Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 543South Africa
M.A.D. v R.G. (2025/047056) [2025] ZAGPJHC 543 (27 May 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
27 May 2025
Headnotes
that:
Judgment
begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
>>
2025
>>
[2025] ZAGPJHC 543
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## M.A.D. v R.G. (2025/047056) [2025] ZAGPJHC 543 (27 May 2025)
M.A.D. v R.G. (2025/047056) [2025] ZAGPJHC 543 (27 May 2025)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2025_543.html
sino date 27 May 2025
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO
: 2025/047056
DATE
: 27
May 2025
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED:
Date:
27 May 2025
In the matter between:
D[...],
M[…] A[…]
(Identity
No. 8[…])
Applicant
and
G[…],
R[…]
(Identity
No. 9[…])
Respondent
Coram:
M Van Nieuwenhuizen, AJ
Heard
on
: 20 May 2025
Delivered:
27 May 2025
JUDGMENT
M
VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN, AJ
:
[1]
On or about
the 6
th
of May 2025 the applicant launched an urgent Rule 43(6) application
out of this Court pertaining to the parties’ 4 year old
minor
daughter (referred to herein as “
E[...]”
).
The applicant in essence seeks an order varying an urgent Rule 43
Court Order of Van Deventer AJ dated the 17
th
of April 2025 (“
the
Rule 43 order”
)
on the basis that the Order is “
patently
unjust”
.
For his contention in this regard the applicant relies on the
Constitutional Court decision in
S
v S and Another
.
[1]
The applicant argued that this was an exceptional case where there is
a need to remedy a patently unjust and erroneous order, whether
a
change in circumstances exists or not.
#
# [2]The
existing Rule 43 order[2]inter
aliaprovides that:
[2]
The
existing Rule 43 order
[2]
inter
alia
provides that:
## [2.1] The applicant
in the Rule 43 application (the respondent in this application) and
the respondent in the Rule 43 application
(the applicant in this
application) shall exercise a shared residency arrangement,
alternating every 2 (two) weeks;
[2.1] The applicant
in the Rule 43 application (the respondent in this application) and
the respondent in the Rule 43 application
(the applicant in this
application) shall exercise a shared residency arrangement,
alternating every 2 (two) weeks;
## [2.2] The two week
period is to continue for a period of 4 (four) months;
[2.2] The two week
period is to continue for a period of 4 (four) months;
## [2.3] During the
two week period, the non-resident parent is entitled to reasonable
telephonic contact on 1 (one) hour’s
notice;
[2.3] During the
two week period, the non-resident parent is entitled to reasonable
telephonic contact on 1 (one) hour’s
notice;
## [2.4] E[...] shall
not be subjected to any therapy or assessments or expert intervention
during the 4 (four) month transition
period;
[2.4] E[...] shall
not be subjected to any therapy or assessments or expert intervention
during the 4 (four) month transition
period;
## [2.5] At the
conclusion of the 4 (four) month period the primary residence of
E[...] shall vest solely with the respondent
(the mother) at her
appointed address and the applicant shall be entitled to contactinter aliaevery alternative weekend from a Friday to a
Sunday, mid-week contact on a Tuesday and a Thursday from 14h00 until
17h00 as well
as telephonic and video contact at times mutually
agreed upon between the parties;
[2.5] At the
conclusion of the 4 (four) month period the primary residence of
E[...] shall vest solely with the respondent
(the mother) at her
appointed address and the applicant shall be entitled to contact
inter alia
every alternative weekend from a Friday to a
Sunday, mid-week contact on a Tuesday and a Thursday from 14h00 until
17h00 as well
as telephonic and video contact at times mutually
agreed upon between the parties;
## [2.6] After the 4
(four) month period, if necessary, the parties shall take steps to
refer the matter to the office of the
Family Advocate or expert
mutually agreed upon and to be appointed by the parties to conduct
the relevant assessment and therapy,
which intervention may only
begin after the 4 (four) month interim period set out in Order 2;
[2.6] After the 4
(four) month period, if necessary, the parties shall take steps to
refer the matter to the office of the
Family Advocate or expert
mutually agreed upon and to be appointed by the parties to conduct
the relevant assessment and therapy,
which intervention may only
begin after the 4 (four) month interim period set out in Order 2;
## [2.7] The applicant
(the father) shall be solely liable for and pay the costs of the
experts and therapists appointed to conduct
such investigation and
therapeutic interventions;
[2.7] The applicant
(the father) shall be solely liable for and pay the costs of the
experts and therapists appointed to conduct
such investigation and
therapeutic interventions;
## [2.8] This order is
to operate as an interim order pending the finalisation of all
assessments to be conducted and pending
the final determination of
the residence of E[...] by the applicable Court of law;
[2.8] This order is
to operate as an interim order pending the finalisation of all
assessments to be conducted and pending
the final determination of
the residence of E[...] by the applicable Court of law;
## [2.9] Each party
shall pay his or her own costs.
[2.9] Each party
shall pay his or her own costs.
##
# [3] The respondent
has taken various pointsin limineas set out hereunder:
[3] The respondent
has taken various points
in limine
as set out hereunder:
## [3.1] The matter is
not urgent;
[3.1] The matter is
not urgent;
## [3.2] There has not
been a “material change in circumstances”as
contemplated by Rule 43(6);
[3.2] There has not
been a “
material change in circumstances”
as
contemplated by Rule 43(6);
## [3.3] This
application is essentially “an appeal”disguised
as a Rule 43(6) application;
[3.3] This
application is essentially “
an appeal”
disguised
as a Rule 43(6) application;
## [3.4] The “report”of educational psychologist Ms Van Jaarsveld is inadmissible.
[3.4] The “
report”
of educational psychologist Ms Van Jaarsveld is inadmissible.
Urgency
#
# [4] In respect of
urgency, the respondentinter aliaargued that:
[4] In respect of
urgency, the respondent
inter alia
argued that:
## [4.1] The current
interim Court Order is applicable for a period of 4 (four) months
with little under 90 (ninety) days remaining
until therapy and
assessments may commence;
[4.1] The current
interim Court Order is applicable for a period of 4 (four) months
with little under 90 (ninety) days remaining
until therapy and
assessments may commence;
## [4.2] There is no
imminent danger to E[...]. The respondent alleges she is “happy”and “adjusting well”;
[4.2] There is no
imminent danger to E[...]. The respondent alleges she is “
happy”
and “
adjusting well”
;
## [4.3] The applicant
waited from 17 April until 6 May 2025 to launch this application.
[4.3] The applicant
waited from 17 April until 6 May 2025 to launch this application.
#
# [5] I heard this
application as one of urgency as it concerns the interests of a minor
child of tender age.
[5] I heard this
application as one of urgency as it concerns the interests of a minor
child of tender age.
#
“
Report”
by Ms Van Jaarsveld
#
# [6] At the outset
the respondent wanted this Court to make a finding regarding the
admissibility of the “report”compiled by Ms Van
Jaarsveld – even prior to the arguing of urgency. I allowed the
admission of the “report”tentatively, but advised
the parties that I would view the “report”with
caution as Ms Van Jaarsveld has not seen any of the parties or E[...]
and no assessment of E[...] had been conducted by Ms
Van Jaarsveld.
[6] At the outset
the respondent wanted this Court to make a finding regarding the
admissibility of the “
report”
compiled by Ms Van
Jaarsveld – even prior to the arguing of urgency. I allowed the
admission of the “
report”
tentatively, but advised
the parties that I would view the “
report”
with
caution as Ms Van Jaarsveld has not seen any of the parties or E[...]
and no assessment of E[...] had been conducted by Ms
Van Jaarsveld.
No real Rule 43(6)
application
#
# [7] The respondentinter aliaargued that there was no material change in
circumstances and that this pointin liminegoes hand-in-hand
with the pointin limineraised by her that this application
constitutes “an appeal”of the judgment and order
of Van Deventer AJ. When this pointin liminewas argued both
parties substantially ventured into the merits of the matter –
the applicant’s counsel contended that
the arguing of this
point is closely intertwined with the merits of the application.
[7] The respondent
inter alia
argued that there was no material change in
circumstances and that this point
in limine
goes hand-in-hand
with the point
in limine
raised by her that this application
constitutes “
an appeal”
of the judgment and order
of Van Deventer AJ. When this point
in limine
was argued both
parties substantially ventured into the merits of the matter –
the applicant’s counsel contended that
the arguing of this
point is closely intertwined with the merits of the application.
APPLICABLE LEGAL
PRINCIPLES
#
# [8]The
applicant has requested this Court to take a stance as envisaged inS
v S.[3]The Constitutional Court considered the available remedies as the
prohibition against appeal proceedings to Rule 43 or interim
orders
might serve to be prejudicial.
[8]
The
applicant has requested this Court to take a stance as envisaged in
S
v S
.
[3]
The Constitutional Court considered the available remedies as the
prohibition against appeal proceedings to Rule 43 or interim
orders
might serve to be prejudicial.
#
# [9] In paragraph 34
the Constitutional Court held that:
[9] In paragraph 34
the Constitutional Court held that:
# “[34]
In any event, should any rule 43 order be contrary to the best
interests of
a child, this can be immediately rectified. The High
Court regularly hears, on an urgent basis, applications where it is
alleged
that the best interests of the child are under threat.”[4]
“
[34]
In any event, should any rule 43 order be contrary to the best
interests of
a child, this can be immediately rectified. The High
Court regularly hears, on an urgent basis, applications where it is
alleged
that the best interests of the child are under threat.”
[4]
#
# [10] In paragraph
58 the Constitutional Court held that:
[10] In paragraph
58 the Constitutional Court held that:
# “[58]
There may be exceptional cases where there is a need to remedy a
patently unjust and erroneous order and no changed circumstances
exist, however expansively interpreted. In those instances, where
strict adherence to the rules is at variance with the interests
of
justice, a court may exercise its inherent power in terms of section
173 of the Constitution to regulate its own process in
the interests
of justice.”[5]
“
[58]
There may be exceptional cases where there is a need to remedy a
patently unjust and erroneous order and no changed circumstances
exist, however expansively interpreted. In those instances, where
strict adherence to the rules is at variance with the interests
of
justice, a court may exercise its inherent power in terms of section
173 of the Constitution to regulate its own process in
the interests
of justice.”
[5]
#
# [11]InDodo
v Dodo[6]the Court, while acknowledging that Rule 43 applications were
intended to afford the parties a quick, short and inexpensive
procedure,
held that there was no reason why special circumstances
should not justify a deviation from the norm where the complexities
are
unusual.
[11]
In
Dodo
v Dodo
[6]
the Court, while acknowledging that Rule 43 applications were
intended to afford the parties a quick, short and inexpensive
procedure,
held that there was no reason why special circumstances
should not justify a deviation from the norm where the complexities
are
unusual.
#
# [12]In
the matter ofKKA
v KNT[7]Bezuidenhout AJ also considered the requirement of material change in
circumstances in Rule 43(6) proceedings andinter
aliaheld:
[12]
In
the matter of
KKA
v KNT
[7]
Bezuidenhout AJ also considered the requirement of material change in
circumstances in Rule 43(6) proceedings and
inter
alia
held:
# “[85]What constitutes a material change in circumstances is not defined by
the rules nor by the various reported and unreported authorities
that
I have considered. And for good reason. It allows a court faced with
such an application to apply the rule expansively and
being mindful
of the Constitutional dispensation of our country as a court is
entitled to do and as was stated by the Constitutional
Court in S
v S[8]:
“
[85]
What constitutes a material change in circumstances is not defined by
the rules nor by the various reported and unreported authorities
that
I have considered. And for good reason. It allows a court faced with
such an application to apply the rule expansively and
being mindful
of the Constitutional dispensation of our country as a court is
entitled to do and as was stated by the Constitutional
Court in S
v S
[8]
:
# “In addition,
there is no reason why rule 43 should not be expansively interpreted
as some courts have already done
“
In addition,
there is no reason why rule 43 should not be expansively interpreted
as some courts have already done
[86]
It is not surprising that the Constitutional Court expressed
the obiter
view
that Rule 43
may
be wanting in certain respects and that there may well be grounds for
a review of rule 43(6) in the future to include not
only changed
circumstances
but
also “exceptional circumstances
”
.
[9]
[87]
In Dodo v Dodo
[10]
the
court held that there was no reason why special circumstances
should
not justify a deviation from the norm where the complexities are
unusual. I align myself with this decision as it certainly
cannot be
argued with any conviction that the facts and issues before me are
not extraordinary.”
#
# [13]I
am mindful that as the upper guardian of minors, this Court, is
empowered and under a duty to consider and evaluate the relevant
facts placed before it with a view to deciding the issue which is of
paramount importance: the best interests of the child. When
a Court
sits as upper guardian in a custody matter it has extremely wide
powers in establishing what is in the best interests of
minor or
dependent children. It is not bound by procedural strictures or by
the limitations of the evidence presented or contentions
advanced by
the respective parties. Furthermore, the interests of minors should
not be “held
to ransom for the sake of legal niceties”and the best interests of the child “should
not be mechanically sacrificed on an alter of jurisdictional
formalism”.[11]
[13]
I
am mindful that as the upper guardian of minors, this Court, is
empowered and under a duty to consider and evaluate the relevant
facts placed before it with a view to deciding the issue which is of
paramount importance: the best interests of the child. When
a Court
sits as upper guardian in a custody matter it has extremely wide
powers in establishing what is in the best interests of
minor or
dependent children. It is not bound by procedural strictures or by
the limitations of the evidence presented or contentions
advanced by
the respective parties. Furthermore, the interests of minors should
not be “
held
to ransom for the sake of legal niceties”
and the best interests of the child “
should
not be mechanically sacrificed on an alter of jurisdictional
formalism”
.
[11]
#
# [14]InTerblanche
v Terblanche[12]it was stated that when a Court sits as upper guardian in a custody
matter “…It
has extremely wide powers in establishing what is in the best
interests of minor or dependent children. It is not bound by
procedural
strictures or by the limitations of the evidence presented
or contentions advanced by the respective parties. It may in fact
have
resource to any source of information, of whatever nature, which
may be able to assist it in resolving custody and related disputes”.
