Fedi Caspary Mvile vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 8689 of 2026; Criminal Case No. 1787 of 2026) [2026] TZHC 2742 (25 May 2026)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (NJOMBE SUB - REGISTRY) AT NJOMBE CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 8689 OF 2026 (Origi nating from Criminal Case No. 1787 of 2026 of Wanging’ombe District Court) FEDI C ASP A R Y MVILE ……………………… … … … ……………………APPELLANT VERSUS THE REPUBLIC ……………………………………………… ………… RESPONDENT JUDGMENT 6 th & 25 th May , 2026 NONGWA, J. T he appellant was indicted before the trial court for an offence of unnatural offence contrary to the provisions of section 154 (1)(a) and (2) of the Penal Code, [ Cap. 16 R.E 2023 ] . It was alleged that, on the 14 th day of September, 2025, at Itamba village within Wanging’ombe district in Njombe region, the appellant, did have carnal knowledge of a boy aged 9 years, the victim herein, against the order of nature. The victim’s true identity is withheld for purpose s of preserving his dignity. The appellant pleaded not guilty as a result; full trial was conducted. The prosecution case was founded on the evidence of seven ( 7 ) witnesses and two ( 2 ) documentary exhibit s which were tendered and admitted in evidence . 2 Summarily, the case for the prosecution runs as follows; on the fateful day, September 14, 2025, during day hours, PW1, the victim, was with his younger brother, PW2 whose identity is also withheld as it may simply expose the victim. The two were sweeping the ground at their mother ’s house at Itamba village when the appellant passed by and welcomed them to accompany him to a nearby river, Mtitifu river, for fishing activities. The two readily agreed and accompanied him to the said river where they started digging for some baits before embarking on fishing, at least that was what the two had thought. However, they never did the fishing as they were directed to proceed deeper in to the bushes where the victim was allegedly tied up by ropes. Both his hands and legs were so tied up and he was then ordered to lie down and take off his trousers although PW2 said that it was the appellant who took off the victim’s trousers . The appellant then took his penis out and inserted it in the victim’s anus. He only left the place after he was done sodomizing the victim and he left both the victim and PW2 at the crime scene. With the aid of his younger brother, the victim was untied and the two went back home where they proceeded to sweep the ground reporting the incident to no one, not even to their mother. PW2’s justification to that was that the appellant threatened and warned them 3 not to inform their mother about the incident or else he would kill them. However, a week after, the victim informed his few schoolmates at Itamba primary school about the ordeal, including PW3 whose identity is also withheld in order to avoid exposing the victim’s true identity. The victim did that on September 22, 2025, on their way back home from the school and named the appellant to be the perpetrator of the incident. His friends kept the matter a secret until after almost two weeks when PW3 communicated the same to PW6 Joshua Frank Mwandenuka, a teacher at Itamba primary school, on October 3, 2025, following Social Welfare Officers’ education on gender - based violence. When the victim was summoned by his teacher, PW6, and asked if he was sodomized just as it was narrated by PW3, he confirmed the same to be correct. He was directed to inform his mother, PW4 whose true identity may expose the victim if revealed. However, he did not inform his mother until September 6, 2025, when he informed her that she had to go to his school so that she could collect a book. Not thinking that anything was off with the information, the victim’s mother accompanied the victim to the school on that very day. On her arrival at the school and upon meeting PW6, she was informed that the victim was sodomized and the victim recounted the 4 same in front of his mother when he was summoned in the office. He, again, named the appellant as the one who had sodomized him. The victim’s mother was advised to report the matter to the local leaders and she did as she was advised. She was, however, forwarded to the police station where she was attended to by PW7 G.8028 Detective Sergeant Advent, a police officer at Wanging’ombe police station. She was supplied with a Police Form No. 3 for purposes of enabling the victim to be treated. She then took her son, the victim, to Wanging’ombe district hospital where the victim was medically examined by PW5 Daima Isaya Kashililika, a medical doctor thereat. However, even before he was examined, the victim was complaining of anal pain and a fter the examination, PW5 concluded that the victim was indeed sodomized for his anus was loose, swollen and bruised. Such findings were filled in a Police Form No. 3 which was admitted in evidence as Exhibit P1. Two days after, the appellant was apprehended but he denied having anything to do with the sodo m y