Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 480South Africa
Mgaga v Britz N.O. and Another (19935/2022) [2024] ZAGPJHC 480 (20 May 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
20 May 2024
Headnotes
re-taking of samples is not per se unreasonable or unconstitutional. The court then ordered that the
Judgment
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## Mgaga v Britz N.O. and Another (19935/2022) [2024] ZAGPJHC 480 (20 May 2024)
Mgaga v Britz N.O. and Another (19935/2022) [2024] ZAGPJHC 480 (20 May 2024)
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sino date 20 May 2024
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG.
(Palm
Ridge).
Case Number: 19935/2022
1.
REPORTABLE: NO
2.
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
3.
REVISED: NO
4.
20 May 2024
In
the matter between:
KENNETH
MDUDUZI MGAGA
Applicant
and
MAGISTRATE
BRITZ N.O.
First
Respondent
THE
STATE
Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
NOKO
J (BOKAKO AJ concurring)
Introduction
[1]
The applicant instituted an application to review and set aside two
rulings of the first respondent taken on 24 May 2022.
The first
respondent dismissed the application brought by the applicant to
re-open his case and ordered the applicant to avail
himself for the
investigating officer to take a buccal sample. The applicant is also
seeking an order that the second respondent
be directed to make
available buccal samples taken from him previously.
[2]
The second respondent is opposing the application on the basis that
the application to re-open the case lacks merits and
further that
according to the docket, no buccal samples were ever taken before.
[3]
Reference to the respondent in this judgment will refer to the second
respondent.
Background
[4]
The applicant was arrested on 1 January 2021 and detained at
Alexandra police station on a charge of rape. The complainant
is
Thabisile Khoza (“Ms Khoza”) with whom the applicant
alleged that he had a romantic relationship.
[5]
Whilst in custody the applicant was requested by a certain police
official, whose details are unknown, to take buccal
samples which is
a standard procedure where a person is accused of rape. The applicant
obliged and the sample was taken. The applicant
was approached later
by Sergeant John Vusimusi Makholwa (“Sgt Makholwa”) who
took the applicant’s fingerprints
and charged him.
[6]
Sgt Makholwa also requested to take buccal samples from the
applicant. The applicant informed Sgt Makholwa that his colleague
has
already taken the samples and in retort Sgt Makholwa stated that he
is the senior police official and the case was allocated
to him. The
applicant obliged and cooperated with the taking of the new buccal
samples.
[7]
Subsequently the applicant appeared before the Alexandra Regional
Court magistrate and was released on bail. The applicant’s
legal representative then made representations to the director of
public prosecutions and the charges were withdrawn during February
2021.
[8]
There were
complaints by members of the public and media who questioned the
decision to withdraw the charges against the applicant.
The docket
was then re-opened and transferred from Alexandra to Tembisa SAPS and
was allocated to Sgt Jack Ngobeni (“Sgt
Ngobeni”). The
transfer was predicated on the belief that there were underhand
dealings by the functionaries at Alexandra
Magistrate Court together
with the applicant’s legal representatives.
[1]
[9]
The applicant was invited to a meeting during March 2022 by Sgt
Ngobeni who informed him that the charge of rape would
be reinstated.
Further that there is a need to take another buccal sample. He
conveyed to the applicant that Sgt Makholwa was not
cooperating with
him. The applicant consulted with his legal representatives and
thereafter declined the invitation to submit himself
for a further
buccal sample.
[10]
Sgt Ngobeni served the applicant during March 2022 with summons in
terms of section 36E(2) read with section 37(3)(b)
of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (“the CPA”) to appear
before the Tembisa Regional Court Magistrate on
12 April 2022. The
matter was postponed to 19 April 2022. The respondent’s
application was argued on 19 April and both parties
closed their
cases. The application was postponed to 22 April 2022 for
judgment.
[11]
The applicant alleges that he was taken aback as contrary to what Sgt
Ngobeni told him, though the sample and other supporting
documents
were in the docket but could not be trusted, it was submitted during
argument by the state that in fact there were no
documents in the
docket. He then instructed his attorney to consult with Sgt Makholwa
to establish the correct position.
[12]
The applicant then approached Sgt Makholwa and Colonel William Chauke
from the Alexandra police station with the aim
of tracing the
previous buccal samples. Both of them were prepared and agreed to
attend court on 22 April 2022 to give the account
of what transpired.
