Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 925South Africa
Black and Others v Marule (2025/129099) [2025] ZAGPJHC 925 (13 September 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
13 September 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Black and Others v Marule (2025/129099) [2025] ZAGPJHC 925 (13 September 2025)
Black and Others v Marule (2025/129099) [2025] ZAGPJHC 925 (13 September 2025)
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sino date 13 September 2025
FLYNOTES:
CIVIL LAW – Defamation –
Harassment
–
Hate
speech and advocacy of racial hostility – Excluded from
protected speech – Inflammatory and racially charged
language – Repeated references to physical appearance –
Threats to publicise dispute via media and political
channels –
Conduct amounted to a sustained campaign of harassment –
Intended to intimidate and publicly shame
applicants –
Rights to dignity and reputation violated – Real
apprehension of further harm – Interdict
granted.
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 2025-129099
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED. Yes
In
the matter between:
ASTIN
JOY RUTH
BLACK
First Applicant
GENERAL,
DOMESTIC AND PROFESSIONAL
EMPLOYERS
ORGANISATION (“GDPEO”)
Second Applicant
INVICTUS
OUTSOURCING SOLUTIONS (PTY)LTD
Third Applicant
and
PABALLO
MARULE
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Matthys
AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an opposed application for final
interdictory and ancillary relief, brought by way of urgency on 13
August 2025. The applicants
sought an order in the following terms:
1.
That non-compliance with the ordinary forms and service periods
prescribed by the Uniform Rules of Court, as well as the
practice
directives of this division, be condoned and that this application be
heard as a matter urgent in terms of Rule 6(12);
2.
That the respondent be finally interdicted from:-
2.1
Making and/ or publishing, or again in future making and/ or
publishing, any further defamatory statements in relation
to the
Applicants, including but not limited to inter alia: accusations of
unethical conduct, lying, and/ or obstructing justice
based on racial
motives;
2.2
Making and/ or publishing, or again in future making and/ or
publishing, any further derogatory, abusive, racially charged,
defamatory and/ or inflammatory remarks in relation to the
Applicants;
2.
Harassing, defaming, threatening, verbally abusing and/ or
coercing the Applicants, as well as inciting and/ or mandating
a
third party to harass, defame, threaten, verbally abuse and/ or
coerce the Applicants;
2.4
Publicising and/ or relaying any further defamatory, racially
charged, derogatory and/ or inflammatory statements, in
relation to
the Applicants, to third parties or the public in general, whether
via correspondence, social media platforms, or any
other form of
dissemination and/ or publication;
2.5
Attacking and/ or diminishing and/ or lowering the estimation
of the Applicants and/ or the professional and/ or personal
reputation of the Applicants or the dignity of the Applicants through
any statements and/ or conduct by the Respondent.
3.
The Respondent is ordered to make known to the Applicants any
publication and/ or posting and/ or dissemination of: any
derogatory,
inflammatory, disparaging, racially charged and/ or defamatory
statements, inclusive of the racially charged statement
made in her
email of 25 July 2025 and is to retract and/ or remove such
publications and/ or dissemination of such statements,
which removal
and retraction is to be confirmed in writing, within 24 hours of the
granting of this order.
4.
That the Respondent be ordered to provide a written apology to the
Applicants and is to further provide such apology, to
all the
original recipients of the statements made in her correspondence of
25 July 2025, along with publication of a written apology
on any
other platform upon which she published further statements as defined
in paragraph 2 & 3 above, within 24 hours of this
order.
5.
That the Respondent be ordered to pay the costs of this application
on an attorney-client scale, inclusive of the costs
of Counsel.
[2]
Having found on the facts that the matter is
urgent, I proceeded to hear the parties and granted the order as
prayed for by the
applicants. This judgment comprises the reasons for
the order granted.
The
Parties
[3]
The first applicant is a female legal practitioner and representative
of the second applicant, in a labour dispute before the Commission
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration ("CCMA") and
Labour Court. The second applicant is a registered employers’
organisation, in terms of the
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995
, of
which the first and third applicant and the respondent’s
erstwhile employer, Telesure Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd ("TIH")
are members. The third applicant is a company specialising in human
resources and industrial relations, contracted by (TIH) to
conduct
labour relations and facilitate labour disputes, including a dispute
involving the respondent. The respondent is female,
formerly
employed by (TIH), engaged in a labour dispute with her erstwhile
employer, before the CCMA and Labour Court.
[4]
The
papers are voluminous, however, the issues are
limited in the context of the relief claimed by the applicants. I
prefer to provide
the following salient facts, which are mostly
common cause, as background.
BACKGROUND
FACTS
[5]
The respondent was employed as a sales consultant
with TIH. TIH does business in the Insurance industry. The respondent
was required
to sit for and pass a regulatory examination, to fulfill
the competency requirements, provided for in her employment contract
and
the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of
2002 (FAIS). FAIS regulates financial advice and intermediary
services to consumers. The respondent did not sit for the examination
within the prescribed period. Pursuant to an incapacity inquiry,
(related to the respondent’s competency requirements for her
job description) conducted by TIH, the respondent was served
with a
notice of dismissal on 18 March 2025.
[6]
The respondent instituted unfair dismissal
proceedings against TIH, in the Johannesburg CCMA. In essence her
stance is, that her
dismissal was unfair, since the employer did not
in her case, explore all other alternatives to a dismissal. At the
CCMA, the respondent
applied for her husband (Mr Mbali Gift Ndobe) to
represent her in the proceedings. On 26 June 2025 the CCMA
Commissioner, ruled
that the respondent’s husband would not be
permitted to represent her in the dismissal dispute, however, that
she is at liberty
to appoint a legal representative.
[7]
According
to the evidence, the respondent then, on 11 July 2025, launched an
urgent stay of the impending arbitration proceedings
set-down in the
CCMA for 12 August 2025, pending the outcome of a review of the
ruling made by the Commissioner on
26 June 2025. It is thus not
in issue, that the labour dispute between the parties is
sub
judice.
[1]
[8]
Nonetheless, the parties attended the court on 23
July 2025. Following the
mentioned appearance, the respondent on
24 July 2025, dispatched email communication to the first applicant,
employees of TIH and
the third respondent, in which she gave her
spontaneous rendition, of what transpired during the proceedings on
23 July 2025. In
the contents of the said email, the respondent
expressed her opinion, stating that the first applicant lied and or
misrepresented
the facts to the Judge, regarding her application for
her husband to represent her at the CCMA. She also made the following
statement:
“
You
simply cannot have a situation where on a judge who is clearly au
fait with what a Respondent must do to raise dispute of fact
in their
papers says he hasn't read our papers thoroughly and then soon
after
a pale skinned blue-eyed representative
has
made her oral submissions, he dismisses the application, just like
that.
The
fact that I am black and have little or no money doesn't mean I have
no rights
or
that whatever I say in my papers can be disregarded by both the CCMA
and the Labour Court. I have rights and
I
cannot be forced to appear at the CCMA unrepresented or to look for a
lawyer when there is absolutely no need.”
[9]
The first applicant responded to the email and
asserted that the allegations contained in the contents of the
respondent’s
email, were baseless. Further, that she has shown
patience despite the respondent’s overtly disturbing and
racially charged
behaviour towards her and her colleagues. First
applicant cautioned the respondent against such unacceptable conduct.
She further
highlighted in her response, that the labour dispute in
question is not rooted in race, still the respondent makes it her
focus.
She then wrote, requesting the respondent to “cease your
racist and defamatory remarks. I find your persistent reference to
myself as 'pale skinned' not only offensive but outright racist in a
society that condemns such behaviour. Throughout all legal
proceedings to date, I have never once referenced your race nor
ventured outside the merits of the dispute between the parties”.
[10]
The first applicant also requested the respondent
to not communicate with her again, save for serving papers in
relation to the
CCMA litigation.
[11]
On the same day, 24 July 2025, the respondent
transmitted a second email to the first applicant, in which she once
more copied various
recipients, including members and employees of
the second and third applicants, as well as her husband. I deem it
necessary to
quote the entire contents of this email for context. It
reads as follows: -
“
Good
day
If
my accusations were baseless, you would have proved me wrong. You
would have pointed out all the parts you disagree with regarding
what
I allege happened in court yesterday and state your version. But I
know you are highly skilled when it comes to evasive responses.
So
your bare denial will do again for now. But I am sure you know you
know even your bare denial cannot disprove an audio recording
of what
happened.Same here,
I myself, have been patient with you so-called
lawyers for quite some time, having to watch you have decisions made
in your favor
even though even you know you guys do not have any
defense against any of my allegations
I stated in my papers,
either at the CCMA or Labour Court.
But
I do not make a fuss about it because from the jump I did say, If we
must go to the Constitutional Court we will,
I know how difficult
it is to get justice if you are Black and are litigating against
people who have money and liars like you as
representives.
It is
for this reason, even when you state you "cautioned" me. I
do not take you seriously, you are not in a moral position
to tell me
anything in this life. You just a pale-skinned liar you to me,
nothing else. And yes to me this is about race, and I
am saying
considering that I am black and litigating against pale skinned
representatives like yourself, I should not expect fair
treatment
especially from these lower courts.
Hence, I want to go all the
way to the top, where there are many judges that will be dealing with
the same facts that were placed
before these lower courts
,
I
want to see if they will allow my husband to represent me.
You are
pale-skinned and I am black and proud.
If you were to refer to
me as black, there is nothing that would make me uncomfortable. I am
black, and am aware that black people
civilized the world and are the
original race.
From the books my husband has been telling me
about, we inventented everything (from medicine, and pretty much
everything). For
those reasons, there is nothing wrong with being
referred to as black. I have no time to hate white people, yes I know
of all the
atrocities (from rape, murder and robbery) that white
people did, especially to black people but that is all in the past. I
just
read about these things and have never witnessed them
personally.
On
the issue of the merits, you have no merits. Do not fool yourself one
bit.
You
are just responsible for ensuring that a black person will not get
justice even though the 3rd Respondent has no defense against
the
allegations and so far you have succeeded.
No
stress, the law allows me to keep escalating the matter as I intend
doing if I am unhappy with any decisions/orders/rulings.
On your last
paragraph,
there
was no need for me to respond to your misrepresentation of the facts
right there and then.
I
already explained that there was no need for me to submit oral
submissions as no dispute of fact arose from the papers, so even
if
you had spoken for the whole day, nothing would change that.
But
in my papers that I will be drafting, I will be pointing out again
all the instances where you deliberately misrepresented the
facts in
support of my allegations that you lie deliberately and unprovoked.
That
will be the perfect opportunity for me to deal with same.
Lastly,
also note that I am now thinking of consulting with my political
party, the EFF through their labour desk, to see if they
can assist
me and my husband in whatever way possible. It is starting to look
like we ourselves need our black brothers and sisters
to defend our
rights. Also, I am still trying to see if I can tell my story through
media platforms (TikTok, Facebook, radio, whatever)
only once I am
certain the law permits same. You should expect to see me trending,
if possible I will be telling it like it is.
I am still busy though
trying to understand all that sub judice stuff and all.
This
is officially my last text to you. Le wena please do not contact me
again unless you want to serve me papers Ms Black. Warm
regards ”
[12]
Aggrieved by the contents of the email quoted, the
first applicant on 25 July 2025 instructed her attorneys, to send a
letter to
the respondent with a demand that she ceases to make
statements of the kind set out in her email and to retract the
statements
in writing to all the recipients of the email
communication. Further, it was requested that the respondent provide
a formal apology
for the harm caused to the first applicant and the
lowering of the first applicant’s esteem in a public forum. The
respondent
was once more requested to restrict communication to the
first applicant, strictly relevant to the legal proceedings and to
desist
from slanderous and attacking statements about the applicants.
The letter by the applicants’ attorneys, set a deadline of
31
July 2025, warning the respondent of urgent High Court litigation, in
the event of her non-compliance. The undertaking was not
made by the
respondent.
[13]
It is once more necessary to quote the full text
of the respondent’s response to the letter dated 25 July 2025,
sent by the
attorneys. It reads as follows: -
“
Good
day
I
have thoroughly read your letter of demand anent your
pale-skinned,
blue-eyed client, namely Astin Black.
I confirm that I stand
by the contents of my email dated the 24th of July 2025 and all my
papers, and confirm that my opinion premised
solely on her unethical
conduct anent the ongoing labour dispute, is that your client is the
lowest of the low, a pathetic liar.
Whenever she opens her mouth, I
honestly feel like I am witnessing a case of feculent vomiting as I
find myself utterly disgusted
by literally every word that comes out
of her mouth because I am fully aware of her determination to ensure
that I, as a black
litigant with little or no money, should not get
justice. I will most definitely tell my story in due course, you can
be sure of
that.
Also
note that I will, most definitely, be writing to my political party,
the EFF (Home of the brave), even later today, to tell
them (through
our labour desk) of what happened in court on the 23rd of July 2025.
Remember, that our Commander in Chief is one of
the members of the JSC when judges are being interviewed and through
the labour
desk, I will share the facts of what happened on the 23rd
of July 2025 when we went to the Labour Court and really hope that
our
story will reach and arouse the interest of our CIC.
