Mwanaidi Ibrahimu Msuya vs Peter Ulomi (Misc. Land Application No 31114 of 2025) [2026] TZHC 2622 (25 May 2026)

1 | P a g e IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA DODOMA SUB- REGISTRY AT DODOMA MISC. LAND APPLICATION NO 31114 OF 2025 ( Arising from Misc. Land Application No. 51/2025 at Singida District Land and Housing Tribunal and Land Appeal No. 17703/2024 at this Honourable Court, Originating from Land Application No. 21/2021 at Singida District Land and Housing Tribunal) BETWEEN MWANAIDI IBRAHIMU MSUYA………….. APPLICANT VERSUS PETER ULOMI……………………………… RESPONDENT RULING Date of last Order: 04/05/2026 Date of Ruling: 25/05/2026 LONGOPA, J.: On 08 December 2025 the applicant herein instituted an application before the Court seeking the extension of time under section 14(1) of the Law of Limitation Act, Cap 89 R.E. 2023. According to the Chamber Summons the applicant sought for the following orders, namely: 2 | P a g e EX-PARTE 1. That, this Honourable Court be pleased to extend time to the Applicant to file an application for revision out of time and the same be heard ex-parte. 2. That, costs of this application be provided for. 3. Any other order(s) deemed fit to be granted. INTER - PARTES 1. That, this Honourable Court be pleased to extend time to the Applicant to file an application for revision out of time and the same be heard inter- parties. 2. That, costs of this application be provided for. 3. Any other order(s) deemed fit to be granted. This application was supported by the affidavit of Mwanaidi Ibrahim Msuya the applicant herein together with other reasons adduced at the hearing. However, the same was objected by the respondent vide a counter affidavit of Mr. Peter Olomi. On 4 May 2026, the application was heard viva voce whereby the applicant enjoyed the legal services of Mr. Emmanuel Sululu, learned advocate from SM Law Chambers in Singida and the respondent had the 3 | P a g e legal services of Mr. Cheapson Kidumage, learned advocate from Kidumage & Associates (Advocates). The learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. Emmanuel F. Sululu was the first to argue the application. It was Mr. Sululu’s argument that this application was for extension of time to file the revision application to the Court whereby he adopted an affidavit of the applicant to form part of the submission. According to Mr. Emmanuel Sululu, learned advocate, this application arose out of the Application for Execution No 51 of 2025 between the parties to this application whose decision was made on 30 September 2025. That application for execution was led by Zahra Chima, learned advocate for the applicant herein who conducted the case throughout as she appeared given that no witnesses were required until the conclusion of the execution proceedings. It was stated that the applicant was being informed that the matter was ongoing before the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Singida vide a phone between the applicant and the learned 4 | P a g e advocate. The applicant had no knowledge of the existence of decision dated 30 September 2025 until 18 November 2025 after visiting the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Singida on her way to Arusha to visit an ailing aunt. It was at this juncture, when she knew about the decision thus communicated with Zahra Chima on the decision and there was no good communication on that day regarding the failure to be advocate to communicate on the decision. It was added that the applicant sought for the copies of the decision, paid the relevant fees and the receipt was attached forming part of the affidavit in support of the application. It was upon the receipt of proceedings and decision of the Tribunal; the applicant contacted the learned advocate to handle the matter but time for revision had lapsed. This application was preferred by the applicant for extension of time on the following grounds: one, the applicant had no knowledge of the existence of the decision dated 30 September 2025 as her advocate Zahra Chima never communicated to the applicant on the matter. Two, the cause 5 | P a g e of delay was done by an advocate not the party to the case which is not negligence on part of the applicant. The courts have decided that where the delay is caused by the advocate not the party such party to the case should not be penalized as per principle in the case of Caspian Engineering Co Ltd vs Zam Cargo Services Limited [2004] TLR 138, where the Court of Appeal of Tanzania stated that mistakes of counsel should not be visited on the client. Mr. Emmanuel Sululu reiterated that another ground is that the Execution in question is against the decision of the court in Land Appeal No 17703 of 2024 between the same parties where the High Court noted that Peter Olomi never purchased the house but was a tenant. It was ordered that Mwanaidi should refund the amount that was handed over to the applicant purportedly as purchase price. It was on that ground that decision of the High Court was not fulfilled by the District Land and Housing Tribunal which ordered the sale of the house which was not an order of the High Court. 