[14]
In
Terblanche
v Terblanche
[12]
it was stated that when a Court sits as upper guardian in a custody
matter “…
It
has extremely wide powers in establishing what is in the best
interests of minor or dependent children. It is not bound by
procedural
strictures or by the limitations of the evidence presented
or contentions advanced by the respective parties. It may in fact
have
resource to any source of information, of whatever nature, which
may be able to assist it in resolving custody and related disputes”
.
#
# [15]InP
and Another v P and Another:[13]
[15]
In
P
and Another v P and Another
:
[13]
“
I
am bound in considering what is in the best interests of P, to take
everything into account, which has happened in the past, even
after
the close of pleadings and in fact right up to today. Furthermore, I
am bound to take into account the possibility of what
might happen in
the future if I make any specific order.”
# [16]InAD
and DD v DW and Others (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae;
Department for Social Development as Intervening Party[14]the Constitutional Court endorsed the view of the minority in the
Supreme Court of Appeal that the interests of minors should not
be
“held
to ransom for the sake of legal niceties”.[15]And now that in the case before it the best interests of the child
“should
not be mechanically sacrificed on the alter of jurisdictional
formalism”[16]
[16]
In
AD
and DD v DW and Others (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae;
Department for Social Development as Intervening Party
[14]
the Constitutional Court endorsed the view of the minority in the
Supreme Court of Appeal that the interests of minors should not
be
“
held
to ransom for the sake of legal niceties”
.
[15]
And now that in the case before it the best interests of the child
“
should
not be mechanically sacrificed on the alter of jurisdictional
formalism”
[16]
THE APPLICANT’S
CONTENTION WITH REGARDS TO A “
PATENTLY UNJUST AND ERRONEOUS
ORDER”
#
# [17] The applicant
argued that the Court granted an order prohibiting therapy and
furthermore granted an order regarding primary
residency without any
expert involvement in a highly contentious matter.
[17] The applicant
argued that the Court granted an order prohibiting therapy and
furthermore granted an order regarding primary
residency without any
expert involvement in a highly contentious matter.
#
# [18]It
was argued that section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa[17]guarantees
that every child has the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic
healthcare services and social services. This must
include
therapeutical intervention which is currently denied by virtue of the
existing order.
[18]
It
was argued that section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa
[17]
guarantees
that every child has the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic
healthcare services and social services. This must
include
therapeutical intervention which is currently denied by virtue of the
existing order.
#
# [19] During the
handing down of judgment it was indicated that:
[19] During the
handing down of judgment it was indicated that:
# “This Court also
orders specifically that no assessment by any expert or therapy
sessions may take place within the first 4 (four)
months of this
order. It is in the minor child’s best interests that there is
stability in her life going forward, which
she needs to learn to
navigate for the rest of her life. After the initial 4 (four) months,
the necessary steps can be taken towards
therapy, assessments,
schools, extramurals, and the office of the Family Advocate,
whereafter this order can be amended.”
“
This Court also
orders specifically that no assessment by any expert or therapy
sessions may take place within the first 4 (four)
months of this
order. It is in the minor child’s best interests that there is
stability in her life going forward, which
she needs to learn to
navigate for the rest of her life. After the initial 4 (four) months,
the necessary steps can be taken towards
therapy, assessments,
schools, extramurals, and the office of the Family Advocate,
whereafter this order can be amended.”
#
# [20] Ms Ferreira
argued that the reasons for the judgment do not expand on the
prohibition ontherapeutic intervention, assessments and
investigations, save to state that it was indicated that “This
Court could not see how such interventions would in any way be
conducted on equal footing if the minor has not had any chance
to
even, visit the applicant in a new environment where she now lives
with her parents. The respondent does not want to take any
responsibility for his role, suitably qualified third parties, and
therapists need to explain to his daughter what “separation”
is and how it will work”.
[20] Ms Ferreira
argued that the reasons for the judgment do not expand on the
prohibition on
therapeutic intervention
, assessments and
investigations, save to state that it was indicated that “
This
Court could not see how such interventions would in any way be
conducted on equal footing if the minor has not had any chance
to
even, visit the applicant in a new environment where she now lives
with her parents. The respondent does not want to take any
responsibility for his role, suitably qualified third parties, and
therapists need to explain to his daughter what “separation”
is and how it will work”
.
#
# [21] Ms Ferreira
argued that it appears that the Court reasoned that the 4 year old
minor child was required to learn to navigate
the difficulties on her
own as she will have to do “for the rest of her life”.
[21] Ms Ferreira
argued that it appears that the Court reasoned that the 4 year old
minor child was required to learn to navigate
the difficulties on her
own as she will have to do “
for the rest of her life”
.
