Sigma KP Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Alpha Upgrade (Pty) Ltd (2025-011279) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1293 (11 December 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPJHC 1293 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Sigma KP Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Alpha Upgrade (Pty) Ltd (2025-011279) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1293 (11 December 2025) Sigma KP Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Alpha Upgrade (Pty) Ltd (2025-011279) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1293 (11 December 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2025_1293.html sino date 11 December 2025 FLYNOTES: COMPANY – Winding up – Postponement – Arbitration referral does not obstruct adjudication of liquidation on papers – Liquidation concerns status – Representation must be by a legal practitioner with right of audience – Admitted unpaid capital was sufficient on its own to ground liquidation application – Alleged unpreparedness did not justify postponement – Matter could proceed on papers as they stood – Application refused. IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG CASE NO: 2025-011279 In the matter between: SIGMA KP HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD Applicant/Respondent and ALPHA UPGRADE (PTY) LTD Respondent/Applicant Summary : [1]     Company – legal representation – neither a director nor a business development manager can represent company in legal proceedings in Court – company needs to be represented in legal proceedings in Court by legal practitioner with right of audience [2]     Postponement – application for by respondent in application for its liquidation – ground for application to await outcome of referral to arbitration of validity of acknowledgment of debt and amount of claim – neither of the two issues referred to arbitration an obstacle to liquidation of respondent on the papers as they stand – referral to the arbitration therefore not a ground for postponement of application [3]     Practice and procedure – referral to arbitration during legal proceedings – proper approach to apply for stay of proceedings pending outcome of arbitration – recognition of right to do so without having raised it in answering affidavits and without prior notice [4]     Arbitration – referral to – liquidation affects status of company – section 2(b) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 excludes from arbitration any matter relating to status – proof of claim and validity of underlying contract in application for liquidation matters relating to status of respondent company which are excluded from arbitration In an application for liquidation, a director and a business development manager of the respondent company sought to represent the respondent in the liquidation proceedings in Court. They were advised by the Court that a company needs to be represented in Court by a legal practitioner with right of audience. Upon their request, the matter stood down for them to arrange for a legal practitioner with right of audience to represent the respondent company. Upon the recall of the matter, an advocate appearing for the respondent company  notified the Court that the respondent was launching a substantive written application for postponement of the application for liquidation pending the outcome of a referral to arbitration by the respondent of the validity of the acknowledgment of debt which was the causa for the applicant’s claim and of the amount of the claim itself. Held, a respondent has the right to do so even without having raised it in answering affidavits and without prior notice. Hed further, a stay of the proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration is the appropriate order that should have been sought by the respondent. Held further, the Court was entitled to have regard to the matter as if it was correctly launched as an application for a stay of the proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration and to dispose of the matter from that vantage point. On the two issues referred to arbitration, namely [1] the validity of the acknowledgment of debt due to alleged inducement by economic duress and [2] the validity of the applicant’s claim due to unlawfully imposed interest, [1] the acknowledgment of debt, although having novated the amount of the claim and the terms of repayment in the original loan agreement, in its terms specifically preserved the validity of the original loan agreement inter alia as security for the acknowledgment of debt, thereby neutralizing the contention of a potential absence of a valid causa for the applicant’s claim emerging from the arbitration if the acknowledgment of debt was ruled to be unenforceable due to the economic duress, and [2] the referral of the amount of the applicant’s claim to arbitration was focussed on interest leaving the balance of the capital outstanding of R 516 000.00 untouched by the referral to arbitration, which was sufficient to prove an unpaid claim of at least more than R 100.00 to ground the application for liquidation.   