Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 313South Africa
S.V.D.B v H.E.V.D.B (2024/067811) [2025] ZAGPJHC 313 (20 March 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
20 March 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## S.V.D.B v H.E.V.D.B (2024/067811) [2025] ZAGPJHC 313 (20 March 2025)
S.V.D.B v H.E.V.D.B (2024/067811) [2025] ZAGPJHC 313 (20 March 2025)
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sino date 20 March 2025
FLYNOTES:
FAMILY – Children –
Relocation
–
Claims
that relocation would harm children by disrupting their social and
educational environment – Unsubstantiated
concerns regarding
respondent's parenting – Lacked concrete evidence –
Undermined by refusal to participate in
voice of child
investigation or engage in mediation – Respondent's
relocation was reasonable and financially necessary
– Not
contrary to children's best interests – Respondent's
financial vulnerability justified costs contribution
–
Application dismissed.
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number:
2024-067811
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
DATE
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
V[…]
D[…] B[…],
S[…]
Applicant
And
V[…]
D[…] B[…], H[…]
E[…]
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Mahomed
J
[1]
The
Applicant a father, applies on an urgent basis for interdictory
relief in terms of R6, for an order preventing the Respondent
the
mother, from relocating with their two children to Cape Town, pending
the finalisation of a psychologist report. Furthermore,
the Applicant
prays for an order for primary residence of the children, in terms of
R43(6). The Respondent was granted primary
residence in the R43
application, the contact is set out in the order
[1]
which
included sleep overs with their father. The Applicant contended that
the children spent 14 days of a month with him, although
further
evidence was that he often sought changes to the arrangement at short
notice and spent on average between 7 and 9 days
a month since 2022.
The psychologist was mandated to investigate allegations of drug and
alcohol abuse of both parents and the
access rights and the best
interests of their children, as per the court order dated 15 October
2024.
[2]
Advocate
F Bezuidenhout appeared for the Applicant and submitted that her
client is permitted to file a reply in terms of Rule 6
and that in
his papers the applicant sets out that he adopts a two pronged
approach to the application. The Respondent argued she
had not had an
opportunity to respond to the reply in which the Applicant is
repetitive, irrelevant and simply takes “another
bite of the
cherry.” I noted Ms Bezuidenhout submissions that material
information as to her employment was only disclosed
in her answering
papers and those facts needed to be addressed. I proposed to apply my
discretion on the information I require
and the weight that I would
attach to the papers in reply in terms of R43(5), see Bader v
Weston.
[2]
The
family law environment is dynamic by its nature, a court must be
apprised of all relevant facts up to the very date of a hearing.
[3]
The Respondent filed a conditional
counterclaim in which she prays for, inter alia, an order permitting
her to relocate with the
children to Cape Town, an order for a
contribution towards her legal costs and for a variation of the
applicants contact rights
to accommodate their move to Cape Town. She
contended that her business has suffered serious financial losses,
and she was forced
to seek employment as an IT specialist, she found
employment after four months of searching and the position requires
that she
move to Cape Town.
[4]
Adv. A Koekemoer appeared for the
Respondent and submitted the finalisation of the report is simply
another way that the Applicant
continues to control her client, the
Applicant on his version did not think the report was necessary, when
they were in discussions
to settle the divorce. The impression I
gained is that the divorce is capable of settlement and this leg of
litigation is simply
a waste of resources that could be ploughed back
into the family. The papers in this application are shockingly
prolix, and unnecessary,
the Respondent is obviously forced to
answer, and it is noteworthy that she is in financial difficulties
already she could do without
additional legal costs.
[5]
The evidence is that the Applicant has
rejected all efforts to arrive at a new arrangement to exercise his
contact rights, he is
concerned that it will cost him more to see his
children and he is prejudiced in that he will see them on fewer days
than he does
currently. According to the Respondent the Applicant
simply dragged his heels on the appointment of the psychologist, her
evidence
is that she approached the Applicant for his cooperation on
the appointment of an expert immediately after the order was granted.
It is common cause that he was to pay for the experts costs which
were to be set off against her share later. The Respondent contended
that he made serious allegations against her in the R43 hearing and
she was keen on addressing the points to ensure progress in
the
finalisation of the divorce. She could not afford an attorney and for
the most part represented herself. Adv. Koekemoer for
the Respondent
contended that when the expert was appointed her client gave her full
cooperation to the process and did so timeously.
She argued that in
November 2024 the Applicant advised the Respondent that he did not
think the report was necessary and suggested
that they simply proceed
to finalise their divorce, he tells a different story now when she
seeks to help herself and be the mother
she wants to be.
[6]
In December 2024 the expert indicated that
although the Respondent would commence the interview process however,
she anticipated
that it would continue into early 2025. She was
unable to guarantee that it will be completed before the Respondent
is to commence
her job in April 2025. Furthermore, in April 2025 the
children are due to commence their school term in Cape Town. The
Respondent
tendered payment for travel costs of the expert to Cape
Town if necessary to finalise the children’s interviews. Adv.
Koekemoer
proffered “ there is nothing one can do with a “blank
no for a response” and contended that the applicant refused
to
attend a mediation, refused to cooperate with responses to issues
raised, failed to provide alternative suggestions, he refused
to
participate in a “voice of the child” investigation, he
places his full reliance on the outcome of the expert report
and
until it is finalised, his view is that the applicant may go ahead
and work in Cape Town, but he refuses to consent to the
children
going along with her.
[7]
Adv. Bezuidenhout for the Applicant
contended that the parties have a “shared residency
arrangement” since 2022, the
children spend almost 14 days of
the month with their father, they are with the applicant for almost
half the month. The counter
argument before this court is that the
applicant has on several occasions changed plans at the last minute,
when he has been unable
to exercise his contact, it was argued that
he quite regularly, only exercised contact for half of his allocated
time.
[8]
The Applicant contends that a move would be
disruptive and not in the best interest of the children. They would
have to make new
friends, establish relationships with teachers, and
adjust to new environments. Furthermore, the Applicant contends that
“he
can keep watch over them, in the light of the Respondent’s
problem with drugs. Therefore the status quo should remain until
the
assessment if done, he is unwilling to mediate unless she agrees not
to move to Cape Town.
[9]
The experts investigation process was
delayed because the Applicant had to find the money to pay for her
services, and his evidence
is that just as he managed to find the
funds, he learnt of the respondent’s plans and is therefore he
forced to launch this
application. The evidence is that the applicant
is a successful businessman, who works in the family business. Adv.
Bezuidenhou
reminded this court that the Respondent has her own idea
of her rights as a parent, she has failed to consult with the other
parent,
regarding the move, she informed schools of the move before
she advised the applicant.
[10]
It was contended by the Applicant that the
Respondent fails to comply with the Children’s Act in terms her
duties as a co-parent
which was denied. The Respondent contended that
the Applicant refuses to co-operate with Respondent’s attorneys
and has been
called on two occasions to mediate the matter, to hold a
round table to discuss in particular for an approach to their
co-parenting
arrangements in the future. Ms Koekemoer submitted that
the Respondent has made every effort to comply with her obligations
in
s 31 of the Children’s Act, the applicant will not engage on
the issue.
[11]
In my view the provisions in the Act on
access, contemplates engagement with the issues raised and it is only
successful if both
parties engage, the respondent argued that the
Applicant refuses to engage on issues raised, he offers no
suggestions, he maintains
his stance that the family cannot move to
Cape Town for reasons set out earlier, his view is that it is
practical for them to be
permanently situated in their known
environment. Ms Bezuidenhout proffered that her client can also keep
an eye on them.
URGENCY
[12]
Advocate Bezuidenhout submitted that the
issue of urgency becomes a moot point as there is urgency on the
arguments of both parties.
Counsel contended that the Respondents aim
is to put an end to the shared residency arrangement, by rushing off
now with the children.
She only advised the Applicant of the move
after she had confirmed arrangements with the schools, it was
contended it was a situation
of a fait accompli. I have difficulty
with accepting this contention, there was no evidence before me of a
proper and meaningful
engagement by the applicant with issues that
concerned him regarding the best interests of the children. A party
who refuses to
co-operate and engage, cannot sit around pouting, the
party must take responsibility for failing to work at a solution. The
Act
presupposes adults engaging and being solution minded and bearing
in mind the best interest of their minor children. There appears
no
opportunity for me to exercise a discretion regarding urgency, the
Respondent has placed her timelines, which is not appreciated,
but I
must view her actions in the context of her limited financial
resources and to litigate at the same level as the applicant.
I am
inclined to agree with Adv. Bezuidenhout that the issue of urgency is
moot, both parties sought relief in relation to the
April 2025
timeline.
THE RELOCATION
APPLICATION
[13]
The Applicant does not dispute the dire
financial situation that the Respondent finds herself in, the
evidence is that he does not
pay her maintenance but rather
contributes R 5000 per month toward her credit card. I am of the view
that the Respondent is bona
fides in her decision to move, and that
the move is justifiable, she set out her challenges with banks,
credit bureaus and informed
the court she is at risk of losing the
home that she and her children live in. She needs to earn a living to
support herself and
her children to retain her dignity and her rights
as their mother.
[14]
I am of the view that she adopted a
rational and considered approach, she provided the necessary
employment documents, presumably
when they became available to her,
there is only a supposition that suggests a delay , she presented
information on their new home,
she stated that the children will
continue to have a support system, their grandfather will join them
in their new home, the children’s
special needs were considered
and information on the schools and curriculum was made available.
There no dispute in that regard
except of a lame attempt in the
replying affidavit, which takes a strike at the grandfather’s
competence at this belated
stage. I noted no objections to his living
with the respondent and their children whilst in Johannesburg. The
arguments raised
in the replying affidavit on the pretext of a R6
application, were weak as the facts were never an “issue”
before the
move to Cape Town was announced.
[15]
In
my view a parent who approaches the court on an urgent basis and is
concerned for his children, that the move is imminent, would
logically cooperate and hold a voice of the child investigation to
determine their best interest, who better than the children
themselves to convey their choice of place to live. The Respondent
secured an expert to investigate this the Applicant rejected
the
holding of a voice of the child investigation. Adv. Buzuidenhout for
the Applicant submitted that the psychologist Ms. Mahogney
will
attend to this aspect in due course, however that raises the question
as to why not hear them now. If the applicant heard
the children and
he was correct, it would have assisted his opposition to this move.
It seems to me that he was not confident as
to their best interest
and uses the pending report as an opportunity to continue his control
over the respondent, albeit he has
no objection to her moving, but
without the children. It is noteworthy that the applicant considered
the respondent to be “a
good mother”, I see no reason why
she would not continue to be the same mother in Cape Town. Our
constitution guarantees
freedom of movement
[3]
and
dignity
[4]
, this court cannot be
held to ransom to allay the fears of a party.
[16]
Section 31(2)(a)of the Act obliges parents
holding rights and responsibilities to give due consideration to the
views and wishes
expressed by the co holder of parental rights and
responsibilities in respect of the child. Adv. Koekemoer for the
Respondent argued
there is nothing that one can do with a “blank
no” from the applicant, he remained belligerent. I agree.
[17]
Adv. Bezuidenhout for the Applicant argued
that the Respondent’s counterapplication and her answering
papers were in essence
a relocation application which R43 does not
provide for. I understand the technical point raised however the
issue arises from
the award of primary residency and rights of access
by the non-custodial parent. I am loathe to dismiss the application
for that
reason alone. The history of the matter is before me, the
details for consideration of the rights and obligation of the parents
are before me, there is no evidence from either party that it is not
in the children’s best interest, the applicant merely
makes a
bald statement to bolster his version but nothing concrete is before
me to deny the respondent a hearing on this aspect.
The Applicant
states she is a good mother.
[18]
In
F
v F
[5]
,
Maya
AJA recognised that the courts in such matters consistently applied
the approach that the children’s best interests are
paramount.
What is in their best interest will depend on the facts of each case.
Satchwell J in
LW
v DB
[6]
,
provided guidelines with reference to the provision of our
Constitution on the consideration of relocation of children. The
court
stated the following to be considered:
“
1.
The interests of the children are the
first and paramount consideration.
2.
Each case is to be decided on its own particular facts.
3. Both parents have
joint primary responsibility for raising the child and where parents
are separated the child has the right
and the parents the
responsibility to ensure that contact is maintained.
4. Where a custodial
parent wishes to emigrate, a court will not lightly refuse leave for
the children to be taken out of the country
if the decision of the
custodial parent is shown to be bona fide and reasonable.