of the victim when he was interrogated. On October 9, 2025, he was taken to the crime scene by PW7 where they were led by the victim. The said PW7 was accompanied with some of his fellow police officers, a social welfare officer, the victim’s mother, and other villagers. Only some grasses could be seen at the alleged 5 crime scene whose sketched map drawn by the said PW7 was admitted in evidence as Exhibit P2. Following closure of the prosecution case, t he trial court was positive that a prima facie case was established against the appellant and it allowed him to defend himsel f, he was the only witness for defence. I n his sworn defence testimony, the appellant, DW1 Fedi Caspary Mvile, shortly distanced himself from the allegations levelled against him. He also said that the victim’s mother once warned to do him harm should he reject having sexual affairs with her. As such, he said that the allegation might have been concocted by the victim’s mother just to do him harm as she promised since he did not succumb to her sexual advances. A fter full trial, that defence of the appellant was rejected on an account of his failure to cross examine both the victim and the victim’s mother. The trial court was confident that the appellant was the perpetrator of the victim’s sodom y and it convicted him as charged . It also proceeded to condemn him to be incarcerated for the rest of his life. That very decision did not appease the appellant. Believing that he is innocent and that justice was not done , he had bumped into the corridors of this court. He fronted four (4) grounds of grievances which, 6 considering the grammatical flaws they are tainted with, are rephrased as follows; One ; That the trial court erred in law by convicting and sentencing the appellant without considering the provision of section 135(6) of TEA, Cap 6 R.E 2023, in relation to the testimonies of PW1, PW2, and PW3. Two; That the trial court erred in law by convicting and sentencing the appellant without assessing the credibility of PW2 who could not run from the alleged scene in order to alert his parents or any other person about the alleged incident. Three; That the trial court erred in law by proceeding with hearing of the matter without considering appellant’s health just as exhibited at page 13 of the typed proceedings thus, violating section 232(1) - (7) of the C P A , Cap 20 R.E 2023 . Four; That the trial court erred in law for its failure to evaluate the whole of prosecution case and disregard the appellant’s insanity. When the matter was tabled for hearing before me, the appellant was fending for himself, unrepresented, whereas Ms. Elece James , learned State Attorney, appeared for the respondent, Republic . Hearing of the matter proceeded orally. Submitting in chief, t he appellant did not have much to say apart from imploring that his appeal be allowed on the basis of the grounds contained in his petition of appeal whose adoption was sought . 7 On her part, the learned State Attorney , Ms. Elece, prefaced her submission by resisting the entire appeal on an account that the appellant was correctly convicted. S he , then, proceeded to respond to the appellant’s complaint in ground 1 by submitting that in terms of the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Deko Faria vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 530 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 128 (10 December 2024 ; TanzLII) , it wa s proper and correct for the trial court to rely on the evidence of the victim of sexual offence , PW1, to ground the appellant’s conviction for the same was proved and believed to be true and reliable. She also reasoned that the victim’s evidence was also corroborated by independent evidence of other witnesses , including PW2 and PW3, thus section 135 ( 6 ) of the Evidence Act , [Cap 6 R.E 2023] , Cap 6 herein, was complied with. As such, it was her view that the appellant’s complaint in ground 1 is baseless. O n t he appellant’s complaint in ground 2 on credibility of PW2 , the learned State Attorney argued that PW2’s credibility could not be doubted on an account of his failure to flee from the crime scene and report the matter to her parents or any other person because it is on record that the said PW2 was 6 years old and that the appellant , who was armed with a machete, threatened to do harm to anyone who would have spoken about the incident. In her considered opinion, however, the appellant’s conviction would still stand in the presence of 8 the victim’s evidence in terms of the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Laurent John vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 210 of 2020) [2023] TZCA 17962 (14 December 2023 ; TanzLII ) which emphasizes that the best evidence on sexual offences comes from the victim. As to the complaint in ground 3, Ms. Elece was of the view that the complained provision of section 232 ( 1 ) - ( 7 ) of the Criminal Procedure Act , [Cap 20 R.E 2023], the CPA herein, was complied with by the trial court for it had no reasons to believe that the appellant was insane and that throughout the trial the appellant presented himself as a completely sane person for he was able to enter his plea, cross examine witnesses, and give his own accounts of defence. Additionally, she submitted that the trial court was even considerate of the appellant’s pleas every single day for it posed to proceed with the matter severally on accounts that the appellant was unwell to proceed with the matter. Thus, she implored the court to find no substance in the appellant’s complaint in ground 3 . Regarding the appellant’s complaint in ground 4, the learned State Attorney argued that the trial court did in fact evaluate the whole evidence properly and that it was correct for the trial court to treat the appellant as sane for there was no reason, whatsoever, that would be taken to suggest that the appellant was insane at any point in time 9 throughout the trial. Her stance was that the complaint is again meritless. Concluding h er s ubmission, the learned State Attorney argued that the appellant was convicted fairly and that his conviction cannot be vacated. She, thus, beseeched the court to find no reason(s) to interfere with the trial court’s findings and dismiss the appeal entirely. Rejoining shortly, the appellant reiterated his earlier stance arguing that his appeal is merited. He added that the charges leve led against him were concocted by the victim’s mother who threatened to do him harm should he reject her sexual advances, which he did . Having considered the oral arguments advanced by the appellant and the learned State Attorney in line with the grounds of appeal which were filed by the appellant and adopted by this court, I have arrived at the conclusion that one pertinent issue will suffice to dispose of this appeal entirely. The said issue is whether there is substance in this appeal. The substance or otherwise of this appeal will depend on determination of some sub issues such as; whether the provisions of section 232(1) - (7) of the CPA was complied with in relation to the appellant’s health; whether the appellant ought to have be en treated as an insane person; and whether the case against the appellant was proved to the hilt. 10 To start with, this being a first appeal, it will take the form of re - hearing. Thus, the appellant will be entitled, in law, to have my own consideration of the entire evidence on record and my very own decision thereon. Indeed, I will subject the entire evidence on record to re - evaluation and accordingly draw my own inference of facts. See Juma Kilimo vs Republic (Criminal Appeal 70 of 2012) [2012] TZCA 51 (9 July 2012 ; TanzLII) and Twalib Omary Juma @ Shida vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 262 of 2014) [2014] TZCA 183 (3 November 2014 ; TanzLII). Being guided by the position of the law above, I will now proceed to deliberate on the issue and sub issues raised hereinabove. In ground 3 , the appellant ’s complaint is that the provision of section 232(1) - (7) of the CPA was disregarded by the trial court in that his health demands were not heeded to. Similar to that, in ground 4, he partly complains that his insanity was not taken into account. However, I am in total agreement with Ms. Elece that the appellant's complaint s are misconceived and the y cannot be accepted. Indeed, the complained provision comes into play when the court trying the accused has reason(s) to believe that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence. And, as rightly argued by Ms. Elece, I do not think that unsoundness of mind of the appellant 11 came into question at any point in time throughout the trial for he was able to enter his plea, cross examine prosecution witnesses, whenever he found it necessary, and proceeded to make his defence. As such, the trial court cannot be faulted or otherwise complained for having failed to comply with the said section 232 of the CPA. If anything, I can only agree with the learned State Attorney that the trial court was more than considerate of the appellant’s pleas in as far as his health condition was concerned. I say so because it is on record that the trial court posed to proceed with the matter whenever the appellant complained to be unwell or when it saw it undesirable for the matter to proceed with hearing including the day when the appellant was suffering from epilepsy. However, without any proof to the contrary, epilepsy cannot be taken to mean that the appellant was insane or that the trial court ought to have treated him as such in terms of the said section 232 (supra). That suffices to dispose of the first two sub issues. The appellant’s complaints in ground s 1, 2, and 4 partly , in my view, are cent er ed on the issue of whether the prosecution was able to prove its case as required, beyond doubt of any reasonable kind. At the outset, however, I feel compelled to restate that, this being a criminal case, it was generally upon the prosecution to prove the case against 12 the appellant a nd the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. As such, it was indeed incumbent on the trial court to direct its mind to the evidence adduced by the prosecution in order to establish if the case was made out against the appellant and that very principle equally applies to an appellate court which sits to determine a criminal appeal. See the cases of Jonas Nkize vs Republic [1992] T.L.R 2 13 ; Christian Kale & another vs Republic [1992] T.L.R 302; Selemani Makumba vs Republic [2006] T.L.R 379; Anthony Kinanila & another vs Republic (Criminal Appeal 83 of 2021) [2022] TZCA 356 (16 June 2022 ; TanzLII); and Malik George Ngendakumana vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 353 of 2014) [2015] TZCA 295 (24 February 2015 ; TanzLII) , where it was held and observed , that : - “ I n criminal cases , the duty of the prosecution is twofold. One, to prove that the offence was committed, and two, that the accused person is the one who committed it. ” As to what is meant by the term beyond reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeal had it clear in Magendo Paul and another vs Republic [1993] T.L.R 219 , where it stated that : - “For a case to be taken to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, its evidence must be strong against the accused person as to leave a remote possibility in his favor which can easily be dismissed.” 13 As hinted in the beginning, the appellant was charged and convicted with unnatural offence contrary to the provisions of section 154 ( 1 ) & ( 2 ) of the Code which provides: - “(1) A person who - a) h as carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature; b) … c) … c ommits an offence, and shall be liable to imprisonment for life and in any case to imprisonment for a term of not less than thirty years . (2) Where the offence under subsection (1) is committed to a child under the age of eighteen years, the offender shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.” Glancing from the provision of the law above, the prosecution was required to prove the following; one, that the appellant had carnally known the victim ; and two, that he did so against the order of nature. By carnally knowing the victim against the order of nature, it had to be proved that the appellant had perforated the anus of the victim . At the trial which is subject of this appeal, the victim and his brother narrated how he (the victim) was carnally known against an order of nature and t hree weeks after commission of the alleged incident, the victim was medically examined by PW 5 , a medical doctor at Wanging’ombe district hospital. Her findings were that the victim’s anus was loose, swollen and bruised , suggesting that the victim was carnally 14 known against the order of nature. Thus, flowing from the evidence of the victim, PW1, and the medical doctor, PW 5 , together with Exhibit P1, it is without doubt that unnatural offence was committed against the victim. However, the question of who was responsible for carnally knowing the victim is what is in dispute. In her support of the conviction and sentence, the learned State Attorney cited the case of Laurent John vs Republic (supra) in which the Court of Appeal reiterated that the true and best evidence in sexual offences comes from the victim of the offence. In the instant case, t he victim had his narration of how he was sodomized by the appellant and his evidence was supported by his brother, PW2, who was with him at the crime scene. On the other hand, however, the appellant distanced himself from the allegations and argued that the same was concocted by the victim’s mother. It is plainly the law t hat any person, who is a competent witness in terms of section 135 of Cap 6, is entitled to credence and his evidence must be accepted and believed, unless there are cogent reason(s) to act differently. See Goodluck Kyando vs Republic [2006] T.L.R 363 . However, it is also the law that no evidence can be acted upon unless it is given under either oath or affirmation. See section 212(1) of the CPA and the cases of Bundala Makoye vs Republic (Criminal Appeal 137 15 of 2018) [2022] TZCA 278 (12 May 2022 ; TanzLII) ; and Cyprian Majura Musiba & Others vs Dorcas Richard Membe (Civil Appeal No. 41 of 2022) [2026] TZCA 387 (2 April 2026 ; Tanz LII) , among many others . Witnesses or children of tender ages are, however, excused from giving their evidence on oath or affirmation, unless they are found to understand the meaning and implication of the oath or affirmation. If they are not knowledgeable of what is meant by the oath or affirmation, they are allowed to give evidence without taking an oath or making an affirmation but they must promise to tell the truth to the court and not to tell any lies. Such a promise must be given before giving evidence. See section 135(2) of Cap 6. However, failure by a child of tender age to promise to tell the truth to the court and not to tell any lies before giving his evidence does not , ipso facto , render his evidence inadmissible in law. In the instant case, the