Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 56South Africa
Firstrand Bank Limited v Mavie (2022/3707) [2024] ZAGPJHC 56 (29 January 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
29 January 2024
Headnotes
judgment against the defendant for payment of the sum of R27 325 034.91 plus interest on the amount at the rate of 6.55% per annum calculated daily compounded monthly in arrears from 1 February 2022 to the date of final payment with both days included. The plaintiff also seeks an order for attorney and client scale costs. The application for summary judgment is opposed.
Judgment
begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
>>
2024
>>
[2024] ZAGPJHC 56
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## Firstrand Bank Limited v Mavie (2022/3707) [2024] ZAGPJHC 56 (29 January 2024)
Firstrand Bank Limited v Mavie (2022/3707) [2024] ZAGPJHC 56 (29 January 2024)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2024_56.html
sino date 29 January 2024
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number:
2022/3707
1.
Reportable: No
2.
Of interest to other judges: No
29
January 2024
In
the matter between:
In
the matter between:
FIRSTRAND
BANK
LIMITED
Applicant
and
MAVIE,
NONHLANHLA
RUTH
Respondent
JUDGMENT
MIA, J
[1]
The plaintiff seeks summary judgment against the defendant for
payment of the sum of R27 325 034.91
plus interest on the
amount at the rate of 6.55% per annum calculated daily compounded
monthly in arrears from 1 February 2022
to the date of final payment
with both days included. The plaintiff also seeks an order for
attorney and client scale costs. The
application for summary judgment
is opposed.
ISSUE
[2]
Counsel agreed that the application filed in terms of Rule 30 and the
determination whether Mr
Maninjwa should pay punitive costs are not
ready for determination and are not before this court for
determination either. The
sole issue for determination is whether the
plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment, which the defendant
disputes.
FACTS
[3]
The plaintiff and the principal debtor entered a structured loan
credit facility agreement. The
principal debtor is the Keliana Group
(Pty) Ltd. The plaintiff agreed to lend the defendant the amount of R
30 000 000.00.
The agreement made provision for the agreed
terms of interest. The principal debtor agreed to repay the amount
due in monthly instalments
depending on the amount loaned. If the
maximum facility were utilised, the monthly instalment would be the
amount of R385 140.18.
According to the plaintiff, the principal
debtor breached the agreement because it failed to pay due amounts.
On the plaintiff’s
version, various attempts were made to
settle the matter. The arrears escalated and the plaintiff demanded
R712 663.40 from
the principal debtor on 23 August 2021.
[4]
The plaintiff’s cause of action is based on a suretyship in
favour of the plaintiff for
the amounts due by the principal debtor.
The credit loan facility agreement refers to a suretyship and
specifically mentions a
suretyship related to the structured loan
facility. This suretyship was signed on 15 March 2018 and is attached
to the particulars
of claim. A second suretyship agreement was signed
in 2017.
[5]
The defendant’s defence to the application for summary judgment
raises several issues, reflected
in the plea and three special pleas
filed separately. The plaintiff filed a supplementary affidavit to
address the issues raised
as the special pleas were filed after the
application for summary judgment was filed and it contended that it
was a party affected
by the defendant’s plea which had changed
over the course of the defendant filing a second and third plea which
amended the
first plea. The
lis pendens
issue was not pursued
in the application for summary judgment as the defendant no longer
pursued it, according to counsel for the
defendant. The issues in the
special plea were:
5.1
non-compliance with clause 14.1.4 of the agreement, non-fulfilment of
suspensive conditions,
5.2
the plaintiff ‘s cause of action is incomplete,
5.3
exclusion of the principal debtor,
5.4
non- joinder
[6]
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the defendant’s defences
were contradictory in that
she raised the issue that she received no
notice of the demand and then also contended that the plaintiff’s
claim was defective
in that it did not require the defendant to pay
the full amount. The defendant contended further that the plaintiff
failed to exercise
“’its election” which prevented
the claimed amount from becoming due, alternatively that it failed to
comply
with its obligations in terms of clause14.1.4. A further
alternative contention was that the plaintiff’s letter of
demand
was defective as it did not require the defendant to pay the
full amount or that it notified the defendant of the default whilst
exercising the right to claim the full amount.
[7]
Counsel submitted that the defendant’s contentions were
mutually destructive in that it
required notification of the demand
on the one hand and then agreed that the plaintiff need not make a
demand before claiming the
full amount. Counsel for the plaintiff
argued that the plaintiff did sent a letter of demand to the
principal debtor at the
domicilium
address indicated in the
structured loan facility agreement when it was not required to. This
informed the principal debtor of
its breach and allowed it ten days
to remedy it. She emphasised that the plaintiff was not required in
terms of clause 14.1.4 to
send a letter of demand to the principal
debtor or the defendant. It did, however, send such a letter to the
principal debtor,
and this letter of demand was also attached to the
summons served on the defendant. Thus, counsel argued that the
defendant was
aware of the plaintiff’s election to cancel the
agreement and, having received the summons, also received the
attached letter
of demand.
[8]
Clause 14.1.4 of the structured loan facility agreement, provided
that:
“
The
bank shall be entitled in its sole and absolute discretion, without
notice to the borrower and without prejudice to any of its
other
rights under the agreement or at law, to cancel the agreement.
In terms of clause
14.1.4, it is clear that the plaintiff was not obliged, in terms of
the contract, to give notice of mora or to
send a letter of demand to
the principal debtor or defendant who is the surety. It was also
clear that the suspensive conditions
must have been fulfilled as it
required documents to be furnished before the registration of the
bond. There was no contention
that the documents were not furnished,
thus it follows that the suspensive conditions were complied with.
