Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 961South Africa
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Tshabalala (3648/2020) [2025] ZAGPJHC 961 (25 September 2025)
Headnotes
judgement is granted for payment of the amount of R439 829-21; B. Interest is to be paid on the amount referred to immediately above at the rate of 8.75% per annum from 13 November 2019 to date of payment as provided for in the Loan Agreement, both dates inclusive; C. It is ordered that the immovable property described as: (1) A unit consisting of: (a) Section No. 22 as shown and more fully described on Sectional Plan No. 67/1988, in the scheme known as Graceland One in respect of the land and building or buildings situate at Northwold Extension 12 Township. Local Authority: City of Johannesburg of which section the floor area, according to the said Sectional Plan is 80 (eighty) square metres in extent; and
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Tshabalala (3648/2020) [2025] ZAGPJHC 961 (25 September 2025)
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Tshabalala (3648/2020) [2025] ZAGPJHC 961 (25 September 2025)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 3648/2020
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/ NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED.
YES
/NO
In the matter between:
THE
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED
Plaintiff
(Registration Number:
1962/000738/06)
and
MBUYISENI
TSHABALALA
Defendant
(Identity Number: 7[…])
COURT ORDER
A.
Summary judgement is granted for payment of
the amount of R439 829-21;
B.
Interest is to be paid on the amount
referred to immediately above at the rate of 8.75% per annum from 13
November 2019 to date
of payment as provided for in the Loan
Agreement, both dates inclusive;
C.
It is ordered that the immovable property
described as:
(1)
A unit consisting of:
(a)
Section No. 22 as shown and more fully
described on Sectional Plan No. 67/1988, in the scheme known as
Graceland One in respect
of the land and building or buildings
situate at Northwold Extension 12 Township. Local Authority: City of
Johannesburg of which
section the floor area, according to the said
Sectional Plan is 80 (eighty) square metres in extent; and
(b)
An undivided share in the common property
in the scheme apportioned to the said section in accordance with the
participation
quota
as endorsed on the said sectional plan, held by Deed of Transfer No.
S[...] (“the Property”);
be declared executable
for the aforesaid amounts;
D.
An order is granted authorising the issuing
of a writ of execution in terms of Rul 46 as read with 46A for the
attachment of the
Property;
E.
It is ordered that a reserve price of R NIL
be set for the sale of the property;
F.
Costs of suit on the attorney and own
client scale to be paid by the respondent.
JUDGEMENT
INTRODUCTION
(1)
This is an application for summary
judgement based on a mortgage loan which is secured by a first
mortgage bond over a sectional
title property owned by the
respondent.
(2)
Summons was already issued in 2020
and the amount allegedly owed by the respondent in respect of unpaid
mortgage instalments, municipal
rates and taxed, as well as levies
and other charges owing to the body corporate, have increased
significantly since 2020 if regard
is had to the information made
available by the applicant in 2025.
(3)
The respondent’s personal and
employment circumstances seem to have changed, mostly for the better,
since he delivered his
plea on 15 September 2022, but his attorney
submitted at the hearing in 2025 that he is over-indebted.
(4)
From
the documents filed on Caselines it appears that the matter was in
the unopposed motion roll of 12 October 2023. On that date
Strijdom J
postponed the matter
sine
die
,
ordered the matter to be re-enrolled in the opposed motion roll and
the respondent was directed to ensure that his attorneys of
record
officially place themselves on record within 14 days from the grant
of that order. The respondent was directed to ensure
that his
attorneys of record are present in court on the next hearing date.
[1]
(5)
At the hearing date in 2025, the
respondent’s attorney was present in court, but the respondent
was personally not present.
I asked the respondent’s attorney
whether he was ready to proceed although he has never placed himself
on record as directed
by Strijdom J on 23 October 2023. He did
not object. He was willing to provide any information that might be
required by the
court in terms of Rule 46A(3), (5), (8) and (9) and
generally for the court to exercise its judicial oversight function
properly.
LITIGATION HISTORY
(6)
On
16 September 2008 the parties entered into a Loan Agreement
[2]
for a loan amount which was utilised by the respondent to acquire the
mortgaged property.
