Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 381South Africa
Manqele and Another v SB Guarentee Company (RF) (Pty) Ltd and Another (2023/050021) [2025] ZAGPJHC 381 (24 March 2025)
Headnotes
relied upon by the said sheriff is concerned, it is not within my knowledge whether or not the sheriff attended in the area of my property that day, but I specifically deny that the sheriff served any documentation on me personally as I was not at the property on 14th of August 2023 as stated in my founding affidavit.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Manqele and Another v SB Guarentee Company (RF) (Pty) Ltd and Another (2023/050021) [2025] ZAGPJHC 381 (24 March 2025)
Manqele and Another v SB Guarentee Company (RF) (Pty) Ltd and Another (2023/050021) [2025] ZAGPJHC 381 (24 March 2025)
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sino date 24 March 2025
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
FLYNOTES:
CIVIL
PROCEDURE – Execution –
Primary
residence –
Notice
of application – Personal service on judgment debtor –
Not personally served with application – Was
in
KwaZulu-Natal filming on alleged service date – Denial was
credible given corroborative evidence of absence on service
date –
Sheriff’s affidavit lacked conclusive proof of identity
verification – Non-service proved on probabilities
–
Court order erroneously granted – Default judgment and writ
of execution rescinded – Uniform Rule 46A(3)(d).
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number: 2023-050021
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: YES
In
the matter between:
NKULULEKO
MANQELE
(Identity
number: 8[…])
FIRST
APPLICANT
PALESA
VALENTINE MAGAKOA
(Identity
number: 9[…])
SECOND
APPLICANT
And
SB
GUARANTEE COMPANY (RF) (PTY) LTD
(Registration
Number: 2006/021576/07)
FIRST
RESPONDENT
THE
SHERIFF OF THE HIGH COURT, SANDTON
NORTH
SECOND
RESPONDENT
in
re
SB
GUARANTEE COMPANY (RF) (PTY) LTD
APPLICANT
(Registration
Number: 2006/021576/07)
And
NKULULEKO
MANQELE
(Identity
number: 8[…])
FIRST
RESPONDENT
PALESA
VALENTINE MAGAKOA
(Identity
number: 9[…])
SECOND
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Introduction
[1]
This is an application for rescission of a court
order granted on 11 September 2023 against the first and second
applicants, allegedly
in their absence (the “court order”).
In this judgment I will refer to -
a.
the application which resulted in the court order
being granted as the “main application”;
b.
the first applicant in these rescission
proceedings as Mr Manqele and the second applicant as Ms Magakoa; and
c.
the first respondent in these rescission
proceedings as SB Guarantee Company.
[2]
SB Guarantee Company was the applicant in the main
proceedings and Mr Manqele and Ms Magakoa were first and second
respondents respectively
in the main proceedings.
[3]
In terms of the court order, Mr Manqele,and Ms
Magakoa were ordered to pay SB Guarantee Company an amount of
R8 294 955.00
plus interest and costs and certain
residential immovable property at 1[…] D[…] Ave, B[…]
(the “property”),
was declared specially executable.
[4]
It is common cause that the property is the
primary residence of Mr Manqele but is not the primary residence of
Ms Magakoa. Mr Manqele
and Ms Magakoa are estranged.
[5]
Mr Manqele and Ms Magakoa state that neither the
main application nor the court order came to their notice until 26
January 2024.
[6]
Mr Manqele and Ms Magakoa apply for rescission on
two bases. The first is on the basis that the court order was
erroneously sought
and erroneously granted in their absence. The
second is on the basis of the common law, for which they must show
sufficient cause
for the rescission including a reasonable
explanation for the default and a bona fide defence.
The sheriff’s
return of service
[7]
in terms of Rule 46A(3)(d) –
“
every
notice of application to declare residential immovable property
executable shall be served by the sheriff on the judgement
debtor
personally…”.
[8]
A copy of the sheriff’s return of service
upon which SB Guarantee Company relies to show personal service of
the main application
on Mr Manqele is attached as annexure “M4”
to Mr Manqele’s founding affidavit in these proceedings. The
return
was dated 14 August 2023 and in it the sheriff stated –
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED:
That on 14 August 2023 at
10h35 at UNIT 1[…], 1[…] D[…] A[…], B[…]
being the 1st Defendant's
chosen domicilium citandi el execulandi a
copy of the NOTICE OF APPLICATION TO DECLARE IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
EXECUTABLE was served
to, NKULULEKO MANQELE personally after the
original document was displayed and the nature and contents thereof
explained to him.
Rule 4(1)(a)(i).
[9]
The
Superior Courts Act
[1]
provides-
“
the
return of service of a deputy sheriff of what has been done upon any
process of a court, shall be prima facie the evidence of
the matter
therein stated”
Mr Manqele
[10]
Mr Manqele, in his founding affidavit, denies that
there was any personal service of the main application upon him –
a.
On 14 August 2023, Mr Manqele was in Albert Falls,
KwaZulu-Natal, filming season 2 of the television series "lngono
Yomsamo."
The call sheet (which he attaches), shows the crew
departed for Albert Falls at 06:00 on 14 August 2023 and returned on
18 August
2023. Mr Manqele says he arrived at Albert Falls before 14
August 2023, because he travels ahead of the crew;
b.
WhatsApp messages between 12 August 2023 and 17
August 2023 indicate communications between Mr Manqele with a
colleague, a Mr. Mkhize,
based in KwaZulu-Natal. One message on 14
August 2023 states "Guys have arrived," to which Mr Manqele
responded "I'm
outside too" at 14:37. This, he says, refers
to being at Albert Falls outside Mr. Mkhize's house.
c.
It would have been impossible to meet with the
sheriff at 10:35 AM in Bryanston and be at Albert Falls at 14:37.
[11]
The sheriff deposed to an affidavit setting out
what he says happened on 14 August 2023. The sheriff stated –
I confirm that service
was completed on the 1st Respondent personally, as he confirmed to me
that he is indeed the 1st Respondent.
It was served in the court yard
garden to the left of the house. I (sic) copy of my Google Maps
extract is attached hereto marked
annexure "RG2".
Furthermore, about thirty minutes following service I was contacted
by a person who alleged that he was
the 1st Respondent's attorney
informing me that they intend on resolving the matter. Shortly after,
the 1st Respondent phoned me
personally to enquire whether his
attorney had called me, and again confirmed that the matter was being
resolved.
[12]
Mr Manqele in reply states –
... it is clear that the
said sheriff failed to confirm the identity of the person he
allegedly spoke to (assuming this to be true,
which is not conceded).
Insofar as the alleged
Google Maps summary relied upon by the said sheriff is concerned, it
is not within my knowledge whether or
not the sheriff attended in the
area of my property that day, but I specifically deny that the
sheriff served any documentation
on me personally as I was not at the
property on 14th of August 2023 as stated in my founding affidavit.
Insofar as the said
sheriff alleges that an undisclosed person, alleging to be my
attorney phoned him, apparently intendant (sic)
"on resolving
the matter", this is specifically denied . I did not instruct
any attorney at all in August 2023 and my
current attorney of record
was instructed for the first time in February 2024 after I received
the notice of sale. I sought legal
assistance for the first time in
February 2024.
Insofar as the said
sheriff alleges that I called the sheriff to enquire whether my
attorney had called him and "confirmed
that the matter was being
resolved", this is specifically denied.
I do not understand what
the sheriff means "in the court yard garden to the left of the
house". The house itself, is on
the left and there is no
courtyard garden. There are three other houses at the street address
, linked by a driveway.
[13]
Neither version concerning the service of the main
application is particularly satisfactory. For example Mr Manqele
could easily
have filed an affidavit from Mr Mkhize confirming that
Mr Manqele was with him in KwaZulu-Natal on 14 August 2023. Similarly
the
sheriff could have done more to confirm that the person upon whom
he was serving the main application, was Mr Manqele.
[14]
Given that the sheriff did serve the main
application on a person, the question remains - was that person Mr
Manqele? The only evidence
supporting this is the sheriff’s
statement that the person he served it on, confirmed that he is the
first respondent (in
the main application). The evidence of Mr
Manqele himself contradicts this.
[15]
The sheriff’s statement that he was later
contacted by a person who alleged that he was the first respondent's
attorney is
not helpful. Mr Manqele denies that he was represented by
an attorney at the time and it is doubtful that Mr Manqele was in
fact
legally represented at the time. As appears from the founding
affidavit, during 2023 Mr Manqele conducted his dealings with the
Standard Bank himself and was not legally represented.
[16]
The sheriff goes on to say Mr Manqele telephoned
him personally to enquire whether his attorney had called the
sheriff, and confirmed
that the matter was being resolved. This is
again denied by Mr Manqele.
[17]
The sheriff makes mention of Google Maps. That
evidence goes no further than showing that the sheriff went to the
property at that
specified time and date.
[18]
This is not to say that the sheriff was being
untruthful in his affidavit. He made it clear in his affidavit that
he relied on or
was repeating what other people had told him.
[19]
SB Guarantee Company submits, correctly, that the
onus rests on Mr Manqele if he wishes to impeach the facts as set out
in the return
of service. The sheriff’s return setting out
personal service stands as prima facie evidence that such personal
service was
effected.
[20]
Relying
on Sussman and Company (Pty) Limited v Schwarzer
[2]
SB Guarantee Company submits that the Mr Manqele must show by clear
evidence that what is set out in the return of service is not
correct. The Sussman case and the cases that followed it, were
dealing with a sheriff’s
nulla
bona
return
under section 8(b) of the Insolvency Act
[3]
.
[21]
In my
view this matter is distinguishable from the Sussman decision. Here
we are dealing with proceedings under Rule 46A. In Absa
Bank Ltd v
Njolomba and Another, and Other Cases
[4]
,
after quoting from Nkata v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Others
[5]
Fisher J held –
There have, of late, been
salutary moves in the statutes, case law , rules, and practice
directives to introduce a measure of flexibility
into the execution
process where it is sought to execute against the home of a debtor.
These laws and rules emanate from an accepted
need to promote the
objects of our Bill of Rights and especially the requirement that all
relevant circumstances be considered
before depriving a person of his
or her home. They include the requirement that immovable property not
be executed against without
judicial oversight being brought to bear
thereon and the recent introduction of rule 46A into the Uniform
Rules, which requires
that the court consider alternative means of
satisfying the judgment debt, other than execution against the
judgment debtor's primary
residence. The cases have required
stringent adherence to notices and service requirement and the
furnishing of details in relation
to the steps taken to manage the
indebtedness of the debtor. Recent amendments to Rule 46 of the
Uniform Rules require the consideration
by the court of alternative
means of satisfying the judgment debt. These changes impose an even
more rigorous investigative function
on a court faced with an
application for a declaration of executability and require still more
information to be forthcoming in
relation to the debtor's
circumstances and the value of the property. This assists in setting
appropriate reserve prices and other
sale conditions in the event of
execution against the property becoming necessary. How ever, the
process has, as its main endeavour,
to maintain the mortgage loan and
to rehabilitate the debtor if at all possible.
[22]
Given the court’s oversight obligations and
requirement to consider alternative means of satisfying the judgment
debt which,
in turn, require information to be forthcoming in
relation to the debtor's circumstances and the value of the property,
it is important
to ensure that the debtor is given the opportunity to
place facts before a court to allow a proper exercise of the court’s
functions under the Constitution and Rule 46A.
[23]
This means that a court should be satisfied that
the debtor has been given the information that he or she requires to
place facts
before the court to enable the court to fulfil its
functions.
[24]
The starting point is for the court to be
satisfied that the debtor has been served with the creditor’s
application. In this
regard the sheriff’s return of service is
prima facie evidence of what has been done. If the respondent denies
personal service
the onus rests on him or her if he or she wishes to
impeach the facts set out in the return of service.
[25]
In my view and in the context of proceedings under
Rule 46A, this onus is discharged on an ordinary balance of
probabilities and
not by “
the
clearest and most satisfactory evidence
”
referred
to in Sussman’s case.
[26]
Returning to the matter under consideration, Mr
Manqele says he was not at 1[…] D[…] Avenue, B[…]
when the
application was served. He says he was in Kwa-Zulu-Natal and
provides some corroborative evidence to this effect. The sheriff, in
his affidavit states that the person upon whom he served the
application confirmed that he was the first respondent (in the main
application). There is no evidence available to decide whether this
person understood the question being asked or whether he was
being
truthful in his answer or not.
[27]
Taking
all the facts into account, in my opinion Mr Manqele has discharged
the onus to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that
the main
application was not served on him personally. I therefore find that
the court order against Mr Manqele has been granted
erroneously and
falls to be rescinded
[6]
.
Ms Magakoa
[28]
In terms of the court order, both Mr Manqele and
Ms Magakoa were ordered to pay SB Guarantee Company an amount of
R8 294 955.00
plus interest and costs and the property was
declared specially executable.
[29]
In
Absa Bank Ltd v Mokebe and Related Cases
[7]
it was held –
…
1. In all matters where
execution was sought against a debtor's primary residence, the entire
claim, including the money judgment,
had to be adjudicated at the
same time. The money judgment in personam was the basis of, and a
necessary averment in, the claim
in rem for execution. ... Since the
two claims were inextricably interlinked, they had to be brought at
the same time in one proceeding.
If the matter required postponement,
it had to be postponed in its entirety.
…
[14] In our view the
money judgment is an intrinsic part of the cause of action and
inextricably linked to the in rem claim for
an order for execution,
the latter which is non-existent without the money judgment. The
default of the debtor and the money judgment
are a precondition for
the entitlement of the mortgagee to foreclose.
[15] It is also
intrinsically linked because the claim for execution is accessory in
nature and is dependent for its existence on
the obligation which it
secures.
…
[18] We … regard
this … as support for the view that personal action for a
money judgment goes hand in hand with the
claim in rem based on the
bond judgment, must be adjudicated at the same time.
[29] There is, therefore,
a duty on banks to bring their entire case, including the money
judgment, based on a mortgage bond, in
one proceeding simultaneously.
Should the matter require postponement for whatever reason, the
entire matter falls to be postponed
and piecemeal adjudication is not
competent.
[30]
In the main application both Mr Manqele and Ms
Magakoa were ordered to pay SB Guarantee Company an amount of
R8 294 955.00
plus interest and costs and the property was
declared specially executable.
[31]
I have decided that the court order against Mr
Manqele has been granted erroneously and falls to be rescinded. This
results in the
order declaring the property specially executable
being rescinded.
[32]
The personal action for the money judgment against
Mr Manqele and Ms Magakoa is inextricably linked with the claim
in
rem
based on the bond judgment. With
the bond judgment being rescinded, this means that the money judgment
in the court order against
Ms Magakoa must be rescinded as well.
Costs
[33]
With the judgment being rescinded because of
non-service and with no consideration of the merits, another court
will determine whether
SB Guarantee Company is in fact entitled to an
order on the same or similar terms to the court order now rescinded.
[34]
That court will be in a better position to decide
who should bear the costs of this application. In my opinion
therefore, costs
should be reserved.
Order
It is ordered –
A.
the default judgment granted against Nkululeko
Manqele (Identity number: 890512 5073 082) and Palesa Valentine
Magakoa (Identity
number: 900306 0048 084) on 11 September 2023 under
case number 2023-050021 is rescinded;
B.
any writ of execution issued by SB Guarantee
Company (RF) (Pty) Ltd (Registration Number: 2006/021576/07) pursuant
to the court
order dated 11 September 2023 under case number
2023-050021 is set aside;
C.
costs are reserved.
A MITCHELL
Acting Judge of the High
Court
This judgment is handed
down electronically by circulation to the parties or their legal
representatives by email, by uploading
it to the electronic file of
this matter on Caselines, and by publication of the judgment to the
South African Legal Information
Institute. The date for hand-down is
deemed to be 24 March 2025.
HEARD
ON:
17 February
2025
DECIDED
ON:
24 March 2025
For
Applicants:
Matthew Kerr-Phillips
Attorney
with right of appearance
011
467 4562
matthew@mkplaw.co.za
For First Respondent:
Adv AJ Venter
ajventer@law.co.za
082
551 4108
Attorneys
Alexandra
Pesci
Martins
Weir-Smith Inc
Tel:
011 450 3054
Email:
alexb@mwlaw.co.za
For Second Respondent:
No appearance
[1]
10 of
2013
[2]
1960
(3) SA 94 (O)
[3]
No.
24 of 1936
[4]
2018
(5) SA 548 (GJ)
[5]
2016
(4) SA 257 (CC)
[6]
Fraind
v Nothmann
1991 (3) SA 837
(W)
[7]
2018
(6) SA 492
(GJ)
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