Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 1171South Africa
Mosia v Molelle and Others (2024/051135) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1171 (17 November 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
17 November 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Mosia v Molelle and Others (2024/051135) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1171 (17 November 2025)
Mosia v Molelle and Others (2024/051135) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1171 (17 November 2025)
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sino date 17 November 2025
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO:
2024/051135
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED. NO
DATE
17 November 2025
In the matter between:
TSELISO
RAINBOW MOSIA
Applicant
and
PULANE
GRACE MOLELLE
First
Respondent
NONKANGALA
CATHERINE MSIBI
Second
Respondent
REGISTRAR
OF DEEDS, JOHANNESBURG
Third
Respondent
THE
CITY OF JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
Fourth
Respondent
JUDGMENT
This judgment is
handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives by email and by being uploaded
to CaseLines. The date
and time for hand down is deemed to be 17 November 2025.
MAHON
AJ:
Introduction
[1]
This matter concerns an application for the cancellation of a title
deed in respect of an immovable property situated
in Orange Farm. The
applicant contends that he is the rightful owner of the property by
virtue of what he describes as an allocation
made to him by the City
of Johannesburg and evidenced, in his view, by certain documents
annexed to his founding affidavit. He
alleges further that the
subsequent transfer of the property, first from the municipality to
the first respondent and thereafter
from the first respondent to the
second respondent, was procured through fraud and the use of forged
documents. On this basis he
seeks, among other forms of relief, a
declaration that both transfers are null and void, together with an
order restoring the property
to what he describes as its original
status.
[2]
The first respondent, who is said to have been the immediate
transferee from the municipality, has taken no active part
in the
proceedings. The second respondent, the current registered owner,
opposes the application and denies all allegations of
impropriety.
The City of Johannesburg, cited as the fourth respondent, has filed
no papers and has offered no explanation for the
transfers impugned
by the applicant.
[3]
The matter was set down for hearing on the opposed motion roll. When
it was called, the second respondent sought a postponement
from the
bar on the basis that new attorneys had been appointed the previous
day and required time to prepare. The request was
advanced without an
affidavit and without any attempt to explain the two-month period
during which the respondents were unrepresented
following the
withdrawal of their erstwhile attorneys. The application for a
postponement was dismissed for reasons given during
the hearing.
[4]
What then remained was the substantive application, which turns on
whether the applicant has placed before the Court a
proper factual
and legal foundation for the relief sought. Central to this inquiry
is whether the documents on which the applicant
relies confer, or are
capable of conferring, any cognisable real right to the property;
whether the allegations of fraud are supported
by admissible facts;
and whether the applicant has established a legal basis for setting
aside a duly registered transfer of land
in circumstances where he
has never appeared in the chain of title.
Factual
Background and Chronology
[5]
The property in dispute is a residential stand situated in Orange
Farm. It was, at all relevant times prior to the impugned
transfers,
owned by the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality. The
applicant contends that the municipality allocated
the property to
him. In support of this contention he relies on three documents: a
document he describes as a permit issued in
his favour (annexure
TRM2); a set of building plans approved by the municipality which, he
says, could only have been sought pursuant
to an allocation (annexure
TRM3); and a document headed “Call-in Notice” (annexure
TRM1) issued under the municipality’s
letterhead requesting
that the first respondent attend its offices in relation to the
property.
[6]
The applicant states that he erected structures on the property in
the belief that he had been allocated it. He alleges
that the first
respondent, together with her mother, thereafter procured transfer of
the property into the first respondent’s
name without his
knowledge or consent. The details of the transaction between the
municipality and the first respondent are not
disclosed on the
papers. The applicant did not witness any of the events he describes
as fraudulent; rather, he infers impropriety
only from the fact that
the property was transferred to the first respondent instead of to
him.
[7]
Following the transfer into her name, the first respondent concluded
a sale of the property to the second respondent.
The second
respondent’s version is that she purchased the property
lawfully and for value. A deeds office search (annexure
TRM5)
reflects only two owners in the property’s history: first, the
City of Johannesburg; and thereafter, the second respondent.
The
applicant has never appeared in the deeds registry records as owner.
[8]
The applicant maintains that the first respondent’s failure to
attend at the municipality in response to the call-in
notice
prevented an inquiry into the circumstances of the transfer. He
contends that had she attended, the municipality would have
been able
to clarify how the property was transferred and on what basis. The
municipality has not provided any explanation for
the transfer, nor
has it confirmed whether an allocation was ever made to the
applicant.
[9]
In these circumstances the applicant seeks relief premised on the
assertion that he should have been the transferee of
the property and
that the transfers to the first and second respondents took place
irregularly or unlawfully.
Analysis
Ownership
and the Nature of the Rights Asserted
[10]
The principal foundation of the applicant’s case is the
assertion that he is, or ought to be regarded as, the owner
of the
property. Ownership of immovable property in South African law is
acquired through registration in the deeds registry. The
deeds search
placed before the Court shows that the only registered owners in the
property’s history are the City of Johannesburg
and,
subsequently, the second respondent. The applicant has never appeared
in the chain of title. Unless the applicant can demonstrate
a legal
right that entitles him to demand transfer of the property into his
name, he cannot impugn the title of the second respondent.
[11]
The applicant relies on three documents in support of his claim to
ownership: a document described as a permit (TRM2),
a set of building
plans (TRM3), and a call-in notice (TRM1). The permit does not
identify the statutory or regulatory framework
in terms of which it
was issued; nor does it state that it confers a right of occupation,
let alone ownership. It is silent as
to its legal effect. The
building plans merely reflect the municipality’s approval of
construction on the property; this
does not, without more, vest a
real right in the applicant. The call-in notice is no more than an
administrative request issued
to the first respondent inviting her to
attend the municipality’s offices. It does not purport to
allocate the property or
to create rights in favour of the applicant.
[12]
Even assuming in the applicant’s favour that an allocation of
some kind occurred, an allocation of land by a municipality,
without
more, does not confer a real right. At best, it may give rise to a
personal right against the municipality to be considered
for transfer
if and when the municipality elects to dispose of the land. A
personal right of this kind is not enforceable against
third parties
and does not in itself entitle the holder to demand cancellation of a
registered transfer to someone else. The applicant’s
papers do
not identify any statute, policy, proclamation, or administrative
scheme that would elevate an allocation or a permit
of the kind
relied upon to a real right capable of defeating the title of a later
registered owner.
[13]
The absence of a statutory or contractual foundation that links the
documents relied upon to a transferable real right
is fatal to the
claim of ownership.
The
Allegations of Fraud
[14]
The applicant alleges that the transfer of the property from the
municipality to the first respondent was effected through
fraud and
the use of forged documents. These allegations, however, are made
without factual support. The applicant does not claim
to have
witnessed any of the conduct complained of. The founding affidavit
does not identify the documents said to have been forged,
the nature
of the purported forgery, or the respects in which the municipality
is alleged to have been deceived.
[15]
The inference of fraud is drawn solely from the fact that the
municipality transferred the property to the first respondent
rather
than to the applicant. Inferences cannot substitute for facts, and an
inference of fraud is permissible only where it is
the most
reasonable inference from the facts. The possibility that the
municipality, fully apprised of its own allocation processes
and
internal records, took a decision to transfer the property to the
first respondent for reasons unknown to the applicant is
not excluded
by the papers. The City of Johannesburg has been served and has
elected not to participate in these proceedings. Its
silence does not
advance the applicant’s case; nor can it be treated as evidence
that the transfer was effected unlawfully
or without its knowledge.
[16]
Accusations of fraud are serious and must be supported by clear and
particularised facts. The applicant’s allegations
fall
significantly short of what is required. In the absence of any
factual foundation, there is no basis upon which a court may
set
aside a duly registered transfer in the deeds registry.
[17]
Because the applicant never acquired ownership, and because he has
not established that he holds a real right enforceable
against third
parties, he lacks the necessary standing to challenge the transfer of
the property to the first and second respondents.
A litigant cannot
obtain the cancellation of a registered title deed unless he
demonstrates a legal right that is infringed by
the continued
existence of that deed. On the papers, the applicant has not
established such a right.
Competence
of the Relief Sought
[18]
The principal relief sought is a declaration that the transfers to
the first and second respondents are null and void.
This relief
presupposes that the applicant should have been the transferee and
that the municipality acted unlawfully in transferring
the property
elsewhere. For the reasons already given, that assumption cannot be
sustained.
[19]
The alternative relief sought is that the property be restored to the
municipality, which must then conduct an inquiry
to determine the
rightful owner. There is no legal basis for such an order. The
applicant does not identify a statute that empowers
a court to compel
a municipality to conduct an inquiry of this nature, nor is there any
indication that the municipality seeks
the return of the property.
Courts do not compel public bodies to take ownership of property
against their will.
[20]
A further difficulty arises from the fact that the first respondent,
whose attendance at the municipality is said to
be essential for the
proposed inquiry, is not under any legal obligation to attend such a
meeting. A court order directing her
to do so would amount to
compelling attendance at an administrative proceeding for which no
statutory or common law authority has
been identified.
[21]
The relief sought is therefore not competent and cannot be granted.
Conclusion
on the Merits
[22]
The applicant has not established that he is the owner of the
property, nor that he holds any real right entitling him
to the
cancellation of the transfers in question. The allegations of fraud
are unsubstantiated and rest on conjecture rather than
fact. The
relief sought, both in its primary and alternative forms, is not
competent. The application must accordingly fail on
the merits.
[23]
In the circumstances, the following order
is made:
1.
The application is dismissed with costs.
D MAHON
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Johannesburg
Date of
hearing:
14 August
2025
Date of
judgment:
17 November 2025
APPEARANCES
:
For the
Applicant:
Mr Sekgatja
Instructed
by:
Radasi Sekgatja Attorneys
For the 2nd Respondent:
Mr Ntonyela
(Instructing attorney not
identified and no notice of appointment on record)
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