(7)
The
Loan Agreement was to endure for a period of 240 months.
[3]
(8)
The Loan Agreement was subject to
terms and conditions, including that a mortgage bond be registered in
favour of the plaintiff
for an amount of R580 000-00 over the
immovable property described as:
Certain:
(1) A unit consisting of: (a) Section No. 22 as shown and more fully
described on Sectional Plan No. 67/1988, in the scheme
known as
GRACELAND ONE in respect of the land and buildings situate at
Northwold Extension 12 Township, Local Authority: City of
Johannesburg of which section the floor area, according to the said
Sectional Plan is 80 (EIGHTY) square metres in extent; and
(b) an
undivided share in the common property in accordance with the
participation
quota
as endorsed on the said sectional plan, held by Deed of Transfer No.
S[...] (hereinafter referred to as “the property”).
[4]
(9)
The defendant chose three different
addresses as the addresses at which notices and documents in any
legal proceedings against the
defendant, including notices of
attachment of the property, could be served.
(10)
Default
notices were sent by registered mail to all three addresses in terms
of section 129, read with
section 130
, of the
National Credit Act 34
of 2005
.
[5]
As at the date of
this notice the arrears were R44 495-85 and the total
indebtedness under the Loan Agreement was R439 829-21.
[6]
(11)
The
respondent failed to remedy his breach of the Loan Agreement and the
applicant was accordingly entitled to claim the total of
all amounts
owing by the respondent under the Loan Agreement.
[7]
(12)
The applicant avers in the
particulars of claim that it made various attempts to assist the
respondent to regularise his arrears
position under the Loan
Agreement.
(13)
In the particulars of claim the
applicant claimed all amounts outstanding under the Loan Agreement,
with interest thereon, that
the property be declared executable for
the amounts claimed, an order authorising the issuing of a warrant of
execution in terms
of
Rule 46
, read with
Rule 46A
, for attachment of
the property, that a reserve price be set by the court for the sale
of the property at a sale in execution,
at a value to be determined
by the court, and costs on an attorney and client scale.
(14)
The
combined summons was served on 13 February 2020. The respondent
(defendant in the action) served a notice of intention to defend
and
delivered a plea on 14 September 2022.
[8]
(15)
On
6 October 2022 the applicant served an application for summary
judgement on the respondent.
[9]
By that time the arrears on the Loan Agreement was R266 373-08
according to a certificate of balance dated 6 October 2022.
[10]
(16)
On
a consideration of the plea filed, the respondent pleaded that he was
unemployed since 2014 until 2022, he denied having received
a
section
129
letter, read with
section 130
, in terms of the NCA and insisted
that service of the summons was premature.
[11]
The respondent denied the correctness of the Certificate of Balance
and described it as “mythical” and that it is
unestablished how the balance was computed.
[12]
(17)
The respondent has, however, not
pleaded any facts to substantiate his bare denial of the amount owed
according to the applicant.
(18)
The applicant has pleaded, in its
particulars of claim, all the averments necessary to comply with the
National Credit Act as
well as those required by section 26 of the
Constitution and those in Rule 46(1)(a)(ii) in respect of the
property being declared
executable, as the property concerned is the
primary residence of the respondent.
(19)
The
respondent has raised as a defence in his plea that the applicant has
not complied with section 129 (read with section 130)
of the NCA.
[13]
He denies being “associated” with any addresses to which
the section 129 NCA default notices were sent. The applicant
referred
to the following:
(19.1)
In the Loan Agreement the respondent chose 3 Greenwood, Niven Avenue,
Bryanston as his address for service of legal
notices.
[14]
(19.2)
In the mortgage bond the respondent chose 589, 5
th
Road, Northwold Extension 12, Randburg and 675 Mpela Street, Dube as
his
domicilium
addresses.
[15]
(19.3)
2[...] G[...], N[...], Randburg is the respondent’s residential
and primary address.
[16]
(20)
The
respondent denied that the section 129 notices were never
“delivered”. The applicant submitted that this defence
does not raise an issue for trial as the notices were
dispatched
to the respondent’s
domicilium
addresses and that it had complied with the requirements laid down
for credit providers in relation to section 129 Notices in
Sebola
v Standard Bank
.