5. The courts have
always been sensitive to the situation of the parent who is to remain
behind. The degree of such sensitivity
and the role it plays in
determining the best interests of the children remain a vexed
question.”
[19]
The Respondent has made several proposals
to the Applicant including an increase in contact hours when he
visits them in Cape Town,
she identified possible accommodation which
is available to him in Cape Town, I do not think she can be faulted
in ensuring that
he maintains contact with his children. The
applicant must take responsibility for failing to cooperate with the
respondent in
arriving at workable solutions to continue to exercise
contact with his children in Cape Town. The ethos in parent
participation
in the Children’s Act is clear, cooperation
between parents toward a harmonious relationship in the best interest
of the
children.
[20]
Maya AJA recognises that in
F
v F
supra, at paragraph 11 where the
court stated:
“
A
refusal of permission to emigrate with a child effectively forces the
custodian parent to relinquish what he or she views as an
important
life enhancing opportunity. The negative feelings that such an order
must inevitably evoke are directly linked to the
custodian parent’s
emotional and psychological well being. The welfare of a child, in
undoubtedly, best served by being raised
in a happy and secure
atmosphere. A frustrated and bitter parent cannot, as a matter of
logic and human experience provide a child
with that environment.
”
[21]
I
mentioned earlier, there is very little before me regarding the
children and volumes before me regarding the parties and their
behaviours, they know their children, if there was any fact of
substance against their move, I have no doubt it would have been
before me, the usual issues of adjustment to new friends and
environment, is simply par for the course. The incomplete report
cannot stand in the way of the life of the respondent, she is not
only looking for a life enhancing opportunity in Cape Town, she
is
asking this court to assist in her attempts to survive and be a
normal parent to her children. The court cannot deny her the
support
she needs, and it cannot “
be
held hostage to the feelings of aggrieved litigants.”
[7]
[22]
In
LW v DB
[8]
, the court stated
“
The
solution of our court can never be to order that separated parents
must live at close proximity to each other in order that
each parent
lives in close proximity to their child. Our courts have not been
appointed the guardians of adults and parents are
not the prisoners
of our courts
.” This court fully
agrees with the learned judges understanding of the role of our
courts and I therefore, implored counsels
to provide practical
solutions.
[23]
Adv. Bezuidenhout suggested the practical
solution would be for the Respondent to go ahead with her work plans,
and leave her children
to their father, until a report is available,
or she can remain in Johannesburg, where “
they
would keep an eye on one another
”.
I might have taken counsel seriously, if I were not doubtful of the
Applicant’s commitment to his children, the evidence
is that he
does not have a healthy relationship with his daughter. I also
question his motives in that if he really cared for his
children’s
best interest, he would have cooperated with the holding of the voice
of the child investigation now, not when
the appointed psychologist
can fit them into the diary after April 2025.
[24]
I am of the view that there is nothing that
prevents the continuation of the expert reporting process, the
respondent has given
most aspects much thought, she will ensure that
the process is facilitated regarding the children when the expert
requires to interview
them. On several accounts a move to Cape Town,
would be an adventure for the young minds, and they are old enough to
express their
opinion, if they no longer enjoy their life in Cape
Town, they have an option to return to their father, the world has
become an
oyster for many young people however much depends on the
nurturing toward a positive outlook on life.
CONTRIBUTION TOWARD
LEGAL COSTS
[25]
In
S v S and Another
[9]
,
the court stated:
“
Applicants
in Rule 43 applications are almost invariably women who, as in most
countries, occupy the lowest economic rung and are
generally in a
less favourable financial position than their husbands. Black women
in South Africa historically have been doubly
oppressed by both their
race and gender. The inferior economic position of women is a stark
reality. The gender imbalance in homes
and society in general remains
a challenge both for society at large and our courts. This is
particularly apparent in applications
for maintenance where systemic
failures to enforce maintenance order have negatively impacted on the
rule of law. It is women who
are primarily left to nurture their
children and shoulder the related financial burden. To alleviate the
burden the courts must
ensure that the existing legal framework, to
protect the most vulnerable groups in society, operates effectively.”
[26]
Our
courts in several judgments
[10]
have
held that the equality provisions in our Constitution enjoin the
courts to order that parties be supported to litigate on an
equal
footing, litigants are entitled to a fair trial. It is common cause
that the Respondent is in financial trouble and will
require costs
for future litigation, given that the parties are unable to resolve
their disputes in more cost effective ways and
the litigation is
protracted. It is noteworthy that the applicant has engaged the
service of senior counsel and the volume of the
papers on file speaks
to the high costs of this leg of the litigation. The parties have not
disclosed what has been spent to date
on legal costs, but what is
certain it is an expensive process. I considered the respondents
submission on past costs of litigation
and future costs up to the
first day of trial. I noted the Applicant’s arguments in the
reply to the counterapplication in
the pro forma invoice. I am of the
view that the claim for a contribution is fair in the circumstances,
less the costs of this
urgent application. The balance available on
the first day of trial must be returned to the Applicant. There is
always a risk that
an award of too small an amount will lead to
additional litigation costs to seek an increase.
COSTS
[27]
The Applicant could have co-operated with
this process and avoided unnecessary litigation, he was non
responsive on several occasions,
he appeared to put his interest
above those of his children, particularly when he refused to hear
their views. He knew of the Respondents
dire financial situation, she
had earlier relied on pro bono services and represented herself at
times. The respondent’s
approach to the relocation is
regrettable, however, she has provided the court with sufficient
relevant information to grant her
the order she seeks. The papers
were prolix, this court simply cannot spend time calculating pages,
but “the parties know
they have tried to throw everything in
and wait to see what sticks”, this is not what the rule
contemplates, and the rules
board must address this dire situation.
In view of the way parties have conducted themselves, almost an
affront to a Bench, I am
of the view that each party is to pay their
own costs.
[28]
Accordingly, I make the following order:
1.
The application for an interdict is dismissed.
2.
The application for a grant of primary residence
to the Applicant is
refused.
3.
The Respondent is permitted to relocate together
with the two minor
children, A[…] v[…] d[…] B[…] born on 10
May 2011 and J[…] v[…] d[…]
B[…] born on
24 October 2014 from Gauteng to Cape Town.
4.
The Respondent is ordered to do all that is
necessary to assist the
psychologist Ms O’ Mahony to complete her report, and is to pay
for the children’s costs of
travel, if necessary.
5.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the order dated 15 October
2024 is varied as
follows:
5.1
Pending finalisation of the assessment and publication of the
recommendations of the psychologist
the minor children shall remain
primarily resident with their mother H[…] E[…] v[…]
d[…] B[…]
and their father S[…] v[…] d[…]
B[…] will exercise reasonable rights of contact to the minor
children
which includes:
5.1
Sleepover contact on a Friday after school until a Monday morning
before school for three weekends
per month.
5.2
the short school holidays to rotate between parties
5.3
the long school holidays to be split between the parties with the
respondent entitled to four
additional sleepover days.
5.4
Daily contact on cellphone after school, which is not to interfere
with the children’s scholastic,
cultural , sports and other
activities.
6.
The Applicant shall contribute towards the
legal costs, up to the
first day of trial, the sum of R115 000 payable within 4 months
from date of this Order. Any balance
is to be repaid to the applicant
within three days of first day of trial.
7.
Each party is to pay their own costs.
MAHOMED J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
JOHANNESBURG
Date
of Hearing: 11 March 2025
Date
of Judgment: 20 March 2025.
For
the Applicant:
A
dv
F. Bezuidenhout
instructed by
Vanessa
Fernihough & Associates
For
the Respondent:
Adv.
A. Koekemoer
instructed by
Zinta Coetzee
Attorneys Inc.
[1]
CL 000-2
[2]
1967 (1) SA 134
C
[3]
S 21(3), Act 108 of 1996
[4]
S
18, Act 108
of 1996
[5]
2006 (3) SA 42
(SCA) at 47 para 8
[6]
2020
(1) SA 169
(GJ) AT 176 para 20
[7]
F
v F fn 1
[8]
LW v DB [2019] ZAGPHC
[9]
2019 ZACC 22
at 3
[10]
See
H v H 44450/22 JHC p20 [77 -78], Van Rippen v Van Rippen, VR v VR,
Cary v Cary
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