Further to dispel the accusation that they were not cooperating with
Sgt Ngobeni. The applicant sought
to lead their evidence orally
and the court directed that re-opening the case should be by way of
application which must be supported
by statements from those
witnesses. The application was then postponed to allow the applicant
to launch an application to re-open
his case.
Before
court a quo
[13]
The applicant contended in its application that it is within the
discretion of the presiding officer to re-open the case
having regard
to certain factors. First, that the evidence could not be presented
earlier as he only became aware that the state
alleges that there is
no evidence of the sample ever having been taken. Second, that there
would not be any prejudice to visit
the respondent if the case is
re-opened. Third, the witnesses are present and available to provide
the court with evidence explaining
what happened to the samples taken
before. The said witnesses signed confirmatory affidavits relative to
the assertions made by
the applicant about them. The applicant
further submitted that the taking of further samples from him amounts
to an unwarranted
infringement of his constitutional rights.
[14]
The respondent did not deliver an opposing affidavit but served heads
of argument. The respondent argued that the applicant’s
witnesses were supposed to prepare statements in writing without
which the application to re-open the case would not be competent.
As
at the time of arguing there were no records of buccal samples having
been taken before, no sexual assessment kit, no chain
statement and
receipts.
[15]
The court ruled that:
“
There is an
application before this Court from the accused’s side to have
his case reopened. The Court requested that certain
statements be
obtained so that we can know for sure whether there are indeed new
evidence and whether this new evidence will take
this matter any
further.
At this stage there is
none. There is promises, there is apparently a person with documents.
That documents, if it is anything relating
to buccal samples, that
documents ought to have been in the docket and the Court cannot make
the finding at this stage that it
is in the docket and therefore
application for reopening is refused.”
[2]
[16]
After the
ruling on the re-opening of the applicant’s case, the court
proceeded and delivered judgment on the respondent’s
application in terms of section 36E of the CPA. The court
a
quo
decided
[3]
that a further buccal
sample should be taken and this was predicated on the conclusion that
a sexual assessment kit; chain statements;
a SAP 13 number that the
samples were kept; receipts issued when samples are taken; and the
requisite reference numbers could not
be found.
[4]
The court a quo also stated that it “…
has
no reason not to accept the evidence of Sgt Ngobeni that there is no
trace of any buccal sample”
.
[5]
In addition, the court was not persuaded that any buccal samples were
taken before as alleged by the applicant.
[17]
The court acknowledged that the matter had been pending and further
appreciated that both the applicant and complainant
were eager to see
finality of the matter. Further that it did not appear that the
applicant would suffer any prejudice from being
directed to submit a
buccal sample. In addition, there appeared not to be
mala fides
on the part of the respondent.
[18]
The court
a
quo
referred to judgments in
Mtshibe
[6]
and
Levack
[7]
where the court held that re-taking of samples is not per se
unreasonable or unconstitutional. The court then ordered that the
applicant’s buccal samples should be taken immediately. The
applicant resisted as he intended to challenge the decision of
the
presiding officer. The court
a
quo
,
reluctantly after several arguments,
[8]
agreed to allow the applicant to launch an application to challenge
its decision within 14 days, failing which the ruling would
be
executed.
Before
this court.
[19]
The applicant launched an application for review on the basis that
the presiding officer was biased against him and further
that the
refusal to re-open the case constituted a reviewable irregularity.
Contentions
and submissions.
Bias
[20]
The
applicant contended that the presiding officer was biased against him
in refusing to allow his witnesses to testify
viva
voce
before the court to account as set out above. The alleged bias was
fortified by the presiding officer’s conduct who even
dismissed
the application to challenge the finding through an appeal process.
The applicant’s counsel referred to
Mzendana
[9]
wherein, he submitted, it was held that it is trite that there is no
need to prove actual bias instead perception or appearance
of bias
was sufficient for the presiding officer to be disqualified from
presiding.
[21]
The
applicant contended that at the time when Sgt Ngobeni requested
buccal samples, he stated that they are in possession of the
samples
taken by Sgt Makholwa but there is no trust between them and as such
the fresh ones were needed. As stated above the applicant
was taken
by surprise at the hearing when the state contended that the docket
is empty and no record and any of the documents relevant
to the
buccal samples could be traced. Further that the reason why a new
Investigating Officer was appointed was because the case
against the
applicant was now politically driven.
[10]
Irregularity
[22]
The applicant further contended that the presiding officer committed
a reviewable irregularity by refusing to allow the
witnesses to
testify and further having rejected WhatsApp messages (referred to in
the answering affidavit) exchanged between the
two Investigating
Officers which confirms that Sgt Makholwa was cooperating with the
Sgt Ngobeni. The refusal to grant
audience to the witnesses
meant that the presiding officer took a decision which was based on
the evidence from the state without
giving the applicant’s
witnesses
audi alteram partem
.
[23]
Consistent with the evidence which would have been presented by the
applicant’s witnesses it has transpired that
in fact the
samples were indeed forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory and
the results were that the applicant was excluded
as a suspect.
[24]
The applicant is not keen about being subjected to the same process
(buccal samples being taken) again and finds
such conduct to be
compromising to the applicant’s rights enshrined in the
Constitution which includes the rights to dignity
and privacy.
[25]
The respondent has suddenly (after the discovery of the buccal
results) summersaulted, so it was argued, and contends
that the
integrity of the buccal sample has been compromised and finds this
stance opportunistic.
[26]
In view of
the fact that the respondent failed to deliver an affidavit setting
out averments to gainsay what was presented by the
applicant then
such applicant’s evidence was not disputed and the court should
have decided in favour of the applicant. The
applicant referred to
Zuma
[11]
and
IClear
Payments.
[12]
In
Zuma
the court held that where there are disputes of fact in motion
proceedings, the court needs to have regard to the applicant’s
facts as averred in the founding papers which have been admitted by
the respondent together with facts alleged by the latter and
grant
the order if justified. The respondent’s version must be
rejected if it consists of bald or unworthy denials, raises
fictitious disputes of fact, is palpably implausible, is far-fetched
and clearly untenable.
[13]
[27]
It was
stated in
Iclear
that Rule 6(5)(g) of the Uniform Rules of Court allows the court to
refer to any specified issue for oral evidence if a dispute
of fact
cannot be readily resolved from the papers. In this regard the court
may order that the deponent appear personally to provide
evidence or
grant such a deponent or any other person to be subpoenaed to appear
and be cross examined as a witness for that purpose.
[14]
[28]
Though the court in
IClear
refers to the Rule applicable in
the High Court, the Magistrate Court Rules has a similar provision in
terms of Rule 55(1)(k).
[29]
The respondent in retort contended that the procedure which the
applicant is advancing was incorrect. There is clear
authority that
the application to re-open a case has to be predicated on exceptional
circumstances and the applicant has failed
to satisfy the said
requirement. In addition, the application should be accompanied by a
statement/affidavit deposed to by the
applicant’s witnesses and
not only confirmatory affidavits. The applicant was afforded the
opportunity to present his case
properly but such opportunity was
rebuffed.
[30]
The respondent’s counsel submitted that the conduct of the
presiding officer was unassailable. The applicant’s
contention
of bias and reviewable irregularities are therefore unsustainable.
[31]
The respondent further submitted that reasons why it was contended
that the integrity of the sample and the results cannot
be relied
upon is because there is no evidence to demonstrate that the sample
tested has been taken from the applicant. Ordinarily
the police
officers would, after the sample has been taken, provide the accused
person with a slip and the police official would
remain with a copy
thereof. Neither the applicant nor the investigating officer could
produce copies of their respective slips.
The chain of custody could
also not be verified. As such there is still a need to take a new
sample and the chain of custody should
not be compromised and must be
accounted for from when the sample was taken until the results are
out.
[32]
The process for the court to assess and admit sample results is
dependent on the chain statement evidence without which
the court
would be entitled to assume that the chain was broken and as such the
results should not be accepted.
[33]
In addition, whilst it is acknowledged that some rights are being
infringed, they are indeed limited as set out in section
36 of the
Constitution.
Legal
principles and analysis.
Reviews.
[34]
The review
process of the decisions taken by a presiding officer in the lower
court is set out in terms of
section 22(1)
of the
Superior Courts Act
10 of 2013
read with Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court.
Section 22(1)
of the
Superior Courts Act provides
the grounds upon
which proceedings of any Magistrates’ Court may be reviewed and
such grounds include but are not limited
to bias
[15]
and gross irregularity.
[16]
[35]
The relief sought by the applicant for the order directing the
production of the sample taken previously is moot since
the results
of the sample have now made available. This also applies to the
request to re-open the case so that evidence of the
witness could be
led regarding the whereabouts of the buccal samples taken by Sgt
Makholwa. This is no longer necessary. The reflection
and
consideration of these issues would be limited to the determination
of the party who should be liable for legal costs.
Re-opening
of the cases.
[36]
The
re-opening of a case to lead further evidence is governed by Rule
29(11) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules which states
that “[a]ny
party may, with leave of the court, adduce further evidence at any
time before judgment; but such leave shall
not be granted if it
appears to the court that such evidence was intentionally withheld
out of its proper order”
.
The SCA
in
Blose
[17]
quoted with approval the decision in
Mkwanazi
[18]
where it was stated that “The discretion under Rule 29(11) must
be exercised judicially, upon consideration of all relevant
factors,
and in essence it is a matter of fairness to both sides”.
[19]
The court should also be slow to strictly apply the letter of the law
or excessively adhere to the printed form of the legislation
and fail
to appreciate what it seeks to realise.
[37]
The counsel
for the respondent referred to
De
Jager
[20]
relative to the test for hearing of further evidence.
De
Jager
was
quoted with approval in
Tofa
[21]
where the court stated that “[t]he power of receive further
evidence on appeal is sparingly exercised; further evidence will
only
be allowed in exceptional circumstances so that there can finality in
cases”.
[38]
Zeffert
[22]
et al
opines
that a determining factor in considering whether to re-open the case
would ordinarily be whether the other side would be
prejudiced. Other
factors, would be:
“…
the
reason why same was not led before, the materiality of the evidence –
whether it is likely to have any effect on the result
of the case –
and possible prejudice to the opposing party, who may no longer have
available the witnesses who could have
testified in rebuttal.”
[23]
[39]
In this instance it can be construed as having been exceptional to
have state witnesses keen to testify against the state.
It is also
understandable that the witnesses refused to provide records directly
to the applicant but were prepared to avail them
to the court. At the
same time, it is mind boggling why they did not first avail the
evidence to the state and not at the invitation
of the applicant. One
can deduce that there was acrimony and animosity between the Tembisa
and Alexander SAPS regarding the accusation
already conveyed to the
applicant.
[40]
Goosen J in
Gamble
[24]
stated that in attending to the assessment of materiality a trial
court would, in contrast to the appeal court, be less stringent.
In
this regard, the court stated that “
[a]s
pointed out in Oosthuizen a less stringent assessment as to
materiality applies at the stage of trial. It is sufficient if
the
court is satisfied that the evidence sought to be tendered is likely
to be weighty if believed
”.
[25]
The applicant needs to also demonstrate that such evidence was not
available or could not be reasonably acquired.
[26]
[41]
The applicant addressed the factors mentioned above by Zeffert
et
al.
In view of the fact that the respondent failed to serve an
answering affidavit the court
a quo
should not have allowed
the state to provide any evidence.
Re-taking
of the samples
.
[42]
The process
to be followed is set out in the Forensic DNA Regulations, 2015
promulgated in accordance with
section 15AD
of the
South African
Police Service Act 68 of 1995
read with
section 36A(5)
if the
CPA.
[27]
The regulation
prescribes the process from the inception until the sample is taken
for analysis.
[43]
The whole process should be outlined and prosecution need to satisfy
the court that the chain was not broken prior the
court admitting the
evidence. The prosecution submitted that the docket has no record and
it would be impossible to prove that
the chain evidence was not
compromised further that in the absence of chain evidence statement
the results would not be admissible.
[44]
It was held
in
Matshaba
[28]
that:
“
The
importance of proving the chain of evidence is to indicate the
absence of alteration or substitution of the exhibits. If no
admissions are made by the defence the state bears the onus to prove
the chain of evidence. The state must establish the name of
each
person who handled the evidence, the date on which it was handled and
the duration. Failure by the state to establish the
chain of evidence
affects the integrity of such evidence and this renders it
inadmissible.”