[17]
The applicant:
(20.1) Sent the
section 129 default notices by registered mail to the respondent’s
domicilium
addresses;
(20.2) The Section
129 default notices were delivered to the correct post office;
(20.3) A “track
and trace” report has been annexed to the particulars of claim;
and
(20.4) The
necessary allegations had been made in the particulars of claim.
(21)
Once the applicant has satisfied the
above requirements, any contention by the respondent that a Section
129 default notice was
not dispatched, is without merit and does not
raise an issue for trial.
(22)
Another
defence raised by the respondent, having not denied to be in default
in terms of the Loan Agreement, is merely that he does
not accept
that he has been in default to the “… exaggerated extent
that the applicant exacts”
[18]
and also claims that he serviced the loan “whenever he
could”.
[19]
No facts
were pleaded in respect of these defences.
(23)
The respondent also claimed that the
Certificate of Balance has “untrue contents” and he also
denies that the Certificate
of Balance is proof of amounts owed.
(24)
The applicant submitted that the
said defence does not raise an issue for trial for the following
reasons:
(24.1)
When entering into the Loan Agreement and mortgaging the immovable
property, the respondent agreed that a certificate
of balance will on
its mere production be sufficient proof of any amount due or owing
unless the contrary is proved.
[20]
(24.2)
The respondent does not deny the mortgage bond or its terms.
[21]
(25)
In
any event, denying the Certificate of Balance or the amount claimed
without providing a factual basis is not enough to withstand
the
granting of summary judgement. In
NPGS
Protection and Security Services CC v First Rand Bank Limited
[22]
it was held at paragraph 11:
“
Rule
32(3) of the Uniform Rules requires an opposing affidavit to disclose
fully the nature and grounds of the defence and the material
facts
relied upon therefor. To stave off summary judgement, a defendant
cannot contend him- or herself with bald denials, for example,
that
it is not clear how the amount claimed was made up. Something more is
required. If a defendant disputes the amount claimed,
he or she
should say so and set out a factual basis for such denial. This could
be done by giving examples of payments made by
them which have not
been credited to their account.”
(26)
The
respondent pleaded that the applicant has brought the summary
judgement application to dispossess the respondent of his
Constitutional
right to housing as the property in question is the
respondent’s primary and only abode.
[23]
(27)
The
respondent also contends that, as at the date of his answering
affidavit
[24]
he was poverty
stricken, he relied on a meagre disability pay to sustain himself and
granting judgement against him will render
him homeless.
[25]
(28)
It
transpired at the hearing of the matter in 2025 that the respondent’s
position has improved financially. That emerged from
an email letter
he himself uploaded onto Caselines
[26]
a few days before the hearing. This aspect was canvassed with his
attorney when the court considered the prescribed factors under
Rule
46A(2). This will be dealt with later.
(29)
The respondent further pleaded bare
denials or that he had no knowledge of the applicant’s
allegations or that he regards
those allegations with suspicion. Rule
32(3)(b) requires an affidavit filed in opposition to summary
judgement to disclose fully
the nature and grounds of the defence and
the material facts relied upon therefore. It is found that these bare
denials by the
respondent did not raise any triable issue and are not
sufficient to resist summary judgement.
(30)
The affidavit filed in support of
the application for summary judgement complied with the requirements
under Rule 32 in that the
applicant launched the application within
15 days after delivery of the respondent’s plea and the
applicant’s deponent
has:
(30.1) Verified the
cause of action and the amount claimed;
(30.2) Identified
the facts upon which the claim is based; and
(30.3) Explained
briefly why the defences as pleaded do not raise any issue for trial.
(31)
It is therefore found that the
applicant is entitled to summary judgement as claimed in the
particulars of claim.
EXECUTABILITY OF THE
PROPERTY
(32)
The
applicant claimed relief that the respondent’s property be
declared executable for the amounts claimed as owing in the
particulars of claim, that an order be issued for a warrant of
execution in terms of Rule 46, as read with Rule 46A, for the
attachment
of the respondent’s property and that a reserve
price be set for the sale of the property at a sale in execution at a
value
to be determined by the court.