DELIBERATION
Whether therapy
should be implemented without delay
#
# [22] During the
Rule 43 proceedings both parties were of the view that E[...]
suffered from anxiety, albeit for different
reasons. The respondent
(the applicant in the Rule 43 proceedings) on more than one occasion
stated that the applicant (the respondent
in the Rule 43 proceedings)
could obtain all the therapy sessions and expert assessments for
E[...] that he wants as long as E[...]
is placed in the applicant’s
primary residency pending such therapeutic interventions/assessments.
[22] During the
Rule 43 proceedings both parties were of the view that E[...]
suffered from anxiety, albeit for different
reasons. The respondent
(the applicant in the Rule 43 proceedings) on more than one occasion
stated that the applicant (the respondent
in the Rule 43 proceedings)
could obtain all the therapy sessions and expert assessments for
E[...] that he wants as long as E[...]
is placed in the applicant’s
primary residency pending such therapeutic interventions/assessments.
#
# [23] The Court
confirmed that E[...] suffered “anxiousness”:
[23] The Court
confirmed that E[...] suffered “
anxiousness”
:
“
[30]
Lastly the Court considered, after the initial period, which had to
stop undue
attachment to one parent only, and possible alienation,
establish stability and ease the anxiousness of the minor child, more
reasonable
contact with longevity in mind.”
[18]
#
# [24]Van
Deventer AJ further stated that “The
respondent in the answering affidavit or in his submissions never
took any responsibility on his part in his daughter being
traumatised
and terrified”.[19]
[24]
Van
Deventer AJ further stated that “
The
respondent in the answering affidavit or in his submissions never
took any responsibility on his part in his daughter being
traumatised
and terrified”
.
[19]
#
# [25] In these
proceedings the applicant alleges that E[...] suffers from anxiety
having been removed from her stable environment
and from him. This
has manifested in E[...] wetting her bed on the 4thof May
2025, being the first night at home after E[...] had spent two weeks
at the respondent’s home. This is disputed by
the respondent
(mother).
[25] In these
proceedings the applicant alleges that E[...] suffers from anxiety
having been removed from her stable environment
and from him. This
has manifested in E[...] wetting her bed on the 4
th
of May
2025, being the first night at home after E[...] had spent two weeks
at the respondent’s home. This is disputed by
the respondent
(mother).
#
# [26] The respondent
avers that the applicant is obsessively controlling and this is
unhealthy, unsafe and emotionally detrimental
to E[...]. The
applicant argues that despite these allegations, which the applicant
disputes, the respondent now however during
these proceedings opposes
therapy.
[26] The respondent
avers that the applicant is obsessively controlling and this is
unhealthy, unsafe and emotionally detrimental
to E[...]. The
applicant argues that despite these allegations, which the applicant
disputes, the respondent now however during
these proceedings opposes
therapy.
#
# [27] The respondent
however states the following in her answering affidavit:
[27] The respondent
however states the following in her answering affidavit:
“
42.2
… If this Court is satisfied that the arrangement is
unsatisfactory
and open to variation then I ask the Court to move the
next phase forward and order that E[...] move to live with me now and
the
order that there is no therapy can then be relaxed.”
[20]
#
# [28] The applicant
argued that E[...]’s interests cannot be held “hostage”until the respondent is vested with primary residency of her –
this is exactly what the respondent seeks.
[28] The applicant
argued that E[...]’s interests cannot be held “
hostage”
until the respondent is vested with primary residency of her –
this is exactly what the respondent seeks.
#
# [29]There
has been a significant change in the life of E[...] who went from
living under one roof with both parents to splitting a month
in half
between two parents and two different schooling arrangements. The
applicant argued that it is unimaginable that the respondent
can
still allege that “a
4 year old toddler does not need therapy because her parents are
living separately. She can hardly appreciate the distinction.”[21]
[29]
There
has been a significant change in the life of E[...] who went from
living under one roof with both parents to splitting a month
in half
between two parents and two different schooling arrangements. The
applicant argued that it is unimaginable that the respondent
can
still allege that “
a
4 year old toddler does not need therapy because her parents are
living separately. She can hardly appreciate the distinction.”
[21]
#
# [30]On the
papers before this Court there are conflicting versions as to
E[...]’s experience during the initial handover to the
respondent and the implementation of the shared residency regime. The
applicant reported that E[...] was crying hysterically during
handover. The applicant alleges that the video footage (Annexure
“UA6”) aligns with the applicant’s version.
This is
disputed by the respondent. This Court does not know what transpires
in between video recordings and photographs that forms
part of this
application or what transpired before and after the video recordings
provided. This Court does not know the attachment
E[...] has with any
of her parents. The respondent alleges that E[...] is “happy
and well-adjusted”in her care. This is disputed by the
applicant.
[30]
On the
papers before this Court there are conflicting versions as to
E[...]’s experience during the initial handover to the
respondent and the implementation of the shared residency regime. The
applicant reported that E[...] was crying hysterically during
handover. The applicant alleges that the video footage (Annexure
“UA6”) aligns with the applicant’s version.
