Geofrey Gregory Isote vs Michael Richard Kachoma and Others (Land Case No. 32419 of 2024) [2025] TZHC 8609 (19 December 2025)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA DODOMA SUB-REGISTRY AT DODOMA LAND CASE NO. 32419 OF 202 4 GEOFREY GREGORY ISOTE (The Administrator of the Estate of the late Gregory Mwakaje Isote) . ....... .... ..... . …. PLAINTIFF VERSUS MICHAEL RICHARD KACHOMA …………………………..……… 1 ST DEFENDANT KEFA KAKA …………………………………………………………… 2 ND DEFENDANT EMMANUEL CHONJO ……………………..………………............ 3 RD DEFENDANT EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF DODOMA CITY COUNCIL …........4 TH DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER FOR LANDS ……………………………….....… 5 TH DEFENDANT REGISTRAR OF TITLES ………………………………………...….. 6 TH DEFENDANT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL …………………………….………..… 7 TH DEFENDANT RULING 12 th and 19 th December 2025 KISANYA, J.: The Plaintiff, Geofrey Gregory Isote, instituted this suit in his capacity as the Administrator of the estate of the late Gregory Mwakaje Isote. He seeks, among other reliefs, a declaration that the land described as Plot Nos. 13 & 14, Block “O”, Mbwanga, Dodoma Municipal, held under Certificate of Title No. 33053- DLR (hereinafter “the suit land”), together with all developments thereon, is the lawful property of the late Gregory

2 Mwakaje Isote. The Plaintiff further seeks declarations that the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants are trespassers on the suit land, an order for vacant possession, mesne profits amounting to TZS 15,000,000, general damages of TZS 1,000,000,000, compensation for loss of use of the land in the sum of TZS 200,000,000, and other consequential reliefs. In addition, he prays for a declaratory order that any transfers or transactions purportedly effected by the 4 th to 7 th Defendants transferring the suit land to the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants are null, void, and illegal. The Plaintiff’s case is that the late Gregory Mwakaje Isote, who was also known as Gregory Isote and Gregory Manase Isote, passed away on 9 th September, 2022, leaving behind several properties, including the suit land, for which a Certificate of Title was issued by the 6 th Defendant on 21 st July, 2017. The Plaintiff further avers that, while discharging his duties as the Administrator of the deceased’s estate, he discovered that the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants had taken occupation of the suit land and had erected permanent residential structures thereon. According to him, such occupation and developments were undertaken without the consent of the deceased during his lifetime and without the consent of the Plaintiff as administrator. It is alleged that each of the said Defendants constructed a residential house on the land, with the 3 rd Defendant also erecting a perimeter fence.

3 The Plaintiff further avers that upon confronting the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants and requesting them to vacate the suit land, they asserted that they were lawfully in occupation, claiming to hold certificates of title and building permits in respect of the same suit land. This prompted the Plaintiff to conduct an official search at the relevant land registry of the 6 th Defendant, which, according to him, revealed that the suit land remained registered in the name of the deceased and had not been lawfully transferred to any of the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants. The Plaintiff further asserts that efforts to resolve the matter amicably proved unsuccessful. Consequently, he issued the requisite statutory ninety-day notice to the relevant public authorities and thereafter instituted the present suit. Conversely, the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants each filed separate written statements of defence, disputing the Plaintiff’s claims and asserting ownership of their respective plots, namely Plot No. 139 Block A, Plot No. 167 Block AE, and Plot No. 156 Block AE, each of which has been issued with a certificate of title. The 4 th to 7 th Defendants filed a joint defence, noting the Plaintiff’s claim of ownership of the suit land but disputing other factual allegations. In conclusion, all Defendants prayed that the suit be dismissed with costs.

4 Based on the pleadings, the Court framed three issues for determination, namely, whether the late Gregory Mwakaje Isote lawfully owned Plot Nos. 13 and 14, Block O, Mbwanga; whether the 1 st to 3 rd Defendants were lawfully allocated or owned plots within the same area and had made developments thereon; and the reliefs to which the parties are entitled. During the trial, the Plaintiff called two witnesses, PW1 and PW2, and tendered seven documentary exhibits. The 1 st and 2 nd Defendants each testified as the sole witness in their cases, featuring as DW1 and DW5. The 3 rd Defendant (DW3) called an additional witness, DW4, and also tendered two documents, admitted as Exhibits D1 and D2. The 4 th to 7 th Defendants collectively called one witness, appearing as DW1. It emerged from the evidence adduced by PW2 and some Defendants that the suit land contains several houses and plots which do not belong to the 1 st to 3 rd Defendants. Following the close of the defence case, the Court visited the locus in quo to ascertain whether the suit land coincided with the plots claimed by the 1 st to 3 rd Defendants, to observe the developments on the disputed property. It was noted that approximately twenty houses and plots exist on the suit land, some belonging to parties not before the Court.