[27]
(33)
The
respondent submitted that the applicant failed to provide evidence of
the market value of the property and the amount owing
to the local
authority. These issues are to be considered under Rule 46A(5)(a) and
(c). These will be considered later in the judgement.
The respondent
objected to his property being declared executable as he has nowhere
to go should he be evicted.
[28]
He accused the applicant of having an ulterior motive and of
seemingly employing devious tactics in seeking executability of the
respondent’s primary residence. He submitted that the applicant
is inspired by profit and has seen the executability of the
respondent’s property as a shortcut to achieving that sinister
objective. The respondent further submitted that the applicant
will
not suffer any prejudice whatsoever should the respondent’s
primary resident not be declared executable. The respondent
submitted
that he will be rendered destitute should he be dispossessed of his
primary residence.
[29]
(34)
As will become evident hereunder, by
2025, when the hearing in this matter took place, the facts were
different from 2022 when the
answering affidavit was signed and
commissioned. The debt has increased significantly and a large
amount, albeit in dispute, is
owing to the body corporate of
Graceland 1 Scheme, a significant amount was owing to the City of
Johannesburg for property rates
and other charges, the total of which
amounts exceeded the market value of the property.
(35)
The applicant submitted that an
order declaring the immovable property executable, is in this case
warranted taking into account
that:
(35.1) The
respondent’s attention was drawn to the relevant provisions of
the Constitution;
(35.2) There has
been proper service of the application, including service on the
local authority and the body corporate;
and
(35.3)
The application complied with Rule 46A(5) as all the prescribed
supporting documents were annexed thereto.
[30]
These documents include a Lightstone valuation
[31]
and an independent valuation.
[32]
(36)
Further
documents were annexed to the application such as statement of the
mortgage account,
[33]
a
municipal account (which also reflected the municipal valuation of
the property),
[34]
and a
payment profile of the respondent’s mortgage accounts detailing
all payments made by him.
(37)
The
applicant complied with the requirements of Rule 46A(5) in respect of
a primary residential property. It relied on the judgement
of the
Constitutional Court in
Jaftha
v Schoeman
[35]
where it was held that:
“
If
the judgement debtor willingly put his or her house up in some or
other manner as security for the debt, a sale in execution
should
ordinarily be permitted where there has not been an abuse of court
procedure.”
CONSIDERATION OF RULE
46A
(38)
In
Bestbier
and Others v Nedbank Lt
[36]
the
Constitutional Court considered the scope, purpose and interpretation
of Rule 46A, the history of which may be traced back to
the
Jafta
-judgement
referred to above. The purpose of Rule 46A is for the courts to
protect the rights enshrined in section 26 of the Constitution
and to
exercise judicial oversight in the execution process. It is important
for the court to tailor a remedy after having regard
to the facts of
a case and against the fact that execution is not an odious thing,
provided that the peremptory provisions of Rule
46A are followed. The
Constitutional Court then considered the provisions of Rule 46A to
consider whether and how they were applicable
to the facts of that
matter.
(39)
What made this matter complicated is
that the factors placed before the court by the applicant in the
affidavit supporting summary
judgement, were stated as at 1 October
2022. The hearing of the matter took place in January 2025 and
updated financial information
was provided. The information as at 1
October 2022 will be dealt first and thereafter the 2025 information.
What has become clear
was that the financial position of the
respondent had become much worse over that period and that prompted
the respondent’s
attorney to submit at the hearing that his
client is “over-indebted”. That is relevant in
considering the provisions
of Rule 46A(2)(a)(iii) as to whether there
are alternative means by the respondent, as judgement debtor, of
satisfying the judgement
debt other than by execution against the
judgement debtor’s primary residence. No alternative means were
put forward by any
party.
(40)
The applicant placed the following
factors before the court as at 1 October 2022.
(40.1)
The instalments payable by the respondent in terms of the Loan
Agreement amount to R8 785-82 (the instalments).
[37]
(40.2)
The instalments in arrears as at 1 October 2022 amount to
R266 373-08, which means that the respondent was approximately
30.31 months in arrears with payment of his monthly instalments.
[38]
(40.3)
The last payment received from the respondent was an amount of
R6 590-85 on 3 May 2021.
[39]
(40.4)
The full amount owing by the respondent to the applicant, and which
was secured by the mortgage bond, is the amount
of R531 057-59.
[40]
(41)
The
applicant submitted that it is unlikely that the respondent will be
willing or able to satisfy the judgement debt by way of
payment to
the applicant for the above reasons and that there is no alternative
or less invasive means available for satisfying
the judgement
debt.
[41]
The respondent
referred to this submission as “utterly confounding” and
then stated that he cannot admit or deny it.
[42]
He did not plead any facts to assist the court to understand his
plea.
(42)
The
applicant submitted that the respondent’s right of access to
housing as envisaged in section 26(1) of the Constitution
should be
weighed against the applicant’s rights against a property
specially mortgaged to it as security, and on the basis
that the
respondent expressly agreed that the applicant could foreclose on the
property in the event that the respondent is in
default with his
obligations in terms of the Loan Agreement.
[43]
The respondent denied this submission.
(43)
The
applicant submitted that the bond serves as a continuing covering
security for the obligations of the respondent and that the
applicant
would not have lent and advanced the monies for which judgement is
sought in the absence of the registration of the bond.
[44]
The respondent denied this submission in a bare denial.
(44)
The
applicant further submitted that it was not seeking the executability
order with an ulterior motive, but does so to recover
a debt that is
due, owing and payable to it.
[45]
The respondent pleaded that the applicant had an ulterior motive and
was inspired by profit and that it would suffer no prejudice
if a
declaration of executability was not made.
[46]
This aspect was not pursued further by the respondent in argument at
the hearing.
(45)
In support of its application for
summary judgement, the applicant annexed to the founding affidavit,
the following in support of
the financial information stated in the
affidavit:
(45.1)
A certificate of balance
[47]
which confirmed the total indebtedness of the respondent.
(45.2)
A payment profile statement
[48]
which recorded each and every payment made by the respondent from 31
July 2008 to 3 October 2022. This statement was not disputed.
(45.3)
A statement of the bond account
[49]
of the respondent indicating all debits and credits on the account
from registration of the bond up to 3 October 2022. This statement
was not disputed.
(46)
Within the above context, the
applicant placed further factors and information before the court to
be taken into account when determining
a reserve price for a sale in
execution, should it be deemed appropriate to do so.
(47)
A
copy of a tax invoice
[50]
from
the City of Johannesburg in respect of the respondent’s
property was annexed to the affidavit showing a municipal valuation
of R700 000-00 and an amount owing of R22 446-09 as at
7 September 2022. The monthly charges were R455-39 excluding
VAT
and the arears outstanding for more than 90 days an amount of
R20 406-62.
(48)
A
Lightstone Valuation
[51]
was
annexed indicating:
(48.1)
The property zoned as a residential property;
(48.2)
The estimated higher tier value of R820 000-00;
(48.3)
The municipal value of the property is R700 000-00;
(48.4)
The estimated lower tier value of the property is R670 000-00;
(48.5)
The estimated overall value of the property is R720 000-00’
(48.6)
The aforesaid estimated values of the property are based on an
accuracy score of 92%;
and
(48.7)
The comparative sales within the area of the property.
(49)
A
current and independent market valuation in respect of the
respondent’s property was provided
[52]
indicating that:
(49.1)
The property is zoned for residential purposes;
(49.2)
The market value of the property is estimated at R670 000-00;
and
(49.3)
The forced sale value of the property is R536 000-00.
(50)
The
applicant submitted that a reserve price could be calculated as
follows:
[53]
Forced Sale
Value:
R536 000-00
Less: Outstanding Rates
and Taxes:
R22 446-09
Proposed reserve
price:
R513 553.91
(51)
The deponent to the founding
affidavit declared that to the applicant’s knowledge the
property was not obtained by way of
a state subsidy.
(52)
In
respect of the applicant’s submissions on the calculation of
the reserve price, the respondent simply pleaded that the
applicant’s
calculation should not be entertained.
[54]
(53)
The applicant further submitted that
there were no other bonds registered over the respondent’s
property and thus no other
secured creditor.
(54)
The
applicant then summarised the factors pleaded by the respondent,
[55]
and also the applicant’s submissions in respect thereof. They
are not dealt with here due to what was part of the information
before the court some two-and-a half years later in 2025.
(55)
The applicant submitted that, in
weighing up the rights of the applicant and respondent:
(55.1)
The respondent’s inability to afford the property and being
unable to pray what
is lawfully due to the applicant and being unable
to pay and keep the liabilities associated with the property up to
date should
be considered.
(55.2)
It was submitted that there is no other satisfactory means of
satisfying the respondent’s
indebtedness to the applicant and
that an order should be granted to declare the property specially
executable;
(55.3)
The applicant will be severely prejudiced if it is not permitted to
execute against the
property as it will have no other means of
recovering the debt.
[56]
SUBMISSIONS AND
INFORMATION AT THE HEARING
(56)
At
the hearing in January 2025 Mr Phambuka appeared for the applicant.
Mr Mukwevho of Mukwevho Mokgola Inc. Attorneys appeared for
the
respondent, despite the fact that the said attorneys had not placed
themselves officially on record as ordered by Strijdom
J on 12
October 2023.
[57]
At this
hearing the respondent did not attend the proceedings in court. I
enquired from Mr Mukwevho whether he would be able to
address the
court and answer any questions which the court may want to ask when
considering the factors prescribed in Rule 46A(8)
and (9). When he
answered in the affirmative, he was allowed to address the court on
behalf of the respondent.
(57)
Prior to the hearing, the applicant
uploaded onto Caselines certain updated information as follows:
(57.1)
A Certificate of Balance dated 16 January 2025 indicating the
indebtedness of the respondent
to be an amount of R647 470-44 as
at that date and that the monthly instalment at that date was
R16 766-61.
[58]
(57.2)
An account statement from the applicant up to 3 January 2025 with the
amount owing as
per the Certificate of Balance of R647 470-44.
This statement indicates that no monthly instalment was paid since
2019, save
for an amount of R5 000-00 on 20 November 2024 and an
amount of R5 500-00 on 14 December 2024.
[59]
(57.3)
A statement
[60]
issued on
behalf of the Body Corporate of Graceland 1 by Whitfield Property
Management indicating an amount due by the respondent
to the Body
Corporate as at 1 February 2025 for levies and electricity of
R1 897 620-37.
(57.4)
A statement from the local authority indicating that at 11 January
2025 an amount
of R36 692-23 was due and payable.
[61]
(58)
Counsel for the applicant dealt with
the claims and the defences raised and submitted that the respondent
did not raise any triable
issue in opposition to the application for
summary judgement. He pointed out that it was now the third time the
matter is in court
and that the indebtedness of the respondent
increased significantly since summons was issued in 2020. From the
statement filed
by the applicant it was clear that each and every
debit order since 2018 was reversed.
(59)
The applicant submitted that in view
of the indebtedness of the respondent and the amounts owing to the
applicant, the local authority
and the body corporate in 2025, the
setting of a reserve price was a futile exercise as there was no
equity in the property. In
all probability no bids would be received
at a sale in execution as the purchaser would have to pay the amounts
owing to the local
authority and the body corporate in terms of the
prescribed conditions of sale, the total of which far exceeded even
the market
value of the property.
(60)
When
the court considered whether a reserve price should be set, the
dicta
in the judgements of
Standard
Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hendricks and Related Cases
[62]
and
Absa
Bank Ltd v Mokebe and Related Cases
[63]
were taken into account that where a court grants an order for
execution against the primary residence of a debtor, saving
exceptional
circumstances it is obliged to set a reserve price. Such
exceptional circumstances are present in this matter and therefore no
reserve price is set. These circumstances have been set out above,
including that the respondent’s total indebtedness far
exceeds
even the market value of his property.
(61)
Mr
Mukwevho submitted on behalf of the respondent that he remains
employed and could pay the amount owing to the applicant in eight
equal monthly instalments.
[64]
The respondent had made an offer to the applicant on 9 October 2023,
which offer was not accepted.
(62)
Mr Mukwevho nevertheless submitted
that the respondent is over-indebted, after having heard the argument
on behalf of the applicant.
He contended that the levy calculation
was incorrect and that the amount owing was R200 000-00 less.
(63)
Even if the court gives the
respondent the benefit of the doubt and reduce the amount owing to
the body corporate by R200 000-00,
the balance of approximately
R1 600 000-00 far exceeds the market value of the
respondent’s property.
(64)
On
a question from the court, Mr Mukwevho replied that the respondent
and his brother reside in the property concerned. No further
information was made available as to whether the brother could
contribute to the expenses in respect of the property.
[65]
(65)
The
court asked Mr Mukwevho whether he had received an email letter
addressed to him a few days prior to the hearing and which letter
was
uploaded onto Caselines by the respondent personally.
[66]
He confirmed that he did receive it. The email reads as follows:
“
Hi
Phathu
Thanks for taking my
call. Could you please negotiate with Standard Bank that I repay
R10 000-00 at the moment until I get
back on my feet. The
current instalment of just over R15 000-00 is unaffordable.
Otherwise that’s what our defence will
be that I did not just
leave the bond as it is, but I suggested reduced premiums and that we
ask the court to reduce the premiums.
Thanks in advance
Mbuyi”
(66)
Mr Mukwevho confirmed that he had
not made the offer to the applicant as instructed by his client. He
also did not request that
monthly instalments be reduced.
(67)
The court put it to Mr Mukwevho that
if his client could afford to spend R10 000-00 per month on
residential accommodation,
the respondent would not be homeless if
his property was sold in execution and that he could rent reasonable
alternative accommodation
for R10 000-00. He agreed with the
court.
(68)
In reply counsel for the applicant
pointed out that no allegation of an abuse of court process was made
by the respondent. He also
submitted that the mortgage bond made
provision for executability.
(69)
An interim order was issued at the
end of the proceedings that the parties had two more days to upload
information and submissions
to verify the amount outstanding in
regard to amounts payable to the body corporate, including any
judgement of the magistrates
court to which reference was made in
argument.
(70)
Well
after the deadline, and some four months later, the respondent’s
attorney uploaded supplementary submissions to the affect
that a
claim of R184 159-17 by the body corporate against the
respondent was dismissed and that the body corporate riled an
appeal
against the dismissal of that claim. The submission was made that the
court could not set a reserve price whilst there are
matters pending
which challenged the levies.
[67]
(71)
Having considered all the facts set
out in Rule 46A(9), and the information set out above, the court has
come to the conclusion
that it is most likely that no offer will be
received should a reserve price be set. Arranging a sale in execution
in accordance
with Rule 46 at a reserve price will simply cause more
time to pass by without any likelihood of an offer being received,
which
will just cause further costs being incurred. This will cause
prejudice to the applicant to pay the costs of the sale in execution
and it will prejudice the respondent in that his indebtedness to the
applicant, the local authority and the body corporate will
simply
further increase significantly without the possibility that there may
be value for him to be obtained from a sale when his
indebtedness far
exceeds even the market value of the property.
(72)
The order to be issued will
consequently make provision for the execution of and attachment of
the property, with a sale in execution
to be held at a R NIL reserve
price. Any purchaser will have to pay the amounts owing to the local
authority and the body corporate.
(73)
Consequently, the order set out
above, is made.
LM
du Plessis
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng
Division
Johannesburg
REPRESENTATION
For
the applicant
Counsel:
Adv N Phambuka
Attorneys:
Ramsay Webber Inc.
Respondent
Mr
Phathutshedzo Mukwevho
Attorneys:
Mukwevho Mokgola Inc. Attorneys
Date of
Hearing:
23 January 2025
Date of
Judgement:
25 September
2025
[1]
Caselines,
029-1 to 2.
[2]
Caselines,
Particulars of Claim (“PoC”), para 4, 001-6.
[3]
Caselines,
PoC, para 5.4, 001-7.
[4]
Caselines,
PoC, para 5.9, 001-7 to 8.
[5]
Caselines,
Annexure “
PoC4
”,
001-57 to 001-61.
[6]
Caselines,
PoC, paras 12.1-12.2, 001-11.
[7]
Caselines,
PoC, 18.1-18.4, 001-13 to 001-14.
[8]
Caselines,
006-1 to 006-14.
[9]
Caselines,
007-1 to 007-18.
[10]
Caselines,
Annexure “
SJ2
”,
007-21.
[11]
Caselines,
Plea, para 13, 006-5.
[12]
Caselines,
Plea, para 16, 006-5.
[13]
Caselines,
Defendant’s Plea, para 13, 006-4 to 5.
[14]
Annexure
“
POC1
”,
Loan Agreement, Clause 17, 001-38.
[15]
Mortgage
Bond, Annexure “
POC2
”,
Clause 13, 001-54.
[16]
Answering
Affidavit, paras 48049, 008-18.
[17]
2012
(5) SA 142 (CC).
[18]
Answering
Affidavit, para 23, 008-9.
[19]
Answering
Affidavit, para 4, 008-5.
[20]
Mortgage
Bond, Annexure “
POC2
”,
clause 5, 001-51.
[21]
Answering
Affidavit, paras 10-13, 008-6.
[22]
[2019]
JOL 44849 (SCA).
[23]
Defendant’s
Answering Affidavit, para 27, 011-11.
[24]
As
at 28 December 2022, 011-21.
[25]
Answering
Affidavit, para 30, 011-12.
[26]
Caselines
039-1.
[27]
Caselines,
Particulars of Claim, paras 22.3-22.5, 001-15 to 16.
[28]
Answering
Affidavit, 011-13.
[29]
Answering
Affidavit, para 37, 011-15.
[30]
Annexures
“
SJ6
”
and “
SJ7
”,
008-46.
[31]
“
SJ6
”,
007-43 to 50.
[32]
“
SJ7
”,
007-51 to 54.
[33]
“
SJ4
”,
007-28 to 42.
[34]
“
SJ5
”,
007-43 to 44.
[35]
Jaftha
v Schoeman and Others
;
Van
Rooyen v Stoltz and Others
[2004] ZACC 25
;
2005 (2) SA 140
(CC) at
[58]
.
[36]
2024
(4) SA 331
(CC) paras [54]-[65].
[37]
Caselines,
para 34.1, 007-12.
[38]
Caselines,
paras 34.2 and 34.2, 007-12.
[39]
Caselines,
para 34.4, 007-12.
[40]
Caselines,
para 34.5, 007-13.
[41]
Caselines,
para 35, 007-13.
[42]
Caselines,
at 011-14.
[43]
Caselines,
para 36, 007-13.
[44]
Caselines,
para 37, 007-13.
[45]
Caselines,
para 38, 007-13.
[46]
Caselines,
para 37, 011-15.
[47]
Caselines,
Annexure “
SJ2
”,
007-21.
[48]
Caselines,
Annexure “
SJ3
”,
007-22 to 27.
[49]
Caselines,
Annexure “
SJ4
”,
007-28 to 42.
[50]
Caselines,
Annexure “
SJ5
”,
007-14.
[51]
Caselines,
Annexure “
SJ6
”,
007-45 to 50.
[52]
Caselines,
Annexure “
SJ7
”,
007-51 to 54.
[53]
Caselines,
para 44, 007-15.
[54]
Caselines,
Answering Affidavit, para 43, 011-17.
[55]
Caselines,
paras 49-54, 00716 to 17.
[56]
Caselines,
para 55, 007-17 to 18.
[57]
Caselines,
Court Order, 029-1 and 2.
[58]
Caselines,
038-18.
[59]
Caselines,
038-1 to 17.
[60]
Caselines,
040-4 to 17.
[61]
Caselines,
038-23 to 24.
[62]
2019
(2) SA 620
(WCC) at 641 C-D.
[63]
2018
(6) SA 492 (GJ).
[64]
Caselines,
Supplementary Heads of Argument, para 5.4, 034-2.
[65]
See
Rule 46A(9)(b)(VI).
[66]
Caselines,
039-1.
[67]
Caselines,
043-1 to 2.
sino noindex
make_database footer start
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