Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 597South Africa
Action Enterprise and Supplier Development Trust v Montle and Noe Transport Services and Another (2022/035872) [2025] ZAGPJHC 597 (12 June 2025)
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Action Enterprise and Supplier Development Trust v Montle and Noe Transport Services and Another (2022/035872) [2025] ZAGPJHC 597 (12 June 2025)
Action Enterprise and Supplier Development Trust v Montle and Noe Transport Services and Another (2022/035872) [2025] ZAGPJHC 597 (12 June 2025)
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sino date 12 June 2025
SAFLII
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Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
no: 2022-035872
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: YES
Date:
12 June 2025
In
the matter between:
THE
ACTION ENTERPRISE AND
SUPPLIER
DEVELOPMENT TRUST
Applicant
and
MONTLE
AND NEO TRANSPORT SERVICES CC
First Respondent
MONTLE
GERALD SELEPE
Second Respondent
DATE
OIF JUDGMENT
: This judgment
was authored and issued by the Judge whose name is reflected herein
and is handed down electronically by circulation
to the parties/their
legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic
file of this matter on CaseLines.
The
date for hand-down is deemed to be 12 June 2025.
JUDGMENT
STYLIANOU,
AJ
1.
The applicant is the Action Enterprise and Supplier Development
Trust, a trust duly registered in accordance with the laws
of the
Republic of South Africa under Master’s reference number
IT1515/2011. The Trust was previously known as the Ed Action
Fund
Trust.
2.
The first respondent is Montle and Neo Transport Services CC, a close
corporation duly registered in accordance with the
laws of the
Republic of South Africa under registration number 2008/224709/23.
3.
The second respondent is Montle Gerald Selepe. The Notice of Motion
seeks no relief against the second respondent.
4.
The parties concluded a loan agreement in terms of which the
applicant agreed to lend and advance R9,4m to the first respondent.
5.
The loan agreement was concluded between the applicant, the first
respondent (defined in the agreement as “the Borrower”)
and the second respondent (defined in the agreement as “the
Entrepreneur”).
6.
A special notarial covering bond was registered in favour of the
applicant and passed as security for the first respondent’s
indebtedness to the applicant. The Special Notarial Covering Bond
specially hypothecated and bound to and in favour of the applicant,
in terms of section 1 of the Security by Means of Movable Property
Act, No 57 of 1993, the following assets:
“
1.
TANK
CLINIC
VIN
number:
A[…]
Vehicle
registration number:
Z[…]
.
MERCEDES-BENZ
VIN
number:
W[…]
Engine
number:
5[…]
Vehicle
registration number:
X[…]
3.
AFRIT
VIN
number:
A[…]
Vehicle
registration number:
G[…]
4.
AFRIT
VIN
number:
A[…]
Vehicle
registration number:
G[…]
5.
GRW ENGINEERING
VIN
number:
A[…]
Vehicle
registration number:
D[…]
6.
GRW ENGINEERING
VIN
number:
A[…]
Vehicle
registration number:
D[…]
7.
SCANIA
VIN
number:
9[…]
7.
In addition, in terms of the special notarial covering bond the first
respondent hypothecated in favour of the applicant:
“
3.3.1.2
generally
all
its moveable property and effects (of whatever description and where
so ever situate, such as the MORTGAGOR [
First
Respondent
]
may now possess or in the future become possessed of, without
exception and without in any way limiting the generality of these
provisions, including:
3.3.1.2.1
all debts of whatever kind or nature
owing to the MORGAGOR;
3.3.1.2.2
its rights to all quotas, permits,
licenses and the like;
3.3.1.2.3
all its contractual rights of
whatsoever nature including but without limiting the generality
of
this clause, rights in respect of insurance policies taken out by or
in favour of the MORTGAGOR;
3.3.1.2.4
all its plant, equipment, machinery,
furniture, fittings, stock in trade and vehicles,
nothing excepted;”
8.
The special notarial
covering bond provides that in the event that the first respondent
fails to pay any amounts due and payable
to the applicant from
whatever cause and/or commits a material breach of any agreement
between the first respondent and the applicant
thereby entitling the
applicant to cancel such agreement or accelerate performance,
then the applicant
shall be entitled to declare
the
first
respondent's
full
indebtedness
to
the
applicant
from whatever cause
to be due and payable and perfect
its
security
in
terms
of
the
bond
by,
inter
alia,
entering
any premises
of the
first respondent and
taking
possession
of any
assets listed in the
bond and thereafter to dispose of all the assets or take other steps
to ensure that it is able to utilise the
assets in order to recover
the first respondent's indebtedness to the applicant.
9.
In the answering affidavit, the first and second respondents admit
the citation of the parties, the conclusion of the loan
agreement and
the registration of the special notarial covering bond as well as the
terms thereof.
