Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 385South Africa
Nene v National Lotteries Commission and Others (2024/024114) [2024] ZAGPJHC 385; (2024) 45 ILJ 1334 (GJ) (22 April 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
22 April 2024
Headnotes
in my judgment on urgency, I have no doubt that Ms. Nene genuinely believes the respondents are determined to dismiss her come what may. But her belief is without any discernible factual foundation. Her attorney ought to have advised her of this
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Nene v National Lotteries Commission and Others (2024/024114) [2024] ZAGPJHC 385; (2024) 45 ILJ 1334 (GJ) (22 April 2024)
Nene v National Lotteries Commission and Others (2024/024114) [2024] ZAGPJHC 385; (2024) 45 ILJ 1334 (GJ) (22 April 2024)
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sino date 22 April 2024
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
1.
REPORTABLE: No
2.
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: No
3.
REVISED.
22
April 2024
Case
No.
2024-024114
In the matter between:
NOMPUMELELO
NENE
Applicant
and
NATIONAL
LOTTERIES COMMISSION
First Respondent
JODY-LYNNE
SCHOLTZ
Second Respondent
LIONEL
VICTOR OCTOBER
Third Respondent
TINTSWALO
MARY-ANN NKUNA
Fourth Respondent
ADVOCATE
PRANISHA MAHARAJ PILLAY
Fifth Respondent
LIBERTY
GROUP LIMITED
Sixth Respondent
#####
##### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
WILSON
J
:
1
The applicant, Ms. Nene, is the first respondent’s
company secretary. The first respondent, the NLC, suspended Ms. Nene
from
that role over a year ago, pending an investigation of her
conduct in office. The NLC then decided to convene a disciplinary
inquiry
to determine whether Ms. Nene had committed various acts of
misconduct identified in a charge sheet that was finalised and given
to Ms. Nene in November 2023. The disciplinary inquiry is to be
chaired by the fifth respondent, Ms. Pillay, and was set to commence
on 26 March 2024.
2
On 14 March 2024, I
struck from the roll Ms. Nene’s urgent application to interdict
and restrain the commencement of the disciplinary
hearing. I found
that Ms. Nene had failed to set out any primary facts upon which it
could be concluded that the disciplinary proceedings
set to commence
would be so tainted by unfairness or illegality as to justify my
enjoining them. The absence of those facts also
meant that the
application could not be urgent, and had to be struck from the roll
for that reason. I gave my judgment
ex tempore.
My judgment
was later transcribed and published as
Nene v
National Lotteries Commission
(0224114-2024)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 286 (14 March 2024).
3
Ms. Nene’s application was so devoid of substance
that it warrants a punitive costs order. Urgent court is for truly
urgent
matters. Enrolling a case in urgent court in the genuine but
mistaken belief that the matter should be given preference is one
thing. Enrolling a matter on an urgent basis without so much as
attempting to set out an urgent cause of action based on primary
facts is quite another. It wastes a court’s time. At best it
reduces the time and attention that can be invested in dealing
with
other cases that might be urgent. At worst, it crowds those cases
out. The Deputy Judge President of this court has repeatedly
warned
that abuse of the urgent roll is widespread and should be penalised.
Ms. Nene’s case is a good example of such abuse.
4
The failure to set out even the slenderest cause of
action naturally raises questions about whether Ms. Nene was
competently and
ethically advised. In addition, the conduct of her
case at the 14 March 2024 hearing left much to be desired. Ms. Nene’s
attorney did not attend court. There was, as a result, no buffer
between Ms. Nene and her counsel, Mr. Alcock. Mr. Alcock’s
attempts to argue what he must have known was a very difficult case
were impaired by Ms. Nene’s attempts to brief him, in
real
time, on the facts I pointed out were missing from her papers. On
more than one occasion, I had to pause argument, or stand
the matter
down, to allow Mr. Alcock to take instructions. In the absence of her
attorney, Ms. Nene appeared unwilling to allow
Mr. Alcock to argue
the case as he saw fit. Recognising how untenable this was, Mr.
Alcock withdrew, and allowed Ms. Nene to press
her case on her own.
5
There was also the further abuse Ms. Nene’s legal
representatives committed by setting her case down for hearing on a
Thursday
rather than on a Tuesday. As is well-known, all urgent
motions to be argued during a particular week should be enrolled on
Tuesday,
which is the ordinary urgent motion hearing day. Tuesday
enrolment allows the presiding Judge to prepare for court on Monday,
before
allocating that week’s motions to the other four days of
the working week when the roll is called on Tuesday.
6
Sometimes a matter is so urgent that it arises and must
be determined between two Tuesdays. In that instance, the senior
urgent
court Judge may be approached for permission to enrol the
matter on a very urgent basis on a day other than Tuesday. But Ms.
Nene’s
case was not of that nature. The application was
instituted on 5 March 2024, nine days before it was heard, and ought
accordingly
to have been set down on either 12 or 19 March 2024. The
logical choice would have been 19 March 2024, since Ms. Nene’s
disciplinary
inquiry was only set to commence the week after that. In
an effort to procure compliance with the practice directives, the
respondents’
attorneys proposed that the matter be moved to 19
March 2024, but Ms. Nene’s legal representatives rejected that
proposal.
7
Given all this inappropriate conduct, Ms. Baloyi, who
appeared together with Mr. Peter for the NLC, asked that I make a
punitive
costs order against Ms. Nene’s attorney,
de bonis
propriis
. The effect of such an order is that the unsuccessful
litigant, in this case Ms. Nene, is relieved from the obligation to
pay the
successful litigant’s costs, which must be paid instead
by the unsuccessful litigant’s attorney. An order
de bonis
propriis
(very loosely translated as “for one’s own
account”) is meant to signify that a legal representative’s
conduct
of the case has fallen so far below the standard expected of
a reasonable legal practitioner that they, rather than their client,
should bear the financial burden of losing in court.
