Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 966South Africa
Nedbank Limited v Roll-Up Serranda (Pty) Ltd and Another (2023/038900) [2025] ZAGPJHC 966 (8 August 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
8 August 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Nedbank Limited v Roll-Up Serranda (Pty) Ltd and Another (2023/038900) [2025] ZAGPJHC 966 (8 August 2025)
Nedbank Limited v Roll-Up Serranda (Pty) Ltd and Another (2023/038900) [2025] ZAGPJHC 966 (8 August 2025)
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sino date 8 August 2025
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number: 2023/038900
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: YES
8
August 2025
In
the matter between:
NEDBANK
LIMITED
Plaintiff/Applicant
and
ROLL-UP
SERRANDA (PTY) LTD
First Defendant/Respondent
DAVID
ALEXANDER KEARNEY
Second Defendant/Respondent
JUDGMENT
CRUTCHFIELD J
[1]
The applicant, Nedbank Limited, seeks an
order compelling the respondents to provide sufficient, adequate or
full particulars in
terms of Rule 21(4) of the Uniform Rules of
Court. The applicant is the plaintiff in the trial action, Nedbank
Limited.
[2]
The first respondent is Roll-Up Serranda
(Pty) Ltd and the second respondent is Mr David Alexander Kearney. At
all times material
hereto, the second respondent was a director of
the first respondent. The respondents oppose the application.
[3]
I intend to refer to the parties henceforth
as they are referred to in the trial action, being as the plaintiff
and the first and
second defendants respectively.
[4]
There is an issue before me in respect of
the plaintiff’s amendment to the notice of motion in this
interlocutory application.
The amendment is not material
notwithstanding the first and second defendants’ cries of
prejudice and objection to the amendment.
The defendants are correct
that there is no formal application for an amendment before me to the
notice of motion.
[5]
The plaintiff initially sought an order
compelling the defendants to deliver a reply to the plaintiff’s
request for particulars
in terms of Rule 21(4) in circumstances where
the defendants delivered a reply thereto already, on 18 March
2024. The plaintiff
contends that that reply was insufficient and
seeks an order in terms of the application that the defendants reply
“fully”
to the request. The defendants object to the
plaintiff’s amendment to the notice of motion in this
application. It is evident
from the defendants’ papers that
they are aware that the plaintiff seeks a full reply to the request
in terms of Rule 21(4)
and the defendants dealt with the application
on that basis. In the circumstances, the defendants well knew what
the plaintiff
sought and dealt with the application accordingly. I
intend to grant the amendment.
[6]
The plaintiff is a finance house. It
concluded an agreement for the provision of finance in respect of the
first and second defendants’
hire of certain telecommunication
equipment (“the equipment”). The plaintiff did not
participate in respect of the
underlying agreement between the
defendants and the supplier of the equipment, one CRS Corporate
Rental Solutions (Pty) Ltd (“CRS”).
[7]
The plaintiff pleads that CRS ceded its
rights and obligations under the master rental agreement concluded
between CRS and the defendants
(“the agreement”), to the
plaintiff during or about June 2018, alternatively August 2018. A
copy of the agreement between
CRS and the first defendant duly
represented by the second defendant is attached to the particulars of
claim and marked as POC1.
The defendants deny that they concluded the
agreement, POC1. The first defendant during or about December 2018,
allegedly breached
the agreement with the plaintiff as a result of
which the full amount due and owing under the agreement became due
and payable
to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff claims
payment from the defendants jointly and severely of the amount of
R163 212.49
together with interest and costs.
[8]
The plaintiff contends that certain
specified equipment was installed at the first defendant’s
premises consequent on the
conclusion of the agreement. The defendant
denies as much.
[9]
The plaintiff argues that its request for
full particularity is necessary in order for the plaintiff to be
sufficiently appraised
of the defendants’ defence that they
intend raising at trial.
[10]
Further particularity or further and better
particularity or full particularity or sufficient or adequate
particularity, all of
which mean substantially the same in terms of
Rule 21(4), may only be requested if the particularity is strictly
necessary to prepare
for trial. The test is whether or not the
particularity sought is “strictly necessary” in order for
the plaintiff to
prepare for trial. Obviously, the plaintiff’s
claim as it appears from the particulars of claim and the defendants’
defences thereto as they appear from the plea, are relevant.
