Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 964South Africa
Ndhlovu v Head of Case Management Committee Kgosi Mampuru II Central and Others (2025/020851) [2025] ZAGPJHC 964 (25 September 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
25 September 2025
Headnotes
at the super-maximum prison in Kokstad. The applicant, however, avers that this incarceration at Ebongweni in Kokstad is unlawful and jeopardises his chances of being released on parole. He states that he ultimately refused to cooperate with the respondents regarding any issue relating to his nationality. [8] Du Plessis AJ did not grant the relief sought by the application in his notice of motion, as it was not supported by any evidence, holding that the respondent’s version should prevail. She, however, found that it was necessary to get clarity on the issue of the applicant’s nationality. In this regard, the learned judge
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Ndhlovu v Head of Case Management Committee Kgosi Mampuru II Central and Others (2025/020851) [2025] ZAGPJHC 964 (25 September 2025)
Ndhlovu v Head of Case Management Committee Kgosi Mampuru II Central and Others (2025/020851) [2025] ZAGPJHC 964 (25 September 2025)
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sino date 25 September 2025
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 2025-020851
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
In
the matter between:-
NDHLOVU
ZIGGY XOLANE
Applicant
and
THE
HEAD OF CASE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
KGOSI
MAMPURU II CENTRAL
1
st
Respondent
THE
HEAD OF PRISON KGOSI MAMPURU II CENTRAL
2
nd
Respondent
THE
AREA COMMISSIONER GAUTENG, KGOSI
MAMPURU
II
CENTRAL
3
rd
Respondent
THE
NATIONAL COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES
4
th
Respondent
THE
MINISTER OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
5
th
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Mfenyana
J
[1]
The applicant seeks an order declaring the respondents in contempt of
an order issued by Du Plessis AJ (as she then was)
on 22 August
2024. The reasons for the order were provided on 13 September
2024. The application was brought on an urgent
basis.
[2]
The application is opposed by the respondents.
[3]
In her order, Du Plessis AJ (as she then was), directed the
respondents to verify whether the identity document of the
applicant
is a valid South African identity document of the applicant, and to
correctly reflect the applicant’s nationality,
once verified.
The learned judge postponed the application
sine die
for the
respondents to provide proof of the applicant’s prison
classification and whether he was classified as a medium or
maximum
offender.
[4]
The background facts to the application, which
served before Du Plessis AJ (as she then was), are that the
applicant, currently
serving a prison term at Kgosi Mampuru II
Central Prison, instituted proceedings seeking to restrain the
respondents from classifying
him as an immigrant, questioning him
about his nationality, or harassing and intimidating him. He had been
arrested in 2013, released
on bail and rearrested in the same year on
a different matter. He states that on his arrival at the
Modderbee prison, where
he was initially detained, Mangani, one of
the prison officials, refused to accept that he was a South African,
telling him that
he looked like a Nigerian. According to the
applicant, this was the beginning of his troubles, which he continues
to suffer to
date, he contends.
[5]
Following his conviction in 2014 and 2015, he was processed as a
Nigerian, as the prison authorities relied on information
provided by
Mangani, the official who disputed his South African nationality and
classified him as an immigrant. He was consequently
put on a
deportation list, whereafter the Department of Home Affairs confirmed
that he was indeed a South African. However, the
respondents failed
to update his status as a South African.
[6]
Four years later, so the applicant avers, unnamed members of the SAPS
and the respondents confiscated his identity document,
which led him
to approach the court in 2020 for relief. In May 2024, he was
provided with a new identity document, but despite
this, in June
2024, he was given a deportation form to sign. On 21 July 2024, he
met the first respondent to discuss his release
on parole as he
believed he became eligible therefor, three years earlier. This did
not progress further as the respondents once
again questioned him
about his nationality.
[7]
It is noteworthy that Du Plessis AJ (as she then was) noted that the
applicant’s profile reflects that his release
on parole was
refused on the basis that he was a maximum offender, held at the
super-maximum prison in Kokstad. The applicant,
however, avers that
this incarceration at Ebongweni in Kokstad is unlawful and
jeopardises his chances of being released on parole.
He states that
he ultimately refused to cooperate with the respondents regarding any
issue relating to his nationality.
[8]
Du Plessis AJ did not grant the relief sought by the application in
his notice of motion, as it was not supported by any
evidence,
holding that the respondent’s version should prevail. She,
however, found that it was necessary to get clarity
on the issue of
the applicant’s nationality. In this regard, the learned judge
ordered that the respondents should validate
the applicant’s
identity document, and if found to be valid, reflect this on their
system. The respondent agreed to this,
although stating that this was
not a simple issue. The present application is a sequel to that
order.