5 Consequently, the Court invited submissions on whether non-joinder of necessary parties arises and the appropriate remedies or consequences. At the instance of the parties, the issue was canvassed by way of written submissions, which were duly filed within the timelines set by the Court. The Plaintiff was represented by Mr. Ambroce Nkwera, learned counsel; the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants were represented by Mr. Seiph Wembe, Mr. Christopher Malinga and Ms. Amina Hamisi, learned advocates, respectively; while the 4 th to 7 th Defendants were represented by Mr. Erasto Baluwa, learned State Attorney. In response to the issue raised by the Court, Mr. Nkwera submitted that the 1 st to 7 th Defendants are necessary parties, unlike others who are not joined in the case as proper parties. He argued that a necessary party is one whose presence is indispensable for the court to make an effective order, even if no distinct cause of action exists against them. To support his argument, he cited the case of Tang Gas Distributors Limited vs Mohamed Salim Said and 2 Others (Civil Application for Revision No 68 of 2011) [2011] TZCA 583 (25 August 2011). It was contended that the 4 th to 7 th Defendants were joined as necessary parties because they could provide evidence on the allocation and transfer of title deeds, whereas the 1 st to 3 rd Defendants were alleged

6 trespassers. According to the learned counsel, the suit land was originally allocated to the late Gregory Mwakaje Isote, and any transfers to the 1 st to 3 rd Defendants are null and void. Mr. Nkwera further argued that non-joinder or misjoinder of other occupants should not defeat the suit. To bolster his argument, he referred the Court to Order 1, Rules 9 and 10 of the Civil Procedure Code [Cap. 33 R.E. 2023], and the case of Mussa Miraji Mussa vs Morogoro Municipal Council and Others (Land Case No. 25157 of 2024) [2025] TZHC 5257 (31 July 2025). He went on to submit that the Plaintiff cannot identify all other occupants and had properly filed the suit against the 1 st to 7 th Defendants, against whom relief can be granted. In view of the foregoing, the learned counsel urged the Court either to join additional parties if necessary or proceed to determine the merits, emphasizing that the Plaintiff, as dominus litis, cannot be compelled to sue parties against whom no relief is sought. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Defendants were unanimous that the non-joinder of other individuals occupying portions of the suit land constitutes a fatal defect, as the presence of all necessary parties is indispensable for the Court to issue an effective and executable order. They cited the cases of Abdulatif Mohamed Hamis vs Mehboob

7 Yusuf Osman and Ano ther (Civil Revision No. 6 of 2017) [2018] TZCA 956 (24 July 2018) ; Efatha Ministry vs J.S. Khambhaita Limited & Other (Civil Appeal No. 823 of 2023) [2025] TZCA 784 (31 July 2025) ; Mussa Chande Jape vs Moza Mohammed Salim (Civil Appeal No. 141 of 2018) [2 019] TZCA 490 (12 December 2019) ; and Departed Asians Property Custodian Board v s . Jaffer Brothers Ltd [1999] EA 55, emphasizing that a necessary party is one whose proprietary rights are directly affected and whose joinder is required to avoid multiplicit y of suits. It was further submitted that proceeding in the absence of the more than twenty other occupants observed during the locus in quo would inevitably result in an un-executable decree and would amount to condemning those persons unheard, contrary to Article 13 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 (as amended) and the principles of natural justice. In the circumstances, learned counsel for the Defendants were of the firm view that the appropriate remedy is to strike out the suit so as to allow for the proper joinder of all necessary parties. From the submissions of the parties, it is clear that non-joinder of necessary parties is central to the resolution of this case. Learned counsel for the Plaintiff argued that the Court could either direct joinder of the

8 missing parties or proceed to adjudicate the matter on the merits against the Defendants already before it. In contrast, counsel for the Defendants maintained that the suit cannot properly proceed without the other necessary parties and requested the Court to dismiss it with costs. To resolve the issue under consideration, it is necessary to examine the pleadings, particularly the reliefs sought. In paragraph 9 and the relief section of the amended plaint, the Plaintiff prays for a declaration that he or the late Gregory Mwakaje Isote is the lawful owner of the suit land and all developments thereon, and that the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants are trespassers. The basis for these reliefs is set out in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the amended plaint, which read as follow: “14. That, the aforementioned plot of land has been trespassed and the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants who have erected permanent buildings for human dwelling, that’s to say normal houses for human dwelling. Whereas, the 1 st Defendant has built a house for human dwelling, the 2 nd Defendant has built house for human dwelling house and the 3 rd Defendant has built a house with fence for human dwelling. 15. That, the Plaintiff went to the respective plot of land and consulted the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants herein needing them to vacate the suit premises. However, the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants informed the Plaintiff that, they have all the rights to live there as they have

9 certificate of title in respect of the plot of land and they have acquired building permits and they cannot vacate. Further, paragraph 17 of the amended plaint avers that: 17. That, the Plaintiff being the administrator of the deceased estate cannot discharge his duties of distributing the suit premise to the beneficiaries of the deceased estates due to the fact that the same unlawfully is occupied by the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants who have trespassed therein. From the plain language of the plaint, it is evident that the Plaintiff seeks a declaration of sole ownership of the suit land and attributes the alleged acts of trespass solely to the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants. The pleadings thus rest on the assumption that the land is occupied solely by the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants. The trial record, however, paints a different picture. Evidence from PW2 and DW2, supported by the Court’s observations during the site visit, indicates that the suit land is not under the exclusive control or ownership of the 1 st to 3 rd Defendants only. Rather, the land suit land contains numerous houses and plots whose proprietors are not parties to this case. In light of the above, a decision in favor of the Plaintiff’s claim of ownership would necessarily impact the proprietary rights of other occupants on the suit land. It is therefore untenable to accept the argument by the Plaintiff’s counsel that no claims arise against any parties

10 other than the named Defendants. These individuals or owners qualify as necessary parties because the issues and relifes in the suit directly affect their rights, and their joinder is indispensable for the Court’s decision to have binding effect upon them. This reasoning is consistent with the decision in Tang Gas Distributors Limited (supra) referred by both parties, where the Court of Appeal observed that: “ From these weighty authorities, a beneficial principle of law has developed. This is that an intervener, otherwise commonly referred to as a NECESSARY PARTY , would be added in a suit under this rule even though there is no distinct cause of action against him, where:- (a) N/A; or (b) his proprietary rights are directly affected by the proceedings and to avoid multiplicity of suits, his joinder is necessary so as to have him bound by the decision of the court in the suit; ” In the circumstances of this case, and applying the principles set out above, I hold that although the Plaintiff, as dominus litis, has discretion in choosing the parties to sue, the other individuals owning plots and houses within the suit land are necessary parties under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. Their inclusion is indispensable to ensure that the Court’s decree, as sought by the Plaintiff, is final, binding, and capable of enforcement against them, while also averting a multiplicity of suits.

11 Moreover, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant, a determination of the Plaintiff’s ownership of the disputed land, including declaratory orders on developments and annulment of transfers allegedly carried out by the 4 th to 7 th Defendants, without joining the other occupants or owners, would condemn them unheard and contravene their fundamental right to be heard. This position was reinforced in Efatha Ministry (supra), wherein the Court of Appeal stated: “… the said people who were not joined in this suit were condemned unheard as at the end of the trial, the learned trial Judge nullified the Survey Master Plan for Plots Nos. 010422 to 466 (exhibit D2), which included their alleged plots and declared the first respondent the lawful owner of the entire suit land without affording them the right to be heard .” The foregoing determination brings me to the second part of the issue raised by the Court, namely, the effect of non-joinder of necessary parties at this stage of the proceedings and the appropriate course to adopt. I agree with the Plaintiff’s counsel that, under Order I, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, a suit is not defeated solely by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. Ordinarily, where a suit is still at a preliminary stage, the trial court may, either suo motu or on application, direct amendment of the pleadings and the joinder of necessary parties under

12 Order I Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. Consequently, upon identifying a necessary party who has not been joined, and where no application for joinder is made by the parties, the Court is duty-bound to ensure that such a party is added. However, in Tang Gas Distributors Limited (supra), the Court of Appeal held that failure to join a necessary party is fatal and constitutes a material irregularity for a court to determine a suit in the absence of such a party. Similarly, in Efatha Ministry (supra) and Abdullatif Mohamed Hamis (supra), the Court of Appeal nullified the proceedings and directed that any party still desirous of pursuing the matter should institute a fresh suit in accordance with the law. In the current case, the issue of non-joinder arose only after both parties had closed their cases and tendered all evidence. Given the advanced stage of proceedings, I hold the view that it would be impracticable to order amendment of the pleadings to join the necessary parties, particularly as the Court lacks power to nullify its own proceedings midstream where evidence has already been fully adduced in the absence of the said parties. For these reasons, I am also unable to agree with the Plaintiff’s counsel that the Court should proceed on the merits again st the current Defendants alone.

13 In view thereof, and guided by Efatha Ministry (supra) and Abdullatif Mohamed Hamis (supra), this suit is hereby struck for non- joinder of necessary parties. Any party wishing to pursue the matter may file a fresh suit in accordance with the law. To facilitate this, should the Plaintiff wish to proceed, the 4 th to 7 th Defendants are directed to furnish him with the names of all persons allocated or owning plots on the suit land following the survey carried out by the 4 th Defendant. Since the issue of non-joinder was raised by the Court suo motu, each party shall bear its own costs. DATED at DODOMA this 19 th day of December 2025. S.E. KISANYA JUDGE 19/12/2025