[11]
At the heart of this application, however,
are the parties’ respective rights to a fair trial which
encompasses each party’s
entitlement to know adequately the
case that it has to meet at trial. That includes the facts reasonably
necessary to know the
case that a litigant has to meet but it does
not include, generally, the evidence in respect of those facts that
an opposing party
intends to prove.
[12]
I do not intend to deal with each of the
plaintiff’s requests for particularity
seriatim
.
The plaintiff bundled the respective paragraphs together for purposes
of the application and I shall deal with the application
accordingly.
[13]
In respect of the plaintiff’s first
request, the plaintiff complains that it is unable to discern the
nature and extent of
the defendants’ defence arising from
various proposals made to the first defendant by a third party,
Samsung Plexis, which
proposals are attached to the defendants’
plea marked as annexures A1 to A45. Each page is given a separate
annexure number
running consecutively from A1 to A45.
[14]
Furthermore, the plaintiff alleges that it
requires details of the equipment installed by Samsung Plexis at the
first defendant’s
premises, that the defendants allege is not
the equipment reflected in the proposals aforementioned or the
agreement concluded
between the first defendant and CRS.
[15]
The
plaintiff alleges that it cannot discern the nature and extent of the
defendants’ defence premised on the proposals, copies
of which
are annexed to the defendants’ plea. The defendants may not
attach documentation to their plea or other pleadings
and expect the
plaintiff to trawl through the documents in order to guess what it is
that the defendants rely on and what the defendants
seek to bring to
the attention of the court at trial. The parties are referred to
Swissborough
Diamond
Mines (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa,
[1]
which
specifies that where documentation is attached, the parties must
refer to the specific paragraph or paragraphs or content
of that
documentation upon which they place reliance. Accordingly, the
plaintiff is entitled to be told what it is that the defendants
rely
on with reference to the proposals attached as annexures A1 to A45.
[16]
Accordingly, the defendants must provide
sufficient particularity to enable the plaintiff to know what it is
that the defendants
intend to prove in respect of the proposals made
by the third party, Samsung Plexis. The defendants must also furnish
such particularity
as is required to provide clarity to the plaintiff
in respect of the annexures to the defendants’ plea.
Accordingly, the
defendants must provide the particularity required
by the plaintiff in paragraphs 2 and 7 of the plaintiff’s
request for
further particulars for trial.
[17]
The plaintiff is entitled to know what case
the defendants seek to advance at trial with reference to the
annexures to the plea,
being the alleged proposals from the third
party, Samsung Plexis. This will include whether or not the
defendants contend that
they accepted a proposal for Samsung Plexis
to install IP equipment on the first defendant’s premises,
being paragraph 8
of the plaintiff’s request. Accordingly, the
defendants must provide the particularity required by the plaintiff
in paragraph
8 of the plaintiff’s request for further
particulars for trial.
[18]
As to the identification of the equipment
that was installed on the first defendant’s premises, the
defendants deny that it
was the equipment alleged and relied upon by
the plaintiff. Yes, the plaintiff must prove that the equipment
relied upon by it
was delivered and installed on the first
defendant’s premises as alleged by the plaintiff. The
defendants attach an expert
notice to their further particulars in
respect of the equipment that was installed on the first defendant’s
premises. The
defendants allege that they have informed the plaintiff
of the identification of the equipment so installed. The defendants
are
required to identify that equipment that was installed on the
first defendant’s premises, which the defendants allege that
they have done.
[19]
In respect of the plaintiff’s second
request (being paragraph 12 of the request for further particulars),
the particularity
required is not strictly necessary to enable the
plaintiff to prepare for trial.