Held accordingly, the issues referred to arbitration were not obstacles to the granting of the liquidation on the papers as they stand resulting in the failure of an application for a stay of the proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration and no good cause for the application for postponement. The application for postponement refused. JUDGMENT KATZEW AJ: # [1]             This is an application by Sigma KP Holdings (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as “Sigma”) for a postponement of the application for its liquidation by Alpha Upgrade (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as “Alpha Upgrade”). [1]             This is an application by Sigma KP Holdings (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as “ Sigma” ) for a postponement of the application for its liquidation by Alpha Upgrade (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as “ Alpha Upgrade” ). # # [2]Alpha Upgrade’sapplication for liquidation first came before me at 10h00 on Wednesday, 5 December 2025 in the Insolvency Court. Mr R De Leeuw appeared on behalf ofAlpha Upgradebut there was no formally appointed legal representative on behalf ofSigma.  A notice of withdrawal ofSigma’sattorney had been uploaded onto CaseLines on 27 November 2025.  The notice of withdrawal as attorney of record was accompanied by a letter from the attorney toAlpha Upgrade’sattorney stating that its withdrawal was due to non-payment of fees. [2] Alpha Upgrade’s application for liquidation first came before me at 10h00 on Wednesday, 5 December 2025 in the Insolvency Court. Mr R De Leeuw appeared on behalf of Alpha Upgrade but there was no formally appointed legal representative on behalf of Sigma .  A notice of withdrawal of Sigma’s attorney had been uploaded onto CaseLines on 27 November 2025.  The notice of withdrawal as attorney of record was accompanied by a letter from the attorney to Alpha Upgrade’s attorney stating that its withdrawal was due to non-payment of fees. # # [3]             When the matter was called, two persons moved from the Gallery into the Well of the Court and identified themselves as Kedibone Moja, a Director ofSigma, and Reabetswe Kgoroeadira, a Business Development Manager ofSigma.  They both sought the right to representSigmain the proceedings. [3]             When the matter was called, two persons moved from the Gallery into the Well of the Court and identified themselves as Kedibone Moja, a Director of Sigma , and Reabetswe Kgoroeadira, a Business Development Manager of Sigma .  They both sought the right to represent Sigma in the proceedings. # # [4]             I pointed out to Mr Moja and Ms Kgoroeadira that there is a common law rule in South African law that a company can only be represented in legal proceedings by a legal practitioner with right of audience in the Court. [4]             I pointed out to Mr Moja and Ms Kgoroeadira that there is a common law rule in South African law that a company can only be represented in legal proceedings by a legal practitioner with right of audience in the Court. # # [5]             They requested that I stand the matter down to Friday, 5 December 2025 to enable them to arrange for a legal practitioner with right of audience to representSigma. I responded that I was prepared to stand the matter down to 14h00 on Thursday, 4December 2025, which I did. [5]             They requested that I stand the matter down to Friday, 5 December 2025 to enable them to arrange for a legal practitioner with right of audience to represent Sigma . I responded that I was prepared to stand the matter down to 14h00 on Thursday, 4 December 2025, which I did. # # [6]             When the matter was called on 4 December 2025, Ms R Blumenthal, a practising Advocate at the Johannesburg Bar, appeared on behalf ofSigmaand indicated to the Court thatSigmais applying for a postponement of the application pursuant to a Respondent’s Application for Postponement supported by an affidavit deposed to by Kedibone Moja. [6]             When the matter was called on 4 December 2025, Ms R Blumenthal, a practising Advocate at the Johannesburg Bar, appeared on behalf of Sigma and indicated to the Court that Sigma is applying for a postponement of the application pursuant to a Respondent’s Application for Postponement supported by an affidavit deposed to by Kedibone Moja. # # [7]             The primary relief sought bySigmain the postponement application is that the application for liquidation be postponed pending the outcome of a referral to the Arbitration Foundation of South Africa of a dispute resolution process provided for in an Acknowledgment of Debt bySigmatoAlpha Upgradethat forms part of the application for liquidation. [7]             The primary relief sought by Sigma in the postponement application is that the application for liquidation be postponed pending the outcome of a referral to the Arbitration Foundation of South Africa of a dispute resolution process provided for in an Acknowledgment of Debt by Sigma to Alpha Upgrade that forms part of the application for liquidation. # # [8]             Mr De Leeuw on behalf ofAlpha Upgradeindicated to the Court thatAlpha Upgradeopposes the application for a postponement and intends doing so in argument based on the papers in the application for a postponement and in the application for liquidation.  