Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 414South Africa
Barloworld South Africa (Pty) Ltd ta Barloworld Equipment v Patraw Construction and Projects CC and Other (2021/18191) [2025] ZAGPJHC 414 (25 April 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
25 April 2025
Headnotes
that: “Rule 23(1) that after delivering an exception, an excipient may apply to the register within 15 days of delivery to have the exception set down for hearing. If the excipient fails to apply to have the exception set down in the period as provided for in Rule 23(1) the respondents may apply to have the exception set down for hearing consistent with the Court’s Practice Directives. But also, the respondents may put the applicants on terms to set the exception down for hearing, failing which they can apply to have it struck out.”[2]
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Barloworld South Africa (Pty) Ltd ta Barloworld Equipment v Patraw Construction and Projects CC and Other (2021/18191) [2025] ZAGPJHC 414 (25 April 2025)
Barloworld South Africa (Pty) Ltd ta Barloworld Equipment v Patraw Construction and Projects CC and Other (2021/18191) [2025] ZAGPJHC 414 (25 April 2025)
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sino date 25 April 2025
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG.
Case
Number: 2021-18191
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/ NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
25
April 2025
In
the matter between:
BARLOWORLD
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Applicant
t/a
BARLOWORLD EQUIPMENT
And
PATRAW
CONSTRUCTION AND PROJECTS CC
First Respondent
LAWRENCE
SITHOLE
Second Respondent
## JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
NOKO
J
Introduction.
[1]
The applicant, Barloworld South Africa (Pty) Ltd delivered a notice
of exception against the respondents’ plea and
counterclaim.
The exception is predicated on the averments that the plea and the
counterclaim do not present a valid defence alternatively
that it
does not set out cause of action and/or is vague and embarrassing.
The exception is opposed by the respondents on the grounds
detailed
hereunder.
The
parties.
[2]
The applicant is
Barloworld South Africa (Pty) Ltd
t/a
Barloworld Equipment, a private company duly incorporated
in terms of the company laws of the Republic of South Africa with its
principal place of business at 1[…] K[…] Street, S[…],
Johannesburg
[3]
The first respondent is Patraw Constructions and Projects CC,
close
cooperation registered in accordance with the Close Corporation Act
of the Republic of South Africa and having its principal
place of
business at 7360 Anise Street, Lotus Gardens, Pretoria West,
Pretoria.
[4]
The second respondent is Lawrence Sithole,
adult
male employed at 7[…] A[…] and H[…] S[…],
L[…] G[…], Pretoria West.
Background
[5]
The parties entered into a lease agreement (agreement”) in
terms of which the applicant let a 426 backhoe loader
(“loader”)
bearing serial numbers and letters EJ 402744 to the first respondent
with effect from 14 August 2020. The
first respondent was represented
by the second respondent and the applicant was represented by Mr
Karabo Sethunya (“Mr Sethunya”).
[6]
The respondent purchased an insurance cover from MiWay Insurance
Company (“MiWay”) to cover the risk of,
inter alia
,
loss of the loader. MiWay’s condition for the insurance cover
was that the first respondent should instal a tracking system
on the
loader. Mr Sethunya informed the second respondent that a tracking
device as required by MiWay was already installed on
the loader. The
respondent thereafter took delivery of the loader.
[7]
The loader was hijacked on 21 October 2021 and the applicant
contacted Mr Sethunya and reported the incident. Mr Sethunya
conveyed
to the second respondent that using the tracking system he is able to
locate where the loader is situated and then forwarded
a map to the
second respondent showing its location. But the loader could not be
recovered.
[8]
The second respondent then lodged a claim with MiWay and on
investigation MiWay established that the tracking device was
not
installed hence the loader could not be found. The claim was then
rejected by MiWay on 13 November 2020. The first respondent
was
therefore unable to return the loader in accordance with the
agreement.
[9]
The applicant launched proceedings against the respondents as the
latter breached the agreement by failing to return the
loader. The
respondent delivered the plea and contended that the respondent is
not liable as there was misrepresentation by the
employee of the
applicant. In addition, that since the loader was required to deliver
on the tender awarded to the first respondent
by City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality the first respondent has a counterclaim for
the damages in the sum of R2 600 000.00
against the
applicant. The first respondent then instituted a counterclaim
against the applicant.
[10]
The applicant delivered notice of exception contending that the
respondents’ plea and counterclaim do not disclose
a valid
defence and/ or is vague and embarrassing and that it should be
struck out.
