Grace Mbise vs Danish Refugee Council (DRC) (Miscellaneous Labour Application No. 000031370 of 2025) [2025] TZHC 8853 (19 December 2025)

THE JUDICIARY OF TANZANIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AT KIGOMA MISCELLANEOUS LABOUR APPLICATION NO. 000031370 OF 2025 GRACE MBISE .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT / APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF VERSUS DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL (DRC) .............................. RESPONDENT / DEFENDANT RULING KAHYOZA, J Under certificate of urgency, the applicant is seeking this court’s intervention by restraining the respondent from operating or dealing with her NMB Bank Accounts No. 51510005917 and 51510005918, of Tshs. and USD currency, respectively. Not only that, the applicant also seeks for this court’s order to prohibit the respondent to proceed with the sale or disposal of two motor vehicles, make Toyota Land Cruiser 2020 and 2019 models. The application is made under Order XXXVII Rule 1 (a) and (b), and Rule 6 and Section 78 (c) and 105 of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 [R.E 2023]. It Page. 1

is supported by the affidavit duly sworn by Ms. Veronica John, counsel for the Applicant. On the other hand, the application is resisted by the Respondent, and a counter affidavit duly sworn by STEPHAN PETRUS DEUTEKOM has been filed to that effect. Along with the counter affidavit, the Respondent has raised a preliminary objection on points of law. It is to the following effect;

1. That, the Application is bad in law for not attaching the Notice Application contravening the provision of Rule 24(1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Labour Rules G.N No.106 of 2007
2. That the application is bad in law for containing omnibus prayers
3. That, the application is bad in law for failure to make the application under the proper law contravening the provision of Section 95 (1) (f) (ii) of the EMployemnt and Labour Relations Act Cap. 366 [R.E. 2023]. Both parties had representation when the matter was called on for hearing of the said preliminary objections. For the respondent was Ms. Elizabeth Haroun, learned advocate. Ms. Veronica John, also learned advocate represented the applicant. In her submission in support of the preliminary objections, the counsel for the respondent submitted that the application violates Rule 24 (1), (2), (3) of the Labour Court Rules, which requires that every application must contain a notice of application. According to the counsel for the respondent, the present application contains no such notice, hence deserving to be struck out. Page. 2

As for the second point, the counsel for the respondent argued that the application is an omnibus one for it combines multiple prayers, including an injunction which is also present in a separate execution application. Equally, the counsel for the respondent has submitted that the application seeks to restrain the respondent from selling a Toyota Land Cruiser 2019 vehicle, and injunctive orders against the respondent's NMB bank accounts (No. 51510005917 in local currency and No. 51510005918 in USD). The counsel for the respondent has thus urged this court to follow the foot steps in Alex Maganga vs. Abubakar Mkakile & Another , Civil Application No. 36/2013, Court of Appeal, in which an omnibus application was struck out by the Court of Appeal. On the third point of the preliminary objections, the counsel for the respondent has submitted that the application has been filed under the wrong law contrary to section 95(1)(f)(2) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act (ELRA), Cap. 366 [R.E. 2023] which confers jurisdiction on this court to hear and determine the labour matters lodged before this court. According to the counsel for the respondent, where there is a specific law, such law must be applied and not the general law. She cited the case of Hamis Mwinyijuma & Another vs. Honora Tanzania Public Limited Company , Civil Appeal No. 42/2023 which emphasized that specific laws like the ELRA must apply over general ones. Page. 3

On her part, Ms. Veronica John, counsel for the applicant, challenged the preliminary objections and argued that they should be overruled to give priority to substantive justice. According to the counsel, the objections are curable under section 4(1)(2) of the Civil Procedure Code which enjoins the court to focus on substantive justice rather than technicalities. She argued that all the objections raised are curable as they do not go to the root of the matter. While admitting that the chamber summons includes omnibus prayers, the counsel for the applicant clarified that the prayers emphasize those prayers already in a separate application for execution. She further distinguished the case of Alex Maganga (supra) noting that it involved two distinct applications one for dismissal of Land Case No. 74/2009 while another was seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. In her brief rejoinder, the counsel for the respondent reiterated that the objections are fundamental to the application's substance, not mere technicalities, and cannot be cured by the provisions of law cited by the counsel for the applicant. She insisted, the application should fundamentally be struck out based on the points raised in the preliminary objection. I have carefully considered the rival submissions by the learned counsel. I have also carefully considered the pleadings. I shall now proceed to determine the preliminary objections on points of law as raised by the counsel for the Page. 4

Respondent. I shall start by looking at Ms. Veronica’s stance that all the objections raised by the counsel for the Respondent are curable under section 4(1)(2) of the Civil Procedure Code cap.33, R.E.2023. The above provision provides thus; 4. – (1) The overriding objective of this Act shall be to facilitate the just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes governed by this Act. (2) The Court shall, in the exercise of its powers under this Act or the interpretation of any of its provisions, seek to give effect to the overriding objective specified in subsection (1). In essence, Ms. Veronica is asserting that the objections raised by the counsel for the Respondent are curable under the Overriding Objective principles. With respect, however, I am afraid this sweeping statement cannot operate in the present matter. As rightly submitted by the counsel for the Respondent, this being a labour matter, it is exclusively governed by labour laws except where it is expressly provided that other laws may be invoked or resorted to for the interests of justice. In the matter at hand, I entirely agree with the counsel for the Respondent that this being a labour matter, it must have been brought under relevant labour Page. 5

laws and not laws of general application. This infraction cannot be cured by section 4 of the Civil Procedure Code. It has been held times without number that specific provisions of the law cannot be circumvented under the disguise of the overriding objective principles. In Martin D. Kumalija & Others vs Iron and Steel Ltd (Civil Application 70 of 2018) [2019] TZCA 542 (27 February 2019) the Court of Appeal made a very pertinent observation on this aspect when it stated; We are aware that the Court is enjoined by the provisions of sections 3A and 3B of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, Cap. 141 RE 2018 introduced recently vide the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 3) Act, No. 8 of 2018 to give effect to the overriding objective of facilitating the just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of disputes. While this principle is a vehicle for attainment of substantive justice, it will not help a party to circumvent the mandatory rules of the Court. We are loath to accept Mr. Seka's prayer because doing so would bless the respondent's inaction and render superfluous the rules of the Court that the respondent thrashed so brazenly. In the case of Hamisi Mwinyijuma & Another vs Honora Tanzania Public Limited Company (Civil Appeal No. 42 of 2023) [2025] TZCA 822 (7 August 2025) cited by the counsel for the Respondent, the court of Appeal made the following observations; Page. 6

When a specific law confers jurisdiction on a particular court or tribunal, that specific grant of jurisdiction typically excludes the application of general jurisdictional provisions. This means that if a law explicitly states which court has the authority to hear a specific type of case, that specific law will govern, and the general jurisdictional rules will not apply. As demonstrated by counsel for the respondent, the present matter has been brought under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. This is wrong altogether. The application was supposed to have been brought under labour laws. I have also noted another anomaly in connection to the third limb of the preliminary objection. This application appears to have been filed in the ordinary sub registry of the High Court. But this being a labour dispute, it was supposed to be filed in the Labour Division of the High Court. The heading speaks it all. It shows that the matter is filed in the HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, KIGOMA SUB-REGISTRY, AT KIGOMA. This is contrary to the express provisions of the law, specifically, The Labour Institutions Act, Cap.300, R.E. 300. Section 52 of the Labour Institutions Act Provides thus; 52. Subject to the Constitution and the labour laws and over any employment matter falling under common law, tortious liability, vicarious liability or breach of contract within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court, the Labour Court has Page. 7

exclusive civil jurisdiction over any matter reserved for its decision by the labour laws. In the Hamis Mwinyijuma case(supra), the Court further stated; Exclusive original jurisdiction implies that the designated court is the sole forum where such cases can be initiated. It signifies that no other court, including those with general jurisdiction, can entertain these matters at first instance. Based on the above discussion, I find it duly established that in terms of the third limb of the preliminary objection, this application is incompetent. This means I do not have to labour on the remaining points of objection, that is, the first and second limbs of the preliminary objections. When that is said and done, I find this application incompetent for the reasons stated. It is accordingly struck out. Dated at KIGOMA this 19th of December 2025 . P. R KAHYOZA JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT Page. 8