K.N.G. v T.L. (25/086657) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1142 (8 July 2025)

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(25/086657) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1142 (8 July 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2025_1142.html sino date 8 July 2025 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG Case Number: 25-086657 (1) REPORTABLE: YES (2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES (3) REVISED: NO 8 JULY 2025 In the matter between: K[___] , N[___] G[___] Applicant and T[___] , L[___] Respondent JUDGMENT This judgment and the order incorporated is handed down electronically by circulation to the applicant’s legal representatives by e-mail and by uploading the signed copy hereof to Caselines. Civil Procedure – Motion proceedings – Interim declaratory relief – Only to be granted in exceptional circumstances – Exceptional circumstances not present – Declaratory relief to be determined on final basis. Civil Procedure – Motion proceedings – Rule nisi – Save in exceptional circumstances, not to be granted where all interested or potentially interested parties having notice of the relief sought – Relief sought to be determined on final basis. Delict – Defamation – Declaratory relief on motion – Publication of defamatory statement implying that applicant is a rapist – Granted. Delict – Defamation – Interdict – ‘Gag’ order sought prohibiting publication of all statements pertaining to or relating to applicant – Refused. Delict – Defamation – Interdict – Grant of relief more limited than that sought, but not inconsistent therewith – Considered. Delict – Defamation – Interdict – Prohibition on publication of unspecified defamatory statements concerning the applicant – Inappropriate. Delict – Defamation – Interdict – Prohibition on respondent’s publication of proven false and defamatory statement extensively published elsewhere – Not granted. Moultrie AJ : [1]  The applicant, who describes himself as a “high profile political and public figure” and as a “renowned and seasoned politician and former Minister who is still in active politics” alleges that the respondent “consistently continues to publish and post defamatory statements concerning me on the internet and her social media pages”. He urgently seeks orders declaring that his “right to dignity, and in particular his right to good name and reputation has been unlawfully infringed” by the respondent’s alleged conduct, as well as: a.           a prohibitory interdict restraining the respondent from: i.             “posting any material or text of whatever nature or in whatever form on social media pertaining to the applicant”; ii.           “sharing any information of whatever nature on social media or on any public platform relating to the applicant”; iii.          “transmitting in whatever format … personal information relating to the applicant”; and b.           a mandatory interdict ordering the respondent “to remove all postings inclusive of pictures and any material she posted on social media or any public platform relating to the applicant or the applicant's family”. Service and Urgency [2]  The application was launched on Monday, 9 June 2025 and the Sheriff served it on the respondent on 11 June 2025 by means of a WhatsApp message to a telephone number designated by the applicant’s attorneys. The Sheriff received no response to his WhatsApp message, and the respondent did not oppose the application, or appear at court on the date stipulated in the notice of motion for the hearing. I am nevertheless satisfied that the application is likely to have come to the respondent’s attention, in view of the allegations made in the founding affidavit regarding her communications to the Sheriff via Whatsapp using the same telephone number some eight days earlier, when he served a protection order that the applicant had obtained against her in the Randburg Magistrates’ Court by the same means. [3] I am also satisfied that, if indeed the applicant is entitled to the interdictory relief that he seeks (which must be assumed for the purposes of the urgency enquiry), he would not be able to obtain substantial redress at a hearing in due course as contemplated in Rule 6(12)(b). While I am not necessarily convinced that the declaratory relief is similarly urgent, I do not consider that it would be appropriate to treat the issues separately for the purposes of urgency, especially since the respondent has evidently elected not to oppose the matter. In those circumstances, the determination of this issue will, in my view, not result in an unnecessary waste of scarce judicial resources, but rather preserve them by avoiding a potential further hearing, [1] and will also serve to reduce the costs of litigating the dispute. [4]  These findings are reflected in the order that I make condoning the applicant’s non-compliance with the rules of court relating to service and time periods and enrolling the matter for hearing on the urgent roll. The nature of the relief sought and the employment of the rule nisi procedure [5]  Paragraph 7 of notice of motion