Imani Jackobo Makubo and Others vs Masumbuko Thomas Nditu (Land Appeal No. 33081 of 2025) [2026] TZHC 2516 (22 May 2026)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REP UBLIC OF TANZ ANIA (MWANZA SUB - RE GISTRY) AT MWANZA LAN D APPEAL NO. 33081 OF 2025 ( O riginating from Land Application No. 12 of 2024 in the District Land and Housing Tribuna l for Sengerema at Sengerema) IM ANI JACKOBO MAKUBO … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … .. 1 ST APPELLANT KWANGU JAMES MALIMI … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 2 ND APPELLANT JOVINI VEDASTUS MUTAGWABA … … … … … … … … … … … … … . 3 RD APPELLANT VERSUS MASUMBUKO THOMAS NDITU … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … .. RESPONDENT JUDGMENT 8 th & 22 nd May, 2026 KAMANA, J . Before the District Lan d and Housing Tribun al (DLHT) for Sengerema, the respondent, Masumbuko Thomas Nditu, sued the appellants, Imani Jacko bo Makubo, Kwangu James Malimi and Jovini Vedastus Muta gwaba. T he crux of the matter was the respondent ’ s clai ms that the appellants had trespassed o nto his piece of land measuring 50 acres located at Sotta Village, Igalula Ward in Sengerema District. A mongst the orders prayed by the respondent was a declaration t hat he is a lawful owner of the di sputed land. D uring the preliminary stage, the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the written statement of defence filed by the appellant 2 was filed out of the prescribed time. Mr. Bugoti, learned Counsel , who was representing the appellants , con ceded to the objection and the written st a tement of defence was s truck out. Following the striking out of the written statement of defence, the DLHT order ed the matter to proceed ex parte against the appellants. After hearing the respondent ’ s case, the DLHT , amongst other orders, dec l a red the r e spondent a lawful owner of the disp uted land. Aggrieved , the appellants preferred this appeal which is premised on six grounds as fo l low s: 1. That, to the extent that the suit involves trespass to the landed property, the Hon. trial Chairperson of Sengerem a District Land and Housing Tribunal erred both in fact and in law for failure to str ike out the Application for want of proper description of the suit property. 2. That, to the extent that evidence on records indicates that the property in dis pute was subje c ted to valuation by Sotta Mining Corporation Ltd for compensation purposes, the Hon. trial Chairperson of Sengerema District Land and Housing Tribunal erred both in fact and in law for failure to struck out the Application for non - joinder of Sotta Mining 3 C orporation Ltd or failure to order the Sotta Mining Corporation be joined as a necessary party. 3. That, the Hon. trial Chairperson of Sengerema District Land and Housing Tribunal erred both in fact and in law for failure to struck out the A pplication for m i sjoinder of parties and cause of actions. 4. T hat, the Hon. trial Chairperson of Sengerema District Land and Housing Tribunal erred both in fact and in law his finding that the Respondent proved his case to the required standard. 5. That, the Hon. trial Chairp e rson of Sengerema District Land and Housing Tribunal erred in law for issuing a decision that was not certain regarding the size of the disputed area. 6. That, the trial Chairperson of Sengerema District Land and Housing Tribunal erre d in for determining the suit ex - parte. H aving been served with the memorandum of appeal, the respondent r aised a preliminary objection that the appe al is incompete nt in this Court as the appell ant had to exhaust available remedies in the DLHT. In the interest of time, I ordered the parties to argue both the preliminary objection and the appeal by written submission s . 4 Submitting in sup port of the objection, Mr. Angelo Nyaoro, learned C ounsel for the respondent, began by restating the legal principles governing the setting aside of ex parte judgments. He argued that under Order IX Rule 13(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 [RE. 2023 ], a judgment debtor may apply to have an ex parte judgment set aside upon demonstrating sufficient cause for his failure to appear when the matte r was directed to proceed ex parte . The learned Coun sel submitted further that when the judgment debtor does not fault the decision to proceed ex parte , but faults the correct n ess of the ex parte judgment, the recourse is to appeal against such jud gment u nder section 70(2) of the Code. In supporting his contention, he cited the c a s e o f Dangote Industries Limited Tanzania v . Warnercom T. Limited , Civil Appeal No. 13 of 2021 - C A T (Unreported) [2022] , where it was state d: ‘ This rule of setting aside an ex parte decree will only benefit a defendant But there ar e two possible scenarios in an ex parte decree. One, a defendant might not want to set aside an ex parte decree but may wi sh to contest the findings of the award . Two, a plaintiff notwithstanding that 5 the decree is in his favour, might n evertheless wish to challenge the finding of the award . ’ Mr. Nyaoro further submitted that where a judgment debtor is aggrieved bo th by an o rder directing the matter to proceed ex parte and by the merits of the resulting ex parte judgment, the proper course is first to apply for setting aside the ex parte proceedings before resorting to an appeal. He contended that this requirement i s anchored on the principle that a litigant ought not to invoke the jurisdiction of a higher court while an effective remedy remains available before the trial court. G uided by the view he held, Mr. Nyaoro contended that the memorandu m of the appeal at hand contain grounds which fau lt the merit of the ex parte judgment and the order to proceed ex parte. He argu ed that since the sixth grounds faults the trial court to proceed ex parte, the appeal is incompetent as such order could only b e set aside by the trial DHL T an d not t his Court. Reinforcing his argument, the learned Cou nsel cited the case of Pangea Mineral s Ltd v . Petrofuel (T) Limited and 2 Others , Civil Appeal No. 96 of 2015 - CAT (Unreport ed) , in which it was held: ‘ On the basis of the above provision and auth orities, it is settled that where a defendant against whom an ex - 6 parte judgment was passed, inten d s to set aside that judgment on the ground that he had sufficient cause for his absence, the appropriate remedy for him is to fil e an application to that effe ct in the court which entered the judgment . In the instant appeal, there is no doubt that both th e main and cross appeals are, among others, challenging the trial court for proceeding with the matter ex par te. ’ As to the way forwa rd, Mr. Nyaoro implored t h is Court to strike the appeal with co sts for being incompetent. In so doing, he pleaded this Cou r t to be guided by the position of the apex Court in the case of Pangea (supra) where it was held: ‘ In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the appellants have lodged the appeal and the cross appeal prematurely without exhausting all the available reme d ies in the High Court, hence rendering the same incompetent. Eventually and for the foregoing reasons, the incompetent appeal and the cross appeal are hereby struck out with costs. ’ In rebutta l, Mr. Heri Kayinga, le arned Counsel for the appellants, prefaced his argument s by considering his counter - party ’ s submission as 7 basel ess. Concerning the cited case of Pangea (supra) , he held the view that the said is di s tinguishab le from the present ca se . He argued that in the said case, the Court of Appeal was de aling w ith an issu e in which the defendant failed to appear which was not the case in the i nstant matter where the written statement of defence was struck out fo r being filed out of time. In the said case , the Court of Appeal stated: ‘ On the basis of the above provision and authorities, it is settled that where a defendant against whom an ex parte judgme nt was passed, intends to set aside that judgment on the grou nd that he had sufficient cause for his absence, the appropriate remedy for him is to file an application to that effect in the court which entered the judgment . ’ As regards the case of Dangote (supra) , Mr. Kayi nga held the same view he had when distin gui shing the case of Dangote (supra) fro m the in stan t case. In that context, the learned Counsel subm itted that wh e re an ex - parte judgment is no t a result of mere non - appearance but a result of a final determination on a point of limitation, the remedy of s etting aside is not available. H e argued that the proper remedy , under such 8 circumstan c es, is to appeal again s t the final judgment and challenge the interlocu tory rulings on limitation as part of that appeal. Mr. Kayinga contended that the order striking out the written statement of defence and t he one refusing leave to apply for ext ension of time were , so f ar a s the DLHT was concerned , final and rendered such DLHT functus officio. Gi ven that he contended that the appella nts c ould not file an application f or setting aside the ex - parte judgment before the very DLHT that struck out their written statement of defenc e . I have earnestly considered the competing arguments of the learned Counsel for both parties . W ithout repeating the ir submissi ons, I am of the considered opinion that when the impu gned judgment is an ex parte one, an aggrieved party is no t allowed to challenge by way of an appeal both t he order to proc eed ex parte and the correctness of the ex parte judgment. If aggrieved by the order to pro ceed ex parte , the aggrieved party must first seek to set aside the order to proceed ex parte instead of challen ging the said order through an a ppeal. In takin g this position, I supported by the position of the Court of Appeal in the case of Dangote (sup