[9]
The applicant avers that the matter is urgent in that the
respondents’ conduct is not only wilful and mala fide,
but also
causes prejudice to him as his status as a South African has not been
verified. He argues that his release on parole depends
on this
verification. The applicant further contends that there was no undue
delay on his part in bringing the application. Finally,
the applicant
avers that he would not be afforded substantial redress if the matter
is heard in due course, as it would take several
months for the
application to be heard.
[10]
The notice of motion required the respondents to deliver their
answering affidavit on 6 March 2025. It was only served
on 11 March
2025. The respondents seek condonation for the late filing of the
answering affidavit, which they state was due to
unforeseen
circumstances, as the deponent to the answering affidavit was on
leave and out of reach until 11 March 2025. As she
has personal
knowledge of the matter, no other person could depose to the
answering affidavit.
[11]
The respondents aver that there was still sufficient time to file a
reply ahead of the hearing. Although the applicant
contends that this
is not the case, I am of the view that no prejudice was suffered by
the applicant. It is not uncommon in urgent
applications for parties
not to achieve strict compliance with the rules, particularly in
relation to timeframes. This less-than-perfect
compliance applies to
both the applicant and the respondents. Despite the applicant’s
assertions, the delay was not inordinate.
In the circumstances,
condonation is granted.
[12]
The respondents contend that the matter is not urgent, as this court
does not consider semi-urgent matters, and a matter
can either be
urgent or not urgent. Notably, the respondents contend that
they have already commenced with their investigation,
and the case
management committee has already compiled a profile which, according
to the requirements of the parole board, must
include a reliable home
address and a competent identity document. Consequently, the parole
board postponed the applicant’s
matter to June 2025 for further
profiling.
[13]
The respondents further state that the investigation revealed that
the applicant’s identity document was obtained
fraudulently.
They provide details of the steps they have taken in complying with
the Du Plessis order. Having thus complied
with the order, the
respondents contend that there can be no urgency to the application.
[14]
On the merits, the respondents submitted that the
applicant was classified as a maximum offender following the findings
of the disciplinary
committee. As this finding has not been properly
challenged by the applicant, it remains in effect. As part of their
investigation,
the respondents included a letter from Mr Ngele, the
principal of Morewane P School in Driekop, Limpopo, where the
applicant allegedly
attended in 1991. In the letter, Mr Ngele states
that the applicant provided a false record: the applicant's name does
not appear
in the school records, and admission number 216, provided
by the applicant, actually belongs to another student.
[15]
The respondents also submit a sworn statement from
Mr Samuel Sebata Mashiane (Mr Mashiane), the headman of Riba Central,
deposed
to on 17 February 2025, in which he confirms that the
applicant is not Ms Suzy Ndhlovu’s (Ms Ndhlovu) child. Ms
Ndhlovu resides
in the village where Mr Mashiane serves as headman.
Furthermore, the headman asserts that the applicant is from Nigeria,
which
contradicts a sworn statement made by Ms Ndhlovu in 2016
affirming that the applicant is her son.
[16]
On 13 February 2025, Mr Ntando George (Mr George),
an official at the Department of Home Affairs (the Department),
deposed to an
affidavit stating that the Department had not issued
any confirmation letter for the applicant's identity number (8[…]),
and that the stamp on the identity document in question is fraudulent
and does not originate from their office.
[17]
Further, Mr Solani Moses Msengi (Mr Msengi),
another immigration officer employed by the Department, states in his
confirmatory
affidavit that he investigated issues relating to the
applicant’s identity document and the letter bearing a stamp of
the
Department of Home Affairs as part of his duties as an
immigration and law enforcement officer.
He states that, based
on his interview with the applicant, he concluded the applicant was
not born in South Africa.
The applicant
stated that he entered South Africa using the name “Ekene
Umeh,” with a date of birth of 1985-03-12; however,
the
Department’s movement control system contains no record of his
entry. Subsequently, Mr Msengi travelled to Limpopo to
interview the
applicant’s alleged mother, Ms Ndhlovu.
[18]
Mr Msengi further states that Ndhlovu informed him
that the applicant was born in Burgersfort, following a relationship
with the
applicant’s father, whom she met while both were
working at a shop in Kempton Park in 1985. She said the applicant’s
father was from Nigeria and was only known to her as Richard.
However, Mr Msengi discovered that the applicant was not born in
South Africa; instead, the applicant’s identity document was
fraudulently obtained through a late registration of birth process
on
12 July 2006 at the Home Affairs service point in Lebowakgomo. Home
Affairs has no record of the applicant’s birth, and
the
requirements for late registration of birth were not met.
[19]
It is worth noting that the registration of birth
document lists the applicant as female. Mr Msengi also states he
obtained a court
order to collect DNA samples from both the applicant
and Ndhlovu.