10.
The applicant alleges that the first respondent breached the loan
agreement by
inter alia
failing
to make repayments to the applicant in terms thereof. Other breaches
of the terms of the loan agreement are alleged by the
applicant such
as a failure by the first respondent to account to the applicant by
furnishing it with management, financial and
other operational
documents and information relating to the first respondent’s
business as well as a failure to allow the
applicant to inspect the
assets that had been pledged to the applicant in terms of the special
notarial covering bond.
11.
Due to the first respondent’s default, the applicant cancelled
the loan agreement and accelerated the balance payable.
It now seeks
to perfect its security.
12.
The applicant seeks payment of the sum of R10 758 636.00 and an order
authorizing the Sheriff of the Court to attach and
take possession of
the assets specifically referred to in the special notarial bond as
well as generally, all of the first respondent’s
movable
assets.
13.
The first respondent admits that it breached the loan agreement in
that it had made only seven payments to the applicant
totalling R1
612 480 between the months of February 2021 and August 2021.
14.
In its answering affidavit, the first respondent admits that it is
indebted to the applicant in the amount of
R10
758 636.00, which amount represents the total outstanding amount in
terms of the loan agreement. The first respondent goes so
far as to
say:
“
The
respondents
(sic)
are
willing to pay the amount of R10 758 636.00 to the applicant and they
have never disputed their liability towards the applicant.
The
respondents will still honour their agreements with the respondent.”
15.
The respondents do not seriously dispute the applicant’s right
to take possession of the assets specially hypothecated
as well as
the general assets. Only a bald denial to the assertion that the
applicant can do so is proffered.
16.
No basis is set out for the denial and, given the fact that the
indebtedness is admitted, the first respondent would have
been
required to comprehensively explain why, since the failure to pay is
admitted, the applicant would not be entitled to the
relief it seeks.
17.
The bald denial can therefore be rejected as no real dispute of fact
is created thereby and it is clearly untenable.
18.
Other than admitting the breaches, the respondents make vague
allegations regarding the applicant playing a role in hampering
its
business activities. This line is not developed by the respondents
and in any event, even if the allegations were true, the
first
respondent does not explain why this would affect its indebtedness to
the applicant and why it still admits owing the applicant
R10
758
636.00
.
19.
It was against this background that the matter came to the opposed
motion court for the week of 10 March 2025.
20.
The matter was allocated for hearing on Wednesday 12 March 2025 at
10h00.
21.
Mr Mfusi, who appeared for the respondents handed up an affidavit
dated 11 March 2025 which was deposed to by the second
respondent on
behalf of the first respondent and himself wherein the Court was
informed that the respondents sought a stay of the
application and
the removal of the matter from the Court roll.
22.
The affidavit of 11 March 2025 explains that the first respondent had
been placed under voluntary winding up in terms
of s80 of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the New
Companies Act&rdquo
;) and
that the second respondent had initiated a process to surrender his
estate for the benefit of all his creditors.
23.
Section 80 of the New
Companies Act deals
with the voluntary
winding-up of a solvent company. Quite to the contrary, the answering
affidavit filed by the respondents paints
a picture of a company that
is unable to pay its debts as and when they fall due.
24.
In the affidavit
requesting the postponement, the deponent attaches certain annexures
which he describes as follows:
“
6.1
the
filing via email to the CIPC as Annexure “AP1”;
6.2
the member’s resolution as Annexure
“AP2”;
6.3
the prescribed notice as Annexure “AP3”;
and
6.4
confirm that the prescribed fee was deposited on the CIPC system for
payment as per the CIPC required
electronic payment.”
25.
The prescribed fee is R250.00.
26.
Adv. Setaba who appeared for the applicant submitted that the
affidavit did not establish that the first respondent had
been placed
into voluntary winding-up in terms of section 80 of the Act as there
was no proof of payment of the prescribed fee
of R250.00 to the
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (“CIPC”).
27.
Section 80 of the Act provides as follows:
“
80
Voluntary winding-up of solvent company
(1)
A solvent company
may be wound up voluntarily if the company has adopted a special
resolution to do so, which may provide for the
winding-up to be by
the company, or by its creditors.
(2)
A resolution
providing for the voluntary winding up of a company must be filed,
together with the prescribed notice and filing fee.
(6)
A voluntary
winding-up of a company begins when the resolution of the company has
been filed in terms of subsection (2).”
28.
Hence, in terms of s80(6), the voluntary winding up only commences
once the resolution is filed in terms of s80(2) which
in turn
requires it to be filed with the “
prescribed
notice and filing fee”.
29.
As there was no evidence of the payment of the filing fee, Mr Setaba
submitted that there was no evidence that the winding-up
of the first
respondent had commenced and hence, an order as sought in the notice
of motion could be granted as there was no intervening
winding-up.
