Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 306South Africa
Rio Ridge 1121 (Pty) Ltd v 130 Fox Street Investment (Pty) Ltd and Another (30135/2019) [2024] ZAGPJHC 306 (26 March 2024)
Headnotes
in interpreting terms of contract or legislation as the case may be; the principles enunciated in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality[2] and Novartis SA (Pty) Ltd v Maphil Trading (Pty) Ltd[3] find application. Furthermore, as was said in Endumeni: “a sensible meaning is to be preferred to that that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results.” [21] The Constitutional Court clarified Endumeni with regard to the application of the parol evidence rule while considering contextual evidence in interpreting documents in the
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Rio Ridge 1121 (Pty) Ltd v 130 Fox Street Investment (Pty) Ltd and Another (30135/2019) [2024] ZAGPJHC 306 (26 March 2024)
Rio Ridge 1121 (Pty) Ltd v 130 Fox Street Investment (Pty) Ltd and Another (30135/2019) [2024] ZAGPJHC 306 (26 March 2024)
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sino date 26 March 2024
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
1.REPORTABLE:
NO
2.OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES:
NO
3.REVISED:
26
March 2024
CASE
NO
:
30135/2019
In the matter between:
RIO
RIDGE 1121 (PTY) LTD
APPLICANT
and
130
FOX STREET INVESTMENT (PTY) LTD
FIRST RESPONDENT
FANUEL
MOTSEPE
SECOND RESPONDENT
Coram:
Dlamini J
Heard
:
24 January 2024 (Courtroom 9B)
Delivered:
26 March 2024 – This judgment was handed down
electronically by circulation to the parties' representatives
via
email, uploaded to
CaseLines
, and released to SAFLII. The date
and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10:30 on March 2024.
JUDGMENT
DLAMINI J
INTRODUCTION
[1]
In this application, the applicant seeks specific
performance against the first respondent in the form of payment in
terms of a
written loan agreement and to hold the second respondent
liable for the same debt as the surety and co-principal debtor of the
first respondent.
[2]
The applicant (Rio Ridge) a
financial service provider advanced a loan to the first respondent
(130 Fox Street Investment), the
second respondent Fanuel Motsepe a
businessman and director of the first respondent signed as surety
co-principal debtor to the
first respondent, collectively( the
Parties).
[3]
In this case, this court is
called upon to determine the contractual rights between the parties,
in particular, whether or not the
parties had the intention to
conclude the Loan Agreement. The requirements of a valid contract
need to be assessed to ascertain
whether or not such requirements
were present and complied with to conclude that the true intentions
of the parties were to the
effect that a Loan Agreement was indeed
concluded.
BACKGROUND FACTS
[4]
The facts underlying this application are largely
common cause.
[5]
The parties on or about 15 December 2017, entered
into a written Loan Agreement (the Loan Agreement). On 15 December
2017, the second
respondent signed a suretyship undertaking to stood
guarantor for the financial obligations of the first respondent and
further
signed a Special Power of Attorney authorising that a
mortgage bond be registered in favour of the applicant for the debts
of the
first respondent to a maximum amount of R1 000 000.00.
[6]
In pursuant to the Loan Agreement the applicant
advanced the respondents in different trenches a total sum of R1 000
000.00.
[7]
In return and in line with the Loan Agreement the
second respondent made certain repayments to the applicants in the
sum of R162 589.
75, leaving an oustanding balance of R1 837
918.31.
[8]
The applicant testified that
the loan amount was repayable to it together with interest thereon at
the end of each succeeding month
within 12 months of the advance of
the loan amount.
[9]
Rio Ridge avers that the
respondents are in breach of the loan agreement as the respondents
have failed and refused to pay the outstanding
balance of the loan to
the applicant.
[10]
The applicant testified that the respondents
despite the applicant having so demanded the respondents have not
repaid the outstanding
balance and hence launched this application.
[11]
The application is opposed by the respondents on
numerous grounds. For instance the Peculiarity of the bond, the fact
that the first
respondent has not been placed in
mora
as required in terms of clause 5 of the Loan
Agreement, further that the matter be referred to trial due to the
alleged existance
of material disputes dispute of facts, and finally
the alleged Non-compliance with the National Credit Act (the NCA) by
the applicant
in advancing the loan to the respondents.
ISSUE
FOR DETERMINATION
[12]
The issue for determination
is whether there was a valid loan agreement entered into between the
parties. Further, in the determination
of the above whether this
court should take into account pre and post-signing discussions of
the parties.Finally, whether material
disputes of facts exist in this
application.
AMENDMENT
OF THE LOAN AGREEMENT
[13]
The applicant contends that
the Shiffren principle finds application in the present case. The
case made by Rio Ridge is that the
various defences raised by the
respondents in essence amount to a variation of the loan agreement.