There is no evidence
to support the view that there was
non-compliance with the suspensive conditions. The defendant’s
reliance on this defence
is misplaced, as it was a requirement that
the documents be provided to ensure registration of the mortgage
bond.
[9]
Counsel for the defendant argued that the defendant signed a
suretyship agreement on 15 March
2018 wherein she stood surety for
the principal debtor in an unlimited amount to the plaintiff. He
submitted that the plaintiff
could not rely on the suretyship signed
in 2017, which was not attached to the particulars of claim. Whilst
the particulars of
claim refer a suretyship marked as Annexure “AB3”,
this document is not attached to the particulars of claim. Thus
the 2017 suretyship agreement could not be applicable as it predated
the date on which the structured loan facility agreement was
granted
as submitted by counsel for the defendant.
[10]
The structured loan facility references the surety signed concerning
the structured loan facility, namely
the suretyship signed in 2018.
This latter suretyship agreement was attached to the particulars of
the claim and referred
to the structured loan facility. With
regard to the structured loan facility agreement and the suretyship
agreement signed
in 2018, it is evident that they are read together.
The suretyship signed in 2017 before the structured loan facility
agreement
was signed cannot thus be relied upon where the agreement
refers to the particular suretyship agreement. The suretyship
agreement
signed in 2017 was also not attached to the particulars of
claim and the summons
[1]
even
though reference was made to Annexure “AB3”.
[11]
The plaintiff’s case is premised on a certificate of balance,
which is attached to the particulars
of claim. The breach on the part
of the principal debtor was the failure to make payment. The
plaintiff sent a letter of demand
to the principal debtor when the
arrears were R 27 325 034.91. The outstanding debt
escalated according to the plaintiff
and on 27 June 2023, was
approximately 8.6 million Rand in arrears. The summons requested the
amount of R27 325 034.91.
The attached letter of demand
informed the principal debtor that it had 10 days to remedy the
breach, failing which the full amount
would become payable. The full
amount exceeds the R27 325 034.91, as counsel for the
plaintiff argued that the full amount
exceeded this figure. The
certificate of balance attached to the particulars of claim, is only
for the amount of R27 325 034.91.
I have considered that
the plaintiff elected to pursue the full amount; however, the full
amount is not the amount indicated in
the particulars of the claim.
[12]
Whilst I accepted counsel for the plaintiff’s submission that
the plaintiff is entitled to act in terms
of the structured loan
facility agreement, the particulars of claim do not have the
suretyship signed in 2017 attached. In any
event I am not persuaded
that this earlier suretyship is applicable to the structured loan
facility agreement where the structured
loan facility agreement
refers specifically to a particular suretyship agreement. In
addition, I had regard to counsel for the
defendant’s
submission that the structured loan facility was not reduced. The
principal debtor could request a reduction,
and the bank was entitled
to the structured loan facility agreement to reduce the facility. The
reduction did not occur either
at the instance of the defendant or at
the instance of the plaintiff. Counsel for the defendant submitted
that the words “subject
to” did not merely indicate a
condition but was indicative of the parties' intention to suspend
their obligations. The bank
elected to cancel the agreement instead.
To suggest that a different interpretation ought to be placed upon
the words that appear
in clause 14.1.4 would require this court
to impose a different agreement upon the parties.
[13] It
was argued further that clause 14.1 did not refer to the surety.
Counsel for the plaintiff conceded this.
She submitted instead that
the surety was not a party to the loan facility agreement and there
was no need to join the principal
debtor in these proceedings. The
plaintiff relied on the loan facility agreement and the 2017
suretyship agreement. The addresses
differed in the different
documents. However, it is accepted that the demand came to the
defendant's attention, who sought various
settlement options. These
settlement options are referred to in correspondence.
[14]
The defendant is required in terms of Rule 32(3)(b), to satisfy
the court that it has a bona fide defence.
In the absence of Annexure
“AB3” attached to the particulars of the claim, and
the plaintiff’s reliance
on the 2017 suretyship agreement as
submitted by counsel for the plaintiff, I am persuaded that the
defendant has attempted to
make payments despite the reliance on
inactivity during the Covid pandemic when for a period of time
principal debtor could not
operate. The amount which appears in the
draft order differs from the claim in the summons. To the extent that
the claim has increased,
and there are different amounts claimed, and
for the reasons furnished above, I am not satisfied that the
plaintiff is entitled
to summary judgment.
ORDER
[15]
Consequently, the following order is made:
1.
The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
2.
The defendant is granted leave to defend.
3.
Costs in the application for summary judgment are costs in the cause
of action.
SC Mia
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
JOHANNESBURG
For
the Applicant:
Adv.
C. Dénichaud
Instructed
by Jay
Mothobi INC
For
the Respondent:
Adv.
P. Mbana
Instructed
by
S.A
Maninjwa Attorneys
.
Heard:
08 August 2023
Delivered:
29 January 2024
[1]
Record,
Annexure, Caselines 001-28
sino noindex
make_database footer start
Similar Cases
Firstrand Bank Limited v K and M International Trading (Pty) Ltd and Others (44155/2018) [2024] ZAGPJHC 73 (30 January 2024)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 73High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)100% similar
Firstrand Bank Limited v Felico General Merchandise CC and Another (2022/21790) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1083 (22 October 2024)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 1083High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
Firstrand Bank ta Wesbank v McCallum (2020/5463) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1004 (7 October 2024)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 1004High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
Firstrand Bank Limited v Van Wyk and Others (2011/9643) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1245 (31 October 2023)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1245High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
Firstrand Bank Limited v Frame and Another (2024-100304) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1186 (21 November 2025)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 1186High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar