Case Law[2025] TZHC 8862Tanzania
Laurensia Lucas @Kulwa @Dunia vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 39733 of 2023) [2025] TZHC 8862 (19 December 2025)
High Court of Tanzania
Judgment
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
(MWANZA SUB - REGISTRY)
AT MWANZA
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 39733 OF 2023
(Arising from Criminal Case No. 148 of 2022 in the District Court of Nyamagana at Nyamagana)
LAURENSIA LUCAS @KULWA @DUNIA………………………………..APPELLANT
VERSUS
REPUBLIC…………………………………………………………………RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
20
th
June & 19
th
December , 2025
KAMANA, J.
The appellant, Laurensia Lucas @Kulwa @Dunia, was convicted of
stealing by servant under sections 258(1) and 271 of the Penal Code,
Cap. 16 [RE.2022]. Following her conviction, she was sentenced to
either pay a fine of TZS 500,000 or serve a two - year prison term . She
was also ordered to refund TZS 27,565,707 / - to Sia Mrema, her
employer.
In her memorandum of appeal, the appellant advanced five
grounds of appeal. However, during the hearing of the appeal, she
abandoned one of the grounds. Upon careful consideration, the
remaining four grounds are, in essence, anchored on a single
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overarching ground , namely, that the prosecution failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction entered by the trial court.
During the hearing, the appellant was represented by Mr. John
Edward, learned Counsel. The respondent had the services of Mr.
Christopher Olembile, learned State Attorney.
In his submission, Mr. Edward contended that the prosecution
failed to adduce cogent and credible evidence to justify the appellant’s
conviction. This position was strongly opposed by Mr. Olembile, who
maintained that the evidence on record was sufficient to support the
conviction.
Being the first appellate Court, I found it necessary to re - evaluate
and re - analyse the entire evidence on record, to determine whether the
prosecution sufficiently discharged its burden of proof to the standard
required in criminal cases . In so doing, I am supported by the position of
the Court of Appeal in the case of Maramo Slaa Hofu and Others v.
Republic , Criminal Appeal No. 246 of 2011 - CAT (Unreported). In the
said case, the apex Court had this to state:
‘ But it is also settled law that the duty of the first appellate
such as what we are now, is to reconsider and evaluate
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the evidence and come to its own conclusions bearing in
mind that it never saw the witnesses as they testified .’
Guided by that position, I proceeded to re - examine the testimony
of Sia Mrema (PW1), who stated that she had employed the appellant to
manage a stationery and money transfer business. Her oral testimony
was corroborated by a written employment agreement (Exh. PE2) that
was concluded between the two. Upon further scrutiny of the appellant’s
defence, I find that the appellant did not dispute the material aspects of
PW1’s testimony. In view of the foregoing, I am satisfied that the
prosecution proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant was
indeed employed by PW1 in the capacity alleged.
As to the question whether the appellant dishonestly appropriated
TZS 27,565,707/ - belonging to PW1 during the course of her
employment, the prosecution's case was principally grounded on the
testimony of PW1 and the documentary evidence tendered through her.
PW1 testified that, following the growth of the money transfer segment
of her business, the appellant was entrusted with its supervision. At the
time of handing over, PW1 asserted that the business was operating with
a capital base of TZS 18,000,000/ - .
4
PW1 further testified that on diverse dates, she injected an
additional capital of TZS 32 million into the business by handing the
funds directly to the appellant, thereby raising the total capital of the
money transfer operations to TZS 50 million. In support of this assertion,
PW1 tendered a record book allegedly used by the appellant to
acknowledge receipt of the said funds. The book was admitted into
evidence as Exhibit PE3.
PW1 further testified that she was a member of various social
groups through which she extended loans to fellow members. She
asserted that a total of TZS 18,842,500/ - was repaid by the borrowers.
According to her testimony, part of the refunded amount was handed
over to the appellant by PW1 herself, while the remaining portion was
paid directly to the appellant by the group members. PW1 stated that
the appellant recorded the repayments in a notebook, which was
admitted into evidence as Exhibit PE4.
PW1 further averred that the appellant stole funds generated as
commission payments from various mobile network operators in
connection with the money transfer business. In support of this
assertion, PW1 tendered a commission record book, which was admitted
into evidence and marked as Exhibit PE5.
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The witness testified that upon making inquiries regarding the
missing funds, the appellant admitted that part of the money was
unaccounted for. The appellant is said to have attributed the
disappearance of the money to chuma ulete . According to PW1, the total
amount found to be missing stood at TZS 27,565,707.97 / - .
At this juncture, I find it pertinent to observe that the prosecution
failed to adduce cogent evidence establishing that the appellant indeed
received the alleged sums from PW1. In particular, the authenticity and
evidentiary value of Exh.PE3 , purportedly the record on which the
appellant acknowledged receipt of TZS 32 million as additional capital ,
appears highly questionable and insufficient to support the allegation.