victim and PW 2 are allegedly the only eye witnesses to the commission of the alleged unnatural offence and they took the witness box as witnesses of tender age as they were aged 9 and 6 years, respectively. PW3, though not an eye witness, was also a child of tender age. As such, the three were not necessarily required to give evidence on oath or affirmation, unless they understood the 16 meaning of oath or affirmation. Both the victim and PW3 were positive that they were knowledgeable of what is meant by an oath and so they were sworn before they were allowed to give their evidence. Similarly, PW2 had it clear that he knew what is meant by an oath , which is reasonably not expected from him . However, he was not sworn nor did he promise to tell the truth to the court and tell no lies before he was allowed to testify . That was done for the reasons best known to the learned trial magistrate . In Ms. Elece’s view, evidence of the victim is the best one in the instant case . Admittedly, it is the law that the victim of sexual offence is the best witness and that his or her evidence does not necessarily need to be corroborated. There is plethora of authorities on th at stance. To mention some of them, they entail; Selemani Makumba vs Republic [2006] T.L.R 379 ; and Abiola Mohamed @ Simba vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 291 of 2017) [2021] TZCA 632 (2 November 2021 ; TanzLII) . For ease of reference, in the case of Abiola Mohamed @ Simba vs Republic (supra), for instance, it was held that: - “It is a peremptory principle of law that the best evidence of sexual offence comes from the victim. … The testimony of the victim of sexual offence should not be taken as gospel truth but has to pass 17 through the test of truthfulness .” Emphasis is added. Also, in the case of Mohamed Said vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 145 of 2017) [2019] TZCA 252 (23 August 2019 ; Tanz LII) , the Court of Appeal had the following to say, I quote: - “ We are aware that in our jurisdiction it is settled law that the best evidence of sexual offence comes from the victim [Magai Manyama v. Republic (supra)]. We are also aware that under section 127(7) of the Evidence Act [Cap 6 R.E 2002] a conviction for a sexual offence may be grounded solely on the uncorroborated evidence of the victim. However, we wish to emphasize the need to subject the evidence of such victims to scrutiny in order for courts to be satisfied that what they state contain nothing but the truth . … We think that it was never intended that the word of the victim of sexual offence should be taken as gospel truth but that her or his testimony should pass the test of truthfulness . …” Emphasis is mine . F rom the position of the law above, it is loud and clear that although the victim is taken to be the best witness of sexual offence , he must be credible and should not be believed summarily without taking into accounts matters of coherence, reliability, and other circumstances in as far as his credibility is concerned. In law, credibility of a witness is in the monopoly of the trial court. However, that monopoly is only limited to the demeanour of the 18 witness and the appellate court may determine the same by assessing the coherence of the witnesses’ own accounts or otherwise relating it with the evidence given by other witnesses. See the cases of Director of Public Prosecutions vs Simon Mashauri (Criminal Appeal No. 394 of 2017) [2019] TZCA 805 (1 March 2019 ; TanzLII) ; Nyakuboga Boniface vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 434 of 2016) [2019] TZCA 461 (29 November 20 19 ); Shani Chamwela Suleiman vs Republic (Criminal Appeal 481 of 2021) [2022] TZCA 592 (28 September 2022 ; TanzLII); Abel Orua @ Matiku & Others vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 441 of 2020) [2024] TZCA 78 (21 February 2024 ; TanzLII); and Sospeter Philipo @ Chiga vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 893 of 2023) [2025] TZCA 1099 (13 October 2025 ; TanzLII) , where the Court of Appeal had the following to say: - “ The import of the above decisions is that notwithstanding the fact that the trial court has the exclusive domain in determining the credibility of the demeanour of a witness, appellate courts may determine the same upon assessing the consistency or coherence of the witness’ own evidence or how it relates with other material witnesses including the accused .” In the case at hand, there are several lingering doubts which touches on the credibility of the victim and the surrounding circumstances corroborating his evidence. Those doubts, in my considered view , are suggestive that the evidence of the victim in this 19 case is not a full - length truth. One , although I acknowledge his tender age of 9 years, it is significantly questionable as to why he would not report the alleged unnatural offence by the appellant to his mother or any other person on the very day of the incident. As per the evidence on record, the victim was sodomized on the fateful day but could