Chama Cha Kutete Haki na Maslahi ya Walimu Tanzania (Chakamwata)) vs Mbozi District Council and Others (Consolidated Labour Application No. 1993, 1990, 1993, 19978,19986,19987, and 20210 of 2024) [2025] TZHC 8431 (17 December 2025)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (LABOUR DIVISION) AT MBEYA CONSOLIDATED LABOUR APPLICATION Nos. 1993,1990, 1993 19978,19986,19987 and 20210 OF 2024 CHAMA CHA KUTETEA HAKI NA MSALAHI YA WALIMUTANZANIA(CHAKAMWATA) ................................. APPLICANT VERSUS MBOZI DISTRICT COUNCIL ........................................... 1 st RESPONDENT CHAMA CHA WALIMU TANZANIA (CWT) ...................... 2 n d RESPONDENT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.............................................. 3 rd RESPONDENT AND CHAMA CHA KUTETEA HAKI NA MSALAHI YA WALIMUTANZANIA(CHAKAMWATA) .................................. APPLICANT VERSUS MOMBA DISTRICT COUNCIL..........................................1 st RESPONDENT CHAMA CHA WALIMU TANZANIA (CWT) ........................ 2 n d RESPONDENT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.............................................. 3 rd RESPONDENT AND CHAMA CHA KUTETEA HAKI NA MSALAHI YA WALIMUTANZANIA(CHAKAMWATA) .................................. APPLICANT VERSUS MBEYA DISTRICT COUNCIL ...................................... 1 st RESPONDENT CHAMA CHA WALIMU TANZANIA (CWT) ........................ 2 n d RESPONDENT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.............................................. 3 rd RESPONDENT AND CHAMA CHA KUTETEA HAKI NA MSALAHI YA WALIMUTANZANIA(CHAKAMWATA) .................................. APPLICANT VERSUS 1

MBEYA CITY COUNCIL .................................................. 1 st RESPONDENT CHAMA CHA WALIMU TANZANIA (CWT) ........................ 2 n d RESPONDENT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.............................................. 3 rd RESPONDENT AND CHAMA CHA KUTETEA HAKI NA MSALAHI YA WALIMUTANZANIA(CHAKAMWATA) .................................. APPLICANT VERSUS BUSOKELO DISTRICT COUNCIL..................................... 1 st RESPONDENT CHAMA CHA WALIMU TANZANIA (CWT) ........................ 2 nd RESPONDENT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.............................................. 3 rd RESPONDENT AND AND CHAMA CHA KUTETEA HAKI NA MSALAHI YA WALIMUTANZANIA(CHAKAMWATA) .................................. APPLICANT VERSUS RUNGWE DISTRICT COUNCIL........................................1 st RESPONDENT CHAMA CHA WALIMU TANZANIA (CWT) ........................ 2 n d RESPONDENT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL..............................................3 rd RESPONDENT AND CHAMA CHA KUTETEA HAKI NA MSALAHI YA WALIMUTANZANIA(CHAKAMWATA).................................. APPLICANT VERSUS KYELA DISTRICT COUNCIL............................................1 st RESPONDENT CHAMA CHA WALIMU TANZANIA (CWT) ........................ 2 n d RESPONDENT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL..............................................3 rd RESPONDENT RULING 02n d &,17th December,2025 TIGANGA, 3 .: The applicant, Chama Cha Kutetea Haki na Maslahi ya Walimu Tanzania (CHAKAMWATA), instituted a labour application before this Court on 12th 2

August 2025 against the Mb o zi District Council, Chama Cha Walimu Tanzania (CWT), and the Attorney General. The application was filed by way of chamber summons under Rule 56(1), (2) and (3), Rule 24(1), 24 (2) (a), (b), (c) (d),(e ), (f), 24 (3) (a),(b),(c) (d) and Rule 28(1), (b), (c), (d) and (e ) of The Labour Courts Rules, Government Notice No. 106/2007) and the provision of sections 94(1) (d) (e ) (f), 94 (3) (a) and (b) 94 (l),(b),(i) of the Employment and Labour Relation Act Cap 366 R.E 2023. The applicant prays for the following orders;

1. That this honourable court be pleased to condone the applicant and grant an extension of time to file a statement of complaint against the respondents before this Honourable court.
2. Any other reliefs this honourable court deems fit and just to grant. The application was supported by an affidavit sworn by Meshack Lupakisyo Kapange, the General Secretary and Principal Officer of the applicant, in which he gave a detailed account of what attributed to his delay. In opposition thereto, the 1st and 3rd respondents in all the applications listed above filed a joint counter-affidavit taken by the 3

respective Principal Officers of the Respondents, who, for purposes of this matter, also deponed on behalf of the 3rd respondent. In all the applications, the defendants raised the notice of preliminary objection to the effect that the application is incompetent and untenable, having been filed prematurely for failure to comply with the requirements of section 65(1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act, Cap. 366 R.E. 2023, and that, consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain and determine the application. Briefly, it is a matter of record that the applicant is a registered trade union, duly registered and operating in Tanzania since 18th March 2015. Shortly after its registration, the applicant recruited and successfully registered a large number of members, including teachers employed in both the public and private sectors, as well as employees of the 1st respondents in all these applications. The employers of the said members, namely the 1st respondent, were duly authorized to deduct one percent (1%) from the members' monthly salaries and to remit the same to the applicant. Such deductions and remittances were affected up to 2019. However, in 2020, the 1st respondent ceased to discharge its obligation of remitting the deducted amounts to the applicant and instead commenced remitting

the same to the 2nd respondent, a practice which has continued from 2020 to date. Consequently, the applicant issued a statutory notice of ninety (90) days to the respondents seeking redress, to which no response was made. As a result, the applicant became time-barred, having failed to institute proceedings within the statutory period of sixty (60) days. It is for that reason that the present application for extension of time was filed. It is these applications that were opposed on a single ground of preliminary objection. The raised ground of preliminary objection was scheduled to be argued by way of written submissions. The 1st and 3rd respondents were represented by the learned State Attorney, Mr Joseph Tibaijuka, while the applicant, in respect of the said ground of preliminary objection, was represented by the learned counsel, Mr Isaya Zebedayo Mwanri. In support of the preliminary objection, the learned State Attorney submitted that the application is untenable in law for having been filed prematurely, in contravention of section 65(1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act, which prescribes the procedure for the resolution of trade disputes. He contended that such disputes must, in the first instance, be reported to the Commission for Mediation and

Arbitration (CMA) within the prescribed time, the purpose being to afford the CMA an opportunity to mediate the dispute before it escalates into litigation. The learned State Attorney further submitted that section 66(l)(a) and (b) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act makes it mandatory that a dispute shall not be referred to the Labour Court unless the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (CMA) has issued a certificate of non-settlement, or the prescribed period for mediation has elapsed without settlement. Mr Tibaijuka argued that, in the present application, there is no evidence that the dispute was ever reported to the CMA. Consequently, the application before this Court is premature, incompetent, and bad in law, and this Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to entertain it. He relied on the authority of Parin A. A Jaffer & Another vs. Abdurasul Ahmed Jaffer & 2 Others (1996) TLR 110. The learned State Attorney maintained that, in the present application, the mandatory procedures prescribed under sections 65 and 66 of the Employment and Labour Relations Act were not complied with, with the result that the application was filed prematurely and that, consequently, this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it. 6

In response, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the learned State Attorney for the 1st and 3rd respondents had misconceived the applicability of the cited provisions. He contended that section 65(1) of the ELRA is couched in non-mandatory terms, as evidenced by the use of the word "may", and is therefore directory rather than mandatory, in accordance with section 54(1) of the Interpretation of the Laws Act, [Cap. 1 R.E. 2023]. Counsel further submitted that section 65(1) of the ELRA does not prescribe a mandatory procedural step where a registered trade union seeks to exercise organisational rights, and that, accordingly, the preliminary objection is devoid of merit. It was additionally argued that the learned State Attorney had misconstrued the scope and applicability of sections 65 and 66 of the ELRA, which provisions, counsel submitted, apply to a trade union seeking to initiate the exercise of organisational rights at the workplace, and not to a union which has already initiated and exercised such rights, but whose rights were unlawfully terminated by the employer, as is alleged in the present case. Counsel emphasised that the applicant had already recruited 295 members, being employees of the 1st respondent, and had continuously exercised its organisational rights up to 2019.