seeks that “all prayers above” (i.e. including not only the declaratory and the interdictory relief, but also the procedural relief for condonation) are sought in the current proceedings on the basis that they will “operate as an interim order”, pending the return day of a rule nisi calling upon the respondent to show cause why they should not be finally granted. [6] I am prepared to accept that interim declaratory relief may be granted in “very unusual circumstances”, for example where it is necessary for the court to declare the applicant’s rights for the purposes of a determination to be made by a functionary and upon whom the declarator would be binding. [2] However, apart from my other difficulties with the employment of the rule nisi procedure (discussed below), I do not consider that such circumstances are present here. In my view, the declaratory order sought in this case is “ final in its very nature ” [3] and the prayer seeking that the declarator (and indeed also the prayer for condonation) should operate as an interim order can be described as a “basic mistake”, as was the case in Manana . [4] [7] However, an even more fundamental concern arises from the applicant’s purported employment of the rule nisi procedure. As the Supreme Court of Appeal has noted, this procedure “is underpinned by the principle that a court will not grant relief which impacts or constrains the rights and interests of a party without affording that party an opportunity to be heard ( audi alteram partem )”. [5] Having noted that Van Zyl had opined as late as 1931 that a rule nisi “is granted only on an ex parte application”, [6] the SCA observed that the practice of our courts has developed since that time, and framed the proposition in broader terms: the procedure is now “generally” used in such applications. [7] It seems to me that the main reason for this is the recognition that it is sometimes also appropriate to employ the rule nisi procedure in applications that are brought on notice to at least one party, but where not all of those whose interests are, or may be, affected by the order sought have been given notice or joined – either because the identities (or even existence) of such potentially interested parties is not known, [8] or because their number is so large that it would not be practical to require individual service in terms of Rule 4. [9] There are also indications that a court may be empowered to grant a rule nisi so as to allow further relevant evidence to be placed on record, [10] but it seems to me that this power should only be exercised where the application is brought on extreme urgency and even then only at the instance of the respondent, save in exceptional circumstances. [8] On its own, a rule nisi “has no legal effect other than to put those to whom it is addressed on notice that specified relief will be sought on the return day”. [11] But where “the interests of justice require the balancing of rights and interests to ensure that what is worthy of immediate protection is not prejudiced by the time it takes to hear all interested parties”, [12] a rule nisi may be coupled with additional relief such as an interim interdict, or even an interim declaration of rights. [9] When the rule nisi procedure is properly understood in this context, it is not surprising that a number of courts have held that no useful purpose would be served by its use (whether accompanied by additional interim relief or not) where all those affected, or potentially affected, by the intended final relief have received due notice of the proceedings [13] and “to grant a rule nisi seems not only a waste of time, but an unnecessary expense”. [14] Where a court declines to grant a rule nisi on this basis, there is no further proceeding and no further judicial or other determination to which the relief sought could meaningfully be described as interim, [15] with the implication that it must be treated as final in nature. [10]  This is the case in the current matter, where I have found there has been satisfactory service on the only relevant interested party, who has chosen not to oppose the relief sought in the notice of motion, and not to adduce any evidence. [11]  While I thus consider it proper to proceed on the basis that the applicant seeks final relief, it will be noted from the discussion below that the adoption of this approach makes no material difference in the disposition of the current matter: the conclusions that I have reached would not have been any different had I decided it on an interim basis. [12] This is primarily because the relief sought by the applicant is firmly founded in the law of defamation and because he does not seek damages. Not only has the Supreme Court of Appeal held that there is no bar to the grant of final interdicts (either prohibitory to prevent either imminent publication, [16] or mandatory to cease continuing publication) [17] or declaratory relief [18] in motion proceedings on the basis of this cause of action, [19] it has also confirmed that in order to obtain such relief, it is only necessary for a defamation claimant (even in motion proceedings) to establish publication (or, in the case of prohibitory interdicts, the likelihood of publication) and defamatory meaning. [20] The declaratory relief [13]  The applicant makes the uncontested allegation in his founding affidavit that on or about 3 June 2025, the respondent updated her Whatsapp status with a photograph (which the applicant identifies as depicting him and his spouse on their wedding day), to which she subscribed the statement: “this is [the applicant’s spouse] can’t believe she is married to this minister of Rape. Please help me bring him down please” [sic]. [14]  In addition, there is no dispute that, upon being served with the protection order that the applicant had obtained against her in early June 2025, the respondent sent the Sheriff a Whatsapp message containing a photograph of what may readily be recognised as the charge office of a South African police station and the statement “We in a police station to report rape cases for [the applicant] and Im with 2other girls that he knows very well and after that we are meeting with a journalist working Sund wold to give our stories” [sic]. [15]  The applicant alleges that both of these publications bore the defamatory meaning that he is a rapist. [16] Although the respondent’s Whatsapp status did not expressly accuse the applicant of rape, I consider that that a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would attribute that meaning to it when viewing it in context, having regard not only to what is expressly stated but also to what is implied. [21] In particular, given the exhortation to “help me bring him down”, it would in my view be unduly impugning the credulity of that notional reasonable person to conclude that they would think that the Whatsapp status merely implied that the applicant, as an erstwhile government Minister, bore some form of indirect responsibility for the scourge of rapes that bedevil our society, but in which it is not alleged he is personally involved. [17] As to the respondent’s Whatsapp message to the Sheriff, I have considered the potential application of the distinction drawn in Ndlozi between the publication of a defamatory allegation that the applicant had committed rape (or was a rapist) and the publication of a non-defamatory allegation that a complaint of rape has (or is being) made against the applicant to the police. [22] I do not think the distinction applies in this case. Given that the message expressly identifies the respondent herself as being (one of) those who were reporting “rape cases for [the applicant]” and who intended to ‘give our stories’ to the media; and given that a reasonable person may be expected to assume that such a report would not be made to the police or publicised to a Sheriff (who in any event has no jurisdiction over rape complaints) or the media if it were not considered to be true by the person making it, the statement cannot be understood as bearing the bland meaning that complaints of rape had been (or were being) made, but that the person publishing them sought to express no allegation that they were true. To the contrary, I find that the message as published to the Sheriff conveys the meaning that the applicant perpetrated the rapes that were ostensibly being reported. [23] [18] Since the identification of a person as a rapist would be likely to injure the good esteem in which he or she is held by the reasonable or average person to whom it has been published, [24] and since the respondent has advanced no allegation, let alone evidence, of any cognisable defence (for example, that her allegations were true), I am bound to conclude that her publications constituted actionable defamation which unlawfully infringed the applicant’s common law personality right to reputation ( fama ). [25] This right is also commonly referred to as “the right to good name and reputation”, [26] being the formulation employed in the notice of motion. Furthermore, this finding carries with it the necessary implication that he has also suffered an unlawful infringement of his constitutional right to dignity. [27] [19] In the circumstances, I am satisfied the applicant is entitled to the declaratory relief that he seeks, and an order will be issued to that effect. For the sake of clarity, it bears recording here that, while the applicant explicitly states on oath in his founding affidavit that the respondent’s allegation that he is a rapist is false, he does not claim a declaration of falsity such as the one granted and upheld in EFF v Manuel . [28] This omission, however, is no bar to the declarator that the applicant does seek – it is not incumbent upon a claimant seeking to establish a claim in defamation (as opposed to claiming patrimonial damages) to allege and prove falsity. [29] The interdictory relief [20] An applicant for an interdict (whether interim or final, and whether mandatory or prohibitive) is required to identify the specific right upon which s/he relies as the foundation of the cause of action (and establish it, either on a clear or prima facie basis). The right in question must be identified in the