Group Five Construction (Pty) Ltd v Fikeni and Others (A2024/091672) [2025] ZAGPJHC 839 (22 August 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPJHC 839 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Group Five Construction (Pty) Ltd v Fikeni and Others (A2024/091672) [2025] ZAGPJHC 839 (22 August 2025) Group Five Construction (Pty) Ltd v Fikeni and Others (A2024/091672) [2025] ZAGPJHC 839 (22 August 2025) Download original files RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2025_839.html sino date 22 August 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG Case Number: A2024-091672 (1)  REPORTABLE:  /NO (2)  OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO In the matter between: GROUP FIVE CONSTRUCTION (PTY) LTD                         Applicant (BUSINESS IN RESCUE) And DR SOMADODA PATRICK MAYIBONGWE FIKENI N.O.    1 st Respondent DR GCWALISILE CYNHIA KABANYANE N.O.                    2 nd Respondent MOROKA ISAAC BUTCHER MATUTLE N.O. 3 rd Respondent ZANDILE QUEENETTE LAVINIA MDHADHLANA N.O. 4 th Respondent MZAMO MICHAEL MLENGANA N.O.                                   5 th Respondent MATSHIPSANA MERIAM MOLALA N.O. 6 th Respondent TLHOTSE ENOCH MOTSWALEDI N.O.                                7 th Respondent NANDISELE FLAVOUR THOKO MPULWANAN.O.              8 th Respondent PHELISA NKOMO N.O.                                                         9 th Respondent RASHID AMOD SADECK PATEL N.O.                                 10 th Respondent ZAKHELE ALEX TUNNY ZITHA N.O.                                  11 th Respondent LOMBARD INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED                   12 th Respondent JUDGMENT MOTHA J: Introduction (1) On 1 November 2013, Independent Development Trust (IDT) and Group Five entered into a written JBCC building contract agreement for the construction of Nelspruit High Court, in Mpumalanga. Following a contractual dispute, a judgment was handed down in favour of DTI, on 02 February 2024. (2) Dissatisfied with the results and having been refused leave to appeal by the court of the first instance, the appellant approached the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) and was granted leave to appeal to this court. Now, serving before this court of appeal are two issues, namely: the condonation application for the appeal that is deemed to have lapsed, pursuant to the appellant’s failure to comply with rule 49(6)(a) of the Uniform Rules of court; and the legal consequences of a final payment certificate in construction law. Condonation (3) The first port of call is the question of condonation. The appellant filed the notice of appeal on 15 August 2024; ipso facto, the sixty-day period, as contemplated in rule 49(6)(a), expired on 10 November 2024. To obtain a trial date, the appellant was required to comply with Rules 7(2) and 49(6)(a), which read as follows: “ 7(2) The registrar shall not set down any appeal at the instance of an attorney unless such attorney has filed with the registrar a power of attorney authorising him to appeal and such power of attorney shall be filed together with the application for a date of hearing." And “ 49(6)(a) Within sixty days after delivery of a notice of appeal, an appellant shall make written application to the registrar of the division were the appeal is to be heard for a date for the hearing of such appeal and shall at the same time furnish him with his full residential address and the name and address of every other party to the appeal and if the appellant fails to do so a respondent may within ten days after the expiry of the said period of sixty days, as in the case of the appellant, apply for the set down of the appeal or cross-appeal which he may have noted. If no such application is made by either party the appeal and cross-appeal shall be deemed to have lapsed: Provided that the respondent shall have the right to apply for an order for his wasted costs." The failure to file the Power of Attorney (4) On 11 October 2024, the Appellant's attorneys applied for the allocation of an appeal date to the registrar. Upon reviewing the request, the registrar directed an email to the Appellant, on 8 November 2024, stating the following: “ Before a date can be allocated the following have to be uploaded to the Court Online file: 1-  Notice of appeal 2-  Power of attorney 3-  Security for costs 4-  Appeal record 5-  Heads of argument (of both sides) 6-  Practice notes (of both sides) 7-  Application for appeal date 8-  Proof of service of the above” (5) The appellant lodged the Power of Attorney with the registrar on 10 February 2025, some three months after the lapse of the appeal. Subsequently, the appellant lodged an application in terms of rule 27(3), which reads: “ The court may, on good cause shown, condone any non-compliance with these rules.” Good cause submissions. The appellant’s counsel (6) Counsel for the appellant submitted that the delay was caused by the appellant’s attorney who was not familiar with the Uniform Rules of Court, since