He concludes that the applicant entered South
Africa unlawfully, in contravention of the Immigration Act.
[20]
In reply, the applicant asserts that the
respondents have unnecessarily delayed their opposition to the
current application. He
criticises the time taken in filing both the
notice of opposition and the answering affidavit. Notably, the
applicant concedes
that the respondents have complied with the
Du Plessis order but points out that this compliance was late and
occurred only
after the present application was lodged. Nevertheless,
the applicant maintains that the respondents are in contempt, arguing
that
they have not raised reasonable doubt that their non-compliance
was neither wilful nor in bad faith. Accordingly, the applicant
submits that this application became necessary solely due to the
respondents' non-compliance and their disregard for the court's
orders. For these reasons, he argues that the respondents should bear
the costs of this application, even if the court finds them
not to be
in contempt. He further requests that these costs be awarded on a
punitive attorney-and-client scale.
[21]
When the matter was heard, it was submitted on behalf of the
applicant that the committal of the respondents to prison
for a
period of 30 days was not persisted with, the key issue being the
finding of contempt against the respondent and for the
respondents to
comply with the Du Plessis. In this regard, the respondents aver that
in the notice of motion, the applicant only
seeks committal if the
respondents do not comply with the Du Plessis order and the order of
this court, within seven days. There
is no dispute that the
respondents complied with the order during February 2025.
[22]
The issue is whether the applicant was entitled to
bring this application. It is common cause that, as of 17 February
2025, the
date on which this application was instituted, the
respondents had not informed the applicant that they were taking any
steps to
comply with the Du Plessis order and as such had not
complied with the order. At that point, it had been five months since
the
order was granted and two months since the Adams order. Moreover,
considering the nature of the application, there can be no suggestion
that the applicant acted hastily or recklessly in bringing this
application.
Non-adherence to a court order is a serious issue
which engages the urgent attention of the court. Contempt proceedings
serve to
vindicate the court’s honour and dignity and compel
future compliance.
[23]
In
Pheko
v Ekurhuleni City
[1]
,
the Constitutional Court noted that:
“
(t)he rule of law,
a fundamental value of the Constitution, requires that the dignity of
the courts be upheld. This is crucial as
the capacity of the courts
to carry out their functions depends on it.”
[24]
The court further highlighted that allowing litigants to disregard
court orders (to which they had agreed) would bring
the
administration of justice into disrepute.
[25]
It appears that at the time the application was enrolled, the
applicant had a reasonable apprehension of harm due to
the
respondents' non-compliance with the court order. The relief sought
by the applicant is conditional on the respondents’
compliance
with the Du Plessis order. There can thus be no point in persisting
with the contempt application save for the determination
of costs. To
the extent that the respondents have purged their contempt, there
is no longer a need to hold them in contempt.
Costs
[26]
The general rule is that costs follow the outcome. However, the court
has a discretion to depart from this rule if it
would be fair and
just to do so.
The applicant was entitled to institute these
proceedings as the respondents had not complied with the Du Plessis
order, as well
as the orders of 5 December 2024 by Allen AJ, and the
judgment of Adams J on 9 December 2024 directing them to provide the
outcome
of the verification process to the applicant.
[27] The applicant
seeks costs against the respondents on an attorney-and-client scale,
arguing that the respondents defied
three court orders, causing him
prejudice. I agree. The respondents’ non-compliance not only
prejudices the applicant but
also undermines the honour and dignity
of the court. Moreover, it unnecessarily burdens the court roll,
diverting scarce judicial
resources that could have been allocated to
other matters had the respondents complied with the orders timeously.
Were it not for
the respondents’ delay in complying with the Du
Plessis order, as well as the subsequent orders, one of which was
issued
following agreement between the parties, this application
would have been obviated. In my view, that is sufficient reason
for this court to deviate from the general rule of costs.
Order
[28]
In the result, I make the following order:
a. Condonation for
the late filing of the answering affidavit is granted.
b. The application
is dismissed.
c. The first to
fifth respondents shall pay the costs of this application jointly and
severally, the one paying the other
to be absolved on an attorney and
client scale.
S
MFENYANA
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
A
PPEARANCES
For
the applicant
:
For
the respondents :
Adv
JC Erasmus instructed by Du Toit Attorneys
okkerd@mweb.co.za
saserasmus3@gmail.com
Adv
Naseera Ali instructed by The State Attorney
Mkhampha@justice.gov.za
naseeraali@duma.nokwe.co.za
Date
of hearing:
Date
of judgment:
20
March 2025
25
September 2025
[1]
[2015]
ZACC 10
;
2015 (5) SA 600
(CC); 2016 (6) BCLR (CC).
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