6 | P a g e The learned advocate for the applicant informed this court that extension of time was discretionary powers of the High Court which should be exercised judiciously as the matter is marred by illegalities. He prayed that this court ought to exercise its powers judiciously to grant extension of time to allow the court to have an opportunity to consider the issues in revision so that the matter can be settled once for all. It was added that in case the applicant is allowed to file the revision, the High Court would have an opportunity to satisfy itself on the matter regarding the conduct of the DLHT for Singida to order the sale of the house in question. Furthermore, the learned advocate Mr. Emmanuel Sululu added that during the process of preparation of the application, he advised the applicant to consult Ms. Zahra Chima to swear/affirm an affidavit but due to bad relationship that existed the learned advocate could not affirm an affidavit to support the application. As such, the learned advocate prayed that this application be granted. 7 | P a g e On the other hand, Mr. Cheapson Kidumage learned advocate for the respondent stated having heard the submission for application of extension of time he was of settled opinion that no sufficient ground for the grant of the application existed. This is due to the fact that lack of knowledge of the order of the court for execution that handled by Zahra Chima advocate. It was respondent ’ s submission that the applicant was negligent personally in handling the matter as it was her duty to make follow ups. It would appear the applicant never did anything after instructing the learned advocate to handle the case. At this juncture, it was intimated that making follow ups by phone as alleged by the counsel for applicant is not appearing anywhere in the affidavit in support of the application for extension of time. The applicant was seriously negligent as at all the time prior to the visit to DLHT she never took any action. As such, the counsel for respondent urged this court to disregard statements from the bar that the applicant was making follow ups vide phone as those statements do not appear in the affidavit then the same be disregarded by the Court. 8 | P a g e According to learned counsel for the respondent, the courts are guided by the requirements that parties who are represented by advocates to take keen interests in the handling of the matters before courts of law and not instruct the lawyers and sit aloof without making follow ups on the matters. There are several decisions regarding the role of the party to the case despite having an advocate handling the matter and decided that if the party is not aware of what was going on in court, then that cannot be ground of extension of time. In the case of LIM HAN YUNG and Another vs Lucy Treseas Christensen , Civil Appeal No 219 of 2019 TANZLII [2022)] TZCA 400 (28 June 2022) – The negligence of the advocate does not absolve the party who has not taken-action timely. The court added that party is obligated/ has a duty to closely follow up the progress and status of his case. A party who dumps his case to an advocate and he does not make any follow ups of his case cannot be heard complaining that he did not know or not informed by his advocate on status and progress of the case. 9 | P a g e The learned counsel beseeched this court to be guided by this decision of superior court of the land on this matter as circumstances appear to be similar as the applicant dumped the case the learned advocate, never followed up on the status and progress thus cannot be heard now complaining against the advocate as a means for extension of time. The case cited by applicant should be distinguished as the applicant was negligent as she never made follow ups of the matter personally. This is if the contents of the affidavit in support of the matter is taken as they appear in the affidavit. The affidavit in question appears to be not authentic given that it was the applicant herein who instituted the execution application before the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Singida and allegedly engaged the advocate in question. There is no affidavit from that advocate in support of the application to have been engaged and handled the execution application that was filed by applicant that would have informed your court on any communication barrier that would have prevented the applicant and her advocate to easily communicate on status and progress. 