Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 464South Africa
Shoreline Auctioneers CC v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (38105/2017) [2024] ZAGPJHC 464 (8 May 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
8 May 2024
Headnotes
as follows: “It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Shoreline Auctioneers CC v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (38105/2017) [2024] ZAGPJHC 464 (8 May 2024)
Shoreline Auctioneers CC v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (38105/2017) [2024] ZAGPJHC 464 (8 May 2024)
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sino date 8 May 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 38105/2017
1.
REPORTABLE: NO
2.
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
3.
REVISED.
In the matter between:
SHORELINE
AUCTIONEERS CC
Applicant/Plaintiff
and
THE CITY OF
JOHANNESBURG
METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
Respondent/Defendant
JUDGMENT
FLATELA J
1.
This is an application for leave to appeal
brought by the Applicant against the judgment granted by me on the 8
March 2023. The
appeal is against the judgement and orders 1, 2 and
5.
2.
The factual background is comprehensively
captured in the main judgement, I do not intend to be as
comprehensive here, but a brief
background context will suffice.
3.
The applicant brought an action against the
defendant on 16 October 2017 for an order for payment as compensation
R13 065 990.00
as the market value and actual financial
loss as a result of expropriation in terms of section 12 of
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975
as amended.
4.
This amount was amended to R9 118 800.00
based on its expert witness’s valuation report.
5.
The defendant filed its own expert valuer
report which opined that the market value of the property is
R8 400 000.00.
6.
On 22
nd
October 2022 the plaintiff amended its particulars of claim and
claimed an amount of R8 400 000 as contended by the
defendant’s valuer.
7.
This matter served before me for trial on 7
November 2022.
8.
The parties filed a joint practice note
which recorded that:
“
10.
Common Cause facts:
1)
That the plaintiff was the registered owner
of the property in question
2)
The property was occupied by unlawful
occupiers.
3)
The plaintiff brought an eviction
application in January 2009 in an attempt to evict the unlawful
occupiers.
4)
The defendant in this matter was
cited as a respondent in the eviction application.
5)
On 23 February 2015, the plaintiff obtained
an eviction order.
6)
On 16 May 2017, the defendant served a
notice of expropriation on the plaintiff.
7)
The defendant offered the plaintiff
compensation in the sum of R2 000 000
8)
The plaintiff rejected the defendant’s
offer.
Issues
in dispute:
The amount of
compensation payable by the defendant to the plaintiff pursuant to
the expropriation.
Other:
The Plaintiffs respective experts compiled a joint
minute on 6 June 2021 and the essence of the joint minute was:
a.
The two valuers were less than 10% apart in
their respective valuations and agreed that either evaluation could
be correct.
b.
The valuation is relied on by the
plaintiff’s expert was R9,118,800 The Valuation done by the
defendant’s expert is
R8,400,000
c.
The plaintiff has amended its particulars
of claim to reflect the amount of R8,400,000 as the market value of
the property (in line
with the defendant’s own expert)
d.
Given the content of the joint minute and
the fact that plaintiff was will only seek the amount as contended
for by the defendants
own expert, it will be submitted that the
market value of the property is now common cause.
12.
Upon consideration of the issues, I issued
directives to the parties to come prepared to run a trial as the
amount of compensation
was still in dispute.
13.
On the day of the trial, the parties
informed the court that the market value of the property is now
common cause. The plaintiff’s
counsel presented me with a draft
court order to be made an order of court.
14.
Mr. Dlamini, the Defendant’s counsel
agreed with the plaintiff counsel that the market value was now
common cause between
the parties but he stated that he had no
instructions to agree with the terms of the order.
15.
The draft order was neither an order by
agreement between the parties nor a consent order.
16.
Having considered the whether the
compensation would be just and equitable in term of section 25(2) and
(3) of the Constitution,
I granted the following order:
a)
The
Defendant’s offer of R2 000 000 (Two Million Rands)
as compensation to the plaintiff pursuant to the Expropriation
is
just and equitable.
b)
The Defendant
is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the remainder amount of R400 000,
within 30 days from the date of this order.
c)
The Defendant
is ordered to pay the plaintiff an amount of
R55
000 as solatium;
d)
The Defendant
must pay interest
temporae
morae from 16 May 2017 to the date of payment.
e)
Each party
shall bear their own costs.