The only additional papers he sought leave to hand to the Court in support ofAlpha Upgrade’sopposition to the application for a postponement was anAPPLICANT’S [ALPHAUPGRADE’S] SUPPLEMENTARY HEADS OF ARGUMENT: MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE BADENHORST PRINCIPLEwrongly dated 2 September 2025. [8]             Mr De Leeuw on behalf of Alpha Upgrade indicated to the Court that Alpha Upgrade opposes the application for a postponement and intends doing so in argument based on the papers in the application for a postponement and in the application for liquidation.  The only additional papers he sought leave to hand to the Court in support of Alpha Upgrade’s opposition to the application for a postponement was an APPLICANT’S [ ALPHA UPGRADE’S ] SUPPLEMENTARY HEADS OF ARGUMENT: MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE BADENHORST PRINCIPLE wrongly dated 2 September 2025. # # [9]             I accordingly called on Ms Blumenthal to address the Court on the application for a postponement, which she did by relying on the notice of application for postponement and the contents of the supporting affidavit together with references to the competing papers in the application for liquidation. [9]             I accordingly called on Ms Blumenthal to address the Court on the application for a postponement, which she did by relying on the notice of application for postponement and the contents of the supporting affidavit together with references to the competing papers in the application for liquidation. # # [10]          There are essentially two grounds for the application for a postponement summarised in the supporting affidavit as follows: [10]          There are essentially two grounds for the application for a postponement summarised in the supporting affidavit as follows: ## [10.1]          To enable the proper invocation and completion of the contractual dispute-resolution process contained in clause 9.1 of the Acknowledgment of Debt. [10.1]          To enable the proper invocation and completion of the contractual dispute-resolution process contained in clause 9.1 of the Acknowledgment of Debt. ## [10.2]          To enableSigmato properly prepare for the application for its liquidation, which it was denied through a combination of factors including the conduct of its former attorneys in failing to notify it of the set-down and in failing to advise it of the implications of the dispute-resolution clause in the Acknowledgment of Debt and that the enforceability of the Acknowledgment of Debt was a contractual dispute requiring invocation of the mediation and arbitration proceedings. [10.2]          To enable Sigma to properly prepare for the application for its liquidation, which it was denied through a combination of factors including the conduct of its former attorneys in failing to notify it of the set-down and in failing to advise it of the implications of the dispute-resolution clause in the Acknowledgment of Debt and that the enforceability of the Acknowledgment of Debt was a contractual dispute requiring invocation of the mediation and arbitration proceedings. ## # [11]          The deponent to the supporting affidavit further discloses that coupled with these two grounds were ongoing settlement negotiations which created the reasonable belief bySigmathat the matter was not proceeding. [11]          The deponent to the supporting affidavit further discloses that coupled with these two grounds were ongoing settlement negotiations which created the reasonable belief by Sigma that the matter was not proceeding. # # [12]          The arbitration clause in question is couched in the following terms in the Acknowledgment of Debt: [12]          The arbitration clause in question is couched in the following terms in the Acknowledgment of Debt: “ 9. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 9.1            Any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement shall be resolved through good faith negotiations between the parties.  If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute amicably within 10 (ten) days, the dispute shall be referred to mediation in accordance with the Rules of the Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa (“AFSA”) and the parties will attempt to settle the dispute by mediation.  Should mediation fail, the dispute shall be finally resolved by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of AFSA.” # [13]A general right to rely on an arbitration clause without having raised it in answering affidavits on the merits and without prior notice was recognised by De Wet, J.P. inElebelle (Pty) Ltd v Szynkarski,[1]as follows at 593D-F: [13] A general right to rely on an arbitration clause without having raised it in answering affidavits on the merits and without prior notice was recognised by De Wet, J.P. in Elebelle (Pty) Ltd v Szynkarski, [1] as follows at 593D-F: # “Lengthy answering affidavits were filed dealing with the merits of the application, but when the matter was called Mr Nathan, who appeared for the respondent, applied for the stay of the proceedings because of the arbitration clause … No formal notice had been given to the applicant that this point would be taken, but it is conceded that an objection amounting to a plea in bar can be taken at this late stage. (See The Rhodesian Railways Ltd. v Mackintosh, 1932 A.D. 359).  