[20]
In respect of the plaintiff’s third
request (paragraphs 14 and 15 of the request for further particulars
for trial), the defendants
allege a proposed agreement that was to be
concluded by the first defendant. Insofar as the defendants rely on
an alleged agreement,
the defendants must identify the terms of that
agreement as alleged and must identify the equipment that constitutes
the “telephone
and communication system,” referred to by
the defendants, particularity of which is requested by the plaintiff
in paragraphs
14 and 15 of the request. The plaintiff cannot be
expected to guess what equipment the defendants received. I have
already found
that the defendants must inform the plaintiff on what
proposal it intends relying. This includes the terms of the intended
agreement
and details of the equipment that was installed on the
first defendant’s premises. The defendants must supply
sufficient
particularity to inform the plaintiff of the terms of the
proposed agreement.
[21]
In respect of the plaintiff’s fourth
request (paragraphs 16.2 and 16.3 of the request for further
particulars for trial),
the plaintiff is entitled to be informed of
the description or identification of the goods or equipment in
respect of the “defendant’s
telephone and communication
system” that was delivered and installed at the first
defendant’s premises.
[22]
The defendants must furnish the plaintiff
with sufficient particularity necessary to inform the plaintiff of
the identification
of the goods that the defendants contend were
installed. Accordingly, the defendants must supply to the plaintiff
the particularity
requested in paragraph 16.2.2 of the plaintiff’s
request for further particulars of trial. Furthermore, the defendants
must
state on what date the delivery of the goods or equipment to the
first defendant occurred, if it is the defendants’ case that
delivery of the goods or equipment to the first defendant did so
occur.
[23]
In respect of the plaintiff’s fifth
request, paragraph 18 of the request for further particulars for
trial, the identification
of the equipment that was delivered to the
first defendant’s premises is dealt with in terms of paragraph
16.2.2 of the request
for further particulars, and must be identified
by the defendants. Accordingly, insofar as the particularity sought
in paragraph
18 of the plaintiff’s request for particulars for
trial differs from the request in paragraph 16.2.2 of the request,
the
particularity sought in terms of paragraph 18 of the request must
be provided by the defendants.
[24]
In respect of the plaintiff’s sixth
and seventh requests, paragraphs 21, 27 and 30 of the plaintiff’s
request for further
particulars for trial, the plaintiff is entitled
to know what agreement the defendants intend to prove for the
purposes of the
defendants’ defence. The plaintiff is entitled
to such particularity as to the terms of the agreement between the
first defendant
and CRS as referred to and relied upon by the
defendants and to know whether the terms were express, implied or
tacit. In respect
of tacit terms relied on by the defendants, the
defendants must set out the circumstances giving rise to the tacit
terms. In respect
of the circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to
the full particulars set out above and I intend to grant an order
accordingly.
[25]
As to the amendment to the plaintiff’s
notice of motion, the defendants were well aware that the plaintiff
intended an application
for sufficient particularity. There is no
prejudice to the defendants arising from the amendment.
[26]
In respect of the costs of the application
for sufficient particularity, both parties have enjoyed some success
in the matter. The
plaintiff’s quantum in the pending trial
action is R163 212.49, which quantum falls within the
jurisdiction of the District
Court. Accordingly, costs on the
Magistrates’ Court scale are appropriate in this matter. In the
circumstances, where both
parties have achieved some success in the
application, I am minded to order that costs on the Magistrates’
Court scale be
costs in the cause of the trial action.
[27]
By reason of the aforementioned, I grant
the following order:
1. The defendants
are ordered to provide, within ten (10) days of the date hereof, the
further particularity requested by
the plaintiff in paragraphs 2, 7,
8, 14, 15, 16.2.2, 18, 21, 27 and 30 of the plaintiff’s request
for further particulars
for trial.
2. The costs of
this interlocutory application for further particulars for trial, on
the Magistrates’ Court scale, are
costs in the cause of the
trial action.
I
hand down the judgment.
CRUTCHFIELD
J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
For
the Applicant/Plaintiff:
Adv M Nieuwoudt instructed by Moodie & Robertson Attorneys
For
the First and Second Defendants:
Adv A P Bruwer instructed by LVH Attorneys
Date
of the hearing:
23 April 2025
Date
of the judgment:
8 August 2025
[1]
Swissborough
Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa
1999
(2) SA 279
(T).
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