Outside
of that, we are only honoring all the promises that we made to your
client and her colleagues, that I will fight, gallantly
and all the
way, and surely I do not want to disappoint them. I have said that I
am not a racist. I don't have any issues with
any race, particularly
pale- skinned people. So in a nutshell, I certainly do not owe your
client an apology, she can go hang for
all I care.
Yours
truly, Paballo”
[14]
On 29 July 2025, the applicants’ attorneys
sent a second letter to the respondent, echoing the demands, noting
the respondent’s
non-compliance with the content of the first
letter and seeking an undertaking from the respondent, to the effect
that she will
refrain from further defamatory, racially charged,
aggressive, threatening and or inflammatory statements, during the
upcoming
arbitration proceedings on 12 August 2025, as the first
applicant intended to continue representing her clients in the
litigation.
In the attorneys’ second letter, it was pleaded
with the respondent to meet the demand made, so further litigation
would
not be necessary.
[15]
On the same day, the respondent replied to the
attorneys’ second letter, confirming that she made the
statements in her emails
of 24 July 2025, but denying that the
statements were defamatory, racially charged or aggressive.
Respondent advised that she refuses
to retract or apologise for her
statements made and that she was willing to proceed to court.
[16]
On 31 July 2025, the respondent addressed an email
to an employee at the CCMA, in which she also copied the first
applicant as well
as employees of the second and third applicants, in
which she stated- “Now I was told through a letter of demand,
that this
very same liar, will be attending the proceedings to "do
her job and therefore I must behave." So, she can fulfill her
primary job, which I know very well is to ensure she obstruction
justice. I am not fazed or intimidated by her. I certainly do
not
fear paper tigers. So for the fact that she will be attending on the
12th, I already know what to expect and to me, it means
all I must do
is prepare for the long haul”.
[17]
In addition, it is not in issue that the
respondent in her papers before the Labour Court refers to the first
applicant, as the
“pale skinned representative” and her
former employer’s legal representatives as “unscrupulous
lawyers”.
In her heads of argument before the Labour Court, the
respondent makes the statement that- “So the Review application
will
help confirm, not decide, because we are dealing with questions
that have obvious answers thereto, that the Applicant should be
represented by her proposed representative and that the matter
(obviously not complex) does not require the appointment of legal
representatives. Once that is confirmed, then
whoever
the 3rd Respondent will dispatch to the Arbitration proceedings will
be seen as an easy target
and will
be dealt with
accordingly.
It will be a one- sided beat-down and the
Applicant will have absolutely nothing to worry about”
[18]
The respondent is adamant and stands by the
content of her statements. Her defence is that the statements
complained of by the applicants,
are the truth and she rely on her
right to freedom of expression. In her heads of argument for this
application, the respondent
made amongst other the following
submissions.
Truth
[19]
The respondent contends that her statements,
referring to the first applicant as a liar who deliberately
misrepresented the facts,
are the truth, as those statements are
based on an audio recording related to what the first applicant told
the Judge on 23 July
2025. However, the said audio recording,
is not part of the record of this matter.
Racially
Charged
[20]
In this regard the respondent argues that, in her
papers at the CCMA, she, when referring to the employer's
representative, said
that the employer was represented by a Caucasian
lady of slim built and that according to the Cambridge Dictionary the
word “Caucasian”
holds the meaning of - "belonging
to the races of people with white or pale skin". Respondent
argues the stated dictionary
meaning, holding that her reference to
the first applicant as the employer’s “pale- skinned,
blue-eyed representative,
was purely made in descriptive terms.
[21]
The respondent further vies, that she did not
accuse the first applicant of racial bias or attack her in anyway.
But what she meant
by her statements, was that the first applicant’s
“primary responsibility is to ensure that she obstructs justice
and
for the fact that “I am black, she must ensure that I as a
black person, do not get justice”. This, as submitted by
the
respondent, means that “the employer flouts labour laws with
impunity, because it has people like the applicants as
representatives, against vulnerable employees like her”.
Threats
to publicise on media platforms
[22]
The respondent denies that she threatened to
publish her allegations on any media platform in the email of 24 July
2025. It is her
argument that what she stated is that she was looking
into telling her story via social media, if it is found to be legally
permitted.
[23]
The argument for the applicants is, that they are
entitled to the relief prayed for, as they have been subjected to
on-going harassment,
defamation, insult, coercion and threats by the
respondent through her verbal and/or written tirades, as well as the
dissemination
thereof to third parties and having been threatened
that the harmful statements will be further published in the public
domain.
