Issa Litson Mgode vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 4885 of 2025) [2025] TZHC 8926 (19 December 2025)

THE JUDICIARY OF TANZANIA IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA (MBEYA SUB - REGISTRY) AT MBEYA CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4885 OF 2025 Case Reference No. 202502262000004885 ISSA LITSON MGODE ……………………………………………………. APPELLANT VERSUS REPUBLIC ……………….………………….…………….………………. RESPONDENT ( An appeal from the Judgment of the District Court of Momba at Chapwa) (Hon. T. Komba - SRM) Dated the 19 th day of December 2024 in Criminal Case No. 20886 of 2024

JUDGMENT Date of Last Order: 22 .09.2025 Date of Judgment: 19.12.2025 KALUNDE, J. : This appeal arises from the decision of the District Court of Momba sitting at Chapwa (Hon. T. Komba, SRM) in Criminal Case No. 20886 of 2024, wherein the appellant, ISSA LITSON MGODE, was charged with the offence of rape contrary to sections 130(1), 130(2 )(e) and 131(1) of the Penal Code, Cap. 16 [R.E. 2022]. According to the amended charge sheet dated 13 th day of November 2024, it was alleged that on diverse dates between the 1 st day of April 2024 and the 20 th day of June 2024, at Kokoto Mpemba in Tunduma

2 Township within Momba District, Songwe Region, the appellant repeatedly had carnal knowledge of a girl aged 13 years, herein referred to as “EEK” or “the victim” in order to protect her identity. The appellant denied the charge and a full trial ensued. Upon the clos ure of the prosecution case and subsequent proceedings, the trial court eventually convicted and sentenced the appellant. Aggrieved by that decision, the appellant has come before this Court challenging both the conviction and the sentence on grounds that inc lude, among others, procedural irregularities said to have materially affected the fairness and legality of the trial. In its bid to prove the charge, the prosecution presented a total of f ive (5) witnesses, whose testimonies were directed at establishing the age of the victim, the identity of the accused, and the alleged acts constituting the offence. In addition to the oral evidence, the prosecution tendered one documentary exhibit, namely, the m edical examination report (PF3) relating to the victim, which was admitted in evidence as proof of the medical findings recorded during her examination. The summary of facts as may be gleaned from the records are as follows: The Victim (Pw1 ) recounted that she previously lived with her mother, her stepfather Issa Litson Mgode (the appellant), and her younger sister at Kokoto, Mpemba, before being sent to

3 Mahenje when her mother discovered she was pregnant on the 9 th day of June 2024. She stated that the accused was the one who impregnated her. According to her account, the first sexual assault occurred in late April 2024 when her mother had travelled to Isandula to harvest. She explained that the accused returned from work, found the children inside the house, and later forced her into the bedroom he shared with her mother. In the room, the appellant had sexual intercourse with her. She did not scream because the appellant threatened her, and the younger sister was asleep. P w1 stated that the accused continued to have sexual intercourse with her several times up to mid - May 2024. The victim recounted that when her mother suspected pregnancy and conducted a test with her aunt, Pw1 initially lied due to fear and mentioned an unnamed young man. However, when her uncle later questioned her, she revealed the truth that her stepfather im pregnated her. She was taken to Mpemba Police Station and then to hospital, where pregnancy was confirmed and tests showed she had no sexually transmitted diseases. PW1 testified that the accused fled after the family discovered the pregnancy. She pointed him out in court and maintained during cross - examination that he was the one who impregnated her despite her initial false story.

4 HPN (PW3), the victims’ mother, informed the court that she lived at Mpemba, Kokoto Street, with the accused, her husband, and her two children, the victim, and her younger sister. The mother testified that on 27 th day of June 2024 she became suspicious of the victim’s condition and bought a pregnancy test with Mama Lina. Upon testing, the result confirmed that the 13 year old victim was pregnant. Pw3 said that when first asked who was responsible, the victim remained silent, later vaguely saying it was a y oung man. Pw3 then called her brother - in - law, ASK (Pw4) , who came the next day. After further questioning on the 29 th day of June 2024, the victim disclosed that her stepfather, the appellant, was the one who impregnated her. According to Pw3, the victim explained that the acts occurred when Pw3 travelled to Isandula for farming trips that lasted between 6 and 7 days leaving the accused with the children. Pw3 stated that after the victim mentioned the accused, he disappeared fr om home, which she described as unusual behaviour. She confirmed that the victim had lived with the accused as her father since infancy and identified him in court. She added in re - examination that the victim initially withheld his name because the accused had threatened to kill her if she spoke. ASK (PW4) testified that on the 28 th day of June 2024, while at Mahenje, he received a call from his sister - in - law (Pw3) informing