applicant’s affidavit(s), which serve the function of both pleadings and evidence in motion proceedings. [30] The requirement to properly define the cause of action not only serves the purpose of informing the other parties of the case that they must meet, which is a fundamental principle of fairness in the conduct of litigation, [31] but also that of defining the issues for the court, whose duty is to adjudicate upon the pleaded issues, and those issues alone. [32] A court “may not decide a case on the basis of its own issues that have not been raised by the parties in the papers”; “should not tell a litigant what it should complain about”; and should not resort to “pity reasoning” to go beyond the pleadings to the prejudice of the other party – even where this reflects “an understandable and well-intentioned attempt to right the wrong”. [33] [21] Other than defamation, no other cause of action is suggested in the founding affidavit as being the basis for any of the relief sought by the applicant in his notice of motion. The affidavit repeatedly refers to the purpose of the interdictory relief sought as being to prevent the publication of defamatory material concerning the applicant. [34] In particular, it bears emphasis that while the affidavit contains a passing reference to the scope of ‘personal information’ as that concept is referred to in the Protection of Personal Information Act, 4 of 2013 (and also an allegation that personal information relating to the applicant and his spouse has been circulated by the respondent without his consent), there is no clear indication in the founding affidavit that this legislation, or the common or constitutional law of privacy, is relied upon as being the source of the right sought to be protected by means of the claimed interdictory relief. [35] In other words, that is not the case that the respondent was called upon to meet, and in the absence of agreement or lack of prejudice to the respondent (which would not be the case) it is not an issue that this court may decide. [22]  Although I accept that it is notionally possible that the posts, communications or transmissions encompassed by the extremely broad scope of the prohibitory and mandatory interdicts that the applicant seeks could potentially include statements that are defamatory of the applicant, a number of difficulties arise in relation to the relief as formulated. [23] No effort has been made to ‘tailor’ the interdictory relief to publication of statements proscribed by the law of defamation, which has been carefully calibrated to balance legitimate interests in the protection of the rights to reputation and dignity with the right freedom of expression protected by section 16 of the Constitution. [36] The grant of any of the relief prayed for in paragraphs 3 to 6 of the notice of motion (as described in paragraph [1] above) would result in a  blanket ‘gag’ being imposed upon the respondent, and would unjustifiably prohibit her from engaging in any and all expression “relating” or “pertaining” to the applicant – even speech that is not defamatory in nature and that would not unlawfully infringe any of his legal rights. The applicant has thus failed to establish any right (whether final or prima facie ) protecting him against publication of the statements that are sought to be prohibited by prayers 3 to 6, and it would thus not be appropriate to grant those prayers in the form that they are sought. [24] However, given that a court may (even in the absence of a residual prayer for alternative relief such as that contained in prayer 10 of the notice of motion) in its discretion grant more limited relief than that sought [37] as long as it is not inconsistent therewith, [38] I have given consideration to the grant of such relief, and how it might be framed. Ultimately, however, I have concluded that I should not do so, for the reasons that follow. [25] It would be inappropriate to simply grant an order prohibiting the respondent from “unlawfully publishing defamatory statements regarding the applicant”. While this would at least have the virtue of limiting the scope of the relief to conduct that would infringe the applicant’s rights, it is a basic principle that interdictory relief “should leave the person against whom it is made, [and] the person in whose favour it is made, in no doubt about the behaviour that is ruled against”. [39] As the Constitutional Court has observed, court orders that are “unsuitably tailored” and lack specificity not only raise rule of law concerns, but may give rise to difficulties of enforcement in contempt of court proceedings that might result from an alleged breach of their uncertain terms. [40] [26] What is more, a defamation claimant is usually required to identify the statements complained of as being defamatory and which give rise to the relief sought, albeit not necessarily the exact words used. [41] In this case, the applicant makes the sweeping allegation that the respondent “consistently continues to publish and post defamatory statements concerning me on the internet and her social media pages”, and only specifically