8
It should be clear by now that many of the
prerequisites of an order
de bonis propriis
are present in
this case. The urgent application was grossly misconceived from the
outset. It was not just that a bad case had
been made out in her
founding affidavit. No legally recognisable case had been identified
at all. Ms. Nene’s affidavit contained
little more than a
series of heated allegations against the respondents, most of whom
should not have been joined to the case at
all. No reasonable legal
practitioner would have permitted Ms. Nene’s affidavit to be
placed before a court.
9
As I held in my judgment on urgency, I have no doubt
that Ms. Nene genuinely believes the respondents are determined to
dismiss
her come what may. But her belief is without any discernible
factual foundation. Her attorney ought to have advised her of this
reality and counselled her against an approach to the urgent court.
The fact that Mr. Alcock was left to argue the application
on his own
merely compounded the situation. Having failed dissuade Ms. Nene from
pursuing a manifestly inappropriate application,
the least her
attorney ought to have done was attend court and help her prepare for
the inevitable outcome.
10
That none of this was done satisfied me that Ms. Nene’s
attorney, a Ms. Vilakazi, ought to explain why she should not be
ordered
to pay costs
de bonis propriis
. I afforded Ms.
Vilakazi a week to file an affidavit giving such an explanation.
11
In her affidavit, Ms. Vilakazi explained that Ms. Nene
drafted her own founding papers, albeit with comment and input from
Ms. Vilakazi.
Ms. Vilakazi also revealed that she took Ms. Nene’s
case
pro bono
. Ms. Vilakazi says that she did not attend the
court hearing because she was at a conference of local government
legal practitioners.
Ms. Vilakazi had nonetheless prepared a WhatsApp
group of all the key players in Ms. Nene’s legal team and
thought that it
was appropriate to keep in touch on that forum. She
was also available to be telephoned.
12
Ms. Vilakazi sent a candidate legal practitioner, a Mr.
Mthembu, to court to represent her. Mr. Mthembu was apparently
sitting in
the public gallery during argument. I do not know why he
did not sit in the well of the court, so as to be able to be of some
practical
use. Mr. Mthembu was not there for show. He had a function
to perform – to take instructions from his client and to convey
them, where appropriate, to Mr. Alcock, whose right it was to
prosecute the case as he saw fit. Mr. Mthembu did not perform that
function. As the WhatsApp exchanges attached to Ms. Vilakazi’s
affidavit show, he looked on in horror as the argument deteriorated,
and Mr. Alcock had finally to withdraw.
13
In sum, Ms. Vilakazi should not have allowed the case
to proceed on the papers that were filed. She should have heeded this
court’s
practice directions and set the matter down for a
Tuesday rather than a Thursday. She should have attended court,
failing which
she should have briefed Mr. Mthembu properly, so as to
put him in a position to be of genuine assistance to Ms. Nene and Mr.
Alcock.
In neglecting to take any of these steps, Ms. Vilakazi’s
conduct fell short of the standard of conduct expected from a
reasonable
legal practitioner.
14
The fact that Ms. Vilakazi acted
pro bono
nonetheless appears to have elicited some sympathy from the
respondents. In their responding submissions, Ms. Baloyi and Mr.
Peter
made clear that the respondents no longer seek a costs order
de
bonis propriis
, primarily for that reason. In my view, however,
the fact that the litigation was undertaken
pro bono
does not
in itself mitigate Ms. Vilakazi’s conduct.
Pro bono
litigation generally demands more, not less, of a legal practitioner
than remunerated legal work. Litigants represented
pro bono
are generally less familiar with legal process, less able to identify
the facts relevant to their claim, and more in need of sensitive
counselling in order to develop and implement the options open to
them.
15
That said, Ms. Nene is no ordinary
pro bono
litigant. She is an admitted advocate, a Bachelor of Laws, and a
senior corporate lawyer. She drafted her own papers. She ought
to
have known that they failed to make out a case, and that,
consequently, her claim could be neither urgent nor successful. Ms.
Nene’s lack of detachment from her claim meant that she could
not face up its shortcomings. But she, more than most, ought
to have
known better. Perhaps Ms. Vilakazi believed that Ms. Nene’s
legal training meant that she could afford to manage
the case with a
light touch. That, if true, was a mistake.
16
The fact that a
de bonis propriis
costs order is
no longer sought is reason enough not to grant one. However, a
punitive costs order is still necessary. Ms. Nene
is an empowered
litigant. She was clearly in a position to know the shortcomings of
her case and the inappropriateness of its conduct.
She ought to bear
the consequences of pressing that case to its inevitable conclusion.
17
Accordingly, I order that the costs of the urgent
application, including the costs of the post-hearing exchange of
affidavits and
submissions, are to be paid by the applicant. Those
costs will be taxed on the scale as between attorney and client. They
will
include the costs of two counsel.
S
D J WILSON
Judge
of the High Court
This
judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties
or their legal representatives by email, by uploading
to Caselines,
and by publication of the judgment to the South African Legal
Information Institute. The date for hand-down is deemed
to be 22
April 2024.
APPLICANT’S
SUBMISSIONS
ON:
28 March
2024
RESPONDENT’S
SUBMISSIONS
ON:
12 April
2024
DECIDED
ON:
22 April 2024
For
the Applicant:
Buthelezi Vilakazi Inc
For
the Respondents:
S Baloyi SC
L Peter
Instructed by Cheadle
Thompson & Haysom Inc
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