only report the incident to his friend, PW3, after a week, that is on September 22, 2025, and he gave no reason, whatsoever, as to why he saw it fit for the incident to be so communicated to PW3 just after a week had elapsed since he was allegedly sodomized. Two , the victim did not tell that he was threatened by the appellant or that he was precluded, in any manner, from reporting the matter to his mother at the very earliest opportune moment. Despite staying with his mother, the victim was only prompted to reveal about the incident to his mother three weeks after the alleged incident and he did that only after his mother was summoned at his school. It is quite unfortunate that only PW2 would tell as to why he did not report the alleged incident to his mother. He said that the appellant threatened to kill them if they would have report ed the incident to their mother. However, his evidence was recorded in defiance of section s 212 of the CPA and 135(2) of Cap 6, and the same is not without doubts. 20 Three , a ssuming that PW2’s evidence was properly recorded, I still think that the same could not have save d the day for the said PW2 would not have been precluded from reporting the alleged incident to any person other than his mother by the reason of that alleged threat by the appellant . If the said threat was only conditional that the incident should not be reported to the victim’s mother , PW4, just as PW2 had stated in his unreliable evidence, the said PW2 would still be expected to report the incident to any other person. Four , if it is correct that the victim and his brother, PW2, were threated and warned not to report the alleged incident of unnatural offence to their mother just as it was testified by the said PW2, I do not believe that the victim, who is three ( 3 ) years older than PW2, would have skipped that important piece of facts in his evidence. As such, it can be correctly assumed that the two brothers, the victim and PW2, were not threated by the appellant and precluded from reporting the alleged incident to their mother by the reason of that threat or that if that threat was made by the appellant, the same was not heard by the victim. That makes it plain that the victim would still have proceeded to report the alleged incident of unnatural offence to his mother or any other person at the very earliest opportune moment he had before September 22, 2025, when he decided to report the same to PW3 21 without giving any reason, whatsoever, as to why he decided to report it after a whole week . In my considered view and in the spirit of the law, that unexplained delay by the victim and/or PW2 to report about the alleged incident of unnatural offence to either PW4 or any other person raises questions that are detrimental to the credibility and reliability of the prosecution evidence . I hold that view because it is the law that assurance of a witness’ credibility depends on his utilization of any earliest opportune moment to report about the incident and mention the perpetrator of the offence in question. See Shukuru Moshi @ Elimringi vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 1022 (1 November 2024 ; TanzLII) , where the C ourt stated that: - “ One, the victim failed to report the incident at the earliest opportunity besides testifying that she was raped by the appellant countless times . … The inability of the witness to disclose the name of the perpetrator at the earliest time following the commission of the offence puts to question the reliability and assurance of such evidence and casts doubts to her evidence and prosecution case. … ” [See also the cases of Jaribu Abdulla vs Republic [2003] T.L.R 271; and Damian Manyika @ Babu Tanga vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 306 of 2022) [2024] TZCA 451 (13 June 2024 ; TanzLII ) ]. Flowing from the position of the law above, it is vividly clear that i n absence of any other explanation, the victim’s failure to disclose or 22 otherwise reveal the alleged incident of sodomy to any one for about eight (8) good days leaves a reasonable gap in the case for the prosecution and it gives weight to the explanation given by the appellant in his defence in that the charges leve led against him were concocted and engineered by PW4 who had some misunderstandings with the appellant. In the circumstances of this case, therefore, the appellant who was unrepresented and a layperson cannot be taken to have accepted the victim’s and his mother’s (PW4’s) accounts to be true as reasoned and concluded by the trial court only because of his failure to cross examine the said mother or the victim. See Zakaria Jackson Magayo vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 411 of 2018) [2021] TZCA 207 (19 May 2021 ; TanzLII) ; Issa Reji Mafita vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 337 of 2020) [2021] TZCA 404 (24 August 2021 ; TanzLII) ; and Michael John Kajela vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 487 of 2021) [2024] TZCA 1014 (31 October 2024 ; TanzLII) . F ive , the victim