That the respondent's defences
would only have been effective if
these were reduced to writing and signed by the parties. I agree with
the applicant's contentions
in this regard and shall expand on these
below.
[14]
The respondents have raised
alleged collateral prior inducing agreements, between Illovo Paradiso
Four CC
(IPF
)
and the second respondents.
[15]
Mr. Motsepe avers that the
funds were lent to him personally, that the loan will be settled upon
the sale and transfer of the first
respondent's property in terms of
a partnership/ joint venture agreement, and that he made the three
(3) repayments to the applicant.
[16]
Further, the respondents
contend that the bond in favour of Canara Bank securing the letters
loan to IPF was not what was agreed
to, more so when the bond
recorded that the first respondent stood surety for IPF's loan from
Canara Bank in the amount of R26
million.
[17]
In sum the respondents
insist that the special power of attorney (“the POA”),
the IPF suretyship, and the bond are relevant
and cannot be discarded
based on parol evidence, the principle in Shifren, or the whole
agreement clause. That these were suspensive
conditions, and that
evidence regarding same and assessment thereof is not precluded.
[18]
In general, contracting parties possess enough
freedom in choosing how they structure their agreements, and it is
not the function
of the court to protect consenting parties from bad
bargains. The established principle of our law of contract is that
legal certainty
and the notion of
pacta
sunt servanda
must always be honored
and enforced by our courts.
[19]
In determining this case It
is apposite to look at the non-variation clause of the Loan
Agreement, Clause 9.1 stipulates as follows;
-
“
This
Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and
no variation, alteration, amendment, or suspension
thereof
shall be valid and binding unless contained in a written document
signed by both parties.”
[20]
The
principle of interpretation of contracts in our law is well
established and has been pronounced upon in a number of our court's
decisions. In
FirstRand
Bank Ltd v
KJ
Foods
,
[1]
the
Supreme Court of Appeal held that in interpreting terms of contract
or legislation as the case may be; the principles enunciated
in
Natal
Joint
Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[2]
and
Novartis
SA (Pty) Ltd v Maphil Trading (Pty) Ltd
[3]
find
application. Furthermore, as was said in Endumeni: “
a
sensible meaning is to be preferred to that that leads to insensible
or unbusinesslike results.
”
[21]
The
Constitutional Court clarified
Endumeni
with
regard to the application of the parol evidence rule while
considering contextual evidence in interpreting documents in the
University
of Johannesburg v Auckland Park
Theological
Seminary and Another
[4]
as
follows at [88]; -
“
In
KPMG and Swanepoel, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the parol
evidence rule remains part of our law, and is one of the
caveats to
the principle that extrinsic contextual maybe admitted. The essence
of the rule was most aptly captured in the case
of Vianini Ferro-
Concrete Pipes, where it was stated :
“
Now
this Court has accepted the rule that when a contract has been
reduced to writing is, in general, regarded as the exclusive
memorial
of the transaction and in a suit between the parties no evidence to
prove its terms may be given save the document or
secondary evidence
of its contents, nor may the contents of such document be
contradicted, altered, added, or varied by parol evidence"
[22]
In my
view the respondent's contention that the Shrifen principle is not
applicable in this case is meritless. The aforementioned
requirements
of the non-variation clause are self-explanatory. A sensible and
businesslike interpretation is that unless the terms
of the variation
as alleged by the respondents (which are denied by the applicants)
are reduced to writing and signed by both parties
such amendments are
invalid. It must therefore follow as it should that the respondent's
claims of the existence of prior and post-signing
of the agreement
are dismissed. I am satisfied unless varied and signed by the
parties, the Loan Agreement constitutes the entire
agreement between
the parties. The Shifren clause was recognized and upheld by the
Supreme Court of Appeal in
SA
Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren and Others
[5]
and as
I have demonstrated above is applicable and binding in this case.
[23]
In an attempt to overcome
this huddle, the second respondent in his answering affidavit avers
at [17.1] that "
I
require that this bond be canceled as a matter of urgency, failing
which I intend to bring the application in this Court to have
the
mortgage bond declared null and void as my signature was obtained
through false pretenses. In crude terms, I was duped
.”
It is significant to note that as at the hearing of this application,
the second respondent has not filled any application
to set aside the
bond. In the result,
unless and
until it is reviewed and set aside the Loan Agreement and the
security bond are binding between the parties.
[24]
Significantly, no argument
has been advanced by the respondents contending that there was any
mistake in the drafting of the Loan
Agreement and no order is sought
by the respondents seeking rectification of any terms contained in
the Loan Agreement.
[25]
In light of the above, the
respondent's contention of the alleged prior inducing agreements
between the applicant and the respondents
are of no moment and stand
to be dismissed in terms of the whole agreement and non–variation
clauses.
