CRDB Bank PLC vs Ndama Shabani Husseni (Civil Appeal No. 3456 of 2025) [2025] TZHC 8616 (19 December 2025)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (IN THE SUB-REGISTRY OF DAR ES SALAAM) AT DAR ES SALAAM. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3456 OF 2025 (Appeal from the decision of the Resident Magistrate ’s Court of Dar es Salaam at Kisutu [Hon. Mhini, SRM] dated 30 th December 2024, in Civil Case No. 199 of 2023) CRDB BANK PLC. …………………………………………………………. APPELLANT VERSUS NDAMA SHABANI HUSSENI......................................................RESPONDENT JUDGMENT Date of last order: 21/11/2025 Date of Judgment: 19/12/2025 A.A. MBAGWA, J. This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court of the Resident Magistrate of Dar es Salaam at Kisutu. The factual background leading to the institution of this appeal can be summarized as follows: The respondent holds Account No. 0250227593400 with the appellant under the name of Ndama Shabani Husseni. On 3 rd January 2020, the respondent received a payment of USD 89,990.00 (equivalent to TZS 206,977,000.00) from Fredrick Wamulume for logistics services rendered in transporting goods from the Dar es Salaam Port to Lusaka, 2 Zambia. The respondent continued to transact through the said account until late January 2020, when he was denied access. Subsequently, on 13 th May 2020, the appellant issued a letter informing the respondent that the account had been frozen pursuant to the directives from the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and Financial Crimes Unit (FCU). It was contended further that, upon making inquiries to the FIU and FCU, the respondent was instructed to submit all supporting documents related to the transaction, including contracts, bank slips, and his passport, the instructions which he duly complied with. Despite the respondent’s consistent efforts to seek clarification over his account, the same remained unlawfully frozen for over two and a half years, without any justification or formal explanation offered to the respondent. According to Mr. Ndama (PW1), the appella nt’s conduct in freezing the respondent ’s account beyond the lawfully permitted period of six months demonstrated a malicious and deliberate intent to deprive him of access to his hard- earned funds; as a result, the respondent had suffered significant harm and detriment. Consequently, the respondent resorted to instituting Civil Case No. 199 of 2023 (the suit) before the Court of the Resident 3 Magistrate of Dar es Salaam at Kisutu (the trial court) against the appellant. Upon service, the respondent ’s claims were vehemently countered by the appellant through a written statement of defence. The appellant (then, the defendant) strongly contended that the alleged claim was misplaced and baseless. She clarified that she was only acting in compliance with lawful directives issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions as contained in the prohibitory notice dated 20 th January 2020. The appellant, therefore, disputed the plaintiff’s claims on the ground that they were unfounded. In proving his case, the respondent (then the plaintiff) was the sole witness (PW1). Besides, he tendered several documentary exhibits, to wit, The Bank Statements for CRDB, KCB, and NBC (Exhibit P1 collectively), the Transport Agreement, and copies of passports for Fredrick Wamulume (Exhibit P2 collectively) and t he letter from the appellant dated 13.05.2020 (Exhibit P3). In brief, the respondent recapitulated the averments in the plaint. PW1 finally maintained his prayers in the plaint. The appellant paraded two witnesses, namely, Mr. Boaz Mbupila, Risk and Compliance officer (DW1), and Mr. Brian Donald Odala, Legal Officer 4 (DW2). Similarly, the defence side tendered two documentary exhibits, to wit: t he copy of the letter dated 15 th January 2020 from the FIU to CRDB Bank PLC (Exhibit D1) and the Director of Prosecution’s Order dated 20 th January 2020 (Exhibit D2). Essentially , the defence witnesses reiterated the averments in the written statement of defence. In the event, the appellant prayed the trial C ourt to dismiss the suit with costs. Having heard and analysed the evidence for both sides, the trial Court found that the respondent’s case was sufficiently established and proceeded to order the appellant to pay the respondent TZS 32,410,023.12/= as specific damages and TZS 30,000,000/= as general damages. Aggrieved by the said decision, the appellant knocked on the doors of this Court by way of an appeal, armed with six grounds as follows; 1. That the trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by entertaining the suit, which was out of the prescribed time, and therefore, acting without jurisdiction. 2. The trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to evaluate evidence, thereby making a defective decision and seriously lacking in reason. 5 3. The trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by deciding the matter in favour of the respondent based on weak evidence which did not prove the case to the required standard. 4. The trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding specific damages which were not quantified and strictly proved by the Respondent. 5. The trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by shifting the burden of proof to the appellant contrary to the law. 6. The trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding general damages arbitrarily. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant was represented by Mr. Jovinson Kagirwa, learned advocate, whereas the respondent had the services of Mr. Robert Kipingili, also learned advocate. By consent of the parties, I ordered the appeal to be disposed of by way of written submissions. I appreciate both counsel for their enriching submissions. I have dispassionately read and considered the rival submissions, but I will not reproduce them. It is noteworthy that, in his written submission, the appellant’s counsel consolidated the 2 nd and 3 rd grounds and argued them conjointly, whereas 6 the 1 st , 4 th , and 6 th grounds were argued independently. The 5 th Ground was dropped forthwith. In determining this appeal , I will start with the 1 st ground of appeal, which touches the jurisdiction of the trial C ourt to determine the suit. In t he 1 st ground of appeal , the appellant complains that the trial C ourt erred in law and fact by entertaining the suit, which was out of the prescribed time and thus acting without j urisdiction. Mr. Kagirwa argued that the trial C ourt lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter, as the suit was time-barred, contrary to the provisions of Part I, Item 1 of the Schedule to the Law of Limitation Act [Cap 89 RE 2019] , now [ Cap 89 R.E 2023 ] (the LLA) . He further argued that the trial Court erred in applying S ection 16 of LLA in dismissing the appellant’s preliminary objection, as the respondent failed to adequately plead and substantiate the reasons for the delay in the plaint, as mandated under Order VII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code [Cap 33 R.E 2023] (the CPC). The appellant’s counsel strongly submitted that since the respondent’s cause of action is, in nature, failure to do an act in accordance with the law, then the plaintiff’s case ought to have been instituted within one (1) year from the accrual of rights. He added that the ground relied upon by the trial Magistrate 7 that the issue of time limitation should be overruled, merely because there was a leave to withdraw and refile the suit, is misconceived. He opined that, in law, the grant of leave to refile a suit is always subject to the law of limitation. Reliance was put on Order XXIII Rule 2 of the CPC. He prayed the C ourt to find merit in this ground and consequently allow the appeal. In reply, Mr Kipingili, learned counsel for the respondent, had a contrary view. He briefly submitted that the trial Court rightly excluded the period of the respondent’s disability in computing the limitation period. He also relied on Section 16 of the LLA to support his submission. He contended that the cause of action accrued from 20 th July 2020 to 4 th March 2021, which amounts to 7 months and 10 days only. He argued that the r espondent was incarcerated from 4 th March 2021 to 2 nd February 2022, a period that is exclud ed in computing time under Section 16 of the LLA. He insisted that, upon release, the r espondent promptly filed Civil Case No. 79 of 2022 on 30 th March 2022, which he later successfully prayed to withdraw the same with leave to refile on medical ground s . He strongly argued that the respondent’s health issues and incarceration were brought to the court’s attention during the hearing of the raised 8 preliminary objection at the trial C ourt. He insisted that paragraph 12 of the plaint clearly averred that the respondent was sick. To bolster his submission, he cited to me the case of Fortunatus Lwanyantika Masha & Another vs Claver Woshi Limited (Civil Appeal No. 144 of 2019) [2022] TZCA 433 (18 July 2022). He concluded that the 1 st ground of appeal is baseless and prayed for the same to be dismissed. Having gone through the records of this appeal, I am in agreement with Mr. Kagirwa's submission that the suit was time-barred, for reasons that will soon be apparent. It is on record that on 20 th January 2020, the appellant herein received a prohibitory notice issued by the Director of Public Prosecution s requiring her to freeze the respondent’s account (Exhibit D2). Similarly, on 13 th May 2020, the appellant issued a letter to the respondent denying him access to his account in compliance with the DPP’s prohibitory notice ( Exhibit P3). Moreso, the respondent pleaded that he made an inquiry at the FCU and FIU concerning the closure of his account. Looking critically and holistically at the plaint, it is clear that the respondent’s claims were predicated on the unlawful closure of his account after the expiration of six months prescribed by the law. Basically, the prohibitory notice was issued as per Section 34 (2), (3) and (4) of the 9 Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act, [Cap. 329 R.E 2023 ] (the PCCA) , which provides; ‘’ 34. (2) Where the Director of Public Prosecutions has reason to believe that any person having illicitly received or acquired an advantage or property, he may by notice addressed to that person or to any other person to whom the advantage, property, the proceeds or money value, or any part of the proceeds or money value, the advantage or property money is believed to have been transferred or conveyed by the person suspected of having illicitly received or acquired it or by an agent of such person, directing the person to whom the notice is addressed not to transfer, dispose of or part with the possession of the property or money value specified in the notice. (3) The Director of Public Prosecutions may, subject to subsection (1), issue a notice to any other person to whom the money or property under this section may pass by operation of law. (4) Every notice issued under subsection (2) shall remain in force and binding on the person to whom it is addressed for a period of six months from the date of the notice or, where proceedings for an offence under this Act or any other written law in relation to the advantage 10 or property commenced against any of such person until the determination of those proceedings. ’’ [Emphasis added] It is a position of law , as rightly submitted by both parties, that the time limitation for claims which are founded on the failure to do an act or omission in accordance with the law is one year. See: Part I, item 1 of the schedule to the LLA. However, exceptional circumstances are provided for under Section 16 of the LLA to exclude days on which a person was under disability to institute proceedings. Moreso, the law is very clear, and this was admitted by counsel for the respondent when citing the case of Fortunatus Lwanyantika (supra), that the plaintiffs under disability may sue outside normal limits if pleaded in the plaint. Similarly, it is a trite law, under Order XXIII Rule 2 of the CPC, that an order for withdrawal of a suit with leave to refile does not exempt the subsequent proceedings from the application of time limitation. Thus, reckoning from 20 th July 2020, when the prohibitory notice was deemed to expire, up to 21 st September 2023, when this suit was filed in court, it follows that the suit was instituted out of the prescribed time of one year in terms of Item 1 of Part I to the Schedule of the LLA. The Court of Appeal in the case of Vision Control a nd Superintendence LT D vs MSK Refineries LTD , 11 Civil Appeal No. 601 of 2023, CAT at Dodoma from page 7 to 8, put the position clear that an order to withdraw the matter with leave to refile it is subject to the time limitation prescribed by the law. The Court held: ‘ As correctly submitted by Mr. Mnyele, the extent of the court's order should have been limited to the grant of the prayer for withdrawal of the suit with leave to refile but subject to the law of limitation. In such a situation, it would be the duty of the appellant to take into account the accrual of the cause of action and take necessary steps including applying for the Ministerial order extending the period within which the appellant could institute judicial proceedings out the prescribed timelines. As the learned counsel for the respondent maintained in his submissions, contrary to Mr. Fungo's submissions, a court order cannot override the law of limitation. To this argument we entirely agree and, we also wish to add by way of emphasis that, while the courts can interpret the law and consider some instances that might form the basis for extension or suspension of the limitation period, they cannot arbitrarily or blindly disregard the prescribed time limits for filing suits or initiating any other legal proceedings. We thus accept Mr. Mnyele's arguments on this score and we have no reason whatsoever to hold that there was perversity in the trial court's finding that the suit subsequently filed by the appellant was time-barred. ’ 12 The respondent relied on paragraph 12 of the plaint in justifying his health condition so as to be covered by Section 16 of the LLA. It is my holding that the said argument was an afterthought as properly submitted by counsel for the appellant. I hold so because Civil Case No. 79 of 2023 was instituted out of the prescribed time, and nothing was stated in the plaint to account for the whereabouts of the respondent from 20 th July 2020, when his rights to sue accrued. For purposes of completeness, I deem it imperative to reproduce the contents of paragraph 12 of the plaint. It goes: ‘’ That the matter was previously before Hon. Kabate R-PRM as Civil Case No. 79 of 2023 and due to the plaintiff’s sickness , we had to pray to withdraw the matter with leave to refile on the 13 th June 2023, and the court granted the prayer.’’ (Emphasis added) The above-quoted paragraph does not indicate that the respondent considered himself time-barred before instituting the suit. Moreover, he did not plead or annex any documents to the effect that he was incarcerated. Faced with a similar situation, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania in the case M/s. P & O International Ltd vs The Trustees 13 of Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) (Civil Appeal No. 265 of 2020) [2021] TZCA 248 (9 June 2021) at page 12 of the Ruling had this to say; “It is clear from the pleadings that the appellant never considered that she was time barred so as to plead exemption from limitation. To bring into play exemption under Order VII rule 6 of the CPC, the plaintiff must state in the plaint that his suit is time barred and state facts showing the grounds upon which he relies to exempt him from limitation. With respect, the plaint has done neither .” (Emphasis added) Since the respondent did not bring his suit within the ambit of Order VII rule 6 of the CPC, I agree with Mr. Kagirwa that the suit should have been dismissed under section 3(1) of the LLA for being time-barred. As the suit was time-barred, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate it and pronounce judgment from which an appeal could lie to this Court. As a result, I nullify the proceedings of the trial Court in Civil Case No. 199 of 2023 for being incompetent. Consequently, I quash and set aside the judgment and decree therefrom. The appeal is therefore allowed. 14 However, considering the chequered history of the matter as explained above, I order each party to bear its costs. It is so ordered. Dated at Dar es Salaam on this 19 th day of December 2025. A.A. Mbagwa JUDGE 19/12/2025