Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 777South Africa
Lampe v City of Johannesburg (2021/27693) [2025] ZAGPJHC 777 (14 August 2025)
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Lampe v City of Johannesburg (2021/27693) [2025] ZAGPJHC 777 (14 August 2025)
Lampe v City of Johannesburg (2021/27693) [2025] ZAGPJHC 777 (14 August 2025)
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sino date 14 August 2025
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
Case
no:
2021/27693
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED.
SIGNATURE
DATE: 14 August 2025
In the matter between:
SYLVIA
MARIA
LAMPE
Applicant
and
CITY
OF JOHANNESBURG
Respondent
##### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
WILSON
J:
1
The applicant, Ms. Lampe,
runs a home exercise studio from her property in Randburg. On 19
January 1984, the Randburg Town Council
granted Ms. Lampe permission
to operate that business on the property. The licence had to be
renewed annually on payment of a licence
fee. Ms. Lampe renewed her
licence every year until 1992, when, she says, the Randburg Town
Council did away with the annual licence
fee, and extended her
licence indefinitely.
2
Some 25 years later, in
2017, the respondent, the City, which had succeeded to the Randburg
Town Council’s rights and obligations,
determined that Ms.
Lampe did not have its consent to operate her business from the
property. On 13 December 2017, the City issued
a notice headed
“UNAUTHORISED USE OF PROPERTY”. The City informed Ms.
Lampe that the property was being used “in
a manner which
contravenes the Randburg Town Planning 1976 [sic]”. The
contravention alleged was that Ms. Lampe was “conducting
a
gymnasium (callanetics studio) without the approval of the council”.
3
Ms. Lampe sent two letters
to the City in which she explained that her business was being
operated in accordance with the licence
she obtained from the
Randburg Town Council in 1984. Accordingly, she said, she did have
the necessary consent to operate her business,
the property was not
being put to an illegal use, and the notice should be withdrawn.
4
Those letters were
ignored. In July 2019,
the City increased the
property rates levied against the property. Ms. Lampe says that, from
that month, her municipal account included
an additional R9400 per
month in rates and taxes, which were levied
on
the basis that the property was being put to an illegal use because
the City did not consent to its use as a home exercise studio.
Ms
Lampe could not afford these charges, and did not pay them. She did,
though, lodge a new application with the City for consent
to run her
business from the property. Nevertheless, the City continued to levy
additional rates and taxes on the basis that the
property had been
used illegally without its consent, and Ms. Lampe continued to refuse
to pay them.
5
In
response to Ms. Lampe’s refusal to pay the additional rates,
the City terminated her electricity supply and sued for the
amounts
outstanding. The electricity disconnection was reversed by order of
Vally J on 5 March 2020. Vally J also ordered the parties
to “hold
a debatement regarding the penalties charged” to Ms. Lampe
within 30 days of his order. That debatement never
took place, since
the City took the view that it would simply proceed with its action
to collect the rates it said were due.
6
Ms.
Lampe’s new consent use application was granted in October
2020. This seems to have triggered the withdrawal of the City’s
action to collect the outstanding rates, but the City continued to
levy enhanced rates and taxes against Ms. Lampe’s property
on
the basis that it was being put to an illegal use, even though the
City had itself consented to the use of the property in October
2020.
In the meantime, Ms. Lampe had to fend off further attempts to
disconnect her water and electricity supplies.
7
Ms.
Lampe now applies to me for an order declaring unlawful the City’s
decision to levy enhanced property rates based on the
tariff
applicable to properties being put to an illegal use. She seeks the
reversal of all illegal use charges levied against her
since July
2019. She also seeks the recalculation of her municipal account as if
the levies were never charged. This relief is
no doubt meant to
insulate her against value added tax and interest charged and
compounded on the monthly amounts levied since
July 2019, and that
included the illegal use charges.
8
The
City does not seriously oppose the relief in respect of illegal use
charges levied on or after 20 October 2020, which is the
date on
which the City says it gave its consent for the use of the property
to run Ms. Lampe’s business. In its answering
affidavit, the
City says that it is “attending to reverse the penalty costs
charged on and after 20 October 2020”.
The answering affidavit
was deposed to on 6 September 2021. I have nothing before me that
indicates that Ms. Lampe’s account
has since actually been
corrected to the extent the City concedes it should be. However, the
City can suffer no prejudice from
an order that it implements such a
correction. If it has already done so, then so much the better.
9
The
only real dispute before me is whether Ms. Lampe is entitled to the
reversal of the penalty charges levied between 1 July 2019
and 20
October 2020. The City says that the property was being put to an
illegal use during that time, since its consent was not
obtained
until 20 October 2020, and the penalty charges it levied against the
property during that time were perfectly lawful.
10
I
disagree. The City accepts that the consent the Randburg Town Council
gave for the use of the property in 1984 binds it as the
Randburg
Town Council’s successor in law. The City also accepts that the
Randburg Town Council granted Ms. Lampe a licence
to use the property
for the purposes to which she put it. The City also accepts that the
licence was renewed annually for ten years
before being renewed
indefinitely. The City stakes its opposition to this application
solely on the contention that Ms. Lampe never
“applied for
consent in terms of sections 13 and 14 of the Randburg Town Planning
Scheme, 1976” (City’s answering
affidavit, paragraph 18).