she mainly dealt with contractual law. In substantiating the reasons for the delay to lodge the Power of Attorney timeously and in terms of the rules, the attorney stated that “after receiving the Registrar's directive to file the Power of Attorney on 8 November 2024, a Power of Attorney was prepared for the Appellant's signature. A Power of Attorney was prepared on 26 November 2024. An internal draft email attaching the Power of Attorney was sent to me so that it could be forwarded to the Appellant for signature. I was erroneously of the email had been sent directly to the Appellant, with me in copy. The error was noted in January 2025, and Power of Attorney was sent to the Appellant on 20 January 2025…” (7) Furthermore, it was stated that the appellant is currently in Business Rescue. On 4 February 2025, the Business Rescue Practitioners of the Appellant called for a Resolution so that the Power of Attorney could be signed. The Resolution and Power of Attorney were signed on 6 February 2025; the Power of Attorney was filed with the registrar on 10 February 2025. The respondent (8) The respondent submitted that they would be prejudiced if the appeal was permitted to proceed. He asserted that by the time the appellant lodged the Power of Attorney on 10 February 2025, the appeal had, for all intents and purposes, lapsed. Thus, in the absence of a proper and timeous application having been made for a date for the hearing of the appeal, the respondent submitted, the appeal was neither correctly set down for hearing by the registrar nor properly placed on the roll. Accordingly, the appeal and the matter should be struck from the roll, he submitted. Security for Costs (9) Security for costs is governed by Rule 49(13)(a) and (b) which provides as follows: "(a) Unless the respondent waives his or her right to security or the court in granting leave to appeal or subsequently on application to it, has released the appellant wholly or partially from that obligation, the appellant shall, before lodging copies of the record on appeal with the registrar, enter into good and sufficient security for the respondent's costs of the appeal. (b) In the event of failure by the parties to agree on the amount of security, the registrar shall fix the amount the appellant shall enter into security in the amount so fixed or such percentage thereof as the court has determined, as the case may be." (10) On 28 November 2024, the appellant dispatched a letter to the respondent, advising them of the directive received from the Registrar to lodge Security for Costs. In the letter, the appellant undertook to lodge security in the sum of R120 000.00. On 3 December 2024, the respondent rejected this amount as being insufficient as security for costs. On the same day, the appellant indicated that in their view the sum was sufficient and would refer the matter to the registrar for a directive. (11) On 12 December 2024, the respondent recommended that parties moved forward and requested guidance from the Registrar or Taxing Master regarding the adequacy of the security for costs. Unfortunately, this was not done. Six months after the lapse of the appeal, the appellant dispatches a letter of security undertaking dated 13 May 2025. The law (12) It is trite that condonation will not be had for the mere asking, and a party that seeks it must give a full explanation for the reasons for the delay. In fact, it is an indulgence from the court. In the matter of Laerskool Generaal Hendrik Schoeman v Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd, [1] the court held: “ As this Court pointed out in Van Wyk v Unitas Hospital, “[a]n applicant for condonation must give a full explanation for the delay. In addition, the explanation must cover the entire period of delay.  And, what is more, the explanation given must be reasonable.” As in Van Wyk (though the delay we focus on here is shorter), we think that the attempt to explain the default “falls far short of these requirements.” [2] (13) In In Grootboom v National Prosecuting Authority 2014 (2) SA 68 (CC) at paragraph [23] the following is stated: “ It is now trite that condonation cannot be had for the mere asking. A party seeking condonation must make out a case entitling it to the court's indulgence. It must show sufficient cause. This requires a party to give a full explanation for the non-compliance with the rules or court's directions. Of great significance, the explanation must be reasonable enough to excuse the default.” (14) Examining this issue and the role played by lawyers, the court in the matter MEC for Health Eastern Cape v A.S obo S.S, [3] said: “ It is trite that the high court has an inherent right to grant condonation for a failure to comply with the rules of court where the interests of justice demand this. The discretion to do so is extensive, but it must be exercised judicially. A party seeking condonation must give a full explanation for the failure to comply with the rules and this explanation must be reasonable. The court must weigh