As correctly submitted by Mr. Edward, the book in question lacks
the appellant’s signature, which would signify her receipt of the stated
sum from PW1. Legally, the absence of the receiver’s signature on an
acknowledgment of money casts serious doubt on its authenticity and
probative value.
Where it is alleged that one party received money from another,
the burden rests on the alleging party to prove that the acknowledgment
was properly executed. In the absence of the appellant’s signature, it
becomes difficult to conclusively establish that the money was indeed
6
received by her. Consequently, an unsigned acknowledgment cannot
suffice as proof of receipt of money.
Regarding Exh.PE4, the memory book which PW1 testified was
used by the appellant to record the refund of money, I am of the
considered view that it does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the sum of TZS 18,842,500/ - was received from PW1 and the borrowers.
This is primarily because the alleged memory book lacks the appellant’s
signature, which would indicate acknowledgment of receipt of the stated
amount. As I previously held in relation to Exh.PE3, in the absence of
the appellant’s signature, it is difficult to conclusively determine that she
received the stated sum.
Further, since PW1 testified that the appellant received certain
sums from borrowers, I am of the considered view that th o se borrowers
were material witnesses whose testimony is crucial to establish that the
appellant indeed received money from them as alleged by PW1. It is
settled law that where the prosecution fails to call a material witness
without justifiable cause, the court is entitled to draw an adverse
inference against the prosecution, which I hereby do.
Regarding the commission’s book (Exh.PE5), its authenticity is
equally questionable, akin to Exh.PE3 and Exh.PE4. The exhibit lacks the
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appellant’s signature or any acknowledgment indicating that she
received commissions from the mobile network operators. It merely
records various transactions without any indication of the appellant’s
receipt.
In an effort to substantiate its case, the prosecution relied on the
testimony of Johnson Mwijage, an auditor who testified as PW2. PW2
stated that following an audit of PW1’s business, he identified a deficit
totaling TZS 27,565,707.97/ - . To support his findings, PW2 tendered the
audit report, which was admitted into evidence as Exhibit PE6.
Upon review of Exhibit PE6, I find that the audit report alone does
not establish that the appellant received the alleged stolen amount in
the course of her employment. This conclusion is drawn from the fact
that PW2’s audit relied heavily on Exhibits PE3, PE4 and PE5, which I
have previously determined lack sufficient evidentiary value to prove
that the appellant actually received the said sums.
Another piece of evidence relied upon by the prosecution was the
series of transactions alleged to have been conducted by the appellant
from PW1’s bank account. This evidence was presented by Nelson Peter
(PW3), a banker employed at CRDB Bank.
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PW3 testified that on 4
th
April 2022, a transaction of TZS 9.4
million was made from PW1’s account to an individual named Juma
Lukamaja. To substantiate his testimony, PW3 tendered PW1’s bank
statement, admitted as Exhibit PE9, and Lukamaja’s bank statement,
admitted as Exhibit PE11.
PW3 further testified that on 14
th
April 2022, a transaction of TZS
5 million was made from PW1’s account to the account of Yutha Oscar.
To support this evidence, PW3 tendered Yutha Oscar’s bank statement,
which was admitted as Exhibit PE10. This evidence was corroborated by
the testimonies of Evodius Oscar and Yutha Oscar, who appeared as
PW4 and PW5, respectively.
During cross - examination, the witness testified that the account in
question belonged to PW1 and was operated using a machine secured
by a password. He further stated that the machine was to be operated
by PW1, the appellant and Consolatha (PW6), as all three held the
password.
In this regard, I am of the considered view that where a password
is jointly managed by more than one person , the prosecution bears the
burden of proving that the accused specifically used the said password
to execute the impugned transactions. Mere access or joint control is
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insufficient to attribute the transactions to the accused. It requires clear
and direct evidence such as digital logs, audit trails or credible witness
testimony , establishing that the accused personally used the password to
conduct the transactions in question. In the absence of such proof,
criminal liability cannot be conclusively imposed on the accused.
I find it difficult to conclusively determine that the transaction of
TZS 9.4 million was made by the appellant and not any other person
with the password . This is because, according to PW3, the machine used
to execute the transaction was accessible not only to the appellant but
also to PW1 and PW6. To attribute the transaction solely to the appellant
would be speculative, a conclusion that this Court is not prepared to
make.
While the evidence adduced by PW3, PW4 and PW5 establishes
that the appellant made the transaction of TZS 5 million, it does not, in
my view, sufficiently prove that the sum of TZS 4 million withdrawn in
cash by the appellant was stolen by virtue of her employment. The
prosecution has not demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
appellant misappropriated this amount in her capacity as an employee.
Having considered the foregoing, I find that the prosecution has
failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, I
10
allow the appeal. The appellant’s conviction and sentence are hereby
quashed and set aside. Furthermore, the order directing the appellant to
refund the alleged stolen amount is also quashed and set aside. It is so
ordered.
Right of Appeal Explained.
DATED at MWANZA this 19
th
day of D ecember , 2025.
KS KAMANA
JUDGE