The City’s point, as far as I understand it, seems to be that
Ms. Lampe might have had a business
licence from the Randburg Town
Council, but that did not mean that Randburg Town Council had
consented to the use of the property
in terms of its Town Planning
Scheme, 1976.
11
I find
that proposition far-fetched. It beggars belief that the Randburg
Town Council would have issued a business licence that
authorised the
illegal operation of Ms. Lampe’s business from the property
nominated in the licence. In other words, it seems
to me that the
issuing of the licence necessarily entailed the Randburg Town
Council’s consent for the use of Ms. Lampe’s
property for
the purpose specified in the licence. Mr.
Magaqa, who appeared
for the City, made no coherent submissions to the contrary.
12
Moreover,
the City’s notice of 13 December 2017 states that the
contravention of its town planning scheme was that Ms. Lampe’s
business was being operated “without the approval of the
council”. The notice did not say that a specific form of
approval – for example consent under a particular statute or
planning scheme – was necessary. It said merely that there
was
no approval at all. That was plainly wrong, since Ms. Lampe did have
the Randburg Town Council’s approval to operate
her business
from the property. That approval bound the City when it succeeded to
Randburg Town Council’s rights and obligations.
On this basis,
too, the notice could not have provided the City with the authority
necessary to levy the penalties it did.
13
In its
answering affidavit, the City submits that “the health
department and the department of
development planning/town
planning . . . are separate institutions”. As a result, so the
City says, Ms. Lampe “cannot
argue that simply because she
obtained consent to trade from the health department [that] meant
that she also obtained consent
of use from the department of
development planning/town planning department”
(City’s
answering affidavit, paragraphs 100 to 101).
14
Plainly,
two departments in the same government entity are not “separate
institutions”. In any event, it seems to me
that the City has
misstated Ms. Lampe’s case. Her case is that the enhanced
charges levied against her rates account are
based on the erroneous
proposition that the City has not consented to the use of the
property. We know that proposition is erroneous
because the licence
she obtained constitutes clear consent to use the property for the
purpose to which she put it.
15
“
Municipal
officials do not act appropriately if they take insulated decisions
in respect of different duties that they are obliged
to perform”
(see
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197
Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg
[2008] ZACC 1
;
2008 (3) SA 208
(CC) (“
Olivia Road
”), paragraph 44).
Even
if it were accepted that the City is entitled to treat Ms. Lampe’s
licence as no more than consent for health purposes
and to insist
that she was also required to apply for planning permission from
“some other department in the bureaucratic
maze” (
Olivia
Road
, paragraph 44), I do not think the
City would be entitled to rely on Ms. Lampe’s failure to obtain
that planning permission
to advance the proposition that it neither
knew about nor consented to the use of the property for the purpose
to which Ms. Lampe
has now put it for 42 years.
16
For all
these reasons, the application must succeed. In her notice of motion,
Ms. Lampe seeks costs on the attorney and client scale.
She is
obviously entitled to them. The City has conducted itself throughout
this litigation in an unresponsive and high-handed
manner. It failed
seriously to oppose the bulk of Ms. Lampe’s claim. In the end,
it pursued a far-fetched justification of
one portion of the
penalties it has imposed. Had the City engaged reasonably and
sensibly with Ms. Lampe from the outset, this
application would never
have been necessary.
17
Accordingly
–
17.1 It is
declared that the respondent’s conduct in levying property
rates on the applicant’s property based
on the tariff
applicable to properties put to an illegal use is unlawful.
17.2
The respondent is directed
to reverse all charges against the
applicant’s municipal account number 401940788
which
were
levied
since 1 July 2019 on the basis
that the applicant’s property is being put to an illegal use
17.3 The
respondent is interdicted and restrained from continuing to levy
property rates against the applicant’s municipal
account number
401940788
on the basis that the applicant’s
property is being put to an illegal use.
17.4 The
respondent must, within 30 days of the date of this order, furnish
the applicant with a municipal account recalculated
on the basis of
the orders in paragraphs 17.2 and 17.3 above.
17.5 The
respondent is interdicted and restrained from terminating any
services to the applicant’s property on the
basis of
non-payment of municipal charges levied in contravention of
paragraphs 17.2 and 17.3 above.
17.6
The
respondent is directed to pay the costs of this application on the
scale as between attorney and client.
S
D J WILSON
Judge
of the High Court
This
judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties
or their legal representatives by email, by uploading
it to the
electronic file of this matter on Caselines, and by publication of
the judgment to the South African Legal Information
Institute. The
date for hand-down is deemed to be 14 August 2025.
HEARD
ON:
30 July 2025
DECIDED
ON:
14 August 2025
For
the Applicant:
N Mhlongo
Instructed by P
Shikwambana Inc t/a PS Attorneys
For
the Respondent:
S Magaqa
Instructed by Madhlopa &
Thenga Inc
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