of the deceased’s relatives who were signatories to Exhibit P6 lacks merit, since the appellant was at liberty to call them as her witnesses to support her, rather than blaming the prose cution. On the issue of differences in the names in the marriage certificate, it is the finding of this court that the case of Catherine Honorati (supra) is distinguishable from the facts of this case, in that case there were two names which differed ( Bia shara and Lyombe) whereas in this case the Marriage certificate in question had the name Mghamba and an abbreviation ‘GD’ . The deceased's full name was Gideon Danson Mghamba. Strictly speaking, there was no difference in the names in this case. With regard to the letter for opening a bank account, the fact that it did not bear the bank's stamp does not preclude the possibility that it was written by the deceased. After all, the prosecution used more than one document to compare the deceased’s si gnature, which is quite in order and proper. The criticism s levelled against Exhibits P4,P5 and P6

25 for comparison of the signatures are unrealistic based on unsubstantiated allegations against PW5. Mr Bagiliye argued that PW5 did not bring the marriage ce rtificate and documents she has been using in several other cases she filed in court . It is improper to discredit the documents used by the prosecution by comparing the signatures only because the appellant did not expect those documents to be used by the prosecution . It is worth noting that the appellant did not challenge the handwriting expert's report , but was suspicious that the documents used to compare the signatures were also forged or not genuine. The position of the law is that suspicion, however strong it is, cannot be relied upon by the court of law in making its decision .[ See the case of Lucia Maria @ Mboje Vs Republic, Misc. Criminal Application No.34 of 2023 ( unreported). Thus, I cannot fault the trial court for re lying on the handwriting expert's report, admitted in court after all procedures for the admission of exhibits were observed , and for properly receiving it as an exhibit. This court finds that the 1 st ground lacks merit. I will deal with the 2 n d and 3 rd grounds conjointly , since both concern the admission of documentary evidence. The court’s records reveal that the trial court declined to admit in evidence the pay slip the appellant sought to tender as an exhibit, on the grounds that it forms part

26 of the document termed the “bankers' book . ” The trial court’s order was predicated on sections 76 and 78A of the Evidence Act , Cap 6 R.E 2019, which are now sections 82 and 85 of the Evidence Act, Cap 6 R.E 2023 , respectively. First of all, it is true that the trial court refused to admit in evidence the pay slip tendered by the appellant as an exhibit in the case . However, r efusing to admit a document in evidence after giving legal reasons does not mean that the court is biased , as it did n ot do so arbitrarily. It based its decision on its interpretation and understanding of the law . W hether the court’s interpretation and application of the law are correct or not is something else, distinct from bias. Also, I have noted that Exhibits P4, P5, and P6, together with the handwriting expert's report (Exhibit P7), were tendered in court by PW3, the handwriting expert, who was competent to tender them, not PW5, as alleged by Mr Bagiliye in his submission. I t is worth noting that Mr Bagiliye did not object to the tendering of exhibits P4, P5, and P6. I have perused the provisions of sections 82 and 85 of the Evidence Act, and I agree with Mr Bagiliye that a bank payslip cannot be termed a banker’s book. A bank pay slip is in the customer's custody . Thus, the trial court erred in refusing to admit the pay slip the appellant sought to tender as an Exhibit in the case to show that the deceased used to send her to the bank to pay the school fees for PW5’s children. However, it is important to take notice that even if the

27 pay slip had been admitted , it would not have affected the court’s finding that the offence of forgery charged against the appellant was proved b y the expert report ( E xhibit P 7 ) , which revealed that the marriage certificate in question wa s forged. The issue in this case was not whether the appellant was staying with or married to the deceased; rather, it was the forgery of the marriage certificate. People can stay together as husband and wife without having a marriage certificate. Thus, pr oviding proof that the appellant was staying with the deceased does not exonerate the appellant from the offence of forgery. With due respect to Mr Bagiliye, most of his arguments aimed at showing that the appellant was married to the deceased. Similarly, the testimonies of DW1 and DW2 supported the appellant’s testimony that she was married to the deceased and that they were staying together. None of them testified that they witnessed the deceased signing the marriage certificate No. B0977464 . On the other hand , Mr Hassan Said Malangali, who issued the marriage certificate No. B0977464 to the appellant, testified that he was misled by one Mr Natepe, who convinced him to fill in the marriage certificate and provided him with the appellant’s and the deceased ’s particulars . He gave Mr Natepe that marriage certificate on the condition that it would be signed by the deceased, and then returned it to him to

28 complete the registration process. Mr Malangali confirmed before the trial court that he did not w itness the deceased signing the marriage certificate No. B0977464 . It is a common ground that the standard of proof in criminal cases is beyond a reasonable doubt and lies with the prosecution. The accused has no burden of proving his innocence. [See the c ase of Pascal Yoya @ Maganga Vs Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 248 of 2017 , (unreported)] . In this case, PW3, the handwriting expert, explained in detail before the trial court how he compared the deceased’s signatures and found that the deceased’s signat ure in the marriage certificate No. B0977464 was forged . Thus, Mr Malangali’s testimony was corroborated by PW3, the handwriting expert who tendered in court the expert report ( Exh ibit P7). Evidence adduced by the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased’s signature in the marriage certificate No. B0977464 was forged. With regard to the 4 th and 5 th grounds of appeal, Mr Bagiliye argued that the trial court was biased and ought not to have believed the PW5’s testimony. He pointed out that PW5 made false testimonies in other cases between her and the appellant; thus, her testimony was not worth believing. Upon perusing the court’s records, I am of the settled view that Mr Bagiliye’s allegation that the trial court was biased against the

29 appellant on the ground that it refused to admit her documentary exhibits is unfounded. The proceedings reveal that all parties were given the oppor tunity to give their evidence. The examination of the witnesses was properly conducted. The parties raised their objections, which were entertained and determined in accordance with the law. Mr Bagiliye ’s contention is that PW5 is not a faithful pe rson. She has lied before the court several times; thus, she could not have been afraid to lie in this case before the trial court . However, all the aforesaid accusations against PW5 are based on assumptions and/or suspicions that cannot be relied upon by this court in making its decision. [ See the case of Lucia Maria @ Mboje , (supra)] In the upshot, this appeal lacks merit. It is hereby dismissed. Dated at Dar es Salaam this 2 nd day of June 2026 B.K.PHILLI P JUDGE

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