ra) , whe re it was held: ‘ It would appear to us to be the principle in the said authorities that, where the defen dant intends to challenge 9 both the order to proceed ex parte and the merit of the findings in the ex parte judgment, he cannot challenge the mer it of the findings before dealing with an applicatio n to set aside the ex parte judgment first. This principle i s based on the long standing rule of procedure that, one cannot go for appeal or other actions to a higher court if there are remedies at the lo wer. He has to exhaust all available remedies to the lower court first. ’ This posi tion was clearly followed by this Cou rt ( Ebrahim, J) in the case of Flora Nelson v. Lazaro William Halinga, PC Matrimonial Appeal No. 9 of 2022 - HC (Unreported), in which it was stated: ‘ However, in addressing the issue further, the Court of Appeal in Dangote's case made a clear posit ion in a case where the defendant seeks to challenge both the order to proceed exparte and the merits of the findings of the exparte jud gement t hat in such circumstances, the defendant shall have to apply to set aside the exparte judgement first. ’ Gu ided by that position, I went th r ough the records and found that on 17 th September, 2024, the DL HT struck out the appellants ’ wri tten 10 statement of def ence for being filed out of time. It then proceeded to order ex p arte hearing which the appellants , through the six th gro und of ap peal, complain that the DLHT erred in issuing the said order. T hat being the case , I asso ciate myself with Mr. Nyaoro ’ s cont ention that the app ellants , through the si xth g round of appeal , are challenging the order of the DLHT to proceed ex parte against them while the res t of the grounds challenges the merit of the im pugned ex parte judgment . This means , as rightly contended by Mr. Nyaoro, that the appellants are challenging both the order to proceed ex parte and the correctness of the e x pa rte judgment. It rescuing the appeal, Mr. Kayinga contended that the order striking out the written statement o f d efence was a final one a nd hence the DLHT could not overtu rn it as it was functus officio. H e argued that the remedy of setting aside th e order to proceed ex parte is available to the defendant who failed to appear before the court o n the date scheduled for a hearing and not to a defendant whose written statement of defence was struck out for limitation reaso ns. I have considered this ar gum ent and found that Mr. Kayin ga ’ s position is supp orted by regulation 11 of the Land Disputes Cou rts ( the District Land and Housing Tribunal) Regula tions, 2 003 [GN No. 174]. 11 According to the said regulation, when the duly served respondent fails to appea r on the date set for a h e aring and in the absence of good cause justifying the non - appear ance, the DLHT is bound to proceed ex parte against th e respondent. It is further provided under such regulation, that the respondent has a right to apply for setting aside the order to proceed ex parte against him. This means that regulation 11 does not cater for circumstance s in which the respondent ’ s writt en statement of defen ce is struck out for limitation reasons. However, I am alive to the position that whe n the said regulations are inadequate, the DLHT ought to apply the Civil Procedure Code. This is provided under section 55(2) of th e Land Disputes Co urts Act, Cap. 216 [RE. 2023] as fo llows: ‘ (2) The District Land and Housing Tribunals shall apply the regu lations made under section 56 and where there is inadequacy in those regulation s it shall apply the Civil Procedure Code. ’ That being t he position o f the law, I am of the considered view tha t under Order VII I R u l e 1 4 (1) and (2) o f t h e C o d e , wh en the court issues an order to proceed ex p arte against the defendan t for his failure to timely file a written statement of defence, the court has di scretion to 12 set aside the order to proceed ex parte. The setting aside is open when the defenda nt fur nishes good reas ons and when the application for setting aside the order to proceed ex parte is made before the delivery of ex parte judgment. Order V III Ru le 14(1) and (2) read s: ‘ 14 . – (1) Where any party required to fil e a written statement of defence fails to do so wit hin the specified period or where such period has been extended in accordance with subrule (3) of rule 1, within the period of such extension, the co urt shall, upon proof of service and on oral application by the plaintiff to proceed ex parte, fix the date for hearing the plaintiff’s evidence on the claim. (2) Where before ex - parte judgment has been entered pursuant to subrule (1) the court may, if the defendant assigns good cause, set aside the order to pr oceed ex parte, upon such terms as the court may di rect as to costs or otherwise. ’ My reading of Order VIII Rule 14(1) and (2) co nvinces me that the appellants could use