was still reluctant to report the alleged incident to his mother or tell her that she had to go to his school even after the alleged incident of unnatural offence was allegedly communicated to his teacher, PW 6 . In his own sworn words at page 11 of the trial court’s proceedings, the victim stated that : - 23 “He directed me to go and call my mother but I didn’t do so, on another day the teacher also ordered me to go and call my mother, I called her and came at the school.” Again, even when he decided to heed to his teacher’s directives and inform her mother that she was needed by his teacher, the victim lied about what his mother was needed for. His mother stated at page 21 of the trial court’s proceedings that : - “… told me that teacher Mtega told him to tell me to go to school so that he can give me a book.” All that, in my view, put the victim’s reliability in question and cast reasonable doubt in the prosecution case when taken together with unexplained delay by the victim in reporting the incident. Six , there is one other thing that is very hard to comprehend, in my considered view. It is the fact that the victim’s mother who takes care of preparing both the victim and his brother on school days did not, at any point, notice, suspect or see that something was off with the victim ever since the alleged disaster had befallen the victim . Surprisingly, on October 6, 2025, when the victim was taken to the hospital for medical examination, it was revealed that his anus was loose, swollen , and bruised , suggesting that it was forcefully perforated by a blunt object . In my view, it was reasonably impossible for the victim’s mother not to notice anything strange from the victim for more than twenty (20) 24 good days if the victim’s anus was still swollen and bruised after those 20 days. If the victim’s anus was totally perforated, bruised and swollen as shown in Exhibit P1, I think the victim’s mother would have noticed that something was off with the victim within a short period of time as the victim would have complained of severe anal pain severally and/or he would be sitting with difficulties. All those signs would have alerted the victim’s mother and perhaps she would have probed the victim on the actual cause beforehand. Seven , it is also surprising that the victim who had never complained of anal pain, at any point in time, to any person f r o m the fateful day when he was allegedly sodomized by the appellant to October 6, 2025, when he was taken before PW5 for medical examination, would complain of experiencing severe anal pain before he could even be examined by the said PW5. At page 25 of the trial court’s proceedings, the said PW5 was recorded saying the following: - “… I recorded the history of the victim as required by my profession; the victim was complaining for [sic] painful [sic] into [sic] his anus. I went to examine him and discovered that his anus has [sic] some bruises. …” That piece of evidence goes against the suggestion of the prosecution that the victim was sodomized on the fateful day . That is because the victim who had kept quiet not complaining of any anal pain for three good weeks could not be expected to complain of such pain 25 after those weeks. If his complaint of anal pain on October 6, 2025, are taken to be valid, I think it is correct to assume that the complained anal pain could not be taken to have been a result of the alleged incident of unnatural offence which was allegedly committed against the victim on the fateful day . As such, PW5’s medical findings w ould not be reasonably taken to have any link with that alleged incident of unnatural offence of the fateful day notwithstanding her finding that the injuries in the victim’s anus were approximately two weeks old. All these anomalies dent the credibility and reliability of the prosecution case against the appellant. As such, it cannot be concluded, with certainty, that the prosecution prove d its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. And the remaining evidence of other witnesses including PW7, PW 6 , PW3, and others cannot be taken to have anything significant to support the appellant’s conviction. The evidence against the appellant has some significant gaps as I have pointed and reasoned hereinabove and t hose gaps should only be taken to have benefited the appellant rendering the offence , unnatural offence, not proved to the hilt. In the upshot, I am inclined to find substance in the appeal and I allow it. I, therefore, proceed to quash the conviction, set aside the sentence imposed on the appellant, and order that the appellant be 26 released forthwith from custody unless he is otherwise held for other lawful cause. V . M . N ONGWA JUDGE 25 /0 5 /2026 Dated and Delivered at Njombe this 25 th day of Ma y , 2026 in the presence of the appellant via video link from Njombe prison and in the presence of M r . Ipyana Mwantoto , the learned State Attorney for the respondent, Republic . - Right of further appeal is fully explained . V. M. NONGWA JUDGE 25 /0 5 /2026