identifies one such statement, namely the allegation that he is a rapist. He does not make out any case that the respondent continues to, or might in the future, publish any other defamatory statement. [27] This then leaves the possibility of limiting the interdictory relief to mandatory and prohibitory interdicts against continued and further publication of the allegation that I have found was contained in the respondent’s Whatsapp status update and in her Whatsapp message referred to above, to the effect that the applicant is a rapist. I note in this regard that the founding affidavit includes undisputed references to the threats of imminent republication that are self-evidently contained in both of these publications. However, I have reached the conclusion that it would not be appropriate to grant even this limited relief. [28] Not only is there no allegation in the founding papers that the respondent is the only person who is seeking to make the allegation in question, there are indications that the same allegation has been and continues to be made by others. In particular, the applicant specifically refers to, and reproduces, another Whatsapp message sent by the respondent to the Sheriff in early June 2025 (annexure ZK6). In this message, the respondent sent the Sheriff screenshots of portions of a media article published online by a well-known South African media house some seven years ago (but which would appear to have still been accessible on the internet at the time that the respondent sent the message). The headline of the article appears to read: “’[I] refuse to bow down to dirty [tri]cks by cowards’ – [the applicant] denies rape accusation”. In those circumstances, I cannot see what useful purpose would be served by interdicting the respondent, and her alone, from publishing the allegation when others appear to be able to do so with impunity. Not only has the “proverbial horse” already bolted, [42] it has evidently been left in the meadow to enjoy a life of freedom. Conclusion, costs and order [29] In conclusion, I am satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the substance of the declaratory relief sought in prayer 1 of the notice of motion but find that she has not established a cause of action for the interdictory relief sought in prayers 3 to 7, or the rule nisi sought in prayer 8 thereof. Furthermore, I do not consider that it would be appropriate to grant a declaration of falsity or any interdictory relief other than that expressly sought in the notice of motion, particularly interdictory relief in respect of the respondent’s threatened republication of the allegation that the applicant is a rapist. [30] With regard to costs, despite the fact that the applicant has not been granted all of the relief sought in the notice of motion, I consider that he has been substantially successful in vindicating what appears to be his main point of principle, namely the contention that the respondent’s publication of the allegation that he is a rapist constituted an unlawful infringement of his rights to reputation and dignity. Although he should therefore be awarded his costs, I do not consider that a punitive costs order against the respondent is justified. In my view it is not appropriate, save in exceptional circumstances, to grant such orders for the purpose of ‘punishing’ a party for the unlawful conduct that forms the subject matter of the proceedings, as opposed to the manner in which they have conducted the litigation. [31] Finally, I should note that while I have ‘anonymised’ this judgment in view of its subject matter and the declaratory order that I am making, I have done so solely to protect any interest that the applicant may have in avoiding unnecessary republication of the respondent’s allegation. Should the applicant not wish to maintain the anonymity afforded him, he is at liberty to waive it. The same does not, however, apply to the respondent who (despite the dismissal of the interdictory relief) should not consider herself free to do likewise. [32] I make the following order: 1. The applicant’s non-compliance with the Uniform Rules of Court relating to forms, service and time periods is condoned, and this application is enrolled on the urgent roll in terms of Rule 6(12). 2. It is declared that the respondent’s publication: 2.1 as her Whatsapp status on or about 3 June 2025 of a photograph showing the applicant and his wife at their wedding, together with the statements that the applicant’s wife “can’t believe that she is married to this minister of Rape” and “please help me bring him down please” [sic]; and 2.2 of her Whatsapp message sent to the Sheriff for Randburg West in early June 2025 containing the statement “we at a police station to report rape cases for [the applicant] and Im with 2 other girls that he knows very well” [sic]; constituted the publication of defamatory statements to the effect that the applicant is a rapist and which unlawfully infringed his right to dignity, particularly his right to good name and reputation. 3. The interdictory relief and rule nisi sought in prayers 3 to 8 of the notice of motion is dismissed. 