It is conceded that para. 6(1) of the new Arbitration Act, 42 of 1965, is similar to the provisions considered in the case mentioned, and that no change has been effected in the legal position.” “ Lengthy answering affidavits were filed dealing with the merits of the application, but when the matter was called Mr Nathan, who appeared for the respondent, applied for the stay of the proceedings because of the arbitration clause … No formal notice had been given to the applicant that this point would be taken, but it is conceded that an objection amounting to a plea in bar can be taken at this late stage. (See The Rhodesian Railways Ltd. v Mackintosh, 1932 A.D. 359).  It is conceded that para. 6(1) of the new Arbitration Act, 42 of 1965, is similar to the provisions considered in the case mentioned, and that no change has been effected in the legal position.” # # [14]An identical situation arose inLancaster v Wallace, N.O.,[2]where Margo, J. is reported as follows at 845A: [14] An identical situation arose in Lancaster v Wallace, N.O ., [2] where Margo, J. is reported as follows at 845A: # “On behalf of the respondent an application has been made in limine for the dismissal of the applicant’s claims on the ground that the present dispute is subject to a general reference to arbitration under an arbitration clause embodied in the contract.  It is clear that what is in fact sought is a stay of the proceedings under sec. 6 of the Arbitration Act, 42 of 1965.” “ On behalf of the respondent an application has been made in limine for the dismissal of the applicant’s claims on the ground that the present dispute is subject to a general reference to arbitration under an arbitration clause embodied in the contract.  It is clear that what is in fact sought is a stay of the proceedings under sec. 6 of the Arbitration Act, 42 of 1965.” # # [15]          From a procedural point of view, it emerges from these authorities that the proper course forSigmato have followed was to have applied for a stay of the liquidation proceedings pending the outcome of the referral of the contractual dispute in the application to arbitration. [15]          From a procedural point of view, it emerges from these authorities that the proper course for Sigma to have followed was to have applied for a stay of the liquidation proceedings pending the outcome of the referral of the contractual dispute in the application to arbitration. # # [16]          I will accordingly assume in favour ofSigmathat that is the application before the Court, and I will approach the question of the competency of the application from that vantage point. [16]          I will accordingly assume in favour of Sigma that that is the application before the Court, and I will approach the question of the competency of the application from that vantage point. # # [17]          It is common cause on the competing papers in the liquidation application thatAlpha UpgradeloanedSigmaR 2 691 000,00 in terms of the original Purchase Order Vendor Funding Agreement, of whichSigmahas repaid R 2 175 000,00, leaving a balance of R 516 000.00 due, owing and payable bySigmatoAlpha Upgradeagainst the capital of the loan, apart from interest. This much was conceded by Ms Blumenthal in argument. [17]          It is common cause on the competing papers in the liquidation application that Alpha Upgrade loaned Sigma R 2 691 000,00 in terms of the original Purchase Order Vendor Funding Agreement, of which Sigma has repaid R 2 175 000,00, leaving a balance of R 516 000.00 due, owing and payable by Sigma to Alpha Upgrade against the capital of the loan, apart from interest. This much was conceded by Ms Blumenthal in argument. # # [18]          The controversy raised bySigmain its Answering Affidavit to the application for liquidation and in its application for a postponement relates to the interest component to the Acknowledgment of Debt which followed the Purchase Order Vending Funding Agreement and to the enforceability of the Acknowledgment of Debt due to alleged economic duress exerted onSigmabyAlpha Upgradeto agree to the amount of the indebtedness in the Acknowledgment of Debt. [18]          The controversy raised by Sigma in its Answering Affidavit to the application for liquidation and in its application for a postponement relates to the interest component to the Acknowledgment of Debt which followed the Purchase Order Vending Funding Agreement and to the enforceability of the Acknowledgment of Debt due to alleged economic duress exerted on Sigma by Alpha Upgrade to agree to the amount of the indebtedness in the Acknowledgment of Debt. # # [19]          The balance of R 516 000.00 left due, owing and payable between the loan capital advanced byAlpha UpgradetoSigmaand the payments bySigmaagainst the capital is untouched by this controversy, which leavesSigmawith an admission of liability toAlpha Upgradein the sum of R 516 000,00 in the application for liquidation, whichSigmahas failed to pay. [19]          The balance of R 516 000.00 left due, owing and payable between the loan capital advanced by Alpha Upgrade to Sigma and the payments by Sigma against the capital is untouched by this controversy, which leaves Sigma with an admission of liability to Alpha Upgrade in the sum of R 516 000,00 in the application for liquidation, which Sigma has failed to pay. # # [20]There is therefore no dispute in the application for liquidation of an existing claim of at least R 100,00 which is due, owing and payable but nevertheless unpaid to support the application for liquidation. The following extract from the judgment of Malan J inBody Corporate of Fish Eagle v Group Twelve Investments (Pty) Ltd,[3]is instructive in this regard: [20] There is therefore no dispute in the application for liquidation of an existing claim of at least R 100,00 which is due, owing and payable but nevertheless unpaid to support the application for liquidation. The following extract from the judgment of Malan J in Body Corporate of Fish Eagle v Group Twelve Investments (Pty) Ltd, [3] is instructive in this regard: # “If the respondent admits a debt over R 100, even though the respondent’s indebtedness is less than the amount the applicant demanded in terms of s 345(1)(a) of the Companies Act, then on the respondent’s own version, the applicant is entitled to succeed in its liquidation application and the conclusion of law is that the respondent is unable to pay its debts.” “ If the respondent admits a debt over R 100, even though the respondent’s indebtedness is less than the amount the applicant demanded in terms of s 345(1)(a) of the Companies Act, then on the respondent’s own version, the applicant is entitled to succeed in its liquidation application and the conclusion of law is that the respondent is unable to pay its debts.” # # [21]Afortiorithere is no dispute in the application for liquidation requiring any form of alternative dispute resolution obstructing the resolution of the application for liquidation on the papers as they stand. [21] A fortiori there is no dispute in the application for liquidation requiring any form of alternative dispute resolution obstructing the resolution of the application for liquidation on the papers as they stand. # # [22]          There was a suggestion in argument by Ms Blumenthal that any claim in the application for liquidation requires a valid cause of action which will not exist if the Acknowledgment of Debt is found to be invalid once the dispute resolution procedure in the Acknowledgment of Debt has taken its course. [22]          There was a suggestion in argument by Ms Blumenthal that any claim in the application for liquidation requires a valid cause of action which will not exist if the Acknowledgment of Debt is found to be invalid once the dispute resolution procedure in the Acknowledgment of Debt has taken its course. # # [23]          This suggestion is neutralized by the following provision in the Acknowledgment of Debt: [23]          This suggestion is neutralized by the following provision in the Acknowledgment of Debt: # “3.BREACH “ 3. BREACH # 3.1            … 3.1            … # 3.2            In the event that[Sigma]fails to perform in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in this Acknowledgment of Debt (AOD), all previously signed agreements, including but not limited to any personal sureties provided by[Sigma]shall remain in full force and effect and shall be binding on the Parties.  The failure of[Sigma]to adhere to the terms of this AOD shall not nullify or affect the validity of any such agreements or sureties,and [Alpha Upgrade]shall retain all rights and remedies available under those agreements and sureties. Furthermore,[Sigma]acknowledges that such agreements and sureties are provided as security for the due performance of its obligations under this AOD.” 3.2            In the event that [Sigma] fails to perform in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in this Acknowledgment of Debt (AOD), all previously signed agreements, including but not limited to any personal sureties provided by [Sigma] shall remain in full force and effect and shall be binding on the Parties.  The failure of [Sigma] to adhere to the terms of this AOD shall not nullify or affect the validity of any such agreements or sureties, and [Alpha Upgrade] shall retain all rights and remedies available under those agreements and sureties. Furthermore, [Sigma] acknowledges that such agreements and sureties are provided as security for the due performance of its obligations under this AOD.” # # [24]          Finally, the application for liquidation concerns the status ofSigma. The issue of its indebtedness toAlpha Upgradein the liquidation application therefore impacts on its status, which is a matter relating to status as contemplated in the exclusion from arbitration of any matter relating to status provided for in section 2(b) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. [24]          Finally, the application for liquidation concerns the status of Sigma . The issue of its indebtedness to Alpha Upgrade in the liquidation application therefore impacts on its status, which is a matter relating to status as contemplated in the exclusion from arbitration of any matter relating to status provided for in section 2(b) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. # # [25]          For all the above reasonsSigmawould not succeed in an application for a stay of the liquidation application pending the outcome of the dispute referred by it to arbitration. Similarly, if postponement pending the outcome of an arbitration is to be regarded as competent,Sigmahas failed to show good cause for the postponement, which is one of the requirements for an application for postponement to succeed. [25]          For all the above reasons Sigma would not succeed in an application for a stay of the liquidation application pending the outcome of the dispute referred by it to arbitration. Similarly, if postponement pending the outcome of an arbitration is to be regarded as competent, Sigma has failed to show good cause for the postponement, which is one of the requirements for an application for postponement to succeed. # # [26]          The ground of unpreparedness for the application induced by lack of notice of the set-down and settlement negotiations has not been carried through to the notice of application for a postponement, which is confined to the arbitration clause. Although mentioned obliquely by Ms Blumenthal in argument, the need for a postponement to adduce further evidence is also not canvassed in the papers in the application for postponement. The only objective lack of preparedness on the part ofSigmafor the application for liquidation is the absence of heads of argument, which was never specifically included in the prejudice complained of in the application for postponement. [26]          The ground of unpreparedness for the application induced by lack of notice of the set-down and settlement negotiations has not been carried through to the notice of application for a postponement, which is confined to the arbitration clause. Although mentioned obliquely by Ms Blumenthal in argument, the need for a postponement to adduce further evidence is also not canvassed in the papers in the application for postponement. The only objective lack of preparedness on the part of Sigma for the application for liquidation is the absence of heads of argument, which was never specifically included in the prejudice complained of in the application for postponement. # # [27]Sigma’snew legal representatives have now had an extra week to prepare for the application for liquidation, which conceivably overcomes this prejudice.  Before the adjournment last Friday, I invited the parties to submit further heads of argument if they so wish, which left it open toSigmato deliver heads of argument in the application for liquidation. [27] Sigma’s new legal representatives have now had an extra week to prepare for the application for liquidation, which conceivably overcomes this prejudice.  Before the adjournment last Friday, I invited the parties to submit further heads of argument if they so wish, which left it open to Sigma to deliver heads of argument in the application for liquidation. # # [28]          In refusing the application for postponement, I intend ruling that the wasted costs occasioned by the application for postponement be confined to the opposed motion week from 1 to 5 December 2025. The opposed argument in the application for postponement ended at 16h20 on Thursday, 4 December, and I intended giving judgment at 10h00 on Friday, 5 December. However, Ms Blumenthal, who had been brought into the matter at extremely short notice on Wednesday, 3 December, indicated that she was unavailable to return to Court on Friday, 5December. I therefore agreed to stand the matter down to the earliest available date for all parties, which is 11 December, on the understanding that the costs in both the application for liquidation and the application for postponement be confined to the motion week from 1 to 5 December 2025. [28]          In refusing the application for postponement, I intend ruling that the wasted costs occasioned by the application for postponement be confined to the opposed motion week from 1 to 5 December 2025. The opposed argument in the application for postponement ended at 16h20 on Thursday, 4 December, and I intended giving judgment at 10h00 on Friday, 5 December. However, Ms Blumenthal, who had been brought into the matter at extremely short notice on Wednesday, 3 December, indicated that she was unavailable to return to Court on Friday, 5 December. I therefore agreed to stand the matter down to the earliest available date for all parties, which is 11 December, on the understanding that the costs in both the application for liquidation and the application for postponement be confined to the motion week from 1 to 5 December 2025. # # [29]          I accordingly make the following order: [29]          I accordingly make the following order: # 1.            The application for a postponement is refused. 1.            The application for a postponement is refused. # 2.Sigmais to pay the wasted costs occasioned by the application for postponement, such costs to be limited to the motion week from 1 to 5 December 2025. 2. Sigma is to pay the wasted costs occasioned by the application for postponement, such costs to be limited to the motion week from 1 to 5 December 2025. # # S M KATZEW S M KATZEW # ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT # JOHANNESBURG JOHANNESBURG APPEARANCES ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: R. De Leeuw Instructed by EY Stuart Incorporated ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: R. Blumenthal Instructed by M Attorneys Inc. Date of Hearing: 5 December 2025 Date of Judgment: 11 December 2025 [1] 1966 (1) SA 592 (W). [2] 1975 (1) SA 844 (W). [3] 2003 (5) SA 414 (W) at 428B. sino noindex make_database footer start