5 him that the victim, his late brother’s 13 - year - old daughter, was pregnant. The next day, on the 29 th day of June 2024 Pw4 travelled to Mpemba and questioned the victim about who impregnated her. She told him that it was her stepfather, the appellant. Thereafter, on the 30 th day of June 2024, Pw4 took the victim to Mpemba Police Post, obtained a Request for Medical Examination (Police form No. 3 - PF3), and accompanied her to Mpemba Hospital where the clinical officer confirmed she was pregnant . The officer estimat ed that the pregnancy at six weeks and six days. Pw4 stated that the victim disclosed that the accused began having sexual intercourse with her from April to June 2024 while her mother was away at Isandula harvesting. The witness made a dock id entification of the accused in court and explained that he did not previously know him because the accused married his late brother’s wife after the divorce. In cross - examination, Pw4 emphasised that he asked the victim more than three times on 29 June, an d she consistently mentioned the accused as the perpetrator. The victim was medically examined at Tunduma Government Hospital. Mayole Kagoma Said (PW2) a clinical officer who examined the victim testified that on 30 th day of June 2024 he received a Request for Medical Examination (Police form No. 3 - PF3) with instructions to examine a 13 - year - old girl for rape, pregnancy,

6 and sexually transmitted diseases. Pw2 recounted that laboratory tests revealed that the victim was pregnant and had a urinary tract infection but was negative for HIV and other STDs. He stated that the physical examination showed she was no longer a virgin, had no bruises or sperm present, and showed physical signs of pregnancy such as a pregnancy line and enlarged breasts. He calculated the gestat ional age to be six weeks and six days. During the examination, the victim informed him that she had engaged i n sexual intercourse several times with her stepfather. Pw2 filled the PF3, which he identifi ed in court, and it was admitted as Exhibit P1 . WP.9414 D/CPL China (Pw5) , a police officer in the investigation department at Mpemba Police Post, testified that she was assigned the rape case file on the 30 th day of June 2024 . She recorded the statement of the thirteen - year - old victim and received the PF3 form which confirmed the child was pregnant. According to her testimony, the victim identified her stepfather, as the person who had raped her repeatedly from April to June 2024. Further, Pw5 informed the trial court that the appellant had escaped from his home following the allegations but was eventually arrested on the 16 th day of July 2024, with assistance from the victim and her mother. During cross - examination, Pw5 clarified that while she was not an eyewitness to the crime itself, she collected evidence

7 through the victim's statement and medical documents and noted that another officer named had performed the actual interrogation of the accused person. The appellant (Dw1) defended himself on oath. He completely denied the charges and challenged the credibility of the prosecution's evidence. He testified that he was arrested on the 14 th day of July 2024, at Kokoto and taken to Mpemba police post, where he was informed of the rape allegations . He claimed that in October 2024, during a court appearance, the victim and her mother allegedly indicated to him that he was not the one who had impregnated her, but rather another person. The appellant further asserted that when the pregnancy was first d iscovered, both he and the mother interrogated the victim, and at that time, she identified a "young man" as the perpetrator who had taken her to hi s house. He expressed shock and wonder that the victim later changed her story to implicate him. Throughout his testimony, the appellant maintained that the victim was now married and living with a husband, suggesting her lifestyle was inconsistent with the prosecution's claims. To support his claim of innocence, he made a formal request to the court for a DNA test to be conducted once the child was born, arguing that such a test was necessary to prove he was not the biological father. Dw1

