Moepya v Mokubedi (2025/164644) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1035 (7 October 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPJHC 1035 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Moepya v Mokubedi (2025/164644) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1035 (7 October 2025) Moepya v Mokubedi (2025/164644) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1035 (7 October 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2025_1035.html sino date 7 October 2025 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG. Case Number: 2025-164644 (1)  REPORTABLE: YES / NO (2)  OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES /NO (3)  REVISED: NO 7 October 2025 In the matter between: MOSOTHO MOEPYA Applicant and SYLVESTER MASHILO MOKUBEDI Respondent ## JUDGMENT JUDGMENT Noko J. Introduction 1. The applicant launched an urgent application for the following orders: first, an order declaring that statements (“ impugned statements ”) published by the respondent on his Facebook account are defamatory, alternatively that they were made with the intention to injure the applicant, and further alternatively that they violated the applicant’s rights to dignity. Second, an order compelling the respondent to permanently retract and/ or remove and/ or delete the statements published. Third, an order directing the respondent not to publish or cause to be published any further defamatory statements concerning the applicant, similar to the impugned statements. Fourth, an order directing the respondent to unreservedly publish an apology to the applicant for the impugned statements within 24 hours of the order, alternatively referring the issue of apology to action proceedings, to be instituted by the applicant. Background 2. The respondent’s mother, who was married to the applicant’s brother, [1] passed on 21  August 2025. The applicant’s brother and his family appointed the applicant to coordinate and supervise the arrangements for the funeral, which was scheduled to take place on 27  August 2025. Due to the strained relationship between the respondent on the one hand and the applicant’s brother (who is the respondent’s stepfather) and his family on the other hand, there was initially reluctance to allow the respondent to participate in the funeral arrangements. They later relented, and the respondent was permitted to attend and speak at the funeral. However, due to some misunderstandings during preparations, including alleged accusations and threats inter se, the permission to speak at the funeral was retracted. 3. The respondent published three posts on his Facebook account: first, a post on 27  August 2025 stating that the applicant is protecting a family of abusers and rapists. Second, a post on 29 August 2025 stating that the applicant, as the chairperson of IEC, should tell his wife why he had condoms hidden in the boot of his Mercedes-Benz. Third, a post on 30 August 2025 stating that the applicant hired bouncers to prevent him from attending the funeral and secured government funds for members of the Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department (“ TMPD ”) to attend the funeral. 4. The applicant construed the said posts as defamatory and caused a letter of demand to be sent to the respondent on 31 August 2025, demanding the retraction of the said posts and an apology. The respondent failed to heed the demand, and the applicant dispatched another letter of demand on 11 September 2025, which was followed by the launching of these court proceedings on 12 September 2025. 5. The applicant has filed a supplementary founding affidavit after the respondent has published further defamatory statements after the launching of the application. This supplementary founding affidavit is preceded by an application in terms of Rule 6(5)(e) of the Uniform Rules of Court, in terms of which the applicant seeks leave of the court to allow further affidavits. 6. The respondent is opposing these proceedings and has filed his answering affidavit out of time and has applied for condonation for the late filing of the said affidavit. The respondent has, in addition, filed two further affidavits. First, a supplementary answering affidavit which expands or supplements his answers set out in the answering affidavit. Second, a ‘Further Final Supplementary answering affidavit’ which deals with the averments set out in the applicant’s supplementary founding affidavit. Urgency 7. The applicant submits that the application is urgent because the impugned statements would have a negative impact on his application to apply for employment. His contract is coming to an end, and there will be a shortlisting for the said post shortly. Further, he would not be able to attain a substantial relief in the ordinary course. In this regard, he continued, damages associated with infringement of the dignity may not be readily quantifiable. He contends further that he attempted to avoid rushing to court by communicating with the respondent through letters from his attorneys, both on 1 September and 12 September 2025, which was an endeavour to exploit other means without rushing to court. Further, he was advised on 2  September 2025 to consider legal action and had to raise funds to pay for the legal services. To this end, the applicant contends that the applicant pursued this process without unnecessary delay. In the alternative, the fact that the posts are still on his Facebook account and are defamatory, they remain continuing wrongful acts and remain as such daily, more particularly as the respondent had instead continued to make further defamatory statements against the applicant, which were posted on 12 September 2025. 8. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that the applicant did not act with the necessary haste and has therefore compromised the urgency by launching the proceedings after a period of nine days. The applicant can obtain a substantial relief in due course and can sue for damages or request Facebook to delete the posts. 9. The test for urgent applications has become settled in our law. Rule 6(12)(b) of the Uniform rules stipulates: “In every affidavit or petition filed in support of any application under paragraph (a) of this subrule, the applicant shall set forth explicitly the circumstances which he avers render the matter urgent and the reasons why he claims that he could not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course.” 10. In addition, the Constitutional Court in the New Nation Movement NPC [2] affirmed that: ‘In assessing whether an application is urgent, this Court has in the past considered various factors, including, among others: (a) the consequence of the relief not being granted; (b) whether the relief would become irrelevant if it is not immediately granted; (c)  whether the urgency was self-created.’ (Footnotes omitted). 11. Where there is a delay, the locus classicus in urgent matters is East Rock Trading, [3] where : “… the court held that w here there has been a delay in launching an urgent application, it is for the applicant to “explain the reasons for the delay and why, despite the delay, he claims that he cannot be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course. I must also mention that the fact that the Applicant wants to have the matter resolved urgently does not render the matter urgent. The correct and crucial test is whether, if the matter were to follow its normal course as laid down by the rules, an Applicant will be afforded substantial redress. If he cannot be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course, then the matter qualifies to be enrolled and heard as an urgent application. If, however, despite the anxiety of an Applicant, he can be afforded a substantial redress in an application in due course, the application does not qualify to be enrolled and heard as an urgent application.” 12. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the applicant cannot be faulted for first attempting to demand retraction and apology from the respondent, who failed to heed the same. In addition, it is correct, as argued by the applicant, that for as long as the posts were on the respondent’s Facebook, each day may be construed as a wrongful act warranting the court’s urgent attention. If the applicant proceeds on a normal basis, the tenor of the relief sought and ultimately granted would pale into insignificance. I am therefore persuaded that a proper case has been mounted for urgency, and the relief sought in this regard is sustained. Respondent’s application for Condonation. 13. The respondent applied for the condonation for the late filing of the answering affidavit. The respondent avers that the application came to his attention on 16  September  2025 in the evening. He was required, in terms of the notice of motion, to serve notice to oppose on 15 September 2025 and to serve an answering affidavit on 17  September 2025. The dies to file notice to oppose had already passed, and the dies for the filing of the answering affidavit was too short. He contended that the applicant would suffer no prejudice if condonation is granted, whereas if it is not granted, he would be denied the right to answer the case against him. 14. The applicant’s counsel, on the other hand, contended that it is not correct that the respondent only received the court processes on 16 September 2025, as it was personally served on him on 12 September 2025. He elected to ignore the same since, he argued, it was ineffectual as it was not served by a sheriff. That notwithstanding, the applicant’s counsel submitted that the said application for condonation is not opposed. 15. I had regard to the stance of the applicant who mounted no opposition to the application for condonation. Furthermore, in urgent applications, strict compliance with rules (and prescribed timelines) is where warranted relaxed, and importantly, the applicant was able to consider the answering affidavit and replied thereto. I therefore find that there is no prejudice to visit the applicant and, in the premises, I exercise my discretion in terms of the rules of court [4] and grants the condonation for the late filing of the respondent’s notice to oppose and the respondent’s answering affidavit. Applications in terms of Rule 6(5)(e) 16. The applicant brought an application, which was uploaded on CaseLines on 19  September 2025, seeking leave for the court to admit a supplementary founding affidavit. The applicant contended that the affidavit relates to further defamatory statements that were published by the respondent after the launch and service of this application. The applicant contends that the respondent would not be prejudiced if the affidavit is admitted, since it relates to the respondent’s own statement, which demonstrates the total disregard of the law by the respondent, and, if anything, it enhances the basis of the urgency of the application. 17. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the application to admit a further affidavit should not be granted as it is trite that a party has to make their case on the founding affidavit and should not be allowed to have a second bite of the cherry. 18. At the same time, the respondent has filed supplementary answering affidavits and requested admission in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6(5)(e) of the uniform rules of court. 19. Rule 6(5)(e) endows the court with a discretion to permit the filing of further affidavits. In this regard, the authors of Erasmus: Superior Court Practice stated that “The court will exercise this discretion against the backdrop of the fundamental consideration that a matter should be adjudicated upon all the facts relevant to the issue in dispute.” [5] In view of the fact that the said further affidavits raise pertinent issues and both parties have engaged with their contents, I find that there is no prejudice to either of the parties, and as such, the respective applications are granted. The parties' contentions and submissions. 20. The applicant contended that the first post stating that the applicant is protecting the rapists and abusers is unfounded and defamatory. The said post presented itself as a statement of fact without any basis or cogent evidence. To a reasonable reader, the applicant argued, the said post implies that he is a man with little regard for the law. 21. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the applicant was aware of the abuse he and his mother suffered at the hands of the applicant’s siblings during 1992 – 1995, and he has failed to do anything about it. The abuse included the rape of his mother and himself. In addition, he attempted to lay criminal charges against the applicant and believes that his efforts were thwarted by the applicant, who has his own contacts and has therefore influenced SAPS to refuse to allow him to lay a criminal complaint against the applicant. This, the respondent argues, amounted to a corrupt propensity on his part which impacts on his integrity as an officer occupying a senior position in government. 22. Regarding the refusal of the SAPS to open the case against the applicant and the allegations that he pulled strings, led the respondent to state that  “… it is precisely this history of suppression and lack of institutional response that compelled me to raise these issues in the public domain. My statements were aimed at ensuring public accountability and transparency for a person who holds one of the highest constitutional offices in the country. They were made in the public interest and did not exceed the lawful bounds of my rights to freedom of expression.” [6] . 23. The respondent had also sent an email to the applicant's employer on 18 September 2025, relaying the same allegations of protecting abusers in his family and accusing him of frustrating the prosecutions of his criminal charges because he is a high-ranking official. He is flabbergasted at the hesitance of the applicant’s employers for not contacting him so that he can substantiate the allegations of the applicant abusing his position and state resources. The applicant contends that the respondent has no evidence to back up such allegations, as he could have made them in the email without hoping for a special invitation from the employer, and this demonstrates malice. 24. In his defence, the respondent further stated that the statements he made are in the public interest. There is, however, no evidence tendered as at publication as to what benefit the public would accrue from the publication. The allegations of abuse are old and were allegedly stated in his book, which was written in 2020. The attempt to justify the statement after the fact is far-fetched, implausible, and was mentioned to be dismissed. 25. The applicant contends that the second post regarding the condom, which was allegedly hidden in the boot of his car, would appear to a reasonable reader that the applicant is dishonest to his wife, a cheat, and an adulterer. He disputes the correctness of the statement and has asserted that the statement is posited by the respondent as a fact but not supported by any evidence. The law requires that the post should have been backed up with evidence, without which it remains defamatory. His attempt to secure a witness, Mr Samuel Manamela (“ Mr Manamela ”), failed as the said witness appeared not to be keen to present evidence to support his assertions. The said witness stated in an email that the allegations were started 14 years ago, and the respondent should let go, in any event, as they seem not to advance his real case regarding the sexual abuse. 26. The inference to be drawn from such a statement, the applicant argues, is that the applicant is not trustworthy as a leader at his work and at church. In any event, the applicant disputes the said story as it has never taken place. The post cannot be justified on the basis that it was in the interest of the public. 27. The respondent stated that he saw the applicant on 16 December 2011 attempting to hide the condoms that fell out of the spare wheel, further that he was not alone, and his firstborn son can attest “… to what pathetic father he was.” In contrast, his son denied the truthfulness of the statement and further stated that the car belonged to his wife and was not his. The applicant stated that the statement has the effect of describing him as a man of questionable morals. 28. In his defence, the respondent continued, he argued that the statement regarding the condom “… constituted a fair comment on the integrity of a public figure who occupies a constitutional position and presents himself as a moral and spiritual leader.” In any event, the allegations contained may be of public interest, bearing in mind that the applicant is a leader at the church and employed in a senior position at a public institution. 29. Concerning the post of abuse of power and state’s resources, the respondent stated that the backing of the accusation that the applicant is corrupt is that he secured the attendance of the bodyguards, intended to prevent him from attending the funeral, and the presence of the six motorbikes of TMPD [7] . 30. The applicant correctly submitted that the publication should have been supported by cogent evidence, and the attempt to suggest that evidence would be provided later is not a justification. The allegations are more than 14 years old and cannot be fair comment now or be considered fair comments. They are not even of public interest. In the premises, the defence is therefore unsustainable. 31. The respondent referred to two bases upon which he believed that the applicant abuses state resources and employs his powers to attain his personal or private gain. He further stated that the applicant is corrupt, as he managed to get him enrolled in a school by following some irregular means. This is disputed by the applicant, who stated that the admission at the said school was above board. 32. Further that he used the state resources to obtain his home address, which was never given to him by the respondent. The applicant stated that this was untrue, and the address was provided to him by the respondent’s mother when she was still alive. Second, and without providing any supporting evidence, the respondent posted a statement and insinuated that I pulled strings in getting six members of the TMPD to attend the funeral, who were bouncers hired by him. All these imply that he abused the state resources. This was denied as the applicant was on leave and could not have put the resources into action to advance the course associated with the funeral. 33. The respondent’s statements were also tagged to the Electoral Commission of South Africa, the Presidency of South Africa, the African Transformation Movement, and the African Democratic Movement. The respondent averred that “[T]he fact that I tagged institutions such as the Electoral Commission, the Presidency, and political organisations was consistent with my right to seek transparency and oversight when a public office-bearer institutes litigation against me that implicates issues of abuse, corruption, and misuse of state resources. This was not mala fide, but rather an appeal to oversight bodies and stakeholders who have a legitimate interest in whether the IEC Chairperson is acting with integrity.” [8] 34. These assertions were meant to elicit the reasons from the applicant to provide a proper answer on state resources abuse, as there were bouncers and members of the TMPD, and the applicant having failed to provide the respondent with a persuasive answer meant that there was an abuse. 35. In his defence, the respondent further contended that the allegations also impact the applicant’s integrity and accountability as a chairperson of the IEC and are of public concern relative to the role he plays. Further, the allegations made have been disclosed in his book and through interviews in 2019 and were never challenged. Legal principles 36. It is trite that to establish defamation, a party should show that a false statement was published negligently or with malicious intent to a third party, which causes harm to the reputation of a person. Once a plaintiff establishes that a defendant has published a defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, it is presumed that the publication was both unlawful and intentional. The defendant who wishes to avoid the consequences must then raise a defence which rebuts unlawfulness or intention. [9] 37. The SCA held in Manuel [10] that the exercise to determine whether a statement is defamatory involves a twofold inquiry. “ First, one establishes the meaning of the words used. Second, one asks whether that meaning was defamatory in that it was likely to injure the good esteem in which the plaintiff was held by the reasonable or average person to whom the statement was published. Where the injured party selects certain meanings to point the sting of the statement, they are bound by the selected meanings. The meaning of the statement is determined objectively by the legal construct of the reasonable reader and is not a matter on which evidence may be led.”. At para 30 (footnotes not added). 38. Concerning the relief of apology, the court stated in Manuel, wherein reference was made of McBride, [11] where it was indicated that ordering an apology would not be warranted in certain circumstances. It also held, at para 130, that when coupled with a relief for the award of damages, it would not be awarded separately, as it may weigh heavily in determining the quantum of damages in defamation cases. it was stated in Du Toit [12] that “ “ I do not believe that it would be reasonable for the applicant, who has explicitly stated that he does not wish to pursue a claim for damages and seeks only the interdicting of future defamatory conduct, together with a retraction and apology, to pursue such a costly and time-consuming remedy”. [13] 39. For the assessment on the question of intention to injure, it was stated in Manuel, [14] that 'Evidence that a defendant honestly thought that his defamatory words were published with a lawful purpose, although in accordance with an objective standard the purpose was not lawful, would justify an inference that he did not have the intention to injure.' 40. Concerning the requirements for an interdict, the applicant has contended that his right to a good name, reputation, and dignity is being infringed or harmed by the publication. The defences open to the respondents include fair comment, truth, and reasonable publication. On the question of alternative remedies, it was stated in Du Toit [15] that “Recognising that an action for damages is likely to be protracted and costly, an interdict in appropriate cases may be justified.” Also, at para 117, where it was stated that “Regarding the availability of an alternative remedy, I believe that in that case a claim for damages is not a satisfactory alternative remedy. 41. The court [16] stated at para 25 that, “It is partly for these reasons that our courts have long held that whether the publication of a defamatory statement is for the public benefit depends critically on the content of the statement and the time, manner and occasion of its publication. The question is whether there was overall public benefit to the statement’s publication in how it was published and when it was published.” 42. Concerning the defence of reasonable publication, the SCA in Manuel [17] stated that “…whether publication was reasonable would involve an assessment of several factors, including the reliability of the source and the steps taken to verify the information. It goes without saying that it would have to be shown that they were satisfied that the information was true...” 43. Regarding the dispute of facts, it is trite that where there are disputes of fact in motion proceedings, the court would ordinarily decide in favour of the respondent unless it can be demonstrated that such disputes are palpably implausible and untenable. [18] Analysis 44. It is noted that several arguments were advanced by the respondent in his defence. First, contending that the requirements for a defamatory claim were not satisfied alternatively that he satisfied applicable common law defences. Second, that the requirements for an interdict were not met, and finally, there is a dispute of facts. 45. The respondent contends that the statements were true and/ or substantially true, alternatively constituted fair comments made in good faith and in the public interest. Furthermore, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the unlawfulness or animus iniuriandi exists. It is stated by the authors in LAWSA that “Publication of a defamatory statement raises two rebuttable presumptions of fact, namely a presumption of intent as well as a presumption of unlawfulness. Once these presumptions arise, the onus rests on the defendant to rebut them.” [19] The respondent has failed to discharge this onus. 46. For a defence of reasonable publication to succeed, the applicant has correctly submitted that such a defence enjoins the respondent to first accept the statement as false. Further that the SCA in Bogoshi [20] stated that the publication has to demonstrate that attempts were made to verify the information, and the applicant has been allowed to reply before the publication. Only then would the respondent be considered to have conducted himself reasonably. No evidence has been marshalled by the respondent to verify the information in his posts. 47. About the defence that the statement is true, it was stated in Manuel [21] that the respondent is required to prove that such a statement was a true public interest defence. The post was not supported by any evidence to justify the respondent invoking this defence. Notwithstanding the applicant disputing the truthfulness of the allegations in the post, the respondent failed to advance a persuasive argument to demonstrate that the allegations were true. 48. The defence contended that the allegation made in the post that he was abused has not been challenged, and mentioning the same is set to be the truth, as he was relating his personal experience. It is noted that abuse (in general) and the crime of rape are ravaging the soul of society with devastating consequences and permanent scars to the victim. They should be frowned upon whence they lurk. Though traumatic and not easy, the facts and evidence underpinning such allegations need to be proved with evidence in court. If they are not proved, it would not be proper for a party to be publicly accused thereof or accused of not having acted thereupon. It is noted that the respondent has acknowledged that the alleged offences did not lapse and can still be proceeded with now. It follows that the respondent may still pursue criminal proceedings against the perpetrators. The decision of the members of SAPS in refusing to open a case can be challenged in court; alternatively, private prosecution, if appropriate, can also be launched. Until then, cadit questio . 49. Concerning the defence of fair comment, the counsel for the applicant contended that the respondent needs to demonstrate that he made a comment and not make a statement of fact. It is trite that a party would succeed with this defence provided that such a comment is not made maliciously and is based on facts that were fairly stated and substantially true. [22] On a proper reading of the statements, the post was not an opinion but a factual indication by the respondent. For a fair comment, the publication should be a matter of public interest, as contrasted with a matter of interest to the public. 50. When asked by the court why it was necessary to raise the issues now, which have been published in his book, he retorted that he was angry and distraught at how the applicant treated him at the funeral, where he was stopped from practising his cultural rituals when someone is burying his or her parents. He was entitled to be upset at the moment. This response is not accommodated in any of the defences set out in our jurisprudence. 51. About the requirements of a final interdict, the respondent contended that the applicant has failed to show that he has a clear right. He failed to exploit alternative remedies, including approaching Facebook and requesting that the posts be deleted. In addition, the alleged defamatory statements have been mentioned in his book he wrote and published in 2020. The applicant had never come to challenge the said publication. 52. In addition, he argues, the applicant failed to prove that there was an intention on his part to defame him, and without establishing the same, the application is unsustainable. 53. The respondent further disputes that there would not be irreparable harm, as there are very few people visited and viewed his post. This contention has no legal basis since the publication need not be any wider to qualify for defamation and warrant an interdict. It would be sufficient if the statements were made to one person. In this case, besides his friends on Facebook, he sent the messages to IEC, the Presidency, the African Transformation Movement, and the African Democratic Movement. 54. The question of interdict has been satisfactorily dealt with. The constitutional court stated in OUTA [23] that where a right claimed is sourced from the constitution, a party need not embellish its facts to any extent. With regard to irreparable damages, it should be noted that if the applicant loses the opportunity to be appointed at the upcoming interview, the damages would not be quantifiable. Further aggravating the situation is that the respondent continued and posted further defamatory statements, hence the filing of a supplementary affidavit. 55. The respondent contended further that there are disputes of fact, the matter must be referred for trial, and in the meantime, he is amenable to deactivate his Facebook account. He will then be able to present evidence from witnesses, voice recordings, and media interviews that have never been contradicted before. [24] To the extent that the respondent is unable to provide evidence in an acceptable form, then the alleged contention of the presence of a dispute of facts is untenable and bound to be dismissed. 56. In reply, the counsel for the applicant stated that the respondent has failed to highlight which facts are in dispute. That notwithstanding, the test should also be whether the said disputes are materially related to the issues to be determined. His argument about the history of his abuse and the meetings that were held does not relate to the issues that are up for determination. Also, the issue about the relationship between her mother and the stepfather is immaterial to the defamation of the applicant. The respondent has failed to discharge the onus upon him to rebut that the allegations do not amount to defamation, having clearly stated that the sting attached thereto is that the applicant was dishonest, a cheater, and with questionable moral character. Conclusion 57. The applicant has successfully demonstrated that the impugned statements regarding misusing state resources implied that he is corrupt, abuses his powers, a man with no integrity, honesty, and that state resources are sustainable, since no evidence was proffered to prove the existence of such facts. The respondent cannot argue that such statements were in the public interest if he cannot prove that they are true or that he was making fair comments. Such statements were presented as if they were correct facts, and the respondent failed to demonstrate that he made efforts to determine their correctness. [25] Instead, he argues that he was hoping that the applicant would prove him wrong. He failed to provide any supporting evidence regarding the condom statement. 58. An attempt to invoke the provisions of section 16 of the Constitution cannot avail the respondent, more particularly, since the said provision does not provide for a licence to defame other parties. Such a right must co-exist with other rights, including dignity [26] and a good name. DCJ Moseneke stated in Dikoko [27] that “[ I]t seems to me that the dialect of defamation implicates human dignity, which includes the reputation on the one hand and freedom of expression on the other. Both are protected in our Bill of Rights.” 59. The respondent failed to survive the challenge mounted by the applicant that the statements published were not supported by any evidence whatsoever, and in retort, the respondent contended that he is prepared to deactivate his account and then later prove his statements in a trial court. If he is unable to prove the same now, they must be removed. Once there are no facts or evidence for the statements, they are obviously false (and not true) and cannot be considered to be a fair comment; neither would the defence of reasonable publication be sustained as the respondent does not accept that the statement is false. 60. His statements appear to have been actuated by malice, as he was angry at how he was treated at the funeral of his mother. It is understood that anyone who feels unfairly dealt with by being forbidden to participate in one parent’s funeral has a valid complaint, but this cannot justify having to publicly annihilate another person's reputation and dignity without a prior proper reflection. 61. In the premises, I find the application to be sustainable. Costs 62. The general principle that the costs should follow the result shall apply. Order 63. In the premises, I make the following orders. 1. The rules relating to forms and time lines prescribed in terms of the rules and practice directives are dispensed with, and this matter is treated as urgent in terms of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court. 2. Applicant’s application to permit the supplementary founding affidavit is granted. 3. Respondent’s application to permit the supplementary answering affidavit is granted. 4. A declarator is issued that statements published by the respondent on his Facebook account on 27, 29, and 30 August 2025 and 12 September 2025 are defamatory. 5. The respondent is ordered to permanently delete the said statements from his Facebook account. 6. The respondent is ordered not to publish or cause to be published any further defamatory statements concerning the applicant. 7. The respondent is ordered to unreservedly publish an apology on his Facebook account and send a copy of the apology to the applicant, IEC, President of the Republic of South Africa, African Transformation Movement, and the African Democratic Movement, for the impugned statements within 24 hours of service of this order. 8. The respondent is ordered to pay costs on a party and party scale, including counsel costs on Scale B. M V NOKO Judge of the High Court DISCLAIMER: This judgment was prepared and authored by Judge Noko and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties /their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on Case Lines. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 7 October 2025 . Dates Of hearing: 23 September 2025 Of Judgment: 7 October 2025. Appearances. For the Applicant:                                         Premhid K, instructed by Ditsela Incorporated. For the Respondent: In Person [1] The names of the applicant’s brother and other parties are not set out in this judgment as they were not joined to the lis and have not been afforded the right of reply to the allegations which implicate them. [2] New Nation Movement NPC & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & others (CCT110/19) [2020] ZACC 11 ; 2020 (8) BCLR 950 (CC); 2020 (6) SA 257 (CC) (11 June 2020). [3] East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Limited and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Limited and Others (11/33767) [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011) paras 5 to 9. [4] In terms of Rule 27 of the Uniform Rules of Court. [5] See Erasmus – “ Superior Court Practice ” at B1-46. [6] Second para at CL 011-23 [7] The respondent had initially stated that they were JMPD, and the same was rectified to TMPD. [8] CL 011-46 [9] See Khumalo and Others v Holomisa [2002] ZACC 12 ; 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) at para 18. See also Manuel at para 36. [10] Economic Freedom Fighters v Manuel (711/2029) [2020] ZASCA 172 ; [2021] 1 All SA 623 (SCA); 2021 (3) SA 425 (SCA) (17 December 2020). [11] The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd and Others v McBride 2011 (4) SA 191 (CC). [12] Du Toit v Becket and Another (8687/2023) [2024] ZAWCHC 56 (21 February 56). [13] Id at at para 109. [14] Id note 10. [15] Id note 12. [16] Id. [17] At para [65]. [18] See Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd [1984] ZASCA 51 ; 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at pp 634 and 635 held as follows: - ‘ It is correct that, where in proceedings on notice of motion disputes of fact have arisen on the affidavits, a final order, whether it be an interdict or some other form of relief, may be granted if those facts averred in the applicant's affidavits which have been admitted by the respondent, together with the facts alleged by the respondent, justify such an order. The power of the Court to give such final relief on the papers before it is, however, not confined to such a situation. In certain instances, the denial by respondent of a fact alleged by the applicant may not be such as to raise a real, genuine or bona fide dispute of fact … … Moreover, there may be exceptions to this general rule, as, for example, where the allegations or denials of the respondent are so far-fetched or clearly untenable that the Court is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers ...’. [19] Joubert WA “ The Law of South Africa ”, Vol 7, 2 nd Ed., LexisNexis, at 235. [20] National Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi (579/96) [1998] ZASCA 94 ; 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA); [1998] 4 All SA 347 (A) (29 September 1998). [21] Id note 10 (para 37) [22] The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd and Others v McBride 2011 (4) SA 191 (CC) para 83, where the court stated that the statement is not unlawful if it was reasonable to publish even if it was false. The respondent bears the onus of proving reasonableness. [23] National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliances and Others 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC). [25] See para 37 in Manuel where the court stated that “[ T]ruth and public interest and fair comment are two defences that have long been recognised as rebutting the presumption of wrongfulness. A defendant relying on truth and public interest must plead and prove that the statement is substantially true and was published in the public interest.” [26] Section 10 of the Constitution. [27] Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) at para [90]. sino noindex make_database footer start