4. The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant’s costs, including the costs of counsel where so employed on Scale B. RJ MOULTRIE ACTING JUDGE Hearing date :          17 June 2025 Judgment date :       8 July 2025 Appearances :          For the applicant: L Mnqandi, instructed by Madlanga & Partners Inc. Attorneys, (011) 217 7290, trust@mpiattorneys.co.za For the respondent: No appearance [1] It appears to be commonly accepted that declining to decide certain issues while deciding others on the basis of urgency will result in a saving of resources. In my experience this is not always, and is usually not, the case: when a matter is carved up in this manner, aggregate use of resources tends to increase, not reduce. [2] cf. the cases referred to in paragraph 45 of Metcash Trading Ltd v CSARS 2001 (1) SA 1109 (CC) and paragraph 71 thereof, as well as CSARS v Langholm Farms (Pty) Ltd [2019] ZASCA 163 ; 2019 JDR 2359 (SCA) para 10. [3] Komatipoort Despondent Residents Association v Nkomazi Local Municipality and others 2024 JDR 1731 (MN) para 26. See also the discussion in Minister of Finance v Hollard Insurance Company of Namibia Limited 2019 JDR 2585 (NmS) paras 45, 62, 63, 89 and 94. [4] Manana and Others v Johannes 1999 (1) SA 181 (LCC) para 4(d). [5] MEC for the Department of Health, Eastern Cape v BM [2022] ZASCA 140 paras 12 - 14; MKK and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2024 JDR 5208 (GP) para 12. [6] Van Zyl, GB The Judicial Practice of South Africa (4 ed., vol. 1) Juta, 1931 at 401. [7] MEC v BM (above) para 13. It is notable that a rule nisi stipulating a return day was for many years considered an essential feature of ex parte applications, so as to afford the respondent the protection of rule 6(8), which only applies where a return day has been set – at least in those (such as in Anton Piller applications) where the reason for employing the ex parte procedure is the risk that notification of a (usually known) respondent would be likely to undermine the very purpose of the order. However, this necessity fell away with the introduction of the reconsideration procedure in Rule 6(12)(c), which affords a party a remedy in circumstances where an urgent order is granted in their absence, as long as this was not wilful. Ex parte applications of this kind that are not brought urgently would probably still require the issuing of a rule nisi , because Rule 6(12)(c) only applies to urgent applications. [8] The most familiar examples of these kinds of rules nisi are probably those granted in insolvency proceedings, and section 11 of the Insolvency Act, 24 of 1936 specifically requires a court granting a provisional sequestration order to issue rule nisi , which must be served not only on the debtor but also upon its employees and their trade union, and on the South African Revenue Service. [9] cf. Safcor Forwarding (Johannesburg) (Pty) Ltd v National Transport Commission 1982 (3) SA 654 (A) 675D; Insamcor (Pty) Ltd v Dorbyl Light & General Engineering (Pty) Ltd 2007 (4) SA 467 (SCA)  paras 28 – 29; Janse van Rensburg NNO v Steyn 2012 (3) SA 72 (SCA) paras 14 – 15; Matjhabeng Local Muni v Eskom Holdings Ltd 2018 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 94; RAF v Legal Practice Council 2021 (6) SA 230 (GP) paras 8 - 10.  In such circumstances, the issuing of a rule nisi will sometimes be accompanied by orders setting out the means by which it should be brought to the attention of such potentially affected parties, for example by publication in the Government Gazette and/or newspapers. [10] cf. Bux v Officer Commanding, Pietermaritzburg Prison 1994 (4) SA 562 (N) 563 – 564. [11] Nzwalo Investments (Pty) Ltd v Infoguardian (Pty) Ltd [2021] ZAGPJHC 100 (GJ) para 13. [12] MEC v BM (above) para 13. [13] Excelsior Meubels Bpk v Trans Unie Ontwikkelings Korporasie Bpk 1957 (1) SA 74 (T) 77H; Methodist Church of SA v The Master 1962 (1) SA 144 (O) 147F – 148D; Ex parte General Chemical Corp Ltd 1971 (2) SA 159 (W) 160D-E; Bux (above) 563 – 564; Kalla v The Master 1995 (1) SA 261 (T) 270H [14] Ex parte Cornell NO: In re Dudfield, Bretherton & Co (Pty) Ltd 1959 (1) SA 4 (N) 6D-G. [15] Airoadexpress (Pty) Ltd v Chairman, Local Road Transportation Board, Durban 1986 (2) SA 663 (A). [16] Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Manuel 2021 (3) SA 425 (SCA) paras 87 – 89; Malema v Rawula [2021] ZASCA 88 (SCA) para 28. [17] Economic Freedom Fighters v Manuel (above) paras 87 – 89; Malema v Rawula (above) paras 23 – 26; Ndlozi v Media 24 t/a Daily Sun and Others 2024 (1) SA 215 (GJ) para 29. [18] Economic Freedom Fighters v Manuel (above) paras 87 – 89; Jacobs v Nkomo and Another [2025] ZAGPJHC 285 (GJ) paras 69 – 70 and 117(a). [19] Damages (which has been held to include claims for retractions and apologies) may not be claimed for defamation on motion: Economic Freedom Fighters v Manuel (above) para 130; Malema v Rawula (above) paras 27 – 28; NBC Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Akani Retirement Fund Administrators [2021] ZASCA 136 ; 2021 JDR 2380  (SCA) para 21; IRD Global Ltd v