8 concluded his defence by pleading for his liberty, stating that he had a family depending on him for their livelihood. Despite these assertions, the trial court believed that the prosecution case was proved to the hilt. In its judgment, the trial court found that the appellant was guilty based on the successful proof of three key legal ingredients: the act of sexual penetration, the victim's age, and the identity of the perpetrator. Regarding penetration, the court relied on the medical testimony of Pw2 and the physical evidence of the victim's pregnancy, which established that sexual intercourse had undeniably occurred. The victim’s age was confirmed to be thirteen years old through the consistent testimonies of both the victim (Pw1) and her mother (Pw3), thereby satisfying the requirements for a conviction of statutory rape where consent is legally irrelevant. Further, the learned trial magistrate was satisfied that the appellant was the perpetrator by finding the victim's testimony credible and plausible. The learned trial magistrate dismissed the appellant's defence . He observ ed that his claim of innocence was undermined by his own conduct. Specifically, the court noted that the appellants’ decision to flee the village and desert his family after the pregnancy was discovered was inconsistent with the behaviour of an innocent pers on. Consequently, the court held that the prosecution

9 had proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced the appellant to thirty years’ imprisonment and twelve strokes of the cane . The trial court also order ed the appellant to pay the victim TZS 300,000 in compensation. Aggrieved, the appellant has filed the present appeal, impugning the decision of the trial court based on five primary grounds of appeal, which are summarized below: The appellant first contended that the trial magistrate erred in law and fact by convicting him despite the prosecution's failure to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt. Secondly, he argued that the court wrongly convicted him for an offense involvi ng impregnation without conducting a DNA test, which he had specifically requested to prove he was not the father. In the third ground of appeal, the appellant alleged that the trial court improperly based the conviction on the perceived weaknesses of his defence rather than the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. Fourth, the appellant faults the trial court for failing to properly analyse the evidence regarding the physical act of rape . He argu ed that the mere presence of pregnancy is insufficient without specific evidence detailing the act of penetration. Finally, he argued that the magistrate failed to account for a significant contradiction in the victim's testimony . S pecifically,

10 the fact that she had initially identified a different "young man" as the person who impregnated her. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant appeared in person unrepresented while the respondent/Republic appeared through Mr. Ignas Joakim Urban, learned State Attorney. Being a lay person, the appellant, chose to rely primarily on his written grounds of appeal, praying that the court adopts and consider them in full. He maintained that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt . He assert ed that the evidence did not “irresistibly point” to him as the perpetrator. He highlighted that the trial court’s failure to conduct a DNA test despite his request . To him, this was a necessary step to prove or disprove the allegation of impregnation. Additionally, the appellant submitted that the court erred by ignoring the victim’s initial contradiction when she first named a “young man” as the responsible party. He concluded by praying for the appeal to be allowed and for his immediate release from p rison. In reply, Mr. Urban, learned State Attorney, took the notable position of supporting the appeal . He conced ed that the charge against the appellant was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. His primary argument was centred on a fatal procedural irregularity, that

11 on 14 th day of November 2024, the prosecution amended the charge sheet to change the victim's age from 15 to 13 and correct the accused’s name. The State Attorney pointed out that although the appellant pleaded not guilty to this new charge, the prosecutor closed the case immedi ately without calling any witnesses to testify regarding the amended substance. The learned State Attorney submitted further that the practice adopted by the trial court violated the provisions of section 234 of the Criminal Procedure Act [Cap. 20 R.E. 2023] by failing to afford the accused the opportunity to recall or re - examine the witnesses after the charge was altered. He argued it was illogical for the trial court to find a "case to answer" when no evidence had been led to establish the specific ingredie nts of the amended charge. Consequently, the State Attorney prayed that the tr ial proceedings be quashed, and the conviction and sentence be set aside. The issue arising in this case concerns the proper interpretation and application of section 251 of the Criminal Procedure Act (the CPA), which governs the alteration, substitution, and amendment of criminal charges during trial. This section embodies an i mportant safeguard intended to balance the imperative of ensuring that the trial proceeds on a proper charge with the equally fundamental

12 requirement that the accused person must not be prejudiced in the conduct of his defence. The section reads: “251. – (1) Where, at any stage of a trial, it appears to the court that the charge is defective, either in substance or form, the court may make such order for alteration of the charge either by way of amendment of the charge or by substitution or addition of a new charge as the court thinks necessary to meet the circumstances of the case unless, having regard to the merits of the case, the required amendments cannot be made without injustice; and all amendments made under the provisions of this subsection s hall be made upon such terms as the court shall seem just. (2) Subject to subsection (1), where a charge is altered under that subsection - (a) the court shall thereupon call upon the accused person to plead to the altered charge; (b) the accused may demand that the witnesses or any of them be recalled and give their evidence afresh or be further cross - examined by the accused or his advocate and, in such last mentioned event, the prosecution shall have the right to re - examine any su ch witness on matters arising out of such further cross - examination; and

13 (c) the court may permit the prosecution to recall and examine, with reference to any alteration of or addition to the charge that may be allowed, any witness who may have been examined unless the court for any reason to be recorded in writing considers th at the application is made for the purpose of vexation, delay or for defeating the ends of justice. (3) Variance between the charge and the evidence adduced in support of it with respect to the time at which the alleged offence was committed is not material and the charge need not be amended for such variance if it is proved that the proceedings were in fact instituted within the time, if any, limited by law for the institution thereof. (4) Where an alteration of the charge is made under subsection (1) or there is a variance between the charge and the evidence as described in subsection (2), the court shall, if it is of the opinion that the accused has been thereby misled or deceived, adj ourn the trial for such period as may be reasonably necessary. (5) Where an alteration of the charge is made under subsection (1), the prosecution may demand that the witnesses or any of them be recalled and give their evidence afresh or be further examined by the prosecution and the court shall call such witness or w itnesses unless the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, considers that the

14 application is made for the purpose of vexation, delay or defeating the ends of justice.” My reading of the above section leads me to a conclusion that section 51(1) vests the trial court with discretionary authority to amend a charge “at any stage of the trial” whenever it appears to the court that the charge is defective in form or substance. The rationale behind this provision is that defects or inaccuracies in the framing of the charge may only become apparent as evidence unfolds. The law thus empowers the co urt to intervene to ensure that the factual issues in controversy are properly captured. However, this discretion is not unfettered. The pro viso that no amendment should be made if it would occasion injustice underscores the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial under Article 13 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 . Therefore, before acting under this subsection, the court must assess whether the proposed amendment is necessary and whether it would unfairly prejudice the accused in such a manner that cannot be cured by procedural safeguards. Section 251(2) sets out mandatory steps that must follow any alteration of the charge. First, under paragraph (a) the court is obliged to call upon the accused to plead to the altered charge. This is done to ensure that the accused fully understands the na ture and

15 scope of the accusation and that the record clearly reflects his position. Second, paragraph (b) preserves the accused person’s right to have witnesses recalled to testify afresh or be subjected to further cross - examination. This safeguard is central to th e right to a fair hearing. It must be noted that an amendment may alter the elements of the offence or the factual matrix upon which the defence was initially premised. For this reason, it is only fair that the accused be accorded an opportunity to confron t and test the evidence as reshaped by the amended charge. Third, under paragraph (c) the prosecution is granted a reciprocal right to recall witnesses where necessary to support the amended charge. The court’s role here is supervisory by ensuring that the application is not motivated by vexation, delay, or a desi gn to frustrate the ends of justice. The requirement that reasons for refusal be recorded in writing enhances transparency and accountability in the exercise of judicial discretion. Additionally, s ection 251(3) comes to address the situation where there are variances between the charge and the evidence concerning the date or time of the alleged offence. Under the respective section, such variances are immaterial unless time is an essential element of the offence or unless the prosecution is constrained by statutory limitation periods.

16 From the above analysis, I gather that the intention of the framers of this section was to shield criminal trials from undue technicalities while maintaining legal certainty where limitation periods apply. The provision therefore ensures that minor discrepancies as to timing do no t derail an otherwise valid prosecution. Even where the law considers a variance envisaged above is immaterial, the court retains a duty to assess whether the accused has been misled or deceived by an alteration or variance. Where prejudice is established, the court must adjourn proceedings for a reasonable period to enable the accused to adjust his defence. This underscores the paramountcy of procedural fairness . That is, the accused must have adequate opportunity to prepare, and the prosecution is not permitted to secure strategic advantage thro ugh late amendments. This procedure is underscored under section 251(4). On the other hand, s ubsection (5) of section 251 reinforces the principle of equality by granting the prosecution the right to recall witnesses where necessary following an amendment. This is similar to the accused’s right under subsection (2)(b). Equally, under this section a proviso is inserted to give the court a discretion to refuse such applications where they are brought for improper purposes. The

