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Case Law[2025] TZHC 8519Tanzania

Registered Trustees of Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania - Northern Diocese vs Attorney General and Another (Land Case No. 4833 of 2024; Land Case No. 4833 of 2024) [2025] TZHC 8519 (19 December 2025)

High Court of Tanzania

Judgment

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA ARUSHA SUB REGISTRY AT ARUSHA LAND CASE NO. 4833 OF 2024 THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN TANZANIA - NOTHERN DIOCESE ................... . ............................................. PLAINTIFF VERSUS ATTORNEY GENERAL........................................... 1 st DEFENDANT SLAHHAMO VILLAGE COUNCIL........................... 2 nd DEFENDANT JUDGEMENT 6th 8t 19th December, 2025. KAINDA, 3 .: This case arises from a long-standing land dispute whose origin is embedded in the transformation of village governance structures, the policies of operation v ijlji of the 1970s, customary processes of allocating land for community development, and the historical involvement of religious institutions in providing essential services in rural Tanzania. The 1

dispute requires the court to consider, in detail, the interaction between statutory land law, customary law, the administrative practices of villages, and the constitutional protection of property rights. The plaintiff, the Registered Trustees of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania - Northern Diocese, asserts that in 1984 it was allocated land measuring 31.005 acres by Slahhamo Village for the social services projects including development of a dispensary and a vocational training centre. The plaintiff states that this land was peacefully possessed and developed for over thirty years, and that all community stakeholders, including village leaders, recognised the church as the lawful occupant. However, beginning in April 2016, and again in 2021, groups of villagers and certain local leaders invaded the land, cultivated parts of it, cut down over seventy trees planted by students, vandalised buildings, destroyed workshops, and disrupted the functioning of the vocational training centre. The plaintiff claims these actions constituted trespass and unlawful interference with a property it had lawfully acquired and developed. The defendants deny this claim and assert that the land in question is village land, that the plaintiff was only ever given one acre for a

dispensary, and that any involvement of the church in construction or development was merely as a supervisor, never as an owner. They claim that the entire 31-acre block belonged to the village from the beginning and was never transferred to the church. During the hearing, the plaintiff was represented by Mr. Emmanuel Safari, learned counsel, assisted by Mr. Geofrey Mollel, learned advocate. The defendants were represented by Mr. Masunga Kamihanda, Senior State Attorney, assisted by Mr. Leyani Mbise and Mr. Joseph Bundala, learned State Attorneys. At the Final Pre-Trial Conference, the parties, by consent, agreed and recorded the issues for determination as being who is the lawful owner of the suit land, whether the 2nd defendant trespassed onto the suit land, and what reliefs the parties are entitled to. These agreed issues have guided the Court's evaluation of the evidence and application of the law. The plaintiff produced eight witnesses (PW1-PW8) and twenty- three exhibits. The defendant produced four witnesses (DW1-DW4) and one exhibit.

PW1, the Legal Officer of the plaintiff, laid the foundation of the plaintiffs claims by explaining that exhibit PI, the 1984 handover Document, originated from church archives and was later found within the village office itself. The document bore seals of the village authority, names of officials, and signatures of participants in the land allocation. PW1 explained that in the 1980s, land allocations were not made through the modern certificate-of-title system, but through resolutions of the Village Council and Ward Development Committee. He tendered additional exhibits (P2-P7) showing donor communications, financial support letters, construction supervision reports, maps, and project implementation documents. PW1 stated that exhibit PI was authentic and aligned with the historical pattern of land allocations during Operation Vijiji. He further emphasised that the plaintiff's development of the land for more than thirty years, including construction of permanent buildings, strengthened its ownership under both statutory and equitable principles. PW2, a former Village Executive Officer who served for over ten years, testified that during his entire tenure the land was known as belonging to the Plaintiff. He confirmed that no village meeting ever rescinded the 1984 allocation. He tendered exhibit P ll, a request he

wrote to the church seeking permission to cut trees, demonstrating operational recognition of the church as owner. He stated that if the land had belonged to the village, he would have addressed the letter to the Village Council, not the church. PW3, a retired medical doctor involved in the project from the beginning, gave detailed historical testimony. He stated that he was present during the handing over of the land in 1984 and recognised his own signature on exhibit PI. He described how villagers who previously lived on parts of the land were compensated and relocated peacefully. He explained that the construction of the dispensary and vocational centre took place steadily from 1985 to 1990, supported by donors and the community. He added that for decades no one contested the church's ownership or occupation. PW4, a vocational instructor of more than twenty years, narrated the operational activities of the vocational centre. He stated that students planted over seventy trees as part of carpentry and agroforestry training. He provided details of workshops, classrooms, demonstration plots, and staff houses used by the institution over many years. He testified that the 2016 and 2021 invasions disrupted training activities, destroyed buildings,

cut down trees, and forced the centre to suspend some programmes. His testimony matched. PW5, a long-serving community elder, stated that he personally knew the history of the 1984 allocation and that the boundaries described in PI matched the historical and natural boundaries recognised by villagers for decades. He also confirmed that the land had always been worked and controlled by the church without any interference from the village authorities. PW6, the former Village Chairman (2019-2024), provided evidence of the current administrative records of the village. He tendered exhibit P18, the official handover book he received when assuming office. This document listed the assets of the village but did not mention the 31-acre land. He testified that the village only had 20.75 acres of registered communal land and that the disputed land had never been part of village holdings in any administrative record. He added that the invasions of 2016 and 2021 were not authorised by the Village Council. PW7, the Village Executive Officer between 2020 and 2023, corroborated PW6's testimony. He testified that he personally found exhibit PI in the village office, contradicting DW1 and DW2's denial. He

stated that if the land had been village land, it would have appeared in the official assets register, which it does not. PW8, the parish pastor, provided detailed evidence from church administrative records. He tendered exhibit P19, confirming that the land had been registered in the parish inventory since the 1980s. He added that villagers historically requested permissions from the church, never from the village,to undertake activities such as tree cutting. The defendant's case attempts to dispute the authenticity of exhibit PI and deny that any land was ever allocated to the plaintiff beyond one acre for the dispensary. However, the credibility of this position must be tested against the testimonies of DW1 through DW4 and weighed within the established evidentiary principles of Tanzanian jurisprudence. DW1, the former Village Secretary from 1980 to 1988, denied ever seeing exhibit PI and insisted that he did not sign it. Yet, he admitted that his name appears on the document. When questioned, he claimed that on the date the meeting was held, 11 December 1984, he was away from the village. He did not, however, produce any record, medical or administrative, proving his absence. His testimony raised internal inconsistencies. In one moment, he claimed the Ward Development

Committee had no power to allocate land; yet, in another, he admitted that in the 1980s villages frequently implemented development decisions that originated from the WDC, including land identification. More importantly, DW1 contradicted not only documentary evidence but also other defence witnesses. For instance, DW2, who succeeded DW1 as VEO, expressly admitted that one acre had been given for a dispensary but conceded during cross-examination that exhibit PI indicated 31.5 acres. He claimed it was his first time seeing the document but also admitted that the names and offices of signatories were accurate for 1984. This inconsistency diminishes the defence narrative suggesting fabrication. DW3, an elderly villager, gave evidence through translation. He admitted that villagers surrendered land voluntarily for social service projects in the early 1980s. He stated that under Iraq tribal customs, when elders request b arisi leaves, one cannot refuse a development request. He confirmed that villagers were compensated with alternative land. He acknowledged that a dispensary and a vocational training centre exist on the disputed land, but insisted that the village remained the owner. Yet, when asked further, he conceded that he did not attend meetings

allocating land, did not know the contents of village resolutions, and did not personally witness who gave final approval. DW4, the current Village Executive Officer, relied heavily on exhibit D l, a certificate of village registration issued in 2020, but this exhibit only establishes the legal existence of the village, nothing more. It does not list the 31.005 acres as belonging to the village. He admitted under cross- examination that the disputed land does not appear in the administrative records he took over from the previous VEO. The Court must consider whether this combination of long occupation, development, public recognition, and documentary evidence satisfies the legal threshold for proving land ownership against a village authority. In Registered Trustees of Holy Spirit Sisters v January Sesa, Civil Appeal No. 193 of 2016, the Court of Appeal held that: "Long, open, uninterrupted occupation o f land with the knowledge o f the law ful authority, coupled with perm anent development, gives rise to a legally protectable interest, even in the absence o f a certificate o f title ." Similarly, in Registered Trustees of Moravian Church v Kungu, Civil Appeal No. 12 of 2015, the Court of Appeal stated that where a

religious institution is allocated land by a village or ward, and proceeds to build permanent structures without objection for a long period, ownership vests in the institution unless there is clear evidence of revocation. This Court finds strong parallels between those cases and the present matter. The totality of the Plaintiff's testimony, from PW1 through PW8, demonstrates; a formal allocation of land documented in exhibit PI; a continued recognition by village leaders over decades; permanent structures erected through donor agreements and community support; absence of competing claims from 1984 to 2016; administrative inclusion of the land in parish handover documents; village correspondence addressed to the church, recognising its ownership; a pattern of peaceful possession exceeding 30 years, which Tanzanian law protects under both statutory and constitutional principles. The defendant's argument rests on the assertion that the Plaintiff was merely a project supervisor. Yet, this claim is directly contradicted by exhibit P4, the donor agreement, which lists the plaintiff as the implementing and supervising authority. No part of the agreement describes the village as owner.

Moreover, the conduct of the defence witnesses revealed inconsistencies that undermine their credibility. DWl's denial of exhibit PI stood in stark contrast to the presence of his name in the document and the recollection of PW3, who successfully identified his own signature. The Court must now address several legal questions arising from the evidence. These include whether exhibit PI constitutes a lawful allocation of land; whether long and continuous occupation by the plaintiff creates a protectable interest; whether the defendant Village had the legal authority to revoke or. interfere with the Plaintiff's occupation; whether the Plaintiff has proved trespass; and finally, whether the Plaintiff is entitled to damages. On the first issue, exhibit PI is a letter titled H ati ya Kukabidhi Ardhi, dated 15 December 1984, authored by Slahhamo Village, addressed to the Pastor of Kilimamoja Parish, and bearing the village stamp, signatures of village officials, committee members, and witnesses, including PW3. It explicitly records that land measuring 31.005 acres was handed over to the church. The defendants questioned its authenticity but did not tender any forensic report, administrative record, or contemporaneous document contradicting the allocation.

The Village Council, being the legally recognised organ responsible for village land administration had authority to allocate land for public and communal benefit. The defendant argued that the Ward Development Committee had no power to direct such allocation. However, the evidence shows that in the 1980s, the WDC functioned as the coordinating body for development planning, and its directions were routinely implemented by villages. Even if the WDC itself lacked direct allocation power, the document in question (PI) was issued by the village authority, not the WDC. Thus, exhibit PI is not invalid merely because the WDC initiated the process. Turning to long occupation, the plaintiff demonstrated uninterrupted use of the land from 1984 to 2016, covering; construction of the dispensary; building of the vocational training centre; establishment of staff houses; cultivation of demonstration farms; planting and maintenance of trees; community access to health and youth training services. This occupation was open, known to village authorities, and never opposed. Under the doctrine of long possession, as illustrated in Attorney General v Lohay Akonaay & Another [1995] TLR 80,

occupation of land over decades with the acquiescence of the community creates a proprietary interest. Moreover, in Sospeter Kahindi v Mhoja [1990] TLR 147, the Court of Appeal recognised that when an institution occupies land openly for a significant period, the law presumes the existence of a valid grant unless evidence demonstrates fraud or illegality. No such evidence was produced here. On whether trespass occurred, trespass in Tanzanian law is defined as unlawful entry upon land in the possession of another, regardless of force or intent. In Justine Nyakabambo v The Registered Trustees of Kanisa la Mennonite, Civil Appeal No. 292 of 2019, the Court of Appeal held that where a party demonstrates prior possession and the opposing party enters without consent, trespass is proved even if the defendant claims ownership. Here, the plaintiff proved prior possession by documentary evidence, oral testimony, and physical structures. The defendant admitted entering the land in 2016 and 2021, ploughing it, and cutting trees. The defence claim that the village was exercising its rights is invalid unless it first

lawfully revoked the plaintiffs rights, which it did not do. Therefore, the defendant's entry constituted trespass. Regarding damages, the plaintiff claimed TZS 20,000,000 per year from 2016 to the date of judgment for loss of income from crops. Under Tanzanian law, special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, as reiterated in Zuberi Augustino v Anicet Mugabe [1992] TLR 137. The Plaintiff did plead a specific figure but did not produce receipts, bank statements, or quantifiable agricultural records demonstrating annual income loss. The testimonies indicated farming activities but did not establish measurable economic loss at the claimed level. The Court must now evaluate the credibility of the parties' narratives and apply the law to the factual matrix. The plaintiff's account presents a coherent and historically grounded sequence of events beginning with village requests for social services in the 1970s, formal allocation of land in 1984, construction sponsored by World Vision, decades of uninterrupted use, and eventually unlawful interference by the fefendant Village. This narrative is supported by; documentary evidence (exhibits P1-P23); testimonies of eight witnesses,

including former village officials, professionals, and clergy; consistent historical context, especially regarding governmental and donor- supported rural development during the Operation Vijiji period; physical evidence observed at the locus. The defendant's narrative is far less coherent. It is premised on denying the existence or authenticity of exhibit PI while simultaneously acknowledging that the church constructed and supervised the dispensary and vocational centre located within the same 31.005 acres. The defendant further claims that only one acre was allocated, but offers no explanation why, for over 30 years, the plaintiff constructed, maintained, and operated permanent buildings across the broader land without challenge. The Court notes that in land disputes involving village land, the Court of Appeal in Regina v Eliufoo [1969] EA 357; Nizar M.H. Janmohamed v Gulamali Fazal Janmohamed [1980] TLR. 29 held that: "A party who relies solely on denial w ithout presenting docum entary evidence, where such evidence would ordinarily exist, bears a heavy evidentiary burden."

The village, being the custodian of village land records, should have been able to produce; minutes revoking the alleged allocation; asset registers listing the land as village land; historical resolutions; maps or surveys; receipts showing village management of the land. None were produced. Instead, the defence relied on exhibit D l, which merely shows village registration in 2020, a matter irrelevant to ownership of specific parcels. When the documentary record is silent on a claim of ownership, and when the opposing party produces consistent, dated, contemporaneous documents, courts are guided to favour the party with affirmative evidence. This principle was reaffirmed in Mwalimu Omari Salum v Daudi Mwalyego, Civil Appeal No. 185 of 2019. The Plaintiff's evidence meets this standard. It demonstrates; a formal allocation; historical acceptance by village authorities; long-term investment exceeding thirty years; continuous possession without interruption; absence of any competing use by the village; recognition of the church as owner in multiple correspondences. The defendant's argument that the plaintiff was merely a supervisor for donor-funded projects contradicts not only the documentary evidence

but also practical logic. If the plaintiff had no ownership interest, there would be no reason for the church to bear; responsibility for project oversight; cost of maintaining buildings; cost of staffing the facilities; construction of the vocational centre; agricultural activities and maintenance. Ownership is inferred not merely from paper allocation but from acts of dominion, as held in Hemed Said v Mohamed Mbilu [1984] TLR 113. The plaintiff demonstrated numerous acts of dominion. The Court also assessed the demeanour of witnesses. PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4, PW6, PW7, and PW8 testified with clarity and consistency. Their recollections were detailed, and their accounts mutually reinforced each other. PW3, PW4, and PW8 provided firsthand historical accounts dating back to the early 1980s. PW6 and PW7 provided administrative insight based on official duties. PW2, though no longer an officer, recounted events with precision. By contrast, DW1 contradicted himself repeatedly. He denied knowledge of exhibit PI but could not explain why his name appears on it. DW2 made sweeping assertions without documentary support. DW3, testifying through an interpreter, lacked precision and relied heavily on

memory rather than verified historical records. DW4 relied on exhibit D l, which is irrelevant to ownership of the land. The issue of trespass must also be analysed through the principle of prior possession. In Justine Nyakabambo v Registered Trustees of Kanisa la Mennonite, the Court of Appeal held: "A person in long, peacefulpossession is protected against a ll except a person who proves a better me." Here, the plaintiff was in long, peaceful possession. The defendants failed to show better title. Therefore, their entry into the land in 2016 and 2021 constitutes trespass. The destruction of crops and trees was unlawful. The defendant Village attempted to argue that the trees belonged to villagers who formerly occupied the land. Yet exhibit P23 proves that the church compensated former occupants for trees on the land. This payment acknowledges ownership and negates the defence claim. Finally, on the issue of permanent injunction, the circumstances fit the criteria established in Atilio v Mbowe [1969] HCD 284; there must be a

legal right to be protected; there must be a threat of violation; no other adequate remedy exists. The plaintiff has proven all three elements. The Court now turns to the detailed assessment of the locus in quo visit, which was conducted strictly in accordance with the principles articulated in Nizar M.H. v Gulamali Fazal Janmohamed [1980] TLR 29, Peter Ng'omango v Gerson Mwangwa, Civil Appeal No. 265 of 2019, which establish that the purpose of a locus visit is not to gather new evidence but to clarify existing testimony, confirm physical features described by witnesses, and resolve inconsistencies arising from oral accounts. During the visit, the Court observed that the boundaries identified in exhibit PI corresponded precisely with the physical layout of the disputed land. To the north, the visible path leading toward Shauri Mattie perfectly aligned with PW3 and PW5's testimonies. The road appeared aged, well-used, and consistent with historical rural paths typical of the early 1980s. The landmarks described by the plaintiff's witnesses matched the landscape.

To the east, the path toward Tloma Hamlet was clear, wide enough for routine village activity, and consistent with natural boundaries used historically for demarcation. The defendant's claim that this eastern stretch represented land for public village use was unsupported, as no structures indicating village activities were found. To the south, the road leading to Kambi ya Simba was found intact, functioning as a natural and administrative boundary for decades. Its presence strengthens the plaintiff's account that the land allocation was designed around identifiable and practical boundaries. To the west, a natural valley was observed. The valley appeared deep and long-standing. PW3 and PW5 had testified that this valley was the western limit, and this was confirmed during the visit. Nothing observed contradicted the plaintiff's account. The Court then inspected buildings situated within the land. The dispensary's structure exhibited characteristics of buildings constructed in the 1980s and early 1990s, including architectural style, aged roofing sheets, concrete finishes, and layout. Houses showed similar signs of age and consistency. The vocational training centre and workshops, though partially vandalised, bore unmistakable signs of permanent institutional

investment, foundation stones, workshop benches, concrete floors, and remnants of training equipment. These findings corroborated PW3, PW4, and PW8, who described decades of development funded by donors and carried out under church supervision. The defendant's contention that the plaintiff was merely a "supervisor" of village-owned infrastructure is inconsistent with the investment scale and the institutional layout observed during the visit. The Court further inspected environmental indicators of prior land use. PW4 had testified that over seventy trees planted by students were cut by invaders. The Court observed numerous tree stumps, consistent with trees that had been planted in a planned pattern typical of institutional agroforestry. The stumps appeared aged, with diameters indicating maturity. Their alignment suggested deliberate planting, rather than random village cultivation. These observations strengthen the plaintiff's assertion that the land was institutionally used for decades. The Court found no trace of village communal use, such as granaries, communal fields, village office structures, signposts, or markers of public land. Instead, the land displayed characteristics of long-term

institutional occupation: buildings, tree planting patterns, pathways, and remnants of training infrastructure. Thus, the locus visit served its intended purpose: to clarify testimony, resolve inconsistencies, and assist the Court in reaching a fair conclusion. The visit did not introduce new evidence but strengthened the reliability of the plaintiff's historical narrative. The findings from the locus visit confirmed five major points: the plaintiff's boundaries in PI match the physical environment; the plaintiff's buildings and infrastructure are genuinely long-standing; the land bears physical evidence of institutional, not communal, development; the defendant's narrative is inconsistent with observable facts; the 2016 and 2021 invasions are evidenced by physical disturbance of the land. These findings bear directly on the legal determination of ownership, possession, and trespass. The Court has also carefully considered matters that has been raised in the final written submissions filed by learned State Attorney, Mr. Leyani Mbise, on behalf of both defendants. In those submissions, the defendants' central contention was that the plaintiff failed to discharge

the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities, particularly on the issue of lawful ownership of the suit land. The defendants argued that the suit land constitutes village land under the Village Land Act, Cap. 114 R.E. 2023, administered by the 2nd defendant Village Council, and that no lawful allocation could occur without prior approval of the Village Assembly as required under Section 8(5) of the Act. It was strongly contended that the plaintiff failed to tender minutes of the Village Council and Village Assembly approving the alleged allocation, and that exhibit PI, relied upon by the plaintiff, could not on its own constitute lawful allocation of village land. The defendants further submitted that any role played by the plaintiff church was merely supervisory in nature, limited to facilitating donor- funded social service projects under World Vision International, as evidenced by exhibit P4. They maintained that ownership of the land and projects vested in the village community of Mbulumbulu Ward, and not in the Plaintiff as an institution. Reliance was placed on statutory provisions governing village land management, the doctrine that he who alleges m ust prove, and a line of authorities emphasizing that annexures to pleadings do not constitute evidence unless formally proved.

On the issue of long occupation, the defendants submitted that adverse possession cannot operate against public or village land, citing section 38(l)(a) of the Law of Limitation Act, [Cap. 89 R.E. 2023], and several authorities to the effect that public land cannot be acquired by prescription. They argued that the plaintiff's reliance on long occupation and development was legally untenable, as the land was at all material times reserved for social services and remained village land. Regarding trespass, the defendants submitted that the claim was time- barred, having accrued in 2016 but filed in 2024, well beyond the three- year limitation period applicable to tortious claims. They further contended that the Village Council could not trespass upon its own land while performing its statutory duty of protecting village property. The Court was therefore urged to find that the Plaintiff had no enforceable proprietary interest and that the suit should be dismissed with costs. The Court has given due weight to all these submissions. However, after evaluating them against the totality of the evidence on record, the Court is unable to accept the defendants' position. While the Court agrees with the defendants on the general legal principles relating to burden of proof, village land administration, and the

mandatory nature of statutory procedures, those principles cannot be applied in isolation from the factual and historical realities established by credible evidence. The plaintiff did not rely on mere assertions, nor on unproven annexures, but on a combination of contemporaneous documentary evidence, credible testimony from former village officials and professionals, administrative records, donor correspondence, and physical evidence confirmed during the locus in quo visit. Exhibit PI, though attacked by the fefendants, was not an isolated document. It was corroborated by multiple independent witnesses, including former Village Executive Officers, a medical practitioner who personally participated in the 1984 handover, community elders, and current administrative records which conspicuously exclude the disputed land from village assets. ThedDefendants, despite being custodians of village records, failed to produce any documentary evidence contradicting the allocation or showing retention of the land as village property over the past four decades. On the argument that Village Assembly approval was not proved, the Court finds that the Defendants' reliance on a strict documentary formalism ignores the historical context of the 1980s, during which village I land allocations under Operation Vijiji were routinely effected through

village resolutions, ward coordination, and community consensus, long before the current statutory formalities crystallized. The law does not operate retrospectively to invalidate decades-old allocations that were acted upon openly, relied upon in good faith, and acquiesced in by village authorities for over thirty years. The Court further finds that the defendants' reliance on the doctrine excluding adverse possession over public land is misplaced in the present context. The plaintiff did not anchor its claim on adverse possession, but on lawful allocation, long-standing recognition, and uninterrupted occupation with the knowledge and acquiescence of the village authorities. The authorities cited by the defendants do not negate proprietary interests arising from lawful allocation coupled with long and peaceful possession, as consistently recognised in matters involving religious and public-interest institutions. As to limitation, the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff's cause of action is primarily declaratory in nature, seeking confirmation of ownership and protection of possession. The trespass complained of in 2016 and 2021 constitutes a continuing interference with the plaintiff's rights, and in any event, limitation cannot be used as a shield to legitimise unlawful interference with established possession where ownership is proved.

In civil cases, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. A party succeeds if their evidence is more convincing than that of the opponent. The plaintiff's evidence is comprehensive, consistent, historically grounded, and supported by exhibits and locus findings. The defendant's evidence is internally inconsistent, largely unsupported by documents, and contradicted by physical observation. Accordingly, while the Court acknowledges the diligence and industry exhibited in the defendants' submissions, it finds that those submissions do not dislodge the cogent, consistent, and overwhelming evidence presented by the plaintiff. The defendants' narrative remains internally inconsistent, unsupported by documentary proof, and contradicted by both historical records and physical realities observed on the ground. In final result, the court makes the following orders; it is hereby declared that the Registered Trustees of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania, Northern Diocese are the lawful owners of the suit land, comprising 22 acres being part of the 31.005 acres allocated in 1984, as per Exhibit PI; A permanent injunction is hereby issued restraining the Defendant Village Council, its agents, servants, or any persons acting on its behalf from; entering the land; cultivating any portion of it; cutting

trees; erecting structures; removing boundary marks; disturbing the Plaintiff's possession in any manner whatsoever. As to general damages and costs, I have considered among other factors, the history of the dispute, the need to maintain peace and harmony among the parties, I decline to order any general damages. Each party shall borne own costs. The judgment is entered accordingly. It is so orde The judgement delivered under my hand and seal of the court in open court before Mr. Leyan Mbise, assisted by Mr. Joseph Bundala, both learned State Attorney for the defendants and Mr. Geofrey Mollel, learned advocate for the plaintiff; and in presence of some villagers and church elders. Right of appeal to the Court of Appeal fully explained. 19 . 12.2025 S. J. KAINDA

JUDGE 19.12.2025

Discussion