Mr Isaya further submitted that the provisions of section 66(l)(a) and (b) of the ELRA are applicable only where the trade union is in default, and the employer is required to take action. He contended that, therefore, the said provisions are irrelevant to the circumstances of the present application. He further submitted that, pursuant to section 95(l)(e) of the ELRA, this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the present dispute, as it is a matter specifically reserved for determination under the ELRA. Learned counsel also argued that, since the Attorney General is a party to this application, the matter cannot be referred to the CMA, and must therefore be brought before this Labour Court. He referred to the case of Kawawa Said & Another vs Tumain Lugasi, Land Appeal No. 4 of 2022 [2022] TZHC 12291 (5 August 2022), noting that under sections 6(3) and (4) of the Government Proceedings Act, it is mandatory to join the Attorney General in civil proceedings against the Government, and that non-joinder vitiates the proceedings. Further, under section 6(5) of the same Act, where the Attorney General is joined as a party, the High Court alone has jurisdiction. He submitted that the learned State Attorney had failed to cite any provision

from the labour laws that provides contrary directions to those set out in the Government Proceedings Act. Mr Mwanri additionally submitted that the case of Parin A. A Jaffer & Another (supra) is distinguishable from the circumstances of the present matter. Accordingly, he contended that this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the application. In conclusion, he submitted that the preliminary objection raised is misconceived and untenable in law, being based on a misconception and incorrect interpretation of the law and procedure. The learned counsel for the applicant prayed that the preliminary objection raised and argued by the respondents be dismissed in its entirety with no order as to costs. In his rejoinder, the learned State Attorney responded regarding the use of the word "may" under section 65(1) of the ELRA, submitting that the term reflects the discretion of the trade union to seek its rights conferred under Part V of the Act, but does not confer discretion to bypass the CMA and approach the Labour Court directly. He maintained that trade unions must first exhaust the extrajudicial machinery before referring any dispute to the Labour Court. The learned State Attorney relied on the 9

authority of Elieza Zacharia Mtemi & 12 Others vs. AG & 3 Others (Civil Appeal No. 177/2018) [2021] TZCA 34 (25 February 2021). The learned State Attorney further rejoined on the issue of joinder of the Attorney General, submitting that the case of Kawawa Said & Another (supra) is distinguishable, as it concerned a land dispute, whereas the present matter relates specifically to a labour dispute involving trade union matters. To support his submission, he cited the authority Mlenga Kalunde Mirobo vs. The Registered Trustees of the Tanzania National Parks & AG (Labour Application No.6 of 2021) [2021] TZHC 9097 (30 December 2021). The learned State Attorney reiterated his submission in chief, contending that the present application was filed prematurely and that the procedures under section 65 of the ELRA ought to have been followed prior to its referral to this Court. He prayed that the application be struck out. Having considered a summary of the rival submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, the issue for determination is whether the raised preliminary objection has any merit. It is on the record that the applicant and the 2nd respondent are registered trade unions, duly registered under the labour laws of 10

Tanzania. The preliminary objection raised by the respondents is that, as this application was filed by trade unions, it is untenable and premature, having been instituted without compliance with sections 65(1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) of the ELRA. The above provision, section 65, provides as follows; "65-(l) A registered trade union may notify an employer in the prescribed form that it seeks to exercise a right conferred under this part. (2) Within 30 days o f the receipt o f a notice under subsection (1), the employer shall meet with the trade union to conclude a collective agreement granting the right and regulating the manner in which the right is to be exercised. (3) Where there is no agreement or the employer fails to meet with the trade union within 30 days, the trade union may refer the dispute to the Labour Court, which shall make appropriate orders. (4) Where the mediation fails to resolve the dispute, the trade union may refer the dispute to the Labour Courts, which shall make appropriate orders. (5) A dispute over the interpretation or application o f an order made under this section shall be referred to the labour court for decision . " The learned State Attorney for the 1st and 3rd respondents submitted that the aforementioned provisions of the law require that a l i

trade dispute be first reported to the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (CMA), to afford the CMA an opportunity to mediate the dispute before it proceeds to litigation. He further contended that section 66(l)(a) and (b) of the ELRA has not been complied with. The said provisions provide as follows: 66 -(1) Where a trade union materially breaches the terms and conditions for the exercise o f organisational rights, the emp/oyer- (a) May refer the issue to the Commission for mediation; (b) Where the mediation fails to resolve the issue; the parties may apply to the Labour Court to ft) Terminate any o f the organisational rights granted to the trade union under a collective agreement; or (ii) Withdraw an order made under section 65. A literal reading of the above provisions indicates that they are applicable where a trade union has breached the agreed terms and conditions, and that the procedure outlined therein is to be followed by the employer, in this case, the 1st respondent, who is required to refer the alleged breach by the trade union, in the exercise of its organisational 12

rights, to the CMA. If the mediation process fails, the matter may then be referred to the Labour Court. I concur with the submission of the applicant's counsel that the learned State Attorney misconceived the application of sections 65 and 66 of the ELRA. The requirement that a dispute be first referred to the CMA for mediation is not a mandatory procedure for a registered trade union when exercising its organisational rights in the workplace. The provisions are intended for trade unions seeking to initiate the exercise of organisational rights, and do not apply to a union, as in the present case, which has already initiated and exercised its organisational rights. It is also on record that the Attorney General has been joined as a party. It is settled law that once the Attorney General is joined as a party, the suit must be instituted in the High Court. Sections 6(3), (4), and (5) of the Government Proceedings Act, Cap. 5 R.E. 2023 provide as follows: 6-(3) The suits against the Government shall, upon the expiry o f the notice period, be brought against the Government, ministry, government department, local government authority, executive agency, public corporation, parastatal organisation or public company that is alleged to have committed the civil wrong on which the civil suit is based, and the Attorney General shall be joined as a necessary party. 13

(4) No joinder o f the Attorney General as prescribed under subsection (3) shall vitiate the proceedings o f any suit brought in terms o f subsection (3). (5) The suits against the Government shall be instituted in the High Court by delivering a claim in the Registry o f the High Court within the area where the claim arose." Therefore, as a general rule, where the Attorney General is joined as a party in civil proceedings, the only authority with jurisdiction is the High Court, and the suit must be instituted therein. I concur with the submission of the applicant's counsel that there is no provision of law extinguishing the requirement to join the Attorney General in labour proceedings; hence, such joinder is mandatory, and it is not in dispute that the suit ought to be instituted before the High Court, Labour Division. Furthermore, the nature of the dispute in the present application falls within sections 95(l)(d), (e), and (f) of the ELRA, whereby this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. The nature of the dispute is such that it cannot be referred to the CMA. The aforementioned provisions provide as follows: 95-(lj Subject to the Constitution o f the United Republic o f Tanzania, 1977, the Labour Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the application, interpretation, and implementation o f the provisions o f this Act and over any employment or labour matter falling under common law, 14

tortious liability, vicarious liability, or breach o f contract, and to decide; (d) Complaints, other than those that are to be decided by arbitration under the provisions o f this Act; (e) any disputes reserved for decision by the Labour Court under this Act; and' (f) applications inciuding- (i) a declaratory order in respect o f any provision o f this Act; or (ii) an injunction." In my view, the provisions vest the High Court with reserved powers to deal with labour matters, and such matters are not necessarily required to pass through the CMA for mediation. In the present application, the nature of the dispute falls squarely under section 95(l)(e) of the ELRA, which empowers this Court to hear and determine the matter. The cases cited by the learned State Attorney, namely Elieza Zacharia Mtemi & 12 Others (supra), Parin A.A. Jaffer & Another (supra), and Mlenga Kalunde Mirobo (supra), are distinguishable, as the disputes in those cases did not fall within the ambit of section 95(1) of the ELRA, unlike the present application before this Court. Based on the foregoing provisions of the law, I am satisfied that this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the application and has 15

been properly moved to grant the orders sought therein. Consequently, the grounds of the preliminary objection lack merit and are hereby overruled, with no order as to costs. It is accordingly ordered. DATED and delivered at MBEYA on this 17th day of December, 2025. 16