10 | P a g e The submission by the learned advocate for applicant that he advised the applicant to seek an affidavit from Zahra Chima to support the case are only appearing in the submission. There is nothing at all in the affidavit in support of the application. Also, there is nothing on record indicating a Tribunal Clerk informed her about the decision being made but there is no affidavit to such extent. There is nothing indicating existing of travel to Arusha as there is no ticket or anything to make the court believe such story to warrant extension of time. The affidavit contains hearsay as to the person who informed the applicant is neither mentioned nor had sworn or affirmed an affidavit to that extent. It is correctly submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that it is discretion of the court to extend time upon having considered all the prevailing circumstances. It was respondent’s view that he had seen anything legal or reasoning that would entitle this court to exercise its discretion to allow extension of time. There is nothing at all. 11 | P a g e On the illegalities, it was submitted that there are nothing indicated in the decision that would amount to irregularities or illegalities that would entitle this court to extend time for the same to be corrected. According to the respondent’s counsel, t he court had emphasised that there should be account of every day of delay but the applicant did not account anything at all. The applicant got the proceedings and order on 18 November 2025 but remained mute without taking any action until 29 November 2025 when the application was signed prior to filing the same. This is evidence of negligence on the party of the applicant. It was the respondent’s counsel prayer that the application be discarded for being unmeritoriously preferred and the costs of the application be met by the applicant as this application is frivolous in nature. As such, the respondent prayed for dismissal of the entire application with costs. In rejoinder, Mr. Emmanuel Sululu, learned advocate took a stance that the applicant did not dump the case to the learned advocate but she 12 | P a g e took all reasonable steps including going to DLHT to follow up the matter. The decision was attached to validate the actions by the applicant. With regard to the cited LIM case , it was submitted that each case should be determined on its own circumstances. There is nothing on record showing the applicant having dumped the case in question as the applicant is a resident of Dodoma who believed the advocate in Singida to handle the matter. It was reiterated that the decision/principle in Caspian Engineering Co Limited case was the guiding principle on this matter. By having the receipt dated on 18 November 2025 from the Court is indicative that is the time when she became aware of the decision of the court on this matter. With regard to eleven days from the date of the order, the applicant went to Arusha using private car thus there was no bus fare receipt as such, there is no way that receipt for refueling would have stated that he went to Arusha. 13 | P a g e With regard to existence of illegalities, it was reiterated that there are illegalities which would not be mentioned at this stage except if the application is allowed the same would be stated. Finally, the applicant stated that applicant does not infringe the rights of the respondent as if the application is granted the parties would be afforded opportunity to hear both parties. At this juncture, the learned advocate for the applicant prayed that the application for extension of time to file revision application be granted for interest of justice between the parties. Having heard the rival submissions of the parties, this Court is enjoined to determine the validity of application. In so doing, this court has considered the application both the chamber summons and affidavit in support, counter affidavit and applicable legal principles both statutory and case laws in light to the application for extension of time. Having examined all the records before this Court, this court finds it imperative to state at the outset that extension of time involves invoking the exercise of 14 | P a g e discretionary powers of the court which should exercised sparingly and in circumstances which demonstrate existence of sufficient cause. For instance, this position was stated categorically in the case of Yusufu Same & Another vs Hadija Yusufu (Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2002) [2006] TZCA 141 (20 October 2006) (TANZLII), at pages 7-9, the Court held succinctly that: It is trite law that an application for extension of time is entirely in the discretion of the court to grant or refuse it. This discretion however has to be exercised judicially and the overriding consideration is that there must be sufficient cause for so doing. What amounts to "sufficient cause" has not been defined. From decided cases a number of factors have to be taken into account, including whether or not the application has been brought promptly; the absence of any or valid explanation for the delay; lack of diligence on the part of the applicant (See Dar es Salaam City Council v. Jayantilal P. Rajani - CAT Civil Application No. 27 of 1987 (unreported), and Tanga Cement Company Limited v. Jumanne D. Masangwa and Amos A. 15 | P a g e Mwalwanda – Civil Application NO. 6 of 2001 (unreported). In the instant case it is common ground that the decision which is intended to be appealed against was delivered on 1.8.1996. It is also common ground that on 24.10.1996 the respondent, through her advocate on legal aid, filed an application for leave to appeal to the Court. Obviously, this contravened the requirement of Rule 43 (a) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1979 which limits the period for so doing to 14 days of the date of the decision intended to be appealed against. It was about two months out of time. This was caused by the respondent's counsel at that time who mistakenly believed that time started running from 15.10.1996 when he received the necessary documents. Generally speaking, an error made by an advocate through negligence or lack of diligence is not sufficient cause for extension of time. This has been held in numerous decisions of the Court and other similar jurisdictions. Some were cited by the appellants' advocate in his oral submission. But there are times, depending on the overall circumstances surrounding the case, where extension of time may be granted even where there is some element of negligence by the applicant's advocate as was held by a Single Judge of the Court (Mfalila JA as he then was) in Felix Tumbo Kisima v. TTC Limited and 16 | P a g e Another - CAT Civil Application No. 1 of 1997 (unreported). It should be observed that the term "sufficient cause" should not be interpreted narrowly but should be given a wide interpretation to encompass all reasons or causes which are outside the applicant's power to control or influence resulting in delay in taking any necessary step. In order to appreciate existence of sufficient cause for extension of time to file an application for revision, this court finds it imperative to reproduce the whole averments in the affidavit in support of the application. Partly in the averments, the affidavit reveals that: AFFIDAVIT I, MWANAIDI IBRAHIMU MSUYA , an adult, Female, Muslim and resident of area C within Dodoma City, DO HEREBY AFFIRM and state as follows:- 1. That, I am the Applicant in this Misc. Land application and I was the decree holder in Misc. Land Application No. 51/2025 at Singida District Land and Housing Tribunal. 17 | P a g e 2. That, Misc. Land Application No. 51/2025 was filed by M/S. Zahara Chima Advocate at the District Land Housing Tribunal and the same was heard in my absence as I was not informed by my advocate when the same came for hearing. 3. That, after hearing of the miscellaneous application, the same was fixed for ruling in my absence on 30th September, 2025. 4. That, on the material date, ruling was delivered in my absence as I was not informed by my advocate on the date ruling. 5. That, I came aware on the ruling being delivered on 18th November, 2025 when I passed through the tribunal while on my way to Arusha visiting a sick aunt, that when I asked the progress of my case I was told by the tribunal clerk that the ruling on the aforementioned application for execution had already been delivered since 30th September, 2025. Copy of payment receipt for obtaining copy of ruling is hereby 18 | P a g e attached as annexure "MIM- 1" forming part of this affidavit. 6. That, it was upon being told so, I applied for copy of proceedings and ruling of the said Misc. Application for execution and started to look for advocate who could assist me to file application for revision challenging the order(s) issued by the trial tribunal chairperson which are contrary to the orders issued by this Honourable Court in Land Appeal No. 17703/2024. 7. That, the delay to file an application for revision in time was not deliberately done but it was beyond my control as I was not informed by my advocate on the date of ruling and what was ordered therein. Dated and Signed at Singida this .2.1..... day of 2025. APPLICANT VERIFICATION: - I, MWANAIDI IBRAHIMU MSUYA, the Applicant herein do hereby verify that all what is stated above in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 inclusive are true to the best of my knowledge. 19 | P a g e Verified at Singida this ....... day of 2025 Conversely, the counter affidavit refuted the averments in the affidavit in support of the application. The challenging of the affidavit was premised on lack of the affidavit from the named advocate to support averments of the applicant in the affidavit, nor the affidavit of the tribunal’s clerk on informing the applicant about the decision in the application for execution. The counter affidavit is hereby quoted in verbatim partly to reiterate the position. It states that: I, PETER ULOMI, Christian Male, Adult and Resident of Minga Maduka Saba Area, Singida Municipality being the Respondent herein, having read the Affidavit of MWANAIDI IBRAHIM MSUYA, ostensibly in support of the application for extension of time within which to lodge the alleged application for Revision, HEREBY SWEAR and STATE as follows in reply thereto. 