The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 2025 (1) SA 117 (SCA) paras 24 – 26. Given that no such relief is sought in the current application, it is unnecessary for me to consider the judgment in Ramos v Independent Media (Pty) Ltd and Others [2021] ZAGPJHC 60 (GJ), which was in any event expressly not followed (albeit in an obiter dictum ) by the SCA in IRD Global (above) paras 25 - 26. [20] Herbal Zone (Pty) Ltd v Infitech Technologies (Pty) Ltd [2017] ZASCA 8 ; [2017] 2 All SA 347 (SCA) para 38. Even if the respondent had opposed the application, it would have been insufficient “simply to state that at a trial [she could] prove that the statements were true and made in the public interest, or some other defence to a claim for defamation, without providing a factual basis therefor”. [21] Le Roux v Dey 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 89. [22] Ndlozi (above) 40 – 44. [23] In the circumstances, it is not necessary for the purposes of this case to express a view as to whether a statement that a complaint of rape has been made is defamatory. [24] Le Roux v Dey (above), para 91. It is a well-established principle that it is to be presumed that everyone has a reputation that can be injured ( Tuch and Others NNO v Myerson and others NNO 2010 (2) SA 462 (SCA) para 17 and NBC Holdings (above) para 22). It is not apparent from the judgment in Cavanagh and Another v Mann and Others [2025] ZAGPJHC 566 (GP) whether that court was referred to these cases. Paragraphs 29 to 42 of the judgment (where it was found that the applicants failed to establish that the statements complained of bore actionably defamatory meanings in the absence of evidence adduced regarding the esteem in which they are held by others) however suggest a finding that the presumption might be a rebuttable one – even for the purposes of liability, as opposed to merely quantum of damages. Since the applicant in the current matter expressly makes the uncontested allegation in his founding affidavit that he is a person of “social standing as a politician of high ethical standards” it is unnecessary for me to consider this issue further. [25] UDM v Lebashe Inv Group (Pty) Ltd 2023 (1) SA 353 (CC) para 50. [26] cf. Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd v Reddell 2023 (2) SA 68 (CC) para 94. [27] Despite the numerous judgments delivered in Le Roux v Dey (above), it was uncontroversial that the common law right to reputation (at least in the case of natural persons) is “the public aspect of the constitutional right to dignity” (see in particular para 173, per Froneman and Cameron JJ). However, the converse is not true (i.e. a finding of an unlawful infringement of a person’s constitutional right to dignity does not necessarily imply that their right to reputation has been unlawfully infringed), and the primary proposition also does not apply in the case of non-natural persons which have a right to reputation, but one that is sourced in the common law and not in the Constitutional right to dignity: see Reddell v Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd 2023 (2) SA 404 (CC) paras 58 - and 87. [28] Economic Freedom Fighters v Manuel (above) paras 3 and 25. [29] Khumalo v Holomisa [2002] ZACC 12 ; 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 44. [30] Fischer and Another v Ramahlele and Others 2014 (4) SA 614 (SCA) para 13; Pilane v Pilane 2013 JDR 0295 (CC) para 40; Molusi and others v Voges NO and others 2016 (3) SA 370 (CC) para 27. [31] South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC) para 202. [32] Molusi (above) para 28. [33] Damons v City of Cape Town 2022 (10) BCLR 1202 (CC) paras 118 – 119. [34] I also observe that no other cause of action was referred to in either written or oral argument delivered on behalf of the applicant – though this would not have been relevant even if it had been the case. [35] Although it is not necessary for a pleader who relies on a particular statute or section to refer to it ‘in terms’, it is nevertheless necessary to formulate the case clearly: Fundstrust (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v Van Deventer 1997 (1) SA 710 (A) 725H – 726B. [36] Khumalo v Holomisa (above) paras 28 and 41; Le Roux v Dey (above) para 123. [37] Harms, LTC Amler’s Pleadings (10 ed.) LexisNexis, 2024 at 13, referring to Queensland Insurance Co Ltd v Banque Commerciale Africaine 1946 AD 272. [38] National Stadium South Africa (Pty) Ltd and others v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2011 (2) SA 157 (SCA) para 45. [39] Du Toit and Another v Jacobs [2022] ZAWCHC 243 (C) para 26. See also in this regard the directions issued by the Constitutional Court in Mtyhopo v South African Municipal Workers Union National Provident Fund 2015 JDR 2098 (CC) regarding the order appealed against, but consideration of which ultimately proved unnecessary. [40] Pilane v Pilane (above) para 63. [41] Intl Tobacco Co of SA Ltd v Wollheim 1953 (2) SA 603 (A) per Schreiner JA at 615D – 616C. [42] cf. Mokate v United Democratic Movement and Another [2020] ZAGPPHC 377 (GP). sino noindex make_database footer start