the said Order to seek the se tting aside of the order to proceed ex parte against them if they would have failed to file 13 the written statement of defence within the prescribed time. H owever, the circumstances of this matter dictate othe rwise. In his submissi on, Mr. Kayi nga concentra ted on the order that struck out the written statement of defence cont en d ing that the same was a final order that cou ld n ot be overturned by the DLHT as it became functus officio. In this regard, I a gree with him that even if the appellants would employ Or der VIII Rule 14, the ultimate goal of filing the written statement of defence would not be att ained. This is becau se, assuming that the DLHT would have set aside the order to proceed ex parte, still the DLHT would not have the jurisdiction to overturn i ts order that struck out the written statement of defence. In that case, the whole exercise of setting aside the order to proceed ex parte would be meaningless. Order VIII Rule 14 could have been properly employed if there would be no order striking out th e written statement of defence. In view o f this, I am o f the considered view that although the appellants chall enge the or der to proceed ex parte through th is appeal, the fact that the setting aside of the said order would be meaningless as the DLHT h as no jurisdiction to overturn its order tha t struck out the written sta tement of defence, the irregulari ty is not fatal. In ot her 14 words, this appeal ’ s competency cannot be a ffected by the appellants ’ failure to seek the setting aside of the order to proceed ex parte which , if granted, would not change the status so far as the striking out o f the written statement of defence is concerned. In that c as e, I dismiss the preliminary objection. Now turning t o the appeal, Mr. Kayi nga combined the firs t , fourth an d fifth grounds of appeal. H e pref aced his a rguments by submitting that under Order VII Rule 3 of the Code, it is imperative to properly desc rib e the suit property if such prop erty is an immovable one. H e held the view that the prope r description of the pr opert y is necessary to en able the court to pass a decree that is e xecutable and afford the defendant to understand a clearly defi ned claim . Mr. Kayinga contended that the decree that was iss ued by t he DLHT was nullity as the DLHT did not declare the resp ondent a lawfu l owner of the definite 50 acres but rather declared him a lawful o w ner of the estimated 50 acres. He held the view that since t he DLHT was uncertain as to the size of the dis puted land, it remains that the respo ndent failed to prove hi s case to the required standard. 15 In supporting his contention, the learned Counsel cited the case of Yahaya Mandia v. Kalim Soa , C ivil Appeal No. 112 of 2023 - CAT (Unreported), in whic h it was held: ‘ Omission by the appellant to particularise the acreage and ne ighbourhood of the disputed piece of land, would make it difficult or impossible to determine the actual size of the piece of land to which he is entitled... In no circumstances should a court of law make order to allocate or apportion land whose acreage a nd location is not specifically stated for the obvious reasons that, description of the land being litigated t he acreage of which is omitted for whatever reason, lacks essential and crucial particular. ’ H e further cited the cases of Olorubare Nginyu v. Kil empu Kinoka Laizer , Civil Appeal No. 416 of 2021 - CAT (Unreported); Abbas Anthony Kilumile & Another v. Felomena Peter Mawata @ Taliyamale , Civil Application No. 262 of 2024 - CAT (Unreported ) . Mr. Kayinga submitted that the DLHT ’ s u ncert ain ty regarding the size of the dis puted property was precipitated by the resp ondent ’ s contradictory testimony. He am pli fied that while under the application, the r espondent claim ed to be declar ed a lawful own er of 50 ac res , his 16 testimony reveals that 28 acres out of the 50 acr es he claimed were already acquired and he was duly compensated. In that context, the learned Counsel contended that the DLHT was unjustified to declare the respondent a lawful owner of the estimated 50 acres. He submitted t hat although the respondent testified that out of th e eight trespassers, the four tres passers surrendered his land measuring 2.25 acres, he failed to mention the name of the fourth trespasser . Howeve r , he held the view that the respondent ’ s failure to mention the name of the fourth t respasser and the size of the la nd he surrendered create s a seriou s gap in his evidence. M r. Kayinga advance d an argu me nt that the respondent ’ s case was tainted with contradictions , omissions and mathematical impossibilities. H e argued that while the resp ondent clai med to be a lawful owner of 50 acres, he conceded that he claims only 32 acres out of 50 acres which is mathematically impossible considering that he admitted to have received com pensati on