Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 265South Africa
M.L v S.J.P.L (17573/2014) [2025] ZAGPJHC 265 (13 March 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
13 March 2025
Headnotes
almost invariably women are at the lowest rung of the economic ladder and are generally in a less favourable financial position than their husbands.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## M.L v S.J.P.L (17573/2014) [2025] ZAGPJHC 265 (13 March 2025)
M.L v S.J.P.L (17573/2014) [2025] ZAGPJHC 265 (13 March 2025)
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number:
17573/2014
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
In
the matter between:
M[...]
L[...]
Applicant
And
S[...]
J[...] P[...]
L[...]
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Mahomed J
[1]
The Applicant in this matter seeks an order
in terms of R43(6), she alleged changed circumstances from the last
occasion when this
matter was heard in 2018. She applies for an order
for maintenance in the amount of R32 613.90 and an increase in a
contribution
to legal costs of R90 000, when previously she was
awarded only R80 000 as a contribution to her legal costs. The
judgment of 2018
was only made available to this court on the morning
of the hearing of this matter.
[2]
It is also necessary to mention that there
are no papers on file for the R43 application, when Splig J granted
an order for contribution
towards costs, the learned judge made no
order in regard to interim maintenance in that the court noted that
the Respondent wanted
to move the matter to the magistrate’s
court to limit legal costs and Splig J stated that since the matter
was set down for
trial the following month, that the trial court
would be in a better position to hear evidence on the aspect of
maintenance and
make the appropriate order. The parties dispute
the interpretation of the judgment, the applicant contends that the
issue
of interim maintenance was reserved whilst the respondent
argued that maintenance was not awarded.
INTERIM MAINTENANCE
[3]
Counsel for the Respondent Adv. Scholtz in
opposition submitted that the claim for interim maintenance cannot
succeed, the Applicant
has not claimed for maintenance in her
particulars of claim, he submitted that a party must stand and fall
on her pleadings, and
the court is bound by the pleadings. Counsel
argued that the Applicant will not establish her right to maintenance
at the trial
and this application is futile.
[4]
Adv. Bergentuin for the Applicant, conceded
that her client did not claim maintenance in her pleadings and
explained that the Applicant
was of the view that she would receive
her share of the joint estate on divorce and would not require any
financial assistance.
Counsel contended that despite there being no
“baseline from which to commence” this court can make an
order for maintenance.
Mr Scholtz, disagreed and submitted that his
client was called upon to answer to a R43(6) application, and
referred the court to
the founding papers in paragraphs 9 and 13
where the allegations made confirm the procedure followed and it is
understood that
the applicant is to put forward her changed
circumstances, for the court’s determination for an increase.
[5]
The respondent argued that the Applicant
has been legally represented throughout the proceedings, the
applicant asks the court to
vary a judgment, which she failed to
place before the court, and the Applicant has only disclosed her
finances a few days before
this hearing, which itself is
questionable, the documents she annexes in support tell a different
story. The financial disclosure
is outstanding for several years, as
the matter commenced in 2014. Counsel further argued that there is no
claim for maintenance
even in her counterclaim, which is deals only
with a dispute about her marital regime. Counsel argued that there is
no even a prima
facie case presented for the maintenance claim, the
matter commenced 11 years ago, and she remained silent on spousal
maintenance.
It was contended that if the Applicant’s
interpretation is to be accepted, then Spilg J is seized with the
matter, and this
court cannot make any determination regarding
interim maintenance.
CONTRIBUTION TO COSTS
[6]
Adv. Bergenthuin reminded the court that
Spilg J awarded her client R80 000, however, the amount has been used
up and referred me
to the pro forma account on file. Mr Scholtz for
the respondent argued that the items as appear, were previously
considered and
cannot be reconsidered, it was argued that the costs
items now are for experts to assist the applicant to prove her claim
for maintenance,
which was not a claim on the papers. Furthermore, it
was argued that since monies were paid over in 2018, nothing has
happened
in this matter, there is no accounting for what was done
with monies. Adv.
Scholtz
submitted that most of the items
claimed for are cost to prove a “non-existent claim,” he
submitted the application
stands to be dismissed, with costs on a
party-party costs.
[7]
In reply, Adv. Bergenthuin referred to
para14 of the judgment by Spilg and argued that the court reserved
its judgment on the interim
maintenance. Counsel conceded that some
line items on the pro forma account may be a repeat and may be
removed, however the costs
are for the “
future
litigation of the matter, which is for proving her maintenance
requirements
.” Counsel for the
applicant implored the court to consider the ethos of the Rule and
grant the order sought.
JUDGMENT
[8]
A court has a discretion in matters of this
nature and must exercise that discretion judiciously. It is trite
that in our law there
is a reciprocal duty of support until the
divorce. I noted Adv. Bergenthuin submissions that the Applicant will
be severely prejudiced
if the application is dismissed, her rights
must be preserved and that an amendment to her pleadings would afford
her a fair opportunity.
In the alternative counsel asked this court
to postpone the matter and reserve the costs.
[9]
In
S v S
, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the purpose of R43 is to
provide a speedy and inexpensive remedy, for the
benefit
of women and
children.
It provides for interim relief in matrimonial disputes until the
divorce court can properly make an informed finding after hearing
oral evidence. The court has held that almost invariably women are at
the lowest rung of the economic ladder and are generally
in a less
favourable financial position than their husbands.
[10]
I noted that the Applicant is of poor
health and cannot rely on her children either for support, I am not
inclined to close the
door on her right to a fair hearing. Having
considered the conspectus of the evidence before, me she suffers
greater prejudice,
if she is not afforded her opportunity to equal
protection before the law and a right to be heard. In my view it is
in the interest
of justice, that the matter be postponed. The matter
is of importance to the applicant and the Respondent will not suffer
any prejudice
in this instance.
[11]
Regarding costs, Counsel for the Respondent
submitted that he was aware that this is a family law matter and
therefore, submitted
that costs on a party and party scale are
appropriate. I think it fair to grant the Respondent the costs of the
application, as
the postponement is an indulgence afforded to the
Applicant in this instance. I also noted Mr Scholtz submissions on
the way the
applicant litigated, in this matter particularly
regarding disclosure of material facts on her financial position.
[12]
Accordingly, I make the following order:
1.
The application is postponed
sine
die.
2.
The Applicant shall pay the Respondent’s
party-party costs on scale C.
MAHOMED J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
For the
Applicant:
Adv. Bergenthuin
Instructed
by:
Swanepoel & Partners Inc.
For the
Respondent:
Adv. Scholtz
Instructed
by:
Jean Keyser Attorneys Inc.
Date of hearing 12 March 2025
Date of delivery 13 March 2025
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