The
test for appeal
17.
The principles governing whether leave to
appeal should be granted are well established, but I summarise them
for convenience.
18.
The test for the
granting of leave to appeal pertinent to the present matter is set
out in
section 17(1)
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
which
provides that:
“
(
1)
Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned
are of the opinion that:
(a)
(i) the appeal would
have a reasonable prospect of success or
(ii) there is
some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard,
including conflicting judgments on the matter under
consideration”
19.
Section
17(1)
of the
Superior Courts Act read
with
section 17(1)(a)(i)
which
provides that a Court
may
only
grant leave to appeal where it is satisfied that the Applicant has
shown reasonable prospects of success or that there is a compelling
reason to entertain the appeal. In
Mont
Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others
[1]
Bertelsmann J held as follows:
“
It
is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a
judgment of a High Court has been raised in the new act.
The
former test whether leave to appeal should be granted was a
reasonable prospect that another Court might come to a different
conclusion. See Van Heerden v Cronwright & Others
1985 (2)
SA 342
(T) at 342H. The use of the word “would” in
the new statutes indicates a measure of certainty that another Court
will differ from the Court whose judgment is sought to be appealed
against
.”
20.
Plasket
AJA, as he then was, in
Smith
v S
[2]
explained the test for reasonable prospects of success as follows:
“
What
the test of reasonable prospects of success postulates is a
dispassionate decision, based on facts and the law that the Court
of
Appeal could reasonably arrive at the conclusion different to that of
the Trial Court. In order to succeed, therefore,
the appellant
must convince this Court on proper grounds that he has prospects of
success on appeal and that those prospects are
not remote but have a
realistic chance of succeeding. More is required to be
established than that there is a mere possibility
of success; that
the case is arguable on appeal or that the case cannot be categorised
as hopeless. There must, in other
words, be a sound, rational
basis for the conclusion that there are prospects of success on
appeal.”
21.
I
have considered the grounds of appeal, the submissions made by
counsel for the applicant and on behalf of the respondents. Relying
on
Legal
Aid South Africa v Magidawana and Others
[3]
and
on
The
Road Accident Fund v
Taylor
and Others
[4]
,
the Applicant contends that the court had no jurisdiction to deal
with this matter in terms of
section 25(2)
and section 25(3) of the
Constitution because the parties had reached a compromise in respect
of the market value of the property
and there was nothing for the
court to determine. I disagree. The draft order that was
handed to court was neither
by agreement nor consent.
22.
The second ground of appeal is that when
embarking on an enquiry in terms of section 25(3) the court relied on
the pleadings, the
discovered documents and experts report from
various potential witnesses which did not constitute any evidence
before the court.
The Applicant contends that only the common cause
factor should have been considered to determine the interest to be
paid on the
market value. I have considered this ground of appeal and
I
am of the opinion
that there is a
reasonable
prospect
of success on appeal.
23.
Consequently, I shall
grant leave to appeal to the Full Bench court of this Division.
The matter does not fall within the
ambit of
section 17(6)(a)(i)
or
(ii) of the
Superior Courts Act.
24.
In
the circumstances, I make the following
order:
1.
Leave to
appeal is granted to the Full Bench of this Division against the
judgment and order 1, 2 and 5.
2.
Costs of the
application for leave to appeal are costs in the appeal.
L FLATELA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
This
matter has been heard in terms of the Directives of the Judge
President of this Division dated 25 March 2020, 24 April 2020,
and 11
May 2020. The judgment and order are accordingly published and
distributed electronically. The date and time of hand-down
is
deemed to be 8 May 2024.
Appearances
Counsel for
Applicant/Plain
:Adv B. Gradidge
Instructed
by
:Howard S Woolf Attorneys
Counsel for
Respondent/Defendant
: Adv E Mokutu SC with K Mashile
Instructed
by
: Popela Maake Incorporated
Date of
hearing
: 11 April 2024
Date of
Judgement
: 8 May 2024
[1]
The
Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others
2014 JDR 2335 (LCC) at para 6.
[2]
S v Smith
2012 (1) SACR 567
, 570 para 7
[3]
2015(2)SA
568 SCA at paragraph 22
[4]
The
Road Accident Fund v Taylor and Others 2023 ZASC 64 (8 MAY 2023)
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