20 | P a g e 1. That, the contents of paragraph 1 of the Applicant’s affidavit are noted. 2. That, the contents of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Applicant’s Affidavit are disputed vehemently and the Applicant is put to strict proof thereof. The Respondent state further that the allegations are irrelevant to the application as her duly instructed Advocate, the said ZAHARA CHIMA’s attendance to the matter was sufficient attendance by the Applicant to the tribunal the rest were personal arrangements between them which did not hinder the Applicant to ensure that she is kept informed of the progress of her matter. All these demonstrate how negligent or disinterested the Applicant was in following her matter. 3. That, the contents of paragraph 5 of the Applicant’s Affidavit are vigorously refuted as being untrue as there is no affidavit of the said tribunal clerk to prove that the Applicant was informed by him/her of the delivery of the Ruling and that prior to that the Applicant was unaware. Further, the facts are only a design of the Applicant who knew everything before the time to take the appropriate action in time as the Applicant has failed to even mention 21 | P a g e the name of the alleged tribunal clerk who informed her on 18TH November 2025 as alleged or at all. 4. That, in addition to what is stated in paragraph 3 herein above, there is no any affidavit of ZAHARA CHIMA, Learned advocate to confirm that she conducted the matter from the institution to its finality without informing the Applicant of what was going on with her case as such the allegations are unproven since even annexure “MIM – 1” is neither proof of lack of knowledge on the progress of the matter nor proof that the payments made therein were in respect of a Ruling on Misc. Land Application No. 51 of 2025 but only proof of the date she made payment to Wizara ya Ardhi which is irrelevant to our matter. 5. That, the contents of paragraph 6 of the Applicant’s Affidavit are without any proof as no proceedings are annexed as part of the affidavit of the applicant so as to show when she did obtain them and further the orders issued by the trial tribunal’s Chairperson are not contrary to what this Honorable Court issued in respect of Land Appeal No. 17703/2024 as alleged or at all. 22 | P a g e 6. That, the contents of paragraph 7 of the Applicant’s Affidavit are without any merits as all that has been stated by the Applicant in her affidavit are demonstrative of how negligent she was in following up her case. I, PETER ULOMI, being the Respondent herein DO HEREBY VERIFY that what has been stated in paragraphs 1 are true to the best of my own knowledge and those stated in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are according to the advice I received from CHEAPSON LUPONELO KIDUMAGE, ADVOCATE which I verily believe to be true. A serious perusal of both affidavit and counter affidavit, this court is satisfied that the sufficient cause for extension of time is premised on two main aspects. One, that delays were not caused by negligence on part of the applicant rather the learned advocate instructed to handle the case one Ms. Zahara Chima, learned advocate. Two, that the decision is seriously marred by illegalities or irregularities. With respect to the first issue as per averments raise two main aspects namely inaction of the advocate in handling the matter leading to 23 | P a g e delays to take an action and legal implications of mentioning another person in an affidavit without another affidavit from that person in support of the application. In the case of Franconia Investment Ltd vs Tib Development Bank Ltd (Civil Application 270 of 2020) [2021] TZCA 563 (30 September 2021) (TANZLII), at page 4, the Court had this to say: The law is clear that if an affidavit mentions another person, then that other person should also take an affidavit. See the case of Sabena Technics Dr. Limited vs. Michael Luwunzu , Civil Application No. 451/18 of 2020 (unreported) citing Benedict Kiwanga vs. Principal Secretary Ministry of Health , Civil Application No. 31 of 2000 and NBC Ltd. vs. Superdoll Trailer Manufacturing Company Ltd , Civil Application No. 13 of 2002 (both unreported also). In the same vein, I think, an advocate cannot purport to depose on a client's financial position but that such a deposition should be made by the client himself by affidavit. My conclusion is that the fact of financial crisis on the part of the applicant was not established. 