for 28 acres. Responding , Mr. Nyaoro pre faced his arg u men ts by supporting Mr. Kayinga ’ s p osition so f ar as the principles stated in the cases of Mandia (supra) ; Nginyu (supra) and Kilumile (supra) . However, despite 17 conceding to his counter part ’ s position, he contended th at the said pri nciples are inapplicable to the ci rcumstances of this case. He argued that in the cited case, the pleadings contravened Order V II Rule 3 , while in this ca se , the application u nder paragraph 3 properly described the di sputed land. T he learned Counsel augmented that in framing th e issues, the DLHT used the description to frame the iss ue as to whether the respondent is a lawful owner of the disputed property. H e added that the sal e ag reeme nt that was admitted as Exh. PE1 describes the suit property. Mr. Nyaoro submitted that as a matter of principle , un survey ed land , if it is the subject matter of the suit, should be described by not only size but a lso via boundaries and names o f owners of a djacent parcels of land. In this regard, he cited the case of Nginyu (supra) , in which th e apex Court had this to state: ‘ We have considered the counsel rival submissions and we were persuaded that, the amended plaint omitted t o disclose the boundaries and names of owners of the adjacent parcels of land, being particulars necessary to describe t he suit property. ’ 18 Concerning the contention that the DLHT was uncertain as to the size of the disputed land, Mr. N yaoro contended that the declaratio n that the respondent is a lawful owner of the land estimated to be 50 acres does not render the de cree d efective or the respondent ’ s claims un proven. I n his rejoinder, Mr. Kayinga maintained his submission in chief. In determin ing the first ground , I hasten to agree with both learned Counsel that und er Order VII Rule 3, a plaint or an a pplication , in the context o f this ma tter , must disclose particulars of the disputed land to enable its identificatio n. Order VII Rule 3 reads: ‘3. Where the subject matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it and, in case such property can be identified by a title number under the Land Regist ration Act, the plaint shall specify such title number.’ In the m atter at hand , the disputed land is unregistered one. That being the case , as correctly, a rgued by Mr. Nyaoro, the respondent was duty bound to describe the disputed land by size , boundaries and names of the persons owning parcels of land adjacent to the disputed land. See: Nginy u (supra) . 19 Applying the princip le to the facts o f this case, I am of the considered view that the responden t properly described the disputed land . According to paragraph 3 of the affidavit, the respondent s tated: ‘ 3. Maelezo na anuani ya e neo la mgogoro; - Lipo Kijiji cha Sotta katika Kitongoji cha Kaningu B kata ya Igal ula , wilaya ya Sengerama Jijini Mwanza. - Eneo ni Ekari 50 , upande wa Kaskazini limepakana na shamba la Nganiko Mash ila , upande wa Kusini limepakana na shamba la mama Sato Matulanya na mli ma , upande wa Mashariki lime pakana na sh amba la Kisumo Mwema , upande wa Mag haribi limepakana na mlima . ’ In my view, guided by t he case of Ngi n yu (supra ) , the respondent sufficiently des cribed the di sputed land. Given that, the first g round is devoid of merit. I n determining the fourth ground that the DLHT erred in conclu ding that the respondent proved the case to the required standard, as the first appellate Court , it is apposite to re - evaluate the 20 evidence and come to a conclusion that is premised on the evidence adduced. In the examination in chief, the respondent mai ntained that he is a lawful owner of the 50 acres he purchased in 2014 from Furaha Lubinza. To support his contention , h e ten dered the sale agreement which was admitted as Exh.PE1. According to Exh.PE1, the r espondent purchased the 50 acres from Furaha Lub inza. In that c ontext, I am satisfied that the respondent purchased the 50 acres from Furaha Lubinza. However, when questioned by the assessors to clarify his testimony adduced in examination in chief , the respondent stated that out of the 50 acres, 28 a cres were valued and compensation was paid in respect thereof. He further testified that the portion allegedly trespassed upon measured 32 acres. I have co nsidered this evidence and am of the view that despite claiming that he is a lawful owner of the 50 acres, the res pon dent , at the time when he was testifying, was no longer a lawful owner of the 50 ac res. This is due to his testimony that the 28 a cr es forming part of the 50 acres he purchased from Furaha Lubi nza were valu ed a nd he was com pensated. 21 Th is means that the respondent proved to own the rem ainin g land after the acquisition of 28 acres . His testimony that he rema ined with 32 acres was challenged by Mr. K ayinga that the same was taint ed with mathematical impossibilities. I agree with Mr. K ayinga that deducting 28 acr es from the 50 acres, the respondent ought to remain with 22 acres and not 32 acres. Th e arithmetical error , in my opinion, is not fatal. Given that, I partly allow the fourth ground to the extent that the re spondent only proved ow ne rship of 22 acres and not 50 acres as alleged in h is application. Concerning the fifth ground that faulted the DLHT for issuing a decision that was not certain regarding the size of the disputed area , following my holding wh en determ i ning the f ourth grou nd, I am of the considered view th at the ground has been overtak en by events. The same stands dismissed. Coming to the second and third grounds, Mr. Kayinga contende d that Sotta Mining Corporation Ltd was a necessary part y to the application that led to this appeal. H e argued that the Corporat ion is responsible for identifying land owners who wou ld be affect ed by its project and compensating them . In that context, Mr. Kayinga conte nded 22 that the Corporation w as supposed to be joined as necessary party to c larify which part of the 50 acres, the 2 8 acres were acquired . The learned Counse l submitted that the DLHT erred in allowing the joinder of the three ap p ellants in the said application w ithout eviden ce of joint liability. He argued that b y lumping all th ree together, the DLHT denied each a ppellant the opportunity to defend against a particularized claim. In response, Mr. Nyaoro subm itted that Sotta Mining Corporatio n Ltd was not necessary in determining the land disp ute between the parties. He cont ended that the land dispute had n othing to do with compensation issues. In de termining the second ground of appeal, I find merit in the submission by Mr. Nyaoro that the dispute before the DLHT essentially concerned the ownership of the disputed land and not the issue of compensation . The central qu estion for determination was whether the respondent had established lawful ownership of the disputed land as against the appellant s . It is my considered vie w that t he mere fact that part of the land may previously have been acquired by Sotta Mining Corporation Ltd and compensa tion paid did not, by itself, transform the dispute into one 23 concerning compensation or render the said C orporation a necessary party to the proceedings. No relief was sought against Sotta Min ing Corporation Ltd, nor was the DLHT called upon to determi ne the legality, adequacy or propriety of the compensation process undertaken by that entity. In law, a necessary party is one whose presence before the court is indispensable for the effect ual and complete adjudication of all issues in controversy. In th e present matter, in my opinion, the DLHT was capable of determining the competing claims of ownership between the parties before it without affecting the legal rights or obligations of Sotta Mining Corporation Ltd. Furthermore, the DLHT was not invited to cancel any title, invalidate any acquisition process or issue any enforceable order against the said C orporation. Consequently, its absence from the proceedings occasioned no prejudice to t he parties and did not impair the jurisdiction of the DLHT to adjudi cate upon the ownership dispute placed before it. I therefore agree with Mr. Nyaoro that Sotta Mining Corporation Ltd was not a necessary party to the proceedings before the DLH T . I di s mi ss the second ground. 24 As regards the third ground of appe al, I am not persuaded by Mr. Kayinga ’ s submission. I am o f the considered view that the joinder of the appellants occasioned ne ither injustice n or prejudice against them. The record demonstrat es that the appellants were joined in the proceedings on account of their alleged trespass onto disputed land. Although the matter eventually proceeded ex parte against them following the striking out of their w ritten s tatement of d efence, the ex parte nature of the proceedings did not, in itself, render their joinder improper. Eq ually, I do not find merit in the argument that the decree became uncertain merely because the disputed land was estimated at 50 acres without specifying the exact portion attributab le to each appellant. The issue before the DLHT was essentially whether th e respondent had proved entitlement to the disputed land as against the appellants collectively. The absence of individualized allocation of acreage to each appellant did not occasio n procedural injustice so as to vitiate the proceedings . The third ground is dismissed. In the final analysis, I partly allow the appeal to the e xtent stated herein . For the avoidance of doubt, the reliefs granted by th e DLHT remain undistur bed save that they should remain operative in the 22 25 acres which the respondent successfully proved to be his. S ince the appeal is partly allowed, ea ch party shall bear its costs. O rder accordingly. Right of Appeal Explained. DATED at MWANZA this 2 2 nd May, 2026. KS KAMANA JUDGE