[26]
It
should follow therefore as it must, that the are no material dispute
of facts in this case. In
Plascon
-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
,
[6]
the
court set out this principle as follows; “
In
certain cases, the denial by the respondent of a fact alleged by the
applicant may not be of such a nature as to raise real,
genuine or
bona fide dispute of fact
.”
The Court stressed that far-fetched allegations by the respondents
should be rejected on the papers. In my view, the signing
of the Loan
Agreement by the parties, the Security Bond, the advance of the loan
by the applicant to the respondents, and the repayment
of the loan to
the applicant by the respondents are all common cause facts and are
not in dispute. The alleged material disputes
of facts by the
respondents are bald and unsubstantiated and are only raised by the
respondents when the respondents were unable
to repay the applicants
and just raised to stall the repayment of the debt to the applicant.
THE
NATIONAL CREDIT ACT
[27]
I
now turn to the issue of whether the provisions of the National
Credit Act
[7]
(“the
NCA”) is applicable in this case.
[28]
The case made by the
respondents is that the loan was a simulated transaction, in that
monies were lent and advanced to the second
respondent (a natural
person) when the second respondent was in dire financial straights
and where there is no suggestion that
the applicant is a registered
credit provider. That the first respondent could only be surety and
the bond could only ever secure
the loan to the second respondent
limited to R1 million with interest and costs. Therefore, insist the
respondents that the NCA
is applicable and its provisions must be
given effect. Finally, argues the respondents that the loan agreement
is therefore not
only a simulated transaction but it is also unlawful
and unenforceable in terms of the NCA
[29]
The respondent submissions
in this regard are meritless. On the evidence and facts before this
court, the loan was advanced to the
first respondent. The Loan
Agreement was then signed by the second respondent on behalf of the
first respondent. The second respondent
only signed surety on behalf
of the first respondent. These agreements are attached as annexures
to the applicant's founding affidavit.
The Loan Agreement as Annexure
('FA2") The Suretyship Agreement and Surety Mortgage Bond are
attached as Annexure ("FA4").
The fact the first respondent
requested the applicant to pay over the lent monies to the second
respondent is of no moment. Once
the loan was approved the second
respondent was at liberty to request the applicant to pay over the
funds to the second respondent,
there was nothing unlawful and
illegal in this request. The ineluctable conclusion therefore is that
the loan was advanced to the
first respondent (a company) and not Mr
Motsepe an individual accordingly the provisions of the NCA are not
applicable in this
case.
NOTICES
[30]
The issue for determination
in this regard is whether notices were properly issued and served by
the applicant on the respondents
as required in terms of clause 5 of
the Loan agreement.
[31]
Rio Ridge contends that it
has complied with clause 5 of the Loan Agreement, in that it has sent
letters of demand to the respective
respondents in terms of or in
accordance with their respective chosen
domicilium
citandi et executandi
being
their nominated email addresses.
[32]
The respondent's submission
is that Rio Ridge has not complied with Clause 5 of the loan
agreement which provides that the applicant
should have placed the
respondents in
mora
requesting the
respondents to rectify the breach within 7 seven days after written
notification.
[33]
There is no merit to the
respondent's contention in this regard. I am satisfied that the
respondents were duly notified and the
letters of demand were
dispatched in terms of the Loan Agreement at the respondent's chosen
domicilium
being the
respondent's emails. Moreover, the applicant has attached proof of
the emails being dispatched and that the emails were
successfully
delivered to the respondents. The respondent's contention without
more does not constitute proof that the letters
of demand were never
delivered to the respondents.
[34]
In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the
applicant has made out its case and is entitled to the orders that
the applicant
seeks. There is no reason why the costs should not
follow the result and must be paid in terms of the Loan Agreement,
which makes
specific provisions for costs to be paid on the scale as
between attorney and client.
ORDER
In the result, the
following order is made: -
1.
The First and Second Respondent are to pay the
Applicant jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be
absolved.
2.
The sum of R1 837 918 .31
3.
Interest on the sum of R1
837 918 .31 at the rate of 4% per month compounded monthly in arrears
from 10 August 2019 to the date
of payment, both days inclusive.
4.
Costs of suite on the scale as between attorney
and client.
J DLAMINI
Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg
FOR THE
APPLICANT: Adv
R J Bouwer
EMAIL:
rjbouwer@gmail.com
FOR
THE RESPONDENT: Adv. C van der
Merwe
EMAIL:
dominus.cvdm@gmail.com
INSTRUCTED
BY: KAVEER
GUINESS INC
EMAIL:
kaveer@kginc.co.za
[1]
(734/2015)
[2015] ZASCA 50( 26 April 2017)
[2]
(920/2010)
[2012] ZASCA 13(15 March 2012)
[3]
(20229/2014)
[2015] ZASCA 111(3 September 20150)
[4]
2021
(6) SA 1 (CC)
[5]
1964
(4) SA 760
[6]
1984
(3) SA 623 (A)
[7]
Act
34 of 2005
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