24 | P a g e Also, in the case of Jamillah Hassan Muyonga vs Almas Charles Muvungi (Civil Application No.199/17 of 2022) [2023] TZCA 17365 (30 June 2023) (TANZLII), at page 4, the Court held that: The law is clear that if an affidavit mentions another person, then that other person should also take an affidavit. See the case of Sabena Technics Dr. Limited v. Michael J. Luwunzu , Civil Application No. 451/18 of 2020 (unreported) citing Benedict Kiwanga v. Principal Secretary Ministry of Health, Civil Application No. 31 of 2000 and NBC Ltd v. Superdoll Trailer Manufacturing Company Ltd, Civil Application No. 13 of 2002 (both unreported also), whereby the Court held that: "... an affidavit which mentions another person is hearsay unless that other person swears as well." It is on record that Paragraphs 2, 4 and 7 of the applicant’s affidavit in support of the application mentions one Ms. Zahara Chima, learned advocate to have been handling the application for execution and did not inform the applicant timely on the hearing of the application for execution, decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal as well information on delivery of the decision against the applicant. 25 | P a g e Also, the contents of Paragraph 5 of affidavit mentions the Tribunal’s Clerk to have informed the applicant about the existence of the decision in the execution application. The tribunal’s clerk was obliged to have sworn or affirmed an affidavit to the extent that he/she informed the applicant on existence of the decision of the tribunal which is subject of this application. However, there is no affidavit(s) in support of these averments from the said advocate Ms. Zahara Chima, learned advocate nor the tribunal’s clerk relating to the information related to the decision of the Court. Given that no affidavit from the mentioned persons is on record, it is conclusive that the information regarding the applicant being informed by such tribunal’s clerk as well as inaction by the advocate for the applicant in the matter leading to the decision is hearsay without any iota of evidence. It is settled law that offending paragraphs of an affidavit can be severed by expunging the offending paragraphs then weigh the remaining paragraphs if they same can support the application. In case the remaining 26 | P a g e paragraphs still support the case then the application cannot be struck out. The vice versa is true. That position was demonstrated in Jacquiline Ntuyabaliwe Mengi & Others vs Abdiel Reginald Mengi& Others (Civil Application 332 of 2021) [2022] TZCA 748 (1 December 2022) (TANZLII), at pages 23-24, where the Court succinctly observed that: It is well settled that affidavits are to be confined in facts and have to be free from extraneous matters - (See Ignazzio Messina v. Willow Investment SPRL , Civil Application No.21 of 2001 (unreported) where the remedy to the affidavit which contains such extraneous matter is to expunge such offensive paragraphs or disregard them to allow the Court to proceed with the hearing and determination of the application basing on the remaining paragraphs. On this, we are guided by the decision in the case of Chanda & Company Advocates (supra) where the Court while citing the case of Phantom Modern Transport (1985) Limited (supra) stated as follows: "Where the offensive paragraphs are in consequential, they can be expunged leaving the substantive parts of the 27 | P a g e affidavit remaining intact so that the Court can proceed to act on it." At this juncture, the contents of Paragraph 2, 4, 5 and 7 of the applicant’s affidavit in support of the affidavit should be expunged from the record as they are based on hearsay. In respect of the second limb regarding the impacts of negligence of the advocate, the law is fairly settled. The principle in the case of Jubilee Insurance Company (T) Ltd vs Mohamed Sameer Khan (Civil Application 439 of 2020) [2022] TZCA 623 (12 October 2022) (TANZLII), at pages 14-15, the court observed that: It should also be emphasized that the negligence of an advocate or his ignorance of the procedure, is not an excuse and does not constitute a sufficient cause for extension of time. In Exim Bank (TZ) Ltd v. Jacquilene A. Kweka , Civil Application No. 348 of 2020 (unreported) the Court stated, among other things, that: " ... firms are manned by lawyers who ought to know court procedures. In fact, failure of the advocate to act within the detect of law cannot constitute a good cause for enlargement of 28 | P a g e time." Further, in the case of Omar Ibrahim v. Ndege Commercial Services Ltd, Civil Application No.83 of 2020 (unreported) the Court stressed that neither ignorance of the law nor counsel's mistake constitutes good cause. It was further held that Lack of diligence on the part of the counsel is not sufficient ground for extension of time. See also Wambura N. J. Waryuba v. The Principal Secretary Ministry of Finance & Another , Civil Application No. 320 of 2020 (unreported). Moreover, in the case of Speed Security Limited vs Hussein Abdallah Kaniki & Another (Civil Application No. 142/12 of 2023) [2024] TZCA 311 (7 May 2024) (TANZLII), at page 16, the Court stated that: But even if I were to agree with Ms. Lyasenga and attribute the tardiness or inaction to Mr. Myovela, the most I can do is to feel pity for the applicant, but such feeling of pity would not culminate in the granting of extension of time for, it is trite law that, negligence of an advocate cannot constitute good cause for extension of time. See: Umoja Garage v. National Bank of Commerce [1997] T.L.R. 109; and Omari R. Ibrahim v. Ndege Commercial Services Ltd , Civil Application No. 83/01 of 2020 (unreported). In the latter, this Court held: I 29 | P a g e sympathise with the applicant. If what he has deponed in his affidavit is true, then the advocate who handled the matter was professionally negligent…. However, this is not a Court of sympathy but it is a Court of law. There is a chain of authorities that an error of an advocate is not sufficient reason under rule 8 for extending the time." As result, even if the contents of Paragraph 2,4 and 7 of the applicant’s affidavit in support of the application would have survived expunging from the record yet cannot pass the test of established principle that inaction of an advocate for a party to a case cannot exonerate such party from the failure to act timely thus cannot form basis of a sufficient cause to warrant granting of extension of time. It is on record that in the complained application for execution, the applicant herein being the decree holder is the one who instituted the application for execution. The applicant was duty bound to handle the matter with diligence and care to extent that engaging an advocate does not exonerate the party to a case from exercising diligence. 30 | P a g e At this juncture, this Court concurs with submission by the learned counsel for the respondent on applicability of principle in Lim Han Yung & Another vs Lucy Treseas Kristensen (Civil Appeal 219 of 2019) [2022] TZCA 400 (28 June 2022) (TANZLII), at page 22, where the Court held that: It is also our considered view that even if the appellants were truthful in their allegations against their erstwhile advocates' inaction, negligence or omission, which generally, does not amount to good cause, they themselves share the blame. The appellants cannot throw the whole blame on their advocates. We think that a party to a case who engages the services of an advocate, has a duty to closely follow up the progress and status of his case. A party who dumps his case to an advocate and does not make any follow ups of his case, cannot be heard complaining that he did not know and was not informed by his advocate the progress and status of his case. Such a party cannot raise such complaints as a ground for setting aside an ex parte judgment passed against him. Conclusively, on this limb of inaction, it can be observed that the applicant being the decree holder who instituted the application for 31 | P a g e execution of the decree proceedings was duty bound to make close follow up on the status and progress of the case. She cannot be heard complaining about her own advocate of choice to handle the matter. The applicant demonstrated negligence for leaving all the conduct of the affairs of the case to her advocate without any serious follow up. Thus, the inaction of the application has resulted into consequences that the applicant must bear. In respect of illegalities as another major limb of the application, this court notes that the same does not fit within the parameters of extending time solely on illegalities. In appreciation of the matter, it is pertinent to articulate the general principle on illegality as a sufficient ground for extension of time and consider the available facts if they meet the criteria in question. The principle on illegalities is lucid in the case of Josephat Joseph Mushi and Another vs Tanzania Postal Bank Plc and Another (Civil Appeal No. 86 of 2022) [2024] TZCA 1174 (3 December 2024) (TANZLII), at pages 6-8, where the Court noted that: 32 | P a g e The law is settled that illegality of the decision sought to be challenged is one of the accepted grounds for extension of time. Our next enquiry is what the term "illegality" entails: The term 'illegality' is not a bottomless pit where every legal error can be dumped into. This Court in Charles Richard Kombe v. Kinondoni Municipal Council [2023] TZCA 137, TANZLII and Kabula Azaria Ng'ondi and 2 Others v. Maria Francis Zumba and Another , [2023] TZCA 162, TANZLII dealt with the issue of illegality. The Court quoted the definition of the term 'illegality' from the Black's Law Dictionary 11th Edition , page 815, which provides: "1. An act that is not authorised by law. 2. The state of not being legally authorised. Further, the Court cited the definition provided by Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure where the learned authors at page 1381 stated: "It is settled law that where a court has jurisdiction to determine a question and it determines that question, it cannot be said that it acted illegally or with material irregularity, merely because it has come to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even of law. It is also the law that for an application to succeed on the ground of illegality, such ground must be apparent on the face of the impugned decision. 33 | P a g e In Glorious Andrew Mjema vs Revocatus Mtolera & Another (Civil Application No. 750/01 of 2023) [2025] TZCA 573 (6 June 2025) (TANZLII), at pages 6-7, the Court held that: Two, the alleged illegality is not the one which can be seen by a person who is riding. Therefore, whether or not the decision of the High Court is tainted with illegality, it needs such a long-drawn process. Therefore, the alleged illegality is not worth it to warrant the grant of extension of time. It is on record that the only aspect that the applicant stated about the illegalities was that arguments would be raised and well-articulated at revision stage if the application is granted. It was mentioned by passing that the illegality relates to the variance between the decision of this Court in land appeal between Peter Ulomi vs Mwainaidi Ibrahimu Msuya (Land Appeal No.17703 of 2024) [2024] TZHC 11158 (31 December 2024) (TANZLII). This court is of the settled view that the question of illegalities does not hold water at all to warrant this Court’s grant of extension of time to file an application for revision out of time. The reasons are mainly two 34 | P a g e namely absence of the impugned decision which is intended to be challenged and failure to demonstrate existence of any illegalities on face of record. While it is settled law that illegalities is a ground for extension of time but for it to warrant such exercise of judicial discretion there are three aspects that must co-exist. One, the illegality should be of significance nature. Two, the illegalities should be on face of decision discoverable by or easily seen by a person riding and does not entail long drawn process. Third, minor irregularities which do not go to the root of the case should be ignored thus insufficient to warrant extension of time. Given that all averments in the affidavit in support of the application did not refer and attach the impugned decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Singida in terms of ruling and drawn order/decree, it is impossible for this court to ascertain existence of any of the above criteria for determination of the illegality as a sufficient cause for extension 35 | P a g e of time. There is nothing on record for this court to have a glance to ascertain if on face of record illegality can be discerned. It was the duty of the applicant to account for every day of delay as per the principle in the case of Felix Ernest Johanes vs Johannes Francis (Civil Application No. 373/02 of 2023) [2024] TZCA 741 (16 August 2024) (TANZLII), at pages 4-5, the Court noted that: Another factor to be considered in the application of this nature is whether the applicant has accounted for each day of delay. The requirement of accounting for each day of delay has been emphasized by the Court in numerous decisions, for instance, the case of Bushiri Hassan v. Latifa Lukio Mashayo , Civil Application No. 3 of 2007 (unreported) and Finca (T) Limited and Another v. Boniface Mwalukisa , Civil Application No. 587/12 of 2018 [2019] TZCA (15 May 2019) As all Paragraphs of the applicant’s affidavit in support of the applicant have not addressed at all the accounting of each day of delay, the application for extension of time to file an application for revision out of time fell short of proof of the civil cases. 36 | P a g e In the case of Equity Bank Tanzania Limited vs Prudence Alibalio Katangwa (Civil Appeal No. 324 of 2024) [2026] TZCA 337 (24 March 2026) (TANZLII), at pages 8-9, the Court held that: It is settled general rule of law that he who alleges must prove the allegations. The rule finds a backing from section 110 and 111 of the Law Evidence Act Cap 6 R. E. 2002 now is sections 117 and 118 of R. E. 2023 which among other things state: 110 "Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist .” 111 "The burden of proof in a suit lies on that person who would fall if no evidence at all were given on either side." See also the case of Godfrey Sayi v. Anna Siame (Legal representative of Mary Mndolwa) , Civil Appeal No. 114 of 2012 (unreported). Undisputedly, in civil cases, the party with legal burden also bears the evidential burden and the standard in each case is on a balance of probabilities. 37 | P a g e The applicant failed miserably to demonstrate before this Court that sufficient cause exists to warrant this court to grant extension of time to file an application for revision within time. At this juncture, it is settled and informed position of this court that the applicant did not manage to prove that the application for extension of time to file application for revision out of time was meritorious. The application for extension of time therefore stands dismissed for being devoid of merits with costs. It is so ordered. DATED and DELIVERED at Dodoma this 25 th day of May 2026. E.E. LONGOPA JUDGE 25/05/2026.