30.
In response to this, Mr Mfusi handed up from the Bar a printout from
the CIPC which he submitted was proof of payment
of the R250.00 fee
to the CIPC. On the face of it, it was clearly not a receipt
evidencing payment of the prescribed fee. The document
appeared to be
a CIPC Entity Search which recorded that “SIMPHIWE MFUSI ACC#
(ACFXSE)” had a balance in his favour
with the CIPC of R250.00.
Mr Mfusi explained that the account with the CIPC was his firm’s
account.
31.
The document that Mr Mfusi sought to rely upon was clearly not proof
of payment of the prescribed fee and I allowed the
matter to stand
down to Friday 14 March 2025 to afford the respondents an opportunity
to obtain proof of payment and to allow the
parties to get clarity on
what the status of the first respondent was.
32.
At the resumption of the hearing on Friday 14 March 2025, the
respondents were unable to furnish any evidence that the
prescribed
fee had been paid.
33.
Mr Mfusi handed up another affidavit by second respondent (dated 13
March 2025) which attached to it as annexure “AP9”
an
“Account Statement” which reflected that an amount of
R230 had been deposited into the Account of SIMPHIWE MFUSI
(ACFXSE)
held with the CIPC bringing the balance on that account to R250.00.
This was no more proof of payment of the prescribed
fee than the
first document tendered as proof of payment. In fact, both documents
merely stated the same thing, that the account
of SIMPHIWE MFUSI
(ACFXSE) was in credit for the sum of R250.00.
34.
There was no proof that payment of the sum of R250,00 had been made
to the CIPC as the prescribed fee for the voluntary
winding-up of the
first respondent.
35.
Accordingly, there was no proof of compliance with
section 80(2)
and
(6) of the
Companies Act.
36.
To
the contrary, counsel for the applicant handed up a printout from
CIPC dated Thursday, March 13, 2025 at 22:25 (the evening before
the
reconvened hearing) which indicates that the “
Enterprise
Status”
of the first
respondent is “
In Business”
.
37.
Mr Mfusi objected to this document being handed up to the Court on
the basis that it was not sworn to and attached to
an affidavit.
38.
Mr Setaba referred the Court to the judgment of Levenberg AJ in the
matter of
The Furniture Bargaining
Council v AXZS Industries (Pty) Ltd Trading As Don Elly Enterprises
2020 (2) SA 215
(GJ) where the
Court was presented with a CIPC report which Levenberg AJ
characterised in par [27] as having “
official
legitimacy
”. However in that
case, the CIPC document formed an attachment to a supplementary
affidavit and was not merely handed up
from the Bar.
39.
In the absence of an affidavit confirming what the CIPC Printout was
and how it was obtained, I cannot have regard to
it.
40.
Even so, there is still no evidence that the prescribed fee had been
paid and therefore no evidence that the necessary
formalities in
section 80
had been complied with.
41.
Another difficulty for the respondents are the terms of the Member’s
Special Resolution which is alleged to have
placed the first
respondent into voluntary winding-up.
42.
The resolution attached to the affidavit of 11 March 2025 is a
resolution which the deponent refers to as “
the
member’s resolution”
. I
quote it in full:
“
MEMBER’S
SPECIAL RESOLUTION
PASSED
BY THE SOLE MEMBER AND SHAREHOLDER OF MONTLE AND NEO TRANSPORT
SERVICES CLOSE CORPORATION (Reg No: 2008/224709/23)(“Close
Corporation”)
HELD
AT 3[…] F[…] STREET, M[…] C[…], C[…],
GAUTENG, ON THE 2TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2025
1.
By a written
resolution signed by GERALD MONTLE SELEPE (Identity Number: 6[…]),
the sole Member of the Close Corporation,
pursuant to Section 80 of
the Companies Act, 71 of 2008 (“
Companies Act&rdquo
;), the
following Special Resolution was duly passed:
1.1
The Close
Corporation be voluntarily wound up;
1.2
The Creditor,
Themba Mazwai, intends to wound up the Close Corporation and the
Close Corporation has no other option outside of
such a push
(sic)
but to
voluntarily wound up the Close Corporation. In that regard, the
Creditor will in terms of
Section 80
of the Companies act assume all
powers to carry on the business of the Close Corporation, manage and
appoint a registered liquidator
to grant such powers to realize all
Close Corporation assets, settle all outstanding liabilities and
distribute the remaining proceeds
to the sole Member, after providing
proper notice to all other creditors and following all legal
requirements;
1.3
The sole Member of the Close
Corporation is authorized to file this Special Resolution with the
Companies And Intellectual Property
Commission (CIPC) together with
the prescribed notice and filing fee.
GERALD
MONTLE SELEPE: SOLE MEMBER AND SHAREHOLDER
MONTLE
AND NEO TRANSPORT SERVICES
Date:
27 FEBRUARY 2025”
43.
On the face of it, the resolution appears to be one passed by the
members of the first respondent that a creditor will
bring an
application for the voluntary surrender of the first respondent.
44.
This is not a resolution to place the first respondent into voluntary
winding-up. It is also not clear to me on what basis
a creditor can
“
assume all powers to carry on
the business of the [first respondent], manage and appoint a
registered liquidator…”
45.
It seems clear therefore that there is no evidence of the first
respondent being placed under voluntary winding-up and
therefore,
given the admission of liability on the part of the first respondent,
there is no reason why the relief sought by the
applicant should not
be granted.
46.
As regards the second respondent. The affidavit filed of 11 March
2025 states that Mr Selepe (the member of the first
respondent and
the second respondent) had decided to surrender his estate “…
as
a debtor, for the benefit of all my creditors.”
47.
As previously mentioned, no relief is sought against the second
respondent in the Notice of Motion. As such, the possibility
that he
may have surrendered his estate is no bar to the application
proceeding against the first respondent.
48.
In any event, there is also a difficulty with the surrender of the
second respondent’s estate.
49.
Section 4(1)
of the
Insolvency Act, 24 of 1936
requires the
publication of an advert in the Gazette and in a local newspaper to
take place no more than 30 days and no less than
14 days before the
date of the application for the surrender of an estate.
50.
The second respondent says that notice of his surrender was published
in the Star newspaper on 5 March 2025. Due to some
difficulties with
the Government Printers, the advert in the Gazette did not appear on
the date that the first respondent intended
i.e. 7 March 2025 and
arrangements were made for it to appear on 14 March 2025. The forms
submitted to the Government Printers
which (for both dates) are
annexed to the affidavit of 11 March 2025 both record the date on
which the application for the surrender
of the second respondent’s
estate is to take place as being 22 April 2025.
51.
This means that the advert in the Star appeared 47 days before the
intended application. The intended advert in the Gazette
for 14 March
2025 would appear 38 days before the intended application.
52.
Hence,
there was therefore no compliance with
section 4(1)
of the
Insolvency
Act and
the voluntary surrender would therefore be a nullity.
[1]
53.
In the
circumstances, I order as follows:
1.
Judgment is granted
against the first respondent in favour of the applicant, in the
amount of R10 758 636.00.
2.
An order is granted
authorizing the applicant and/or the Sheriff of the Court with
jurisdiction, to enter the first respondent’s
business premises
situated at 3[…] F[…] Street, M[…] C[…],
C[…], Gauteng, or any other premises
occupied by the first
respondent, and to attach and take possession of the following
assets, whether kept in such premises or elsewhere:
2.1.
the following assets listed in Annexure A of
Special Notarial Covering Bond B[…] (“the listed
assets”):
2.1.1.
Tank Clinic, Vin
number A[…], vehicle registration number Z[…];
2.1.2.
Mercedes-Benz, Vin
number W[…],
engine
number 5[…], vehicle registration
number
X[…];
2.1.3.
Afrit, Vin number
A[…], vehicle registration number G[…];
2.1.4.
Afrit Vin number
A[…], vehicle registration number G[…];
2.1.5.
GRW Engineering, Vin
number A[…], vehicle registration number D[…];
2.1.6.
GWR Engineering, Vin
number A[…], vehicle registration number D[…];
2.1.7.
Scania, Vin number
9[…].
2.2.
generally, all the
first respondent’s moveable property and effects (of whatever
description), including the following (“the
general assets”):
2.2.1.
All debts of whatever
kind or nature owing to the first respondent;
2.2.2.
The first
respondent’s rights to all quotas, permits, licences and the
like;
2.2.3.
The first
respondent’s contractual rights of whatsoever nature;
2.2.4.
All of the first
respondent’s plants, equipment, machinery, furniture, fittings,
stock in trade and vehicles.
3.
The applicant is
entitled to hold the listed assets and the general assets as security
for the payment of the amount of R10 758
636.00;
4.
The applicant is
entitled to dispose of the listed assets and the general assets or
any of them by public auction or by private
treaty or otherwise in
the applicant’s sole discretion;
5.
The applicant is
entitled to execute upon all or any of the listed assets and the
general assets;
6.
The first respondent
is directed to pay the costs of this application on an attorney and
client scale.
X
STYLIANOU, AJ
Acting
Judge of the Hight Court
Heard:
12 and 14 March 2025
Judgment
delivered: 12 June 2025
Appearances:
For
Applicant: Adv.
Setaba
Instructed
by: Webber
Wentzel Attorneys
For
Respondents: Mr. Mfusi
Instructed
by: Mfusi &
Co Attorneys
[1]
Ex
Parte Oosthuysen
1995
(2) SA 694
(T)
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