[29]
[45]
It
was also held by the SCA in
Bokolo
[30]
that DNA evidence is circumstantial evidence the weight of which
depends on various factors, which include:
“
(i)
the establishment of the chain evidence, i.e. that the respective
samples were properly taken and safeguarded until they
were tested in
the laboratory.
(ii)
the proper functioning of the machines and
equipment used to produce the electropherograms;
(iii)
the acceptability of the interpretation of
the electropherograms;
(iv)
the probability of such a match or
inclusion in the particular circumstances;
(v)
the other evidence in the case.”
[46]
The retaking of a buccal sample is provided for in terms of
regulation 3(9) of the Forensic DNA Regulations which states
that the
re-taking must take place within 30days of receiving such request.
Further that re-taking is normally where the first
sample taken was
either not suitable or insufficient for forensic DNA analysis.
[47]
Though authorities state that the re-taking of the sample is not an
unlawful invasion per se, the applicant correctly
questioned whether
the motivation for the re-take should be interrogated lest the police
officials would be allowed to display
a
laisser-faire
attitude, lose the samples and readily call upon the accused to be
subjected again to the taking of buccal samples. Ordinarily
the court
cannot be seen to countenance wanton disregard of duties by SAPS
members. The court would have to intervene and balance
the interests
of the complainant with the interests of the accused. Either way the
court should not easily condone the infractions
by the police
officials without conveying its displeasure. In this case there is an
indication that parties and functionaries at
Alexandra Court may have
acted with unfairness and have contaminated the wheels of justice.
Strangely so, the SAPS members appear
keen to assist the applicant
with evidence rather than readily placing the said evidence at the
disposal of the respondent. I therefore
do not find the request
unreasonable and malicious on the part of Sgt Mnguni.
[48]
The evidence presented does not satisfy the requirements set out
above and as such, the contention that the magistrate
was biased is
unsustainable. The magistrate gave the applicant an opportunity to
launch an application to re-open the case and
further gave the
applicant latitude to challenge his ruling to submit the sample even
though the magistrate was of the view that
the order to give the
sample should have been executed immediately. The conduct of the
magistrate displaces the alleged accusations
that he was biased
against the applicant.
Biasness
[49]
It was stated in
Hewitt
[31]
that “
[b]ias,
in the sense of judicial bias, has been said to mean a departure from
the standard of even-handed justice which the law
requires from those
who occupy judicial offices
”
[32]
.
The requirements for the test are that, first, there must be a
suspicion that the administrator might – not would –
be
biased, second, the suspicion must be that of a reasonable person in
the position of the person affected. Third, the suspicion
must be
based on reasonable grounds and fourth, the suspicion must be one
which the reasonable person would – not might –
have.
[33]
Irregularity
[50]
An irregularity which could lead to the proceedings being vitiated
refers to an irregularity which prevents a party from
having his case
properly heard. The applicant’s case is predicated on the
irregularity allegedly committed by the court
a quo
and in
contrast
section 22(c)
of the
Superior Courts Act specifically
refers
to a gross irregularity and not just an irregularity. Notwithstanding
there were no facts presented to the court supporting
new evidence
which should have swayed the magistrate to exercise his discretion to
re-open the case.
[51]
Reference to
Zuma
and
Iclear Payments
by the applicant
failed to meet the test of relevance as there were no disputes of
fact presented before the court
a quo
to warrant the referring
of issues for oral evidence.
Conclusion
[52]
Having regard to what the applicant presented before the magistrate,
I find no fault in the decision arrived at. There
was nothing new
presented to the magistrate except to repeat what was said before
that Sgt Makholwa was prepared to come to testify
and proffer the
explanation. The case now presented before us includes whatsapp
communications which may have persuaded the court
a quo
to
rule in favour of the applicant. To this end, the review would have
been unsustainable and therefore a costs order cannot be
awarded in
favour of the applicant.
[53]
With regard to the second issue relating to the order to re-take the
buccal simple. Though the results of the first sample
have been
found, I find merits in the argument that such results would not
assist the prosecution as there is no chain of custody
without which
evidence of the results would not be accepted by the court. I further
find the request for a further sample and order
of the court
a quo
not assailable.
Order
[54]
In the premises it ordered as follows:
The
application for review is dismissed with costs.
M V Noko.
Judge
of the High Court.
T.
Bokako
Acting
Judge of the High Court.
Date
of Hearing:
22 April 2024
Date
of Judgment:
20 May 2024
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the
Applicant:
Adv KP Mputle.
Instructed
by:
Ramakgadi Attorneys Inc.
Counsel for the First
Respondent: Adv M
Papachristoforou.
Instructed
by:
Director of Public Prosecutions.
[1]
See
record of hearing at 013-128 of CaseLines at lines 7-10 where the
applicant stated that Sgt Ngobeni said, “
[w]e
cannot trust the previous investigating officer because this
information pointing to extracts of the representations, your
previous attorneys could have only known about it as a result of
colluding with the investigating officer
”.
[2]
See
ruling on the re-opening of the applicant’s case at 013-139 of
CaseLines.
[3]
See
judgment of the court
a
quo
at 013-142 of CaseLines.
[4]
Id
at 013-149 of CaseLines.
[5]
Id
at 013- 150 of CaseLines.
[6]
S
v Mtshibe
2012
JDR 2349 (Nm).
[7]
Levack
and Others v Regional Magistrate, Wynberg and Another
[2002]
ZASCA 146; 2004 (5) SA 573 (SCA).
[8]
See
judgment of the court
a
quo
at 013-161 of CaseLines.
[9]
Mzendana
v Muller & Another
[2022]
ZAECMKHC 93 at para 16. (incorrectly cited by the Applicant as
Mzendana
v Magistrate & Another
[2022] ZAECGHC 79).
[10]
See
hearing records at 013-96 of CaseLines.
[11]
National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma
(“
Zuma
”)
[2009] ZASCA 1; 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA).
[12]
IClear
Payments (Pty) Ltd v Honeywell
(“
IClear
”)
[2023] ZAKZDHC.
[13]
Zuma
above
n 11 at para 26.
[14]
IClear
above
n 12 at para 13.
[15]
Section
22(1)(b).
[16]
Section
22(1)(c).
[17]
Blose
v Ethekwini
Municipality
[2015] ZASCA 87.
[18]
Mkwanazi
v Van Der Merwe and Another
1970
(1) SA 609 (A).
[19]
Id
at 616B.
[20]
S
v De Jager
1965
(2) SA 612
(A).
[21]
Tofa
v The State
[2015]
ZASCA 26
at para 5.
[22]
DT
Zeffert
et
al
The
South African Law of Evidence
(LexisNexis, Durban, 2003).
[23]
Id
at 771. See also
Oosthuizen
v Stanley
1938
AD 322
at 333 where it was stated that “
[i]n
a trial court, however, in my judgment, the test of materiality
should be held to be satisfied where the evidence tendered,
if
believed, is material and likely to be weighty”.
[24]
Gamble
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Santam Ltd and Another
[2020]
ZAECPEHC 9.
[25]
Id
at para 7.
[26]
Id
at para 10.
[27]
Section
36A(5)
of the CPA provides that “[a]ny authorised person who,
in terms of this chapter or in terms of any other law takes a buccal
sample from any person, must do so
—
(a)
in accordance with the requirements of any regulation made by the
Minister of Police; and …”.
[28]
S
v Matshaba
2016
(2) SACR 651 (NWM).
[29]
Id
at
para 14. Effort should be made to ensure that the samples are not
contaminated and in the event a report in terms of
section 212(8)
of
the CPA detailing the chain of custody is not accepted by the
defence, the prosecution would have to put up evidence on the
route
the sample undertook. See also De Wet
et
al
,
DNA
profiling and law in South Africa
PELJ, vol 14, 2011, at para 5.2 where it was stated that “…
if
the original location, mode of collection and chain of custody of
DNA evidence is not properly documented, its origin may be
questioned. This is because if biological evidence is improperly
collected or packaged, cross-contamination or sample degradation
may
occur
”.
See also
Nkwanyana
v
S
[2016] ZAKZPHC 82 at para 22.
[30]
Bokolo
v S
[2013] ZASCA 115
;
2014 (1) SACR 66
(SCA) at para 18.
[31]
Hewitt
v The Regional Magistrate and Another
2015
(3) All SA 183
(KZP).
[32]
Id at para 54.
[33]
See
S
v Roberts
1999 (4) SA 915
(SCA) at para 32.
sino noindex
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