[24]
The above is a brief account of the evidence and
the submissions made.
The entire body of evidence was
considered to arrive at the final findings.
DISCUSSION
[25]
To
succeed with final interdictory relief, it is trite law that the
applicants must establish a clear right, an injury suffered
or
reasonably apprehended and that there is no other suitable remedy
available to them
.
[2]
In
Hotz
v University of Cape Town
[3]
the court held that, once the applicant has established the three
requisite elements for the grant of an interdict, the scope,
if any,
for refusing relief is limited and that there is no general
discretion to refuse relief."
[26]
In essence, what is required to be decided by this
court, is whether the respondent’s statements are defamatory
and/or derogatory
(including racially charged) in relation to the
applicants. Further, whether the respondent’s conduct infringed
upon the
applicants’ rights, causing harm or harm reasonably
apprehended, for which final interdictory relief is warranted.
[27]
In this matter it is not disputed that the
respondent intentionally made statements in her email communication
about the applicants,
with which the applicants take offence. It is
further not in issue that the respondent published the contents of
her emails in
question, to various recipients on more than one
occasion.
[28]
I
now proceed to assess the alleged defamatory/derogatory nature of the
respondent’s communication regarding the applicants.
In
Le
Roux and Others v Dey
[4]
the
Constitutional Court held at paragraph 91 (c) that:
“
Examples
of defamatory statements that normally spring to mind are those
attributing to the plaintiff that he or she has been guilty
of
dishonest, immoral or otherwise dishonourable conduct. But defamation
is not limited to statements of this kind. It also
includes
statements which are likely to humiliate or belittle the plaintiff;
which
tend to make him or her look foolish, ridiculous or absurd; and which
expose the plaintiff to contempt or ridicule that renders
the
plaintiff less worthy of respect by his or her peers”. [my
emphasis]
[29]
It
is trite law that the elements of defamation are the wrongful
intentional publication of a defamatory statement concerning a
plaintiff/applicant.
[5]
A
plaintiff/applicant does not have to establish every one of the
elements stated to succeed.
[30]
All the plaintiff/applicant must prove at the
outset is the publication of defamatory matter concerning himself or
herself. In this
context “Publication” means the
communication or making known to at least one person other than the
plaintiff.
[31]
Once the plaintiff/applicant has proved the
publication of defamatory matter, it is presumed that the statement
was both wrongful
and intentional. Thus, for a defendant/respondent
to avoid liability base on defamation, she must raise and prove a
defence which
excludes either wrongfulness or intent on a
preponderance of probabilities.
“
pale
skinned, blue eyed” representative; “pale skinned liar”;
“unscrupulous lawyers”
[32]
The
respondent seeks to justify her repeated reference to the first
applicant as “pale skinned, blue eyed” representative;
“pale skinned liar”. She argues, that the words were used
in neutral descriptive terms and not ill intended. In this
regard, I
sought guidance from the decision in
Rustenburg
Platinum Mine v SAEWA obo Bester and Others
[6]
in
which the Constitutional Court had to determine, whether referring to
a fellow employee as a “swart man” (black
man),
within the context of that case, was racist and derogatory.
[33]
In the unanimous judgment of the Court, Justice
Theron wrote the following: -
“
[36]
The issue of when an apparently neutral race descriptor may be
regarded as racially abusive or insulting is an important one
that
has not yet been considered by this Court.
This
issue is one which encompasses interests beyond those of the parties
involved and the approach of the courts in such matters
is of general
public importance.
The
context in which the words were uttered
:
[38
It was accepted by both parties (the applicant and first respondent)
that the use of the words “swart man”, per
se, is not
racist and that
the context within which the words were used would
dictate whether they were used in a racist or derogatory manner.
It was also accepted that the test to determine whether the use of
the words is racist is objective – whether a reasonable,
objective and informed person, on hearing the words, would perceive
them to be racist or derogatory. This is in accordance
with the
test for whether a statement is defamatory, as enunciated in Sindani:
“
The
test to be applied is an objective one, namely what meaning the
reasonable reader of ordinary intelligence would attribute to
the
words read in the context of the article as a whole. In
applying this test, it must be accepted that the reasonable reader
will not take account only of what the words expressly say but also
what they imply.”
[7]
[48]
The Labour Appeal Court’s starting point
that phrases are
presumptively neutral fails to recognise the impact of the legacy of
apartheid and racial segregation that has
left us with a racially
charged present.
This approach holds the danger that the
dominant, racist view of the past – of what is neutral, normal
and acceptable – might
be used as the starting point
in the objective enquiry without recognising that the root of this
view skews such enquiry.
It
cannot be correct to ignore the reality of our past of
institutionally entrenched racism and begin an enquiry into whether
or
not a statement is racist and derogatory from a presumption that
the context is neutral – our societal and historical
context dictates the contrary
.
In this sense, the
Labour Appeal Court’s decision sanitised the context
in which the phrase “swart man”
was used, assuming
that it would be neutral without considering how, as a starting
point, one may consider the use of racial descriptors
in a
post-apartheid South Africa”.
[my
emphasis]
[34]
In
this regard, the term “racially charged” (as used in the
applicants’ papers) connote words
or
statements that are influenced by racial prejudice, hostility or
discrimination or that evoke strong emotions related to race. The
term implies an underlying racial bias, that fuels the content,
manifesting as antagonism, contempt, or unfriendliness based on
a
person's perceived or actual racial group or association.
[8]
[35]
I take regard of the obvious fact that the
respondent’s email communication quoted herein, are replete
with racialised statements
and overtone, that is the case, in
addition to the references to the first applicant as “pale
skinned blue eyed”. Objectively
assessed and from the
perspective of a reasonable reader, it cannot be accepted, that these
terms with which the first applicant
takes umbrage, were merely
descriptive and innocuously used by the respondent. In its context,
the repetition of the terms, (even
after the first applicant
requested the respondent not to use same in reference to her)
compound the rest of the racial statements
in the communication,
proves the terms “pale skinned; blue eyed” used by the
respondent, in relation to the first applicant,
to be intended to be
racist and derogatory.
[36]
I find the respondent’s argument in this
regard a failed attempt to cleanse her overtly derogatory reference
to the first
applicant. This finding is validated by the respondent’s
emphatic statement writing to the applicants that: -
“
yes,
to me this is about race, and I am saying considering that I am black
and litigating against pale skinned representatives like
yourself, I
should not expect fair treatment….”
[37]
To ascribe dishonesty (liar; lying;
unscrupulousness) and racist conduct to any person are intrinsically
defamatory and insulting.
Needless to say, to attribute dishonest
conduct to a legal practitioner is tantamount to an accusation of
unprofessional conduct.
The respondent’s defence, as to the
truth of her averments, that the first applicant was dishonest during
the labour court
proceeding, appears to be founded on her and her
husband’s subjective opinion, on the merit of the unfair
dismissal dispute.
[38]
The respondent also makes mention in her answering
affidavit of an audio recording, that seemingly will prove the truth
of her statements
that the first respondent lied in a court of law.
No audio recording in support of the defence “truth” of
the statements
made, forms part of the record of this matter.
It further needs to be stressed, that the pending
labour dispute is not before this court. This court is not tasked to
decide the
issues in that matter.
[39]
The
respondent conflates
the issues in this application and the labour dispute, holding that
her stance in the on-going labour dispute
is the only truth. With the
contents of her email communication, the respondent appears to have
an intention to harass the applicants
into accepting her stance,
which is improper, as a final decision in that regard is yet to be
made, by the court before which the
labour dispute serves. The
defence of the truth of her statements pleaded, remains
unsubstantiated and cannot be upheld.
[40]
The
respondent also relies on the right to freedom of expression in
justification of her statements made about the applicants
[9]
.
It is noteworthy that
section
16(2) of the Constitution, clearly provides for exceptions to the
right to freedom of expression. The right to freedom of
expression,
does not extend to sentiments of hatred based on race or ethnicity,
akin to the offensive statements made in relation
to the
applicants.
[10]
The respondent
with the statements published, over stepped the boundaries of what
constitutes freedom of expression, I find this
defence raised, ill
conceived
[11]
.
[41]
A
holistic reading of the statements published by the respondent, will
be understood by a reasonable reader that, concerning the
labour
dispute, the second and third applicants instructed unscrupulous /
dishonest / unethical lawyers, amongst whom the first
applicant.
Further, that the first applicant is guilty of unprofessional
conduct, through her deliberate lies in a court of law,
with the aim
of obstructing justice for racially motivated reasons, to ensure that
the respondent “as a black litigant with
little or no money,
should not get justice”
[12]
.
This objective contextual construct is significantly in accordance
with the argument made by the respondent in her heads of
argument.
[13]
[42]
Reasoned
as aforementioned,
the
respondent failed to proffer any non-defamatory or non-derogatory
meaning to the statements made in her communication published.
Her
statements published are evidently intended to harm the applicants in
their reputation also to harm the first applicant in
her dignity, by
insults and belittlement in a public forum
[14]
.
[43]
It
cannot be denied that the applicants have a right to vindicate their
respective rights to reputation
[15]
and
the first applicant her right to dignity
[16]
.
The wrongful statements intentionally published to a range of email
recipients, by the respondent, no doubt constitute, what it
takes, to
harm the first applicant in her dignity also her professional
reputation as a legal practitioner. Similarly, the harm
extends to
the second and third applicants in their business reputation in the
public eye.
[44]
I considered that the respondent spontaneously on
24 July 2025, after the court hearing the previous day, dispatched
her first email
to the first applicant and others. In this
communication she gave her lone rendition of the proceedings and
states that the first
applicant lied/misrepresented the facts to the
Judge.
[45]
There was no need for the respondent to correspond
with any of the applicants on this occasion in the way she did. Her
launching
of a personal attack on the first applicant was evidently
malicious and uncalled for. It is clear from the evidence that the
respondent
is acutely aware of the
sub
judice
nature of the labour litigation,
as well as the remedies to her disposal.
[46]
Nevertheless, the respondent preferred to treat
the first applicant’s response to her upsetting email contents
with disdain,
that is even though she was reasonably requested to
stop her baseless accusations and the offensive reference to the
first applicant
as 'pale skinned’. If only the respondent
heeded the words of warning extended by the first applicant at this
initial stage,
this matter would have ended there.
[47]
Be that as it may, the evidence is that the
respondent’s wrongful statements continued unabated in
subsequent email communication
in which she also made it clear, that
she refuses to comply with the undertaking sought by the applicants
through their attorneys.
Unfortunately it is the respondent’s
recalcitrant attitude that triggered this litigation.
[48]
Further to the above, the respondent’s
untoward conduct escalated to her stating that she is exploring her
options to “tell
her story” on social/media platforms as
well as involve her political party, all measures outside of the
known legal remedies
related to the pending litigation. Objectively
assessed, the applicants cannot be faulted to receive those
statements as imminent
threats by the respondent, that she will
further publish in the public domain, statements of the kind made in
her email contents,
which are evidently defamatory and derogatory.
The publication of the type of offensive statements at hand, on media
platforms
is known to trigger dire consequences and irreparable
reputational harm in the eyes of the public, for any person, business
or
professional.
[49]
It
was aptly held by the
Supreme
Court of Appeal in
Hotz
and others v University of Cape Town
[17]
that: -
“
...all
rights are to be exercised in a manner that respects and protects the
foundational value of human dignity of other people
(s 10) and
the rights other people enjoy under the Constitution. In a democracy
the recognition of rights vested in one person
or group necessitates
the recognition of the rights of other people and groups, and
people
must recognise this when exercising their own constitutional rights.
… 'every right must be exercised with due
regard to the
rights of others'.
Finally, the fact that South Africa is a society founded on the
rule of law demands that the right is exercised in a manner
that
respects the law.” [my emphasis]
[50]
The respondent’s resolve to bolster and
continue with her defamatory and derogatory statements, caused harm
and further establishes
a real apprehension of more harm to the
applicants personal and professional reputation and the first
applicant’s dignity.
Respondent
was afforded more than one opportunity to make good on her wrongful
statements published, to no avail.
[51]
Further, by the general language employed in the
email communication by the respondent, her
hostility
and bitterness, towards the applicants is pulpable. On the unique
facts of this case, I find that there is no viable alternative
remedy
available to the applicants, other than final interdictory relief. I
find that the facts of the matter substantiate the
grant of the
relief prayed for on an urgent basis, especially pending
the on-going labour litigation in which the
parties require to engaged each other.
[52]
The applicants prayed for costs against the
respondent on the attorney and client scale. It is clear
that they were
obliged to bring this application to protect their
respective rights to reputation and dignity. The applicants are
substantially
successful with the application and the respondent’s
recalcitrant conduct cried out for a punitive costs order including
the costs of counsel. I deem the costs order prayed for a just order
as to costs.
[53]
It is for these reasons that the order set out in
paragraph 1 herein was granted.