17 provision therefore ensures that the truth - seeking function of the trial is not compromised while guarding against potential abuse of the procedure. In fine, it is clear from the above observations that s ection 251 is an essential procedural section in criminal trials. The section imposes obligations on the prosecution whenever it seeks or benefits from an amendment. The prosecution must demonstrate that the amendment is necessary, timely, and not calculated to ambush the defence. Furthermore, the prosecution must be prepared to facilitate the accused ’s rights, including recall of witnesses and reasonable adjournments. For its part, t he trial court bears the primary responsibility of ensuring that no amendment undermines the fairness of the proceedings. It must exercise its discretion judiciously, ensuring that the accused is not prejudiced, that the prosecution does not abuse the proc ess, and that the administration of justice is not brought into disrepute. In view of this, it goes without saying that a conviction founded on a charge amended without compliance with the safeguards under section 251 is liable to be vitiate d on appeal or revision . Reverting to the fa c ts of the case, it is not disputed that on the 14 th day of November 2024, when the matter came for ruling on case

18 to answer, the prosecutor requested to amend the charge with a view to change the age of the victim from 15 years to 13 years and the name of the accused from ISSA LITSON KAMENDU to ISSA LITSON MGODE. For ease of reference, I will let the records speak: Proceedings PP: Your honour, the matter comes for prosecution hearing, We have no witness today however we have prayer that under Section 234 of the CPA R.E. 2022, the aim is rectify the age of the victim from 15 years to 13 years and the name of the accused from ISSA LI TSON KAMENDU to ISSA LITSON MGODE. Accused: No objection COURT: Prayer granted. PP: Your honour, we pray to read the amended charge to the accused. Accused: No objection COURT: Prayer granted COURT: The amended charge is read over and properly explained to the accused who is asked to plead thereto. Accused plea: Accused: SIO KWELI COURT: Entered as a plea of not guilty to the charge. PP: Your honour, as we have said earlier, the matter comes for prosecution hearing too, We have no witness, therefore we pray to close our evidence.

19 COURT: The Prosecution case marked close as prayed. PP: Your honour, we leave to the court to decide if all the accused have a case to answer or not. Accused: I also leave it to the court to decide. ” Thereafter, the learned trial magistrate delivered a ruling on no case to answer finding that, through the five witnesses and one exhibit, the accused person had a case to answer. The appellant was addressed in terms of section 321 of the Criminal procedure Code. He was called to defend himself, which he did. Following his defence, he was found guilty, convicted and sentenced as indicated earlier. A critical issue arising in this appeal concerns the validity of the proceedings conducted on the 14 th day of November 2024, during which the prosecution successfully moved the trial court to amend the charge after it had already closed its case. On that date, the court substituted the charge by altering both the age of the victim and the particulars of th e accused, yet no prosecution witnesses were recalled to testify on the amended charge, and no reasons were recorded to justify the failure to do so. Despite the amendment, the court proceeded immediately to determine the question of whether the appellant had a case to answer, based entirely on evidence tendered in relation to the original charge.

20 This sequence of events raises substantial doubt as to the procedural integrity of the trial, particularly whether the court complied with the mandatory safeguards under section 251 of the Criminal Procedure Act intended to prevent prejudice to the accused . The legality and fairness of the proceedings of that day are therefore placed in serious question, with far reaching consequences for the propriety of all subsequent steps, including the ruling on no case to answer and the final judgment. Upon a careful examination of the record, it is manifest that the procedure adopted by the trial court following the amendment of the charge on the 14 th day of November 2024 contravened several mandatory safeguards under section 251 of the Criminal Procedure Act. First , although the court was empowered under section 251(1) to amend a defective charge, the subsection expressly prohibits such amendment where it would occasion injustice. In the present case, the amendment was introduced after the prosecution had closed its case and after f ive witnesses (Pw1 to Pw 5 ) had already testified on materially different particulars, thereby creating an inherent risk of prejudice which the court failed to mitigate. Second , the trial court clearly violated the mandatory provisions of section 251(2)(b), which entitles the accused, once a