This is
disputed by the respondent. This Court does not know what transpires
in between video recordings and photographs that forms
part of this
application or what transpired before and after the video recordings
provided. This Court does not know the attachment
E[...] has with any
of her parents. The respondent alleges that E[...] is “
happy
and well-adjusted”
in her care. This is disputed by the
applicant.
#
# [31] It is
undesirable to unnecessarily interfere with a judgment of another
Court, however in circumstances like this where
the interests of a
child have to be placed as paramount importance the Court may remedy
such order.
[31] It is
undesirable to unnecessarily interfere with a judgment of another
Court, however in circumstances like this where
the interests of a
child have to be placed as paramount importance the Court may remedy
such order.
#
# [32] During the
Rule 43 proceedings there was a clear indication and it was common
cause that E[...] was suffering from anxiety
and it would be more
undesirable to leave such anxiety unattended. I am mindful of the
confirmation by the Court hearing the matter
previously that E[...]
is suffering from anxiety, a condition which neither parent in the
current circumstances and with the existing
animosity are placed to
attend to or to remedy. This Court as upper guardian of all minor
children has an unfettered discretion
to make any order in relation
to the best interests of a minor child in its area of jurisdiction as
this Court may deem meet. E[...]
has a constitutional right to
healthcare, which includes therapy. In the absence of therapy E[...]
is left to navigate an uncertain
world fraught with the animosity of
a high conflict divorce of her parents unsupported and without any
professional assistance.
With the level of animosity between the
parents E[...] is at significant risk of becoming conflicted,
something that she too would
have to navigate unassisted.
[32] During the
Rule 43 proceedings there was a clear indication and it was common
cause that E[...] was suffering from anxiety
and it would be more
undesirable to leave such anxiety unattended. I am mindful of the
confirmation by the Court hearing the matter
previously that E[...]
is suffering from anxiety, a condition which neither parent in the
current circumstances and with the existing
animosity are placed to
attend to or to remedy. This Court as upper guardian of all minor
children has an unfettered discretion
to make any order in relation
to the best interests of a minor child in its area of jurisdiction as
this Court may deem meet. E[...]
has a constitutional right to
healthcare, which includes therapy. In the absence of therapy E[...]
is left to navigate an uncertain
world fraught with the animosity of
a high conflict divorce of her parents unsupported and without any
professional assistance.
With the level of animosity between the
parents E[...] is at significant risk of becoming conflicted,
something that she too would
have to navigate unassisted.
#
RESIDENCY AND
EXPERT ASSESSMENT
#
# [33] At this stage
the Court is not going to interfere with the Court Order currently in
place in relation to the interim
residency of E[...] and orders
relating to expert assessment (being prohibited for a period of four
months after the granting of
the Rule 43 order). This Court is not
placed in possession of sufficient evidence as to determine what is
in the best interests
of E[...] pertaining to her medium to long-term
residency.
[33] At this stage
the Court is not going to interfere with the Court Order currently in
place in relation to the interim
residency of E[...] and orders
relating to expert assessment (being prohibited for a period of four
months after the granting of
the Rule 43 order). This Court is not
placed in possession of sufficient evidence as to determine what is
in the best interests
of E[...] pertaining to her medium to long-term
residency.
FAMILY ADVOCATE
#
# [34] In the best
interests of E[...] and so as to enable the future Court to make an
informed decision the matter is to be
urgently referred to the Family
Advocate for investigation into what is in the best interests of
E[...].
[34] In the best
interests of E[...] and so as to enable the future Court to make an
informed decision the matter is to be
urgently referred to the Family
Advocate for investigation into what is in the best interests of
E[...].
The role and
function of the Family Advocate
#
# [35]InSoller
NO v G and Another[22]Satchwell J gave some consideration as to what the role and functions
of the Family Advocate are.
[35]
In
Soller
NO v G and Another
[22]
Satchwell J gave some consideration as to what the role and functions
of the Family Advocate are.
“
[21] The
Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987 provided for the
appointment of persons in the public service
at each division of the
High Court to be styled “the Family Advocate”. The powers
and duties of the Family Advocate
are set out in section 4 of the
legislation and provide, inter alia that “The Family Advocate
shall … after an application
has been lodged for the variation
… of an order with regard to the custody … or access to
a child, made in terms
of the Divorce Act, if so requested by any
party to such proceedings … institute an enquiry to enable him
to furnish the
Court … with a report and recommendations on
any matter concerning the welfare of each minor or dependent child of
the marriage
concerned or … regarding such matter as is
referred to him by the Court.”
# [36]The
office of the Family Advocate was created in terms of the
appropriately named “Mediation
in Certain Divorce Matters Act”.
The title of this legislation comprises within its use of the words
“mediate”the concepts of “negotiation”perhaps leading to “settlement”and in so doing acting as a sort of go-between between the parties.
If such attempts at mediation of disputes through discussion
and
counselling are unsuccessful then the Family Advocate, as required by
legislation, reports to the Court on the facts which
it will find to
exist and makes recommendations based on professional experience. In
so doing the Family Advocate acts as an advisor
to the Court and
perhaps as a mediator between the family who has been investigated
and the Court.[23]
[36]
The
office of the Family Advocate was created in terms of the
appropriately named “
Mediation
in Certain Divorce Matters Act”
.
The title of this legislation comprises within its use of the words
“
mediate”
the concepts of “
negotiation”
perhaps leading to “
settlement”
and in so doing acting as a sort of go-between between the parties.
If such attempts at mediation of disputes through discussion
and
counselling are unsuccessful then the Family Advocate, as required by
legislation, reports to the Court on the facts which
it will find to
exist and makes recommendations based on professional experience. In
so doing the Family Advocate acts as an advisor
to the Court and
perhaps as a mediator between the family who has been investigated
and the Court.
[23]
# “The
Family Advocate is not appointed the representative of any party to a
dispute – neither the mother, father or any child.
In a sense,
the Family Advocate is required to be neutral in approach in order
that the wishes and desires of disputing parties
can be more closely
examined and the true facts and circumstances ascertained”.[24]
“
The
Family Advocate is not appointed the representative of any party to a
dispute – neither the mother, father or any child.
In a sense,
the Family Advocate is required to be neutral in approach in order
that the wishes and desires of disputing parties
can be more closely
examined and the true facts and circumstances ascertained”
.
[24]
# “The
function of the Family Advocate has been described to be of
assistance to a Court by placing facts and considerations before
the
Court. The Family Advocate should make a balanced recommendation and
should not take sides against one party in favour of the
other.”[25]
“
The
function of the Family Advocate has been described to be of
assistance to a Court by placing facts and considerations before
the
Court. The Family Advocate should make a balanced recommendation and
should not take sides against one party in favour of the
other.”
[25]
#
# [37]InTerblanche
v Terblanche[26]the Court described the Family Advocate as:
[37]
In
Terblanche
v Terblanche
[26]
the Court described the Family Advocate as:
“…
particularly
well equipped to perform such functions and duties, having at his or
her disposal a whole battery of auxiliary services
from all walks of
life, including family counsellors appointed in terms of the Act and
who are usually qualified social workers,
clinical psychologists,
psychiatrists, educational authorities, ministers of religion and any
number of other persons who may be
cognisant of the physical and
spiritual needs or problems of the children and their parents or
guardians, and who may be able to
render assistance to the Family
Advocate in weighing up and evaluating all relevant facts and
circumstances pertaining to the welfare
and interests of the children
concerned.”
#
# [38] The fact
remains that the parties cannot agree on a medium to long-term
residency and contact regime in respect of E[...].
An objective
investigation and recommendation is therefore imperative in order to
assist the Court ultimately in finding what arrangements
would serve
E[...]’s best interests. The Family Advocate has been
established by virtue of legislation. Both parties have
agreed to the
appointment of the Family Advocate during the Rule 43 proceedings. I
am accordingly inclined to grant the applicant
the relief that he
seeks for the immediate referral of the matter to the Family
Advocate.
[38] The fact
remains that the parties cannot agree on a medium to long-term
residency and contact regime in respect of E[...].
An objective
investigation and recommendation is therefore imperative in order to
assist the Court ultimately in finding what arrangements
would serve
E[...]’s best interests. The Family Advocate has been
established by virtue of legislation. Both parties have
agreed to the
appointment of the Family Advocate during the Rule 43 proceedings. I
am accordingly inclined to grant the applicant
the relief that he
seeks for the immediate referral of the matter to the Family
Advocate.
ORDER
#
# [1] A
therapist/play therapist shall be appointed by the parties for E[...]
to assist and guide E[...] during this transition
phase and to
address her alleged anxiety, and if necessary, to equip E[...] with
the necessary tools to assist her in coping with
the effects of her
parents’ pending divorce. Such appointment shall be done
immediately.
[1] A
therapist/play therapist shall be appointed by the parties for E[...]
to assist and guide E[...] during this transition
phase and to
address her alleged anxiety, and if necessary, to equip E[...] with
the necessary tools to assist her in coping with
the effects of her
parents’ pending divorce. Such appointment shall be done
immediately.
# [2] The costs of
the therapist shall be paid by the applicant.
[2] The costs of
the therapist shall be paid by the applicant.
# [3] Should the
parties be unable to agree on a therapist within 2 (two) days after
the granting of this order, they shall
immediately approach the
Chairperson of the Gauteng Family Law Forum, with or without their
legal representatives, for urgent nomination
of a suitable therapist.