Parties’
contentions and submissions
Point
in limine
[11]
The respondents contend in their heads of argument that the exception
was set down after the prescribed 15 days as required
in the rules
and without application for condonation the said application should
be struck out.
[12]
In retort
the applicant referred to
Singular
Systems (Pty) Ltd
[1]
where it was held that:
“
Rule 23(1)
that
after delivering an exception, an excipient may apply to the register
within 15 days of delivery to have the exception set
down for
hearing. If the excipient fails to apply to have the exception set
down in the period as provided for in Rule 23(1) the
respondents may
apply to have the exception set down for hearing consistent with the
Court’s Practice Directives. But also,
the respondents may put
the applicants on terms to set the exception down for hearing,
failing which they can apply to have it
struck out.”
[2]
[13]
In view of the sentiments set out above that it is not compulsory for
the applicant to set down the application the point
in limine
is bound to fail and is therefore not upheld.
Merits
.
[14]
The applicant contends that the respondents are
ad idem
that
the agreement entered into remains valid and enforceable. Further
that in view of the clauses in the agreement as set out
below a
defence and the counterclaim on the basis as alleged by the
respondent is unsustainable.
[15]
Clause 9.2 provides that
“
As far as
permissible in law, the customer hereby waives any claim it may have
or acquire against Barloworld or Barloworld’s
Directors,
officers, employees, contractors and or agents:
(a) For any
incidental, consequential or special damages (which is deemed to
include all loss of profit, loss of business,
any loss or
interruption of production or operations and any costs related to the
delay of vessels), suffered by the customer and
which arise from or
in connection with, any cause of action, including contract, delict,
strict or statutory liability).
[16]
The applicant contended that the respondents waived any claim they
may have against the applicant in accordance with
this clause. It
also precludes a claim for loss of profits. In retort the respondent
contended that said clause is only applicable
to damages which arose
as a result of the delay in the delivery of the vessel. The
respondents’ counterclaim is not based
on the delay in the
delivery of the vessels and as such this ground of exception is
unsustainable and should be dismissed.
[17]
Clause 9.6. provides that
“
the customer
expressly agrees that, except for any written warranty or guarantee
which is signed by both parties and which Barloworld
expressly agrees
in writing is part of the contract, as far as permissible in law:
(a) The goods are
sold or let voetstoots (that is as they stand where they stand)
without any warranty and or guarantee including
any implied or common
law warranty:
(b) …
(c) Barloworld does
not make any representations in respect of the goods or the services
and/or any part thereof for any particular
purpose, other than as
provided for in the operators and maintenance manual or expressly
agreed between the parties.
[18]
In this regard the applicant stated that there is no representation
made in respect of the
merx
and none could be a basis for a
cause of action by the respondent. In retort the respondent submitted
that this clause is also
not implicated since it relates to the
integrity of the machinery being acquired whereas the respondents’
plea and counterclaim
relates to the installation of the tracking
system.
[19]
Clause 8.5 provides that
“
The customer
acknowledges that these are the only trading terms and conditions
which apply between Barloworld and the customer,
unless separate
terms and conditions are negotiated and agreed between the parties in
writing (e.g. rental with an option to purchase
contracts).”
[20]
Clause 8.8. provides that
“
Each contract is
the whole agreement between Barloworld and the customer and contains
all the express provisions agreed by the parties,
about its subject
matter.”
[21]
Clause 8.10 provides that
“
No variation of
the contract will be valid or effective unless recorded in writing
and signed by the customer and a director or
general manager of
Barloworld.”
[22]
The applicant contended that based on the aforegoing any
representation outside the agreement will not be effective unless
same was reduced into writing and signed as envisaged above. Further
that the respondent is not raising fraudulent misrepresentation
which
could have formed the basis for a valid claim.
[23]
The respondents submitted in retort to the argument that there is no
challenge to the validity of the agreement, that
indeed the plea and
counterclaim is not intended to vary the lease/sale agreement entered
into by the parties and to this end the
clause on variation is not
implicated. That notwithstanding the respondents persist with the
claim that the clauses referred to
above do not oust their right to
institute a civil suit as crafted.
Duty
of Care
[24]
The applicant submitted that the claim based on duty of care
allegedly owed by the applicant to the respondent was not
properly
explained and nothing to countenance the said claim could be
discerned from the pleadings. In any event any claim has
been waived
in terms of clauses referred to above.
[25]
In retort
the respondent contends that there was a duty of care on the part of
the applicant to ensure that the “…
proper and accurate
representations is made to the respondents before the delivery and
taking of possession of the backhoe loader.
Further that the evidence
which will be led will demonstrate a valid claim because,
wrongfulness must be determined with reference
not only to the
misrepresentation itself, but also to the less suffered.”
[3]
[26]
The respondent’s plea states that the applicant misrepresented
to the respondent that a tracker was installed on
the loader which
misrepresentation induced the respondent to enter into the agreement
with the applicant.
Counterclaim
[27]
The applicant contends that the amount of R2 600 000
claimed by the first respondent as loss of profit has
not been
pleaded in detail as envisaged in the rules and the applicant is
unable to plead thereto. The letter of appointment attached
to the
respondents’ pleadings indicates certain requirements which
must be met before the first respondent is appointed.
The first
respondent has failed to indicate in the pleadings that same were
complied with. As indicated above, applicant argued,
the loss of
profit as a basis for a claim has also been waived in terms of the
agreement.
[28]
The respondents contend the particulars of claim set out in the
counterclaim clearly indicates that the said amount is
the loss of
profit which could have been generated had there been no
misrepresentation which led to the inability to receive a
replacement
of the loader necessary to implement the tender requirements with the
City of Tshwane.
Legal
principles and analysis.
[29]
The
principles underpinning exceptions have been crystallised in several
court pronouncements that the object is,
inter
alia
,
to dispose of the case or a portion thereof expeditiously and without
having to incur unnecessary legal costs. One of the considerations
as
referred to in the respondent’s argument is that
“…
over-technical
approach should be avoided because it destroys the usefulness of the
exception procedure, which is to weed out cases
without legal
merit.”
[4]
In addition, exception would ordinarily be upheld where the applicant
can demonstrate that “…
upon
every interpretation which the particulars of claim could reasonably
bear, no cause of action was disclosed
.”
[5]
[30]
The respondents’ defence and the counterclaim is grounded on
the argument that there was a misrepresentation by
an employee of the
applicant. These contentions are met with an applicant’s
argument that the agreement between the parties
clearly states,
first, that the respondent waives claim based on any cause of action
and the respondents chose not to challenge
this clause. Secondly,
that any other representation would not be binding unless signed off
by the parties and this clause is not
being challenged either. To the
extent that the respondents confirm that the plea does not and is not
intended to vary the terms
of the contract which remains intact,
means that any claim should fall within the contract failing which
such a claim would not
be sustainable. The respondent would have to
challenge those clauses in the contract which are insurmountable
hurdles to their
claim more particularly the waiver of claims clause
and non-variation clause. As it is dealt with comprehensively below
the arguments
advanced in this paragraph are of no consequences and
need not delay the prosecution of this
lis
.
[31]
Other legal
principles implicated by the applicant’s submission includes
Shifren
rule, entrenchment clause and waiver. There is a propensity to
confuse waiver and variation clauses in the contracts. It was stated
by the SCA in
Phoenix
Salt Industries (Pty) Ltd
[6]
that :
A waiver is an
abandonment or relinquishment of a right or privilege
in
a contract
which is expressed through an explicit statement or conduct that
indicates a voluntary decision to give up that right or privilege,
without modifying the contract's terms. On the other hand, a
variation involves making changes to the
terms
of a contract
,
either through mutual agreement between the parties or through
unilateral action by one party with the consent of the other. A
party
exercising a waiver chooses to walk away from a privilege that might
have been derived from the contract while the
contract
remains extant, whereas a variation alters or amends the terms of a
contract.’
[7]
(underlining added).
[32]
Though not
addressed clearly in those terms the respondents’ case is that
the waiver referred to in the clauses in the agreement
should relate
to rights which should be flowing from the contract.
[8]
In this case the rights which are sought to be waived relates to a
distinct contract of the insurance cover with MiWay. The utterance
which were made by the applicant’s employee were made in
relation to the contract which was entered into between the
respondent
and the MiWay and not ancillary to the contract between
the applicant and the first respondent. One may be tempted to
interpret
the clauses in the contract between the parties and
conclude that any other claim whatsoever is waived, whether linked to
the specific
contract or not. This may be too extreme or over
stretched interpretation and may lead to absurdity. As a way of
example if the
meaning is that fluid, then the second respondent may
have waived his right to sue the employee from defaming him whilst
still
at the premises of the applicant or even sue for the injuries
sustained as a result of the slippery floor as a result of negligence
of the applicant’s cleaners. On a proper interpretation the
claims excluded (or waived) should be based on or linked to the
contract between the parties being lease agreement and not Insurance
agreement.
[9]
[33]
The respondents have further correctly stated that the information
about installation of the tracking device cannot be
implicated by
clause 9(6)(c) which exclude any representation about service and/or
products or any part thereof as the installation
of the tracking
system is not part of the products and/ or service which the
applicant offered to the respondents in terms of the
contract.
[34]
The
contention that the quantum of damages does not comply with the
provisions of rule 18 of the Uniform Rules of court is unsustainable
as the respondents did set out the amount claimed. In any event it is
not unusual that the quantum claimed would be globular at
the initial
stage and be detailed during the exchange of pleadings. The counsel
for the applicant having contended that non-compliance
with rule 18
may be construed as irregular and susceptible to a rule 30
application
[10]
. Based on
those assertions, exception may not be an inappropriate route to
undertake. In addition, as highlighted above the damages
which arose
emanate from the contract entered into with MiWay and clearly
distinct from the contract with the applicant.
[35]
In certain instances a counterclaim may however defeat an exception.
Where the claim in the counterclaim is illiquid
the
lis
may
still proceed and adjudication of the counterclaim may be dealt with
first in accordance with the provisions of rule 22(4)
of the Uniform
Rules of Court except where rule 22(4) has been specifically excluded
in the contract.
Conclusion
[36]
Having stated that the pleadings do present the facts which the
applicant can readily plead to there is no reason why
other grounds
raised should detain me. Furthermore, as set out above being over
technical should be frowned upon. In the premises
the application is
bound to fail. Furthermore, the contention that the amount claimed by
the respondents has not been dissected
to the tee does not bar the
applicant from pleading. Ordinarily at the end of the trial the first
respondent would be granted an
order only for the amount/damages
proved.
[37]
Notwithstanding the above legal position, it is incorrect for the
respondents to contend that the agreement entered into
with the
applicant was influenced by the misrepresentation `by the applicant’s
employee. The argument on said misrepresentation
would not obtain
having regard to the clauses referred to above. In any event, the
information was only made available for the
purposes of purchasing an
insurance cover. Though the pleadings should not be crafted with
military precision it is required as
a minimum that the counterclaim
should demonstrate that the conditions set out in the tender have
been complied with. To this end
the exception is sustainable.
Costs
[38]
The general principle is that the costs should follow the result and
am not persuaded to upset this well-trodden path.
[39]
Order
1. Respondent’s
point
in limine
is dismissed with costs.
2. The exception is
upheld with costs.
3. The respondents
are granted leave, if so advised, to amend their plea and
counterclaim within 20 days from the date of
this order.
M
V NOKO
Judge
of the High Court,
Gauteng
Division, Johannesburg.
This
judgement was prepared and authored by Noko J and is handed down
electronically by circulation to the Parties / their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file
of this matter on CaseLines. The date of the judgment is deemed
to be
25 April 2025
,
at 15:00.
Dates:
Hearing:
20 November 2024.
Judgment:
25 April 2025,
Appearances:
For
the Applicant:
L Hollander
Instructed
by:
AD Hertzberg Attorneys
For
the Respondent:
M R Maphutha.
Instructed
by:
Morakile Tibane attorneys Inc.
[1]
Singular
Systems Pty Ltd and Another v Multichoice South Africa Holdings
(Pty) Ltd and Others
[2023] ZAGPJHC 958.
[2]
Id
at
para 14.
[3]
Para
53 of the Respondents’ Heads of Argument at CL 043-16.
[4]
See
para 15 in
Living
Hands (Pty) Ltd NO and Another v Ditz and Others
2013 (2) SA 368
(GSJ).
[5]
Francis
v Sharp
2004
(3) SA 230
(C) at 237D-I. “
[I]t
follows that where an exception is taken, the court must look at the
pleading excepted to as it stands: no facts outside
those stated in
the pleading can be brought into issue and no reference can be made
to any other document.”
See
Superior Court Practice at B1-151.
[6]
Phoenix
Salt Industries (Pty) Ltd v The Lubavitch Foundation of Southern
Africa
(330/2023)
[2024] ZASCA 107
(03 July 2024)
[7]
Id
at
para 23.
[8]
Noting the Court cannot be held ransom or be detained by
mischaracterisation and misapplication or incorrect identification
of legal principles by the parties.
[9]
Noting
that a waiver would be for a right conferred by the terms of the
contract. And further that one need to know the rights
he is
waiving, Christie RH having stated that “…there is
ample authority that it must be clearly proved that the
person who
is alleged to have waived knew what those rights were.”
Christie RH “
The
Law of Contract in South Africa
”,
5
th
ed, LexisNexis Butterworths.
[10]
See
Applicant’s Heads of Argument at 54 CL 04-27.
sino noindex
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