21 charge has been altered, to demand that witnesses be recalled to testify afresh or be further cross - examined. While the court did pose the question to the accused, it failed to appreciate that this right does not depend solely on the accused’s initiative; rather, the court must ensure the accused fully understands the implicat ion of the amended ingredients and must affirmatively facilitate the safeguard where the nature of the amendment itself creates unavoidable prejudice. The court’s perfunctory inquiry therefore fell short of the protection envisaged under the subsection. Third , the court violated section 251(2)(c) and section 251(5) by failing to record whether the prosecution wished to recall any witnesses and by omitting to make any written findings as to whether allowing or declining such recall would cause delay, vexation, or injustice. Under these provisions, the court is required not only to permit recall where necessary, but also to record in writing its reasoning when declining or accepting such applications; the total absence of such reasoning constitutes a materia l procedural defect. Fourth , by proceeding to deliver a ruling on no case to answer on the same day without any witness being recalled to testify on the amended particulars the court contravened section 251(4), which mandates adjournment where an amendment has misled or is likely to mislead the accused. The alteration of the victim’s age (an

22 essential element in offences under section 130(2)(e) of the Penal Code) and the correction of the accused’s identity were substantive changes that necessarily required recall of witnesses and opportunity for the defence to recalibrate its case. The court’ s refusal to adjourn the matter deprived the accused of this statutory protection. The next question would be what the consequence of such violations are? Having considered the circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that the legal consequences of these violations are grave. The cumulative non - compliance with section 251 nullified the procedural integrity of the trial. The evidence on record pertained to a different charge than the one on which the accused was ultimately called to answer . This render ed the ruling on no case to answer legally unsustainable. A ruling founded on evidence t hat does not support the amended charge violates the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial, offends the requirement that a charge must be proved as laid, and constitutes a fatal irregularity warranting the setting aside of the ensuing proceedings. In effect, the trial court proceeded without legal foundation; the resultant ruling is a nullity for having been reached in breach of mandatory statutory provisions and in a manner that inevitably occasioned injust ice to the accused. But that is not all. In the present matter, the consequences of the trial court’s non - compliance with the mandatory safeguards under

23 section 251 of the Criminal Procedure Act did not end with the defective ruling on no case to answer. The illegality permeated the entire subsequent proceedings, thereby fatally vitiating the defence stage, the conviction, and the sentence that followed. O nce the charge was substantively amended after the close of the prosecution case, and once no witnesses were recalled to testify or be cross - examined on the altered particulars , contrary to section 251(2)(b), (c), (4), and (5) , the trial thereafter proceed ed on a charge for which no evidence whatsoever had been tendered. Consequently, when the accused was called upon to defend himself, he was required to do so against a charge that had not been proved prima facie . This violat ed the foundational rule that an accused person can only be placed on his defence where the prosecution has established a case sufficient to require an explanation. Because the case to answer ruling was itself a nullity, the defence that followed was built o n an unlawful procedural footing; and because the substituted charge was never supported by any e vidence from the prosecution, the trial court lacked any legal basis upon which to convict. In these circumstances, the conviction is incurably defective, as it rests on a process that was fundamentally unfair and contrary to statutory provisions . The sentence, being dependent on a void

24 conviction, likewise cannot stand. Accordingly, the entire proceedings after the unlawful amendment including the defence, conviction, and sentence are rendered a nullity, and the judgment must be set aside in its entirety for having been founded on proceedings tainted by material illegality and occasioning grave prejudice to the accused. For the foregoing reasons, and having found that the proceedings of the trial court were fundamentally vitiated by material non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of section 251 of the Criminal Procedure Act, resulting in an unlawful ruling on no case to answer, a defence conducted on an unproven substituted charge, and a conviction unsupported by evidence properly adduced, I am satisfied that the trial was incurably defective and the resultant judgment cannot be allowed to stand. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby allowed in its entirety. The conviction entered against the appellant is quashed, and the sentence of thirty (30) years’ imprisonment and twelve (12) strokes of the cane is set aside. As the conviction and sentence cannot stand, and since the order for compensation was anchored solely on that conviction, the court finds that there is no legal foundation upon which a compensation order may be sustained or imposed. The order for payment of TZS 300,000 as compensation to the victim is therefore

25 set aside. In view of the above, the appellant must be released from prison unless his continued incarceration for other lawful reasons. It is so ordered. DATED at MBEYA this 19 TH day of DECEMBER 2025 . S.M. KALUNDE JUDGE