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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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[2025] ZAGPJHC 1143
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## K.S.S v Fire Fanatix CC and Another (2025/038772)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 1143 (10 November 2025)
K.S.S v Fire Fanatix CC and Another (2025/038772)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 1143 (10 November 2025)
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sino date 10 November 2025
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 2025-038772
(1)
REPORTABLE NO
(2)
OF INTREST TO OTHER JUDGES NO
(3)
REVISED YES
In
the matter between
K[…]
S[…] S[…]
Applicant
and
FIRE
FANATIX CC
First
Respondent
W[…]
A[…]
S[…]
Second
Respondent
JUDGMNET
[1]
This is the return day of a provisional winding-up order, granted by
Dippenaar J, winding-up the first respondent, a close
corporation, on
the basis that it is just and equitable to do so.
[2]
The applicant and the second respondent are husband and wife,
apparently in the throes of an acrimonious divorce, and
each a 50%
registered member of the first respondent.
[3]
The second respondent raised various defences to the winding-up
application brought by the
applicant, the main ones being:
[3.1]
The applicant is not in fact a 50% member, but holds her
50%
interest as the second
respondent’s
nominee.
[3.2]
The first respondent is not unable to pay its
debts.
[3.3]
The applicant has not approached the court with
clean hands,
which
is necessary when seeking a winding-up on just and equitable grounds.
[4]
Dippenaar J gave a careful and reasoned judgment, the main findings
of
which
are the following:
[4.1]
The
respondents to a large extent left the
applicant’s version unchallenged (para 14).
[4.2]
It was not
meaningfully disputed on the papers that the
business
of the first respondent has been subsumed into Facility Fire
[1]
(para 15).
[4.3]
The respondents’ version that the
applicant holds her 50% interest in the first respondent as the
second respondent’s
nominee does not create a
bona
fide
irresoluble dispute of fact,
and it would serve no purpose to refer that issue to oral evidence
(para 25).
[4.4]
The applicant manifestly failed to make out any
case that the first respondent is commercially insolvent or unable to
pay its debts
(para 27).
[4.5]
The applicant’s behaviour does not bar
her from obtaining a winding-up order on the just and equitable
ground (para 35).
[4.6]
The evidence establishes at least
prima
facie
that the deadlock principle is
applicable (para 38).
[4.7]
It cannot be concluded that there are
alternative
remedies at the disposal of the parties (para 39).
[4.8]
A
winding-up
order is appropriate and necessary so that all the irregularities can
be properly investigated (para 39).
[4.9]
The applicant
has “
established
a case on a
prima
facie
basis and a provisional order is appropriate. Importantly, there may
well be interested parties, such as creditors of the first
respondent, who may wish to participate in the proceedings who should
be afforded an opportunity to do so. It is further open to
the
respondents to seek to persuade a court on the return of the order
that no final order should be granted
.”
(para 40).
[5]
The
respondents delivered no further affidavits after the provisional
order was granted, and have done nothing to disturb the
prima
facie
case
found by Dippenaar J. To the extent that it was incumbent on the
respondents to show cause why the provisional order should
not be
made final, they have done nothing to do so. Instead, counsel for the
respondents, Mr W Coetzee, sought to argue that the
applicant’s
case as made out in the founding papers did not pass muster and was
insufficient to justify a final order. Whereas
the test at the stage
of provisional
winding-up
is whether the applicant has adduced
prima
facie
proof of its case, when a final order is sought, the relief sought
must be proved on a balance of probabilities
[2]
[6]
Mr Coetzee
submitted that, on the strength of the case of
Jafte
v Ilifu Trading 330 CC
[3]
,
that it is an extreme stance to wind up a solvent entity. That case
is however distinguishable. There were four members in the
respondent
close corporation, and the court found that the
winding-up
of the respondent would bear extremely harshly on the applicant’s
co-members who had contributed their effort and
expertise to the
respondent and grown it into a successful and flourishing concern
against the applicant’s minimal contribution
and deliberate
lack of participation since a particular event.
[7]
The applicant and second respondent are in the throes of an
acrimonious divorce. That makes co-operation difficult if
not
impossible, and a deadlock probable.
[8]
But more importantly, the applicant
alleges
that the business of the first respondent, Fire Fanatix, has over a
number of years been transferred to and subsumed into
another entity
owned by the second respondent and later by his father, namely
Facility Fire (Pty) Ltd, which is in the same line
of business as the
first respondent. The financial statements of the first respondent
reflect that from the financial year ending
28 February 2020 until
the financial year ended 28 February 2023, the turnover from its
operations has progressively dwindled from
(in round figures)
R 12.6 million to R 3.7 million in the next year,
to R 48 000 in the next year,
to nothing in 2023. There is
no proper denial of the allegation of diversion of business or
explanation for this state of affairs,
save for the second
respondent’s insistence that the applicant held her 50%
member’s interest in the first respondent
as his nominee, and
that his father started Facility Fire “pursuant to the
Applicant’s continued abuse of the member’s
interest in
the First Respondent”. However, on the applicant’s
version, not denied by the second respondent, the applicant
played no
role in the business for at least the last seven years, and has had
no access to the bank accounts or the premises of
the first
respondent in that period. There was accordingly apparently no
obstacle to him running the business as he saw fit, and
the diversion
of business to another company is clearly aimed at prejudicing the
applicant. It is therefore not surprising that
Dippenaar J found that
the deadlock principle was at least
prima
facie
established to be applicable, and that it was just and equitable to
wind-up the first respondent. Dippenaar J had to go no further
than a
prima
facie
case, but it is clear to me that this has been established on a
balance of probabilities.
[9]
Dippenaar J found that there was no purpose in referring the question
of the applicant’s 50% interest in the
first
respondent
to oral evidence. I agree with that finding. The
applicant and the
first respondent
are both
reflected as 50% members of the
first respondent
in the annual
financial
statements to
which
I referred above. That is certainly the picture presented to the
world at large. If the
second
respondent
was indeed the beneficial 100% member of the
first
respondent
, I would have expected him to seek to establish
that in a court of law, rather than diverting
business
from what is, on his version, entirely his own close corporation to
another company. That would be cutting his nose to
spite his face.
But diverting business to another entity makes sense if he believes
that the applicant is a 50% beneficial member
of the first
respondent. I therefore find on a balance of probabilities that the
applicant is indeed a 50% beneficial member of
the first respondent.
[10]
Mr Coetzee also submitted that the applicant did not come to court
with clean hands. That was dealt with by Dippenaar
J, who found that
the conduct of the applicant was not causative of the breakdown of
the parties’ business relationship,
and that in any event the
second respondent was also not without blame. That finding is in my
view well justified on the facts,
and has not been disturbed by any
new facts.
[11]
The applicant is therefore in my opinion entitled to a final order.
[12]
The applicant, in a supplementary affidavit, sought further relief,
namely to convene a section 417/418 enquiry. I have
two difficulties
with this. The first is that it is simply requested in a
supplementary affidavit, without a notice of motion.
The second is
that there is no commissioner identified and suggested, but it is
left to the court to appoint a commissioner. That
is in my view
undesirable, and contrary to the usual position
which
is that the party seeking the order would have approached a potential
commissioner, obtained their
agreement
and suggested their name to the court. I am therefore not prepared to
grant this order. The applicant is free to approach the court
after
the final winding-up order is granted.
[13]
In the result, I make the following order:
[1] The first
respondent is placed under final winding-up in the hands of the
Master of this Court.
[2] The costs of
this
application
are to be
costs in the winding-up of the first respondent.
ANDRÉ
GAUTSCHI
Acting
Judge of the High Court
10
November 2025
Date
of hearing:
28
October 2025
Date
of judgment:
10
November 2025
For
the applicant:
Adv
N Riley
(Instructed
by Fairbridges Wertheim Becker Inc)
For
the respondent:
Adv
W Coetzee
(Instructed
by Jurgens Bekker Attorneys Inc)
[1]
The relevance of this entity to this matter is explained
below.
[2]
Braithwaite
v Gilbert (Volkskas Bpk intervening)
1984 (4) SA 717
(W) 718B-C;
Wackrill
v Sandton International Removals (Pty) Ltd
1984 (1) SA 282
(W) at 285A-286B
[3]
Jafte
v Ilifu Trading
330 CC (EL 1259/11
, ECD 2092/11)
[2012] ZAECELLC 6 (5 April 2012)
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