all relevant factors including, depending on the facts of each case, the degree of non-compliance, the explanation therefore, the importance of the case, the avoidance of unnecessary delays in the administration of justice and the prospects of success. These factors are interrelated and must be weighed one against the other. For example, a slight delay and a good explanation might compensate for weak prospects of success. However, in a case of flagrant or gross non-observance of the rules, a court may refuse condonation regardless of the prospects of success. Where an attorney is to blame for the non-compliance, a blameless litigant may escape penalisation, but there is a limit beyond which she or he may be indemnified against the attorney’s lack of diligence and absence of a reasonable explanation. The negligence of the attorney is weighed together with the other relevant factors in considering whether condonation is justified.” (15) When dealing with Rule 7(2), the court in Aymac CC v Windgerow [4] held: “ The application for a date of hearing is that referred to in rule 49(6)(a). The effect of these two rules is that, simultaneously with making written application to the registrar for a date for the hearing of the appeal, the appellant’s attorney (if he is represented by one) shall file the power of attorney. Unless the power of attorney is filed together with the application for a date of hearing, the appellant cannot be considered properly to have been written application in terms of rule 49(6)(a).” [5] Analysis (16) Indeed, it is correct that the trial date was obtained irregularly. By any computation, the appeal had lapsed when the appellant applied for a trial date in February 2025. The appellant has not given a full explanation nor accounted for each period of the delay. For example, in the email dated 26 November 2024 the following is said: “The Registrar has requested a Power of Attorney on behalf of the Group Five Construction. Please see the attached Special Power of Attorney for your perusal. If you are happy, please attend to sign same and send back to us.” (17) From the contents of this email, the appellant seems oblivious to the urgency of the matter. As if that was not enough, the email dated 20 January 2025 stated: “Compliments of the season and wishing you a prosperous new year.  In order to advance the appeal, it is imperative that we deliver security. We have not received any meaningful response to our offer from the Respondents and cannot afford to delay any longer, as this poses a risk of our appeal lapsing. Under the circumstances, please proceed to sign the attached Special Power of Attorney. Additionally, kindly ensure that Van Wijk Attorneys sign the guarantee so that we may file it with the Registrar. Should the Respondents wish to contest the amount or form of security, they may do so with the Registrar. However, it is crucial that we provide security as soon as possible.” (18) As far back as 8 November 2024, the registrar advised the appellant that the Power of Attorney was a prerequisite for the allocation of a trial date. When having regard to the emails, the appellant was lackadaisical in handling this matter. On 20 January 2025, some two months after the deemed lapse, the appellant does not display a sense of urgency and states that the delay poses a risk of the appeal lapsing, a bizarre statement since the appeal had already lapsed in 2025. (19) Save to state that the attorney does not practice in litigation and is contrite, and apologises for the non-compliance with the rules, the appellant does not offer any explanation or shed light on the delay to file the Power of Attorney before the end of November 2024 nor is there any explanation proffered about why the registrar’s requests were not adhered to promptly. This matter is of importance to both parties. We heard the submission on the leaking court roofs and cracked walls on one side, and on the other, on the importance of the final payment certificate. Both these issues are of paramount importance, especially in construction law. However, it would be a slippery slope to bend rules for expediency. Without rules, chaos prevails. (20) As the matter currently stands, the issue of security for costs remains unresolved. Counsel for the appellant’s submission that the attorney was blindsided by the respondent’s (IDT’s) failure to reach an agreement on the adequate amount for security, and that the respondent must carry some of the blame is untenable. As far back as December 2024, the respondent invited the appellant to approach the registrar for a directive. To date, the appellant has not done that. To simply belatedly file R120 000. 00, fully aware that the respondent indicated that that amount is insufficient security and nine (9) days before the hearing, flies in the face of rule 49(13)(b). Furthermore, there is absolutely no explanation proffered about why the R120 000.00 was filed on 13 May 2025. Whether one views this conduct as a series of wrongs/mistakes, as submitted by counsel for the appellant, or as a fragrant disregard of rules, it is conduct that must neither be condoned nor countenanced. (21) To me, it is baffling why the registrar allocated the appellant a trial date in conflict with rule 49(6)(a). As already mentioned in a Widgerow’s case: “In the absence of a proper making of an application for a date for the hearing of the appeal the appeal is not properly set down and should be struck off the role.” Indeed, there is no appeal serving before this court. In the result, the matter stands to be struck off the roll with costs. MP MOTHA JUDGE OF THE COURT GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION JOHANNESBURG WINDELL J (MAIER-FRAWLEY J CONCURRING): (22) The appeal centres on whether a final payment certificate issued under a JBCC principal building agreement is enforceable notwithstanding that defects were identified by the principal agent at the time of final completion, or whether IDT (the employer) was entitled to withhold payment pending rectification of those defects. (23) The appellant, Group Five Construction (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue), seeks an order setting aside the dismissal of its counter-application and substituting it with an order directing the first to eleventh respondents, the IDT, to pay the balance certified as due in the final payment certificate issued under the building contract. (24) I have had the benefit of reading the judgment authored by my colleague, Motha J (‘the first judgment’). The first judgment focuses exclusively on the preliminary objections raised by the respondents and concludes that the appeal has lapsed and must be struck from the roll. Although I am in agreement with my colleague’s recitation of the factual background and the legal principles applicable to condonation, I part ways with him in the result. In my respectful view, the interests of justice require that condonation be granted, and that the merits of the appeal be considered. (25) It is common cause that the appellant filed its power of attorney late, well outside the 60-day period stipulated in Rule 49(6)(a), and that the finalisation of security for costs was also delayed. IDT submit that these defects are fatal and the appeal must be regarded as having lapsed, and no proper application for set-down was made. (26) The appellant applies for condonation for the non-compliance with the Uniform Rules of Court and an order for the reinstatement of the appeal in terms of Rule 49(6)(b). The appellant explains that the delay arose from its attorney’s inexperience with appeal procedure and from the internal processes of the business rescue practitioners, which delayed execution of the necessary resolution and signature of the power of attorney. Once the omission was detected, corrective steps were taken and the document lodged. As regards security, correspondence shows that the appellant offered an amount, the respondent objected, and the matter could have been resolved by referral to the Registrar. The failure to pursue that process was an error, not an act of bad faith. (27) The governing principles are settled: condonation is not had for the mere asking, but the court must weigh the explanation, the degree of non-compliance, the absence or presence of prejudice, the importance of the matter, and the prospects of success ( Melane v Santam Insurance 1962 (4) SA 531 (A); Grootboom v National Prosecuting Authority and Another 2014 (2) SA 68 (CC)). (28) I agree with the first judgment that these are serious non-compliances and that the appellant’s explanation is not perfect. It reflects unfamiliarity with appellate procedure and delays arising from the internal approval processes of business rescue practitioners. Nonetheless, the omission was eventually corrected, and the delay was not wilful.  Ignorance, inexperience, and naivete on the part of the attorney, explains to some extent the attorney’s failure to keep to the procedural requirements and stipulated time periods contained in the rules regulating the prosecution of appeals. The attorneys’ conduct should be viewed within the bounds of human fallacy. As the constitutional court put it in Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v Makate and Another [6] : ‘Justice and, indeed, the court process are not about perfection’. (29) Whilst it is correct that the attorney ought to have properly acquainted herself in advance with the relevant rules, her bigger mistake lay in the fact that she failed to appreciate the import of the rules, more particularly, the consequences attached to the non-compliance. Thus, even after the appeal had lapsed, she continued to endeavour to take steps aimed at advancing the appeal (as opposed to sitting back and doing nothing and thereby hampering its progress). Her prior experience lay mainly in conducting construction arbitrations, as opposed to litigation in general, including appeals. (30) Moreover, the respondents have suffered no tangible prejudice. The full record is before Court, both parties filed heads of argument, and the appeal is ripe for determination. (31) On prospects, the appeal enjoys strong merit. The building contract provides in express terms that “the employer shall pay to the contractor the amount certified for payment in the final payment certificate within twenty-one calendar days” of issue (clause 34.10). It is common cause that payment certificate 72 was the final payment certificate. The principal agent’s letter and the final completion certificate place any outstanding matters within the latent-defects regime, not as a jurisdictional bar to payment under the final payment certificate. In these circumstances, the interests of justice plainly favour the determination of the merits. Condonation for any delay in prosecuting the appeal is therefore granted. The merits (32) The IDT appointed Group Five to construct the Mpumalanga High Court. Lombard Insurance (the twelfth respondent) issued a construction guarantee in favour of the IDT for Group Five’s performance. On 3 June 2021, the duly appointed principal agent issued final payment certificate no. 72 in the amount of R14,498,020.71. This amount became due and payable to Group Five within 21 days in terms of clause 34.10 of the building contract. (33) On 31 August 2021, the principal agent issued a final completion certificate, certifying final completion of the works as at 11 August 2021. The accompanying letter recorded the existence of latent defects but confirmed that final completion had been reached, and that rectification of latent defects would occur in the defects liability period. (34) The counter-application in the court a quo sought payment of the outstanding balance due under the final payment certificate. The court, however, held that the counter-application was bound to fail because defects had been identified. (35) The issuing of a final payment certificate is a contractual event with significant legal consequences. As held in Ocean Diners (Pty) Ltd v Golden Hill Construction CC , [7] an architect’s final certificate issued under a standard building contract is conclusive and binding between the parties—save for limited exceptions such as fraud—and cannot be cancelled, withdrawn, or undermined by claims of error, negligence, or public policy. The employer is obliged to make payment in accordance with its terms. (36) The IDT, represented by its trustees, argues that the appellant’s case rests on a misreading of the JBCC contract and of the legal effect of the certificates. Their contentions are threefold. Firstly, the defects liability periods. The contract distinguishes between (i) patent construction defects identified during works completion, (ii) defects identified within the 90-day defects liability period, and (iii) latent defects manifesting within 10 years after final completion. It is submitted that the waterproofing and structural cracks identified by the principal agent on 31 August 2021 were not latent defects, but patent defects already known before final completion. Group Five was thus obliged to rectify them before it could demand payment and the court a quo correctly held that IDT could withhold payment until these defects were remedied and certified by the principal agent. (37) Secondly, the nature of the liquid documents. The IDT argues that while a payment certificate may ordinarily be liquid, it may be subject to fulfilment of a “simple condition” ( Rich v Lagerwey; [8] Pepler v Hirschberg [9] ). In this case, the principal agent simultaneously certified payment and required remedial work to be completed. The certificate was therefore conditional upon rectification of defects. Until that was done, Group Five could not demand immediate payment. (38) Lastly, it raises the issue of reciprocity. The principle of reciprocity applies in contracts of locatio conductio operis . A contractor cannot claim payment before completing its work ( BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk [10] ). It is submitted that IDT’s obligation to pay is reciprocal to Group Five’s obligation to deliver defect-free works. Payment may be withheld under the exceptio non adimpleti contractus until the contractor has complied. It is contended that far from creating a “stalemate,” the mechanism for resolving the issue lies in Group Five remedying the defects and requesting the principal agent to issue a further certificate. (39) The competing contentions present a stark question: whether clause 34.10 imposes an unconditional obligation on the employer to pay once a final payment certificate is issued, or whether the certificate in this case was subject to fulfilment of remedial obligations identified contemporaneously with the final completion certificate. (40) The respondents are correct that the JBCC agreement recognises multiple defects liability regimes. The letter of 31 August 2021 explicitly referred to waterproofing and potential structural cracks as defects requiring attention. However, the decisive question is whether such defects suspended the employer’s obligation to pay under clause 34.10. (41) On a proper reading of the contract, clause 34.10 embodies an absolute payment obligation: once a final payment certificate is issued, the employer must pay within 21 days. Clause 27 separately provides a remedial mechanism for defects, including patent defects not rectified by final completion. That mechanism does not override the clear stipulation of clause 34.10. (42) The respondents’ reliance on Rich v Lagerwey and conditional liquidity is misplaced. The certificate issued here was not expressly conditional: it quantified a fixed amount due. The principal agent’s covering letter placed ongoing obligations on Group Five in relation to defects, but those obligations were to be pursued under the defects liability regime, not as a precondition to payment. (43) As for reciprocity, the principle applies only where the obligations are so closely linked that one is undertaken in exchange for the other. In building contracts under the JBCC, the mechanism of certification was expressly chosen as the trigger for payment, with defects addressed through later remedial processes. To import a reciprocal bar at this stage would be to re-write the contract. (44) The practical effect of the respondents’ case is to allow an employer indefinitely to frustrate a certified payment. This undermines the commercial function of payment certificates and is inconsistent with the authorities treating them as liquid and enforceable instruments. (45) The court a quo did not have regard to Clause 34.10 of the building contract. As alluded to earlier, this clause expressly provides that payment certified in the final payment certificate must be made within 21 days of certification. The employer’s remedy in respect of latent defects lies in clause 27.1, which allows enforcement of liability for latent defects within a ten-year period. The existence of defects does not suspend the employer’s obligation to pay the certified amount. (46) The court a quo regrettably conflated the final payment certificate with the final completion certificate. They are distinct: the former embodies an enforceable monetary obligation, while the latter is prima facie evidence of the sufficiency of the works. The obligation to pay under the final payment certificate remains unaffected by defects to be remedied during the latent defects period. (47) The effect of the court a quo’s approach is to permit an employer indefinitely to frustrate payment under a valid certificate, thereby undermining both the contract and settled law, including Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture , [11] which held that such certificates are the equivalent of cash. (48) On a proper interpretation of the contract, IDT was bound to make payment to Group Five of the amount certified in the final payment certificate within 21 days. Any dispute about latent defects was to be addressed separately under the defects liability provisions of the contract. (49) The court a quo erred in dismissing the counter-application and in holding that the defects excused non-payment. That finding was contrary to the contract, contrary to authority, and gave rise to untenable commercial consequences, both in this case and more broadly for the construction industry. (50) In the result the following order is made: 1.  Condonation is granted in respect of all preliminary issues. 2.  The appeal is upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel where so employed. 3.  Paragraph 2 of the order of the court a quo is set aside and substituted with the following: “ 2. The Second Respondent’s (Group Five Construction (Pty) Ltd In business rescue) counter application is granted with costs. 3. The first to eleventh respondents in reconvention (IDT) is ordered to make payment to the applicant, Group Five Construction (Pty) Ltd In business rescue, in the amount of  R1 728 534.00. 4.  Interest thereon at the rate determined by the Minister of Finance from time to time in terms of section 80(1) of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 , from 24 June 2021 until date of payment in full.” L WINDELL JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG I agree A. MAIER FRAWLEY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG Delivered: This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on Caselines.  The date for hand down is deemed to be 22 August 2025. APPEARANCES: Date of Hearing:                22 May 2025 Date of Judgment:             22 August 2025 ADV AV VOORMOLEN SC Instructed by COX YEATS ATTORNEYS ADV SJ BEKKER SC Instructed by SIKUNYANA INCORPORATED ATTORNEYS [1] CCT 22/09) [2009] ZACC 12 ; 2009 (10) BCLR 1040 (CC) ; 2012 (2) SA 637 (CC) (7 May 2009) [2] Supra para 15. [3] [2025] ZASCA 2 (15 January 2025). [4] 2009 (6) SA 433. [5] Supra para 6. [6] [2025] ZACC 13 para 43. [7] [1993] ZASCA 41 ; 1993 (3) SA 331 (A). [8] 1974 (4) SA 748 (A). [9] 1920 CPD 438. [10] 1979 (1) SA 391 (A). [11] 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA). sino noindex make_database footer start