Matthys
R
Acting
Judge
Of
the High Court of South Africa
Gauteng
Division (Johannesburg)
Appearances:
Counsel
for the Applicants: Adv Jonathan Steyn instructed by GGD Attorneys
The
Respondent: Ms P Marule in Person
Judgment
handed down electronically via email by circulation to the Registrar
of the Court, the parties and or their legal representatives
for
uploading on caselines. The date of the judgment handed down shall be
deemed to be 13 September 2025.
[1]
Under judicial consideration
and therefore prohibited from public discussion elsewhere.
[2]
Setlogelo
v Setlogelo
1914
AD 221
at 227.
[3]
2017
(2) SA 485
(SCA) para 29
[4]
Le
Roux and Others v Dey
(CCT
45/10)
[2011] ZACC 4
;
2011 (3) SA 274
(CC)
2011 (6) BCLR 577
(CC) (8
March 2011) footnotes cited in the decision omitted for brevity sake
[5]
Khumalo
and Others v Holomisa
[2002]
ZACC 12; 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC); 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC)
## [6][2018]
ZACC 13(2018) 39 ILJ 1503 (CC); 2018 (8) BCLR 951 (CC); [2018] 8
BLLR 735 (CC); 2018 (5) SA 78 (CC) (17 May 2018)
[6]
[2018]
ZACC 13(2018) 39 ILJ 1503 (CC); 2018 (8) BCLR 951 (CC); [2018] 8
BLLR 735 (CC); 2018 (5) SA 78 (CC) (17 May 2018)
[7]
Sindani
v Van der Merwe
[2001]
ZASCA 130
;
[2002] 1 All SA 311
(A) at para 11.
[8]
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/racially
https://getidiom.com/dictionary/english/racially-charged
[9]
Section
16 of the Constitution provides-
16 (1) Everyone has the
right to freedom of expression, which includes—
(a)
freedom of the press and other media;
(b)
freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;
(c)
freedom of artistic creativity; and
(d)
academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.
(2) The right in
subsection (1) does not extend to—
(a)
propaganda for war;
(b)
incitement of imminent violence; or
(c)
advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or
religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.
[my
emphasis]
## [10]CompareFrancois
Jurie Nicolaas Harman v Pieter Hendrik Strydom(285/2024)
[2025] ZASCA 108 (18 July 2025).
[10]
Compare
Francois
Jurie Nicolaas Harman v Pieter Hendrik Strydom
(285/2024)
[2025] ZASCA 108 (18 July 2025).
[11]
Also
consider
The
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
4/2000 (“PEPUDA”) proving in s 10(1) the following:
…
.
no
person may publish,
propagate,
advocate or
communicate
words based
on
one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that
could reasonably be construed to
demonstrate
a clear intention to be harmful
or
to incite harm
and
to
promote
or propagate hatred. Amongst the prohibited grounds listed are
-race, ethnic or social origin, colour. "prohibited
grounds"
are— (a) race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation,
age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, birth and HIV/ AIDS
status;
[12]
I
quote respondent’s own words; Also see footnote 4
supra
Le
Roux and Others v Dey
para
89-The meaning of the statement is determined objectively by the
legal construct of the reasonable reader and is not a matter
on
which evidence may be led.
[13]
In
heads of argument the respondent states that what she means with her
statements made, was that the first applicant’s
“primary
responsibility is to ensure that she obstructs justice and for the
fact that “I am black, she must ensure
that I as a black
person, do not get justice”. This as submitted by the
respondent, means that the employer flout labour
laws with impunity,
because it has people like the applicants as representatives,
against vulnerable employees like her.
[14]
See
the respondent’s statement made ..”your client is the
lowest of the low, a pathetic liar. Whenever she opens her
mouth, I
honestly feel like I am witnessing a case of feculent vomiting as I
find myself utterly disgusted by literally every
word that comes out
of her mouth…”
[15]
The
Constitutional Court has made it clear that a trading corporation
(my insertion juristic person/Entity) has a right to its
good name
and reputation. See
Reddell
and Others v Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others
(CCT
67/21)
[2022] ZACC 38
;
2023 (2) SA 404
(CC);
2023 (7) BCLR 830
(CC)
(14 November 2022)
[16]
The
actio
iniuriarum is an action available to remedy the intentional
infringement of personality rights (corpus, dignitus and fama).
A
single action can be resorted to vindicate fama (reputation or
public esteem) and dignitus or self
-
esteem
-
JR
Midgley “Delict” in LAWSA 3
rd
ed
(2016) vol 15, at para 10
[17]
2017
(2) SA 485
(SCA) at para [62]
sino noindex
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