Grace F Mrosso vs Grace Felix Temu (LAND CASE NO. 36 OF 2022) [2026] TZHC 3019 (1 June 2026)

es THE JUDICIARY OF TANZANIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AT DODOMA LAND CASE NO. 36 OF 2022 GRACE F MROSSO COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF VERSUS GRACE FELIX TEMU RESPONDENT / DEFENDANT RULING HASSAN, J On 20th May 2026, this Court made an order directing the parties to file written submissions on the issue whether, following the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 26th February 2026 directing the joinder of the Registrar of Titles as a necessary party to these proceedings, the provisions of section 6 of the Government Proceedings Act, Cap. 5 R.E. 2023, ought to be complied with before the matter proceeds further. The Court deemed it necessary to hear the parties on the issue because one of the intended parties, namely the Registrar of Titles, is representing the government institution. In such circumstance, the Court was concerned that the inclusion of the said institution may attract the operation of the Government Page. 1

Proceedings Act. Consequently, raise the question whether the proceedings could lawfully continue through amendment of the existing suit, or whether compliance with the mandatory statutory requirements prescribed under section 6(2) of the Act was first required. Pursuant to the said order, the Plaintiff filed written submissions through the service of Mr. Ibrahimu Mcharo, learned counsel. In his pursuit, learned counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the present matter is not a fresh suit against the Government but an existing suit which was remitted to this Court by the Court of Appeal for rehearing upon the joinder of the necessary parties. He argued that, in its judgment, the Court of Appeal neither struck out the suit nor ordered the institution of a fresh action. Instead, it directed that the matter be reheard after joining the Registrar of Titles, Kondoa Auction Mart and Frank Valerian respectively. Learned counsel further submitted that the Plaintiff has already complied with the requirements of section 6 of the Government Proceedings Act by serving a ninety days' notice dated 1st April 2026 upon the Registrar of Titles and by forwarding copies thereof to the Attorney General and the Solicitor General. It was additionally contended by Mr. Mcharo that section 6(2) of the Government Proceedings Act applies only where a fresh suit is instituted against the Government and does not apply where a Government institution is Page. 2

sought to be joined in already existing proceedings. Reliance was placed on sections 6(6) and 7 of the Government Proceedings Act, which provide for the joinder or intervention of the Attorney General in proceedings involving Government institutions. The Plaintiff ’ s learned counsel further relied on Order I Rule 9 and Order VI Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 R.E. 2023, to argue that, non joinder of parties is a curable defect and that amendment of pleadings is permissible at any stage of the proceedings for purposes of determining the real questions in controversy. In the circumstance, he pray the court to allow amendment of the pleadings by adding the postulated parties as per the Court of Appeal order requires. For determination of this matter, I have carefully considered the submissions of the Plaintiff, the record before me and the relevant laws. In that regard, the issue for determination is whether the joinder of the Registrar of Titles, as directed by the Court of Appeal, can lawfully be adhered to through amendment of the existing suit, or whether compliance with section 6 of the Government Proceedings Act, constitutes a mandatory condition precedent before proceedings involving the Government institution can be maintained. Page. 3

The starting point is section 6(2) of the Government Proceedings Act which provides: "A suit against the Government shall not be instituted and heard unless the claimant previously submits to the Government, Minister, department or officer concerned, a notice of not less than ninety days of his intention to sue the Government, specifying the basis of his claim against the Government, and he shall send a copy of his claim to the Attorney General and the Solicitor General. " To my judgment, the language of the provision is plain, clear and mandatory. The legislature deliberately employed the words "shall not be instituted and heard", thereby making the issuance of a ninety days' notice a mandatory condition precedent to the institution and maintenance of proceedings against the Government or its institutions. As the matter of facts, there is no dispute that the Registrar of Titles is a government institution. Likewise, there is no dispute that the Court of Appeal directed that the Registrar of Titles be joined as a necessary party to these proceedings, in such circumstance therefore, once the Registrar of Titles is brought on board, the proceedings inevitably become proceedings involving a government institution and therefore, attract the application of the Government Proceedings Act. Page. 4

In his submission, the Plaintiff ’ s counsel contended that because the suit was instituted before the Court of Appeal rendered its decision, the addition of the Registrar of Titles should simply be effected through amendment. With respect, I am unable to agree with such misdirection. The Court of Appeal found that the Registrar of Titles was a necessary party. In my considered view, such finding was not made casually. It was made because the presence of the Registrar of Titles was considered indispensable for the complete and effectual determination of the dispute before the Court. The legal consequence of that finding is that the controversy remitted to this Court cannot properly be adjudicated in the absence of the said party. It follows, therefore, that before proceedings involving the Registrar of Titles can be competently maintained, the statutory requirements governing proceedings against Government institutions must first be complied with. Meaning that, such requirements cannot be bypassed merely because the suit was originally instituted between private parties. I am equally unable to accept the Plaintiffs reliance on sections 6(6) and 7 of the Government Proceedings Act. A careful reading of those provisions reveals that they merely regulate the manner in which the Attorney General may be joined as a party or intervene in proceedings involving Government institutions. They neither expressly nor impliedly dispense with the mandatory requirement prescribed under section 6(2) regarding the issuance of a ninety Page. 5

days' notice. It is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that where Parliament employs mandatory language, the Court is bound to give effect to it. therefore, since section 6(2) expressly provides that a suit against the Government shall not be instituted and heard unless the prescribed notice has first been served, the same has to be obeyed. In my firm opinion, the words employed are prohibitory in nature and leave no room for judicial discretion. Furthermore, sections 6(6) and 7 cannot be construed in isolation. They must be read harmoniously with section 6(2). When so read, it becomes apparent that sections 6(6) and 7 merely govern joinder and intervention by the Attorney General, whereas section 6(2) governs the mandatory pre-condition for proceedings involving Government institutions. Consequently, those provisions do not preclude or waive the requirement of serving the statutory notice before suit has been instituted. Accordingly, even where a Government institution is sought to be joined as a necessary party pursuant to an order of the Court, compliance with section 6(2) remains mandatory. The requirement is couched in mandatory terms and must be complied with by the parties before proceedings involving such Government institution can be competently instituted and maintained. Page. 6

The Plaintiff further submitted that a ninety days' notice was served upon the Registrar of Titles, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General on 1st April 2026. While that may be so, such compliance came at a stage when the present suit was already in existence. In my considered view, such compliance does not satisfy the requirement contemplated under section 6(2) of the Act. The law requires the notice to precede the institution of proceedings against the Government. It does not contemplate the issuance of notice after proceedings are already pending and thereafter seeking to validate those proceedings retrospectively. Based on the foregoing, this Court wishes to observe, albeit obiter, that where, in the course of proceedings, it becomes apparent that a Government institution is a necessary party and compliance with section 6(2) of the Government Proceedings Act becomes inevitable, the prudent and legally safe course available to the parties is not to attempt to cure the defect by issuing the statutory notice while the suit is already pending. Rather, the proper course would be to withdraw the suit, issue the requisite notice in accordance with the law, await the expiry of the prescribed ninety days period, and thereafter institute competent proceedings against all necessary parties, including the Government institution concerned. Such a course accords with both the letter and spirit of section 6(2) of the Act, which contemplates that the statutory notice must precede, and not follow, the institution of proceedings involving the Page. 7

Government. Any contrary approach would have the effect of defeating the mandatory nature of the provision and rendering the legislative intention nugatory. The contention that the present proceedings are not a fresh suit but merely an existing suit remitted by the Court of Appeal does not alter the legal position. Once the Court of Appeal directed that the Registrar of Titles be joined as a necessary party, compliance with the mandatory provisions governing proceedings against Government institutions became inevitable. Such compliance had to precede the institution of proceedings involving that Government institution. In fact, the Court of Appeal insisted in its judgment on the compliance of the law. See in Grace Felix Temu vs Grace F. Mrosso (Civil Appeal No. 294 of 2025) [2026] TZCA 150 (27 February 2026), where the court held: “ Consequently, we nullify and quash the proceedings and judgment dated 10 December 2024 and set aside all resultant orders. We order the file to be remitted to the trial court for re hearing upon the appellant joining the aforesaid necessary parties in accordance with the law . ” [emphasis supplied] I have also considered the Plaintiffs reliance on Order I Rule 9 and Order VI Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no doubt that nonjoinder of parties is ordinarily curable and that courts possess broad powers to allow Page. 8

amendments. However, procedural provisions cannot override an express statutory requirement imposed by substantive legislation. It is common knowledge that, where Parliament has prescribed a mandatory condition precedent, such requirement cannot be circumvented through amendment of pleadings. I am mindful that the Court of Appeal has remitted the matter to this Court for rehearing upon joinder of the necessary parties. However, that directive cannot, at any proportion, be interpreted as dispensing with the statutory requirements imposed by the Government Proceedings Act. In my firm view, the joinder directed by the Court of Appeal must itself be effected in accordance with the law. Reliance be in Grace Felix Temu vs Grace F. Mrosso (supra). For the foregoing reasons, I find that the inclusion of the Registrar of Titles as a necessary party attracts the operation of section 6(2) of the Government Proceedings Act. And, since compliance with the statutory notice requirement was not effected before proceedings involving that Government institution came into existence, the defect goes to the root of the proceedings and is incapable of being cured by amendment. In fact, I find the contention raised by the Plaintiff ’ s counsel, that the subsequent service of the statutory notice cured the defect is, with respect, wholly unfounded and legally untenable. Such an argument, in my considered Page. 9

view, amounts to an invitation to this Court to sanction a procedure which is plainly contrary to the express provisions of the law. It seeks, in effect, to transform a mandatory condition precedent into a mere procedural formality capable of retrospective compliance at the convenience of a litigant. Notably, that is not what the legislature intended. In my judgment, I think, and so hold that the requirement under section 6(2) is not an ornamental procedural step to be observed at leisure, nor is it a defect that can be remedied ex post facto after proceedings have already been set in motion. Instead, it is a substantive jurisdictional requirement which must be satisfied before proceedings involving the Government can be competently instituted and maintained. In that regard, to accept the Plaintiffs proposition would not only render the mandatory language employed by Parliament otiose, but would also undermine the very purpose for which the notice requirement was enacted. This Court cannot countenance an interpretation that permits parties to first institute proceedings and thereafter seek to validate them through subsequent compliance. Such an approach would, in my opinion, amount to placing the cart before the horse, and would effectively reduce a statutory command to a matter of choice. Accordingly, all said and done, I find the Plaintiffs contention to be devoid of legal merit and incapable of salvaging the proceedings from the Page. 10

fatal defect identified herein. Consequently, I hold that the present suit is incompetent in law, and is hereby struck out. Given the peculiar circumstances of the matter and the fact that the issue arose following the directions of the Court of Appeal regarding the joinder of necessary parties, I make no order as to costs. It is so ordered. Dated at DODOMA this 1st of June 2026 . S. H HASSAN JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT Page. 11