[3] Should the
parties be unable to agree on a therapist within 2 (two) days after
the granting of this order, they shall
immediately approach the
Chairperson of the Gauteng Family Law Forum, with or without their
legal representatives, for urgent nomination
of a suitable therapist.
# [4] The matter
shall immediately be referred to the offices of the Family Advocate
by the parties to investigate what would
be in E[...]’s best
interests pertaining tointer aliaher care, residency and
contact arrangements. The referral shall incorporate a full copy of
the initial Rule 43 application and
a full copy of the papers in this
application. Copies of both applications shall be made available to
the offices of the Family
Advocate within 5 (five) days of the
granting of this order.
[4] The matter
shall immediately be referred to the offices of the Family Advocate
by the parties to investigate what would
be in E[...]’s best
interests pertaining to
inter alia
her care, residency and
contact arrangements. The referral shall incorporate a full copy of
the initial Rule 43 application and
a full copy of the papers in this
application. Copies of both applications shall be made available to
the offices of the Family
Advocate within 5 (five) days of the
granting of this order.
# [5] The Family
Advocate is requested to convene an inquiry and to provide a report
to the parties and the Court as a matter
of urgency.
[5] The Family
Advocate is requested to convene an inquiry and to provide a report
to the parties and the Court as a matter
of urgency.
# [6] The costs of
the application shall be costs in the divorce action.
[6] The costs of
the application shall be costs in the divorce action.
Delivered
:
This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judges whose names are
reflected and is handed down electronically
by circulation to the
Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for
hand-down is deemed to be on 27 May 2025.
HEARD ON:
20 May 2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
27 May 2025
FOR APPLICANT:
Advocate R Ferreira
INSTRUCTED BY:
Farouk Attorneys
E-mail:
muhammad@farouk.co.za
Tel: 061 588 3522
FOR RESPONDENT:
Advocate Z Khan
INSTRUCTED BY:
Farhana Ismail
Attorneys
E-mail:
farhana@ismailatt.co.za
Tel: 082 677 2041
##
[1]
2019 (6) SA 1 (CC)
[2]
Caselines, 022-2 to 022-9
[3]
Ibid
[4]
See
NS
v Presiding Officer of the Children’s Court
[2018] ZAGPJHC 59;
S
v L
,
unreported judgment of the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng
Division, Pretoria, Case No 72839/2016 (30 September 2016) and
Chief
Family Advocate v G
2003 (2) SA 599 (W)
[5]
Section 173 of the Constitution states:
“
The
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court
of South Africa each has the inherent power to protect
and regulate
their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into
account the interests of justice.”
[6]
1990 (2) SA 77
(W) at 79D-E
[7]
2025 JDR 0581 (GJ)
[8]
Ibid
at
paragraph 56
[9]
Paragraph [53]
[10]
Ibid
at
79B-D
[11]
J v
J
2008
(6) SA 30
(C), paragraph [20] at 37D-38A, paraphrased
[12]
1992 (1) SA 501
(W) at 504C
[13]
2002 (6) SA 105
(N) at 110C-D
[14]
[2007] ZACC 27
;
2008 (3) SA 183
(CC)
(2008 4 BCLR 359
paragraph 30 at 370A)
[15]
De
Gree and Another v Webb and Others (Centre for Child Law as Amicus
Curiae)
2007
(5) SA 184
; SCA paragraph [99] at 2201
[16]
AD
and DD v DW and Others (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae,
Department for Social Development as Intervening Party)
[2007] ZACC 27
;
2008
(3) SA 183
(CC)
(2000 4 BCLR 359
, paragraph 30 at 370A)
[17]
Act 108 of 1996
[18]
Paragraph [30], CaseLines, Judgment 023-16
[19]
Paragraph [9], CaseLines, Judgment, page 20, 023-16
[20]
Paragraph 42.2, Answering Affidavit, CaseLines, 026-26
[21]
Paragraph 104.3, CaseLines, 026-60
[22]
2003 (5) SA 430
(W)
[23]
Soller
NO v G and Another
supra
at paragraph [22]
[24]
Soller
NO v G and Another
supra
at paragraph [23]
[25]
Whitehead
v Whitehead
1993
(3) SA 72
(SE) and
Soller
NO v G and Another
supra
at paragraph [24]
[26]
1992 (1) SA 501
(W) at 503E-I
sino noindex
make_database footer start
Similar Cases
M.A.D.T v M.D.T (2023/132917) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1080 (25 September 2024)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 1080High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)100% similar
M.L.D.T v G.J.D.T and Others (A2024/042817) [2025] ZAGPJHC 957 (19 September 2025)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 957High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
S.L.M. v H.A.C (18281/2021) [2025] ZAGPJHC 687 (19 June 2025)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 687High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
M.B. v S (A94/2024) [2025] ZAGPJHC 707 (14 July 2025)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 707High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
Mataboge v Road Accident Fund (2025/034313) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1311 (9 December 2025)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 1311High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar