Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 520South Africa
Malik v South Africa Chapter of the Bricks Business Council and Others (2022/6731) [2024] ZAGPJHC 520 (24 May 2024)
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Malik v South Africa Chapter of the Bricks Business Council and Others (2022/6731) [2024] ZAGPJHC 520 (24 May 2024)
Malik v South Africa Chapter of the Bricks Business Council and Others (2022/6731) [2024] ZAGPJHC 520 (24 May 2024)
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sino date 24 May 2024
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
1.
REPORTABLE: NO
2.
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
3.
REVISED.
24
May 2024
CASE
NUMBER:
2022/6731
In
the matter between:
JAVED
MALIK
Applicant
And
SOUTH
AFRICA CHAPTER OF THE BRICKS BUSINESS COUNCIL
First
Respondent
MINISTER
OF TRADE, INDUSTRY AND COMPETITION
Second
Respondent
BUSISIWE
MABUZA
Third
Respondent
AYANDA
NTSALUBA
Fourth
Respondent
BRIDGETTE
RADEBE
Fifth
Respondent
ELIAS
MONAGE
Sixth
Respondent
STAVROS
NICOLAOU
Seventh
Respondent
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' and/or the parties' representatives by email and
by being
uploaded to CaseLines. The date and time for hand-down is deemed
to be 10h00 on
May 2024
JUDGMENT
LOUW
H AJ
:
Introduction
[1]
This application has its origin in a decision by the first
respondent to remove and terminate the membership of the applicant as
a member of its Aviation Working Group on 12 March 2020 (“the
Decision”), the Aviation Working Group falling within
the
structure of the first respondent, the South Africa Chapter of the
BRICKS Business Council (“SABBC”).
[2]
The
Applicant seeks an order declaring the Decision ultra vires, unlawful
and inconsistent with the Constitution of the SABBC, alternatively
the review of the Decision in terms of Section 6(1) of the Promotion
of Administrative Justice
Act
(“PAJA”)
[1]
or the
common law, in circumstances where it alleges that the decision was
illegal and ultra vires, alternatively stands to be
reviewed on the
basis that it was both procedurally unfair and not rationally
connected to the facts.
BRICKS
Business Council and South Africa Chapter of the BRICS Business
Council
[3]
The
BRICS Business Council was established in 2013 during the 5
th
BRICS Summit by way of a “
Declaration
on the establishment of the BRICS Business Council
”
[2]
(“the Declaration”) as part of a global alliance of
business leaders with the common objective to strengthen and promote
economic, trade, business and investment ties between business
communities of the BRICS countries, BRICS being a
government-two-government
formation.
[4]
The BRICS Business Council is an associated “
workstream
”
comprising of 25 nominated members with five members from each member
country or chapter, the five members usually representing
business
associations and chambers in each country.
[5]
The BRICS Business Council discharges its mandate through nine
Working Groups which includes aviation, with each country or chapter
Working Group having a chair and secretariate, with a global Working
Group Chair.
[6]
The
SABBC was not constituted in terms of legislation and does not have a
statutory framework, it originating from the 5
th
BRICS Summit pursuant to the Declaration,
[3]
it being an unincorporated voluntary association of business people
working to promote and strengthen trade, business and investment
ties
between South Africa and other BRICS nations, with the additional
objectives of providing advice to the South African government
on
policies and regulations to promote, facilitate, diversify and
strengthen trade, business and investment relations amongst the
BRICS
countries with the trade-related economic areas falling under the
Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (“the
Department”).
[7]
The
focus of the SABBC and the Department are aligned requiring close
collaboration with it seeking approval or endorsement of its
proposed
Council members from the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition
(“the Minister”) which the Minister entertains,
it not
being assigned to the Minister by either legislation nor the
Declaration, the SABBC Terms of Reference
[4]
confirming that its nominee to the Council must be approved by the
Minister in office at the time of appointment, the council members
being nominated by Business Unity of South Africa and the Black
Business Council.
[8]
Neither of the members of the SABBC nor the members of the
Working Groups are renumerated with SABBC obtaining its resources
through
financial and other support from interested role players with
government not making any direct financial contribution to it.
[9]
The
SABBC created its own governance structure by way of the “
South
African Chapter of the BRICS Business Council (SABBC) Terms of
Reference
”
(“Terms of Reference”),
[5]
described by the applicant as its Constitution and by the first
respondent as a set of guidelines to define the purpose and structure
of the SABBC, to facilitate the co-operation of the various
structures to reach common goals, and to provide a general framework
and binding document to guide the SABBC work program in circumstances
where the Minister was not a party to the Terms of Reference.
[10]
The
Preamble
[6]
to the Terms of
Reference records the SABBC being established as a platform to
promote and strengthen business, trade and investment
ties amongst
the business communities of the BRICS countries with regular dialogue
between the business communities of the BRICS
countries and the
Governments of BRICS countries, also to identify problems and
bottlenecks to ensure greater economic, trade and
investment ties
among BRICS countries and to recommend solutions accordingly, it
being accountable to the Department.
[11]
The
Terms of Reference further identified the main objectives
[7]
of the SABBC to i) facilitate and expedite business-to-business
interactions to support increased trade, investment and business
engagement, ii) raise requisites funding for the Council, iii)
encourage and support SMME participation and new business,
contributing
to an inclusive economy, iv) foster alignment between
Government and business communities in relation to commercial
opportunities
offered by the BRICS relationship, v) promote business
opportunities for South African businesses within BRICS countries,
vi) ensure
that the working group programs and activities are
strategically aligned and relevant to, and support the advancement of
business
interests, and vii) ensure that the working groups further
the trade and investment objectives of South Africa.
[12]
Clause
3 of the Terms of Reference provided for the Constitution
[8]
of the SABBC (akin to composition), it being made up of five members
with extensive business experience both locally and internationally
requiring them to meet once each quarter with its members nominated
and appointed by Business Unity South Africa and the Black
Business
Council, those nominees to be approved by the Minister in office,
they serving for one term of three years.
[13]
Clause 3.2 provides for their Cessation of Office and clause
3.3 for the Authority of the SA BRICS Business Council, the business
and affairs of the SABBC to be managed and directed by the Council
members in consultation with the Minister, they to meet with
the
Minister at least twice a year and also to meet with the Deputy
Director-General of Trade and Investment at least every quarter
of
each year. The Duties of the Council members were further provided
for in clause 3.4 which include the obligation to establish
Working
Groups, directing the actions of the working groups and eliciting the
report-backs from the Working Groups.
[14]
The
Terms of Reference further provided for the Working Groups
[9]
to be established by the SABBC with specific areas of work and with
its main objectives to facilitate interaction among businesses
with a
view to better understand the market opportunities and build
synergies based on their respective competitive strengths and
to
promote industrial development and job creation. The SABBC could from
time to time establish sub-committees within the Working
Groups to
address specific issues and/or objectives, these Workings Groups not
independent bodies of SABBC and are not decision-making
bodies
independent of SABBC and all deliberations, discussions and decisions
of the Working Groups are subject to the SABBC’s
approval.
[10]
[15]
The
composition of the Working Groups was provided for in clause 4.2 of
the Terms of Reference with nominees for appointment to
the Working
Groups to be received by the SABBC and it at its sole discretion
making final appointments.
[11]
[16]
The
Working Group-Cessation of Office
[12]
provisions are provided for in clause 4.3, the following relevant
hereto; “
clause
4.3.1 he/she becomes ineligible or disqualified for an event of
violating corporate governance, generally, in terms of the
principles
of the company And/or the King IV Code; clause 4.3.2 Members of the
SABBC elect (by a majority consensus) to remove
him/her on the basis
that he/she has done an action which threatens to or which has
brought the SABCC to disrepute, subject to
having obtained the
written consent of the Minister; clause 4.3.7 he/she is otherwise
removed in accordance with any provisions
of these Terms of
Reference,
”
clause 4.3.7 also including the clause 11 “
Code
of Conduct of the SABBC and its Working Groups
”
provisions.
[13]
[17]
Clause 5, Reimbursement/Renumeration further provided that no
renumeration or fees shall be payable to SABBC members, the
chairperson
or members of the Working Groups.
[18]
Clause
11 of the Terms of Reference provide for the Code of Conduct of the
SABBC and its Working Groups to which members of both
the Council and
the Working Groups were to adhere, which included the obligation to
participate in good faith and pursue the national
interests of the
business community of South Africa, to act with honesty and integrity
at all times, to adhere to all decisions
made by the SABBC and
Working Groups once adopted and to observe and comply with all the
SABBC rules, policies and directives.
[14]
Factual
Matrix
.
[19]
During
and prior to July 2019 the applicant lead the Aviation Working Group
which leadership was criticized resulting in the SABBC
resolving
during July 2019 to appoint June Crawford as the new Chair which was
conveyed to the applicant on Monday, 22 July 2019
with the applicant
being reluctant to be removed and expressing the view that he was
being personally targeted.
[15]
[20]
Various projects with key outcomes were determined by the
Aviation Working Group with the applicant being assigned to the air
connectivity
sub-committee. On 13 February 2020 at an Aviation
Working Group meeting not attended by the applicant, he was
re-assigned to the
knowledge sharing sub-committee.
[21]
The
applicants took issue with his re-assignment and his approach was
described by Crawford as disrespectful in an email dated 20
February
2020,
[16]
the applicant
admitting to have reacted in a seemingly authoritarian manner. On 21
February 2020 a telephonic discussion occurred
between the applicant
and Crawford, the applicant insisting that he be allocated to the air
connectivity sub-committee which call
left her feeling disturbed and
concerned resulting in her contacting the core members of the
Aviation Working Group and discussing
the matter with the third
respondent, Busisiwe Mabuza (“Mabuza”), the Chairperson
of SABBC.
[22]
On
23 February 2020 Crawford addressed a formal letter of complaint to
Mabuza,
[17]
she writing on
behalf of the Aviation Working Group and four of its members.
Crawford penned the letter because of the unsatisfactory
exchange
between herself and the applicant on 21 February 2020, expressing the
view that the core membership of the Aviation Working
Group
unanimously requested the removal of the applicant form the Aviation
Working Group with immediate effect.
[23]
Crawford advised that the applicant added “
no value,
does not respond to emails or meeting requests, gives no input other
than to denigrate, interrogate, humiliate, insult
and patronise
members of the group. He is destructive and consistently thwarts the
progress of the group preferring to be regressive
in his attempt to
remind us of his past Chairmanship and experience. We can no longer
tolerate this unacceptable behaviour. In
the interest of both the
Council and the Aviation Working Group we request Mr Malik be removed
immediately. This is to prevent
what is already and untenable
situation continuing and, in particular, when we meet for the first
time with the 20-strong newly
appointed members on 19th March 2020
should he be present. Our professionalism would be called into
question. We thank you for
your urgent consideration the intervention
in this matter.
”
[24]
This resulted in the SABBC discussing the complaint on 2 March
2020 and mandating a sub-committee of Council members led by Mabuza
to follow a process to understand the gravity of the complaint and to
take the required action, the sub-committee consisting of
Mabuza and
Bridget Motsepe and Elias Monage.
[25]
On 2
March 2020 Mabuza addressed correspondence
[18]
to the applicant, also copying the various members of the BRICS
Business Council, informing him that it was brought to their
attention
that there was some discord between him and Crawford
relating to the allocation of members to a sub-committee of the
Aviation Working
Group. It was further stated that the Applicant
presented challenges to the functionality of the Aviation Working
Group by, inter
alia not responding to emails, not responding to
meeting requests, providing no input other than to denigrate,
interrogate, humiliate,
insult and patronize other members of the
Aviation Working Group.
[26]
The applicant was further informed that the SABBC had resolved
to provide him with the opportunity to provide a response in writing
and the Council was also to meet with him to discuss the allegations
put forward and thus provide him with a platform to respond,
also
informing him that the SABBC had decided to withdraw him from the
Aviation Working Group until the matter was investigated
and finalize
by the Council, further requesting him to refrain from participating
in any meetings of the Aviation Working Group
until the matter had
been resolved. This was arranged in circumstances where the Council
did not have any specific dispute resolution
or disciplinary
procedure as appears from the Terms of Reference.
[27]
The
Applicant elected to participate in the process and provided a
written response on 6 March 2020
[19]
on the allegations of not responding the emails and meeting requests,
he further electing not to provide a written response on
the
allegation that he provided no input to the Aviation Working Group
other than to denigrate, interrogate, humiliate, insult
and patronize
other members of the Aviation Working Group.
[28]
The
applicant attended the meeting on 9 March 2022 at a neutral venue
where he, on his version was presented with an opportunity
to merely
verbalised his 6 March 2020 written submissions. However, from the
meeting notes
[20]
it is
apparent that the proceedings went further than that, the applicant
expressing his dissatisfaction in Crawford’s leadership,
the
manner in which she treated him, he denying the allegations against
him and he took issue with being re-allocated from one
sub-committee
to another.
[29]
Crawford and three other members of the Aviation Working Group
were also presented with the opportunity to address the sub-committee
with Messrs. Phenyane and Rammopo dialling in. Mabuza indicated that
the common thread of the submissions to the sub-committee,
with which
the applicant took issue, was that the applicant was aggrieved by
having been removed as Chair of the Aviation Working
Group, his
engagement with the Crawford as Chair was offensive and disrespectful
and his relationship with the rest of the Group
was poor, the
applicant being disruptive during meetings with his conduct creating
tension and being negative, the applicant not
contributing to the
value of the Group and attempts to change his behaviour was
unsuccessful with the members of the Group not
wanting him to be part
of the Group, requesting his removal.
[30]
The dispute between the parties was not resolved
notwithstanding the applicant being specifically requested to provide
a solution,
he electing not to do so. Consequently, the BRICS
Business Council concluded that the dispute could not be resolved.
[31]
On 9
March 2020 the sub-committee tasked with the Aviation Working Group
Dispute Resolution process issued a “
Report
on Aviation Working Group Dispute Resolution
”
with recommendations to the SABBC that; “
After
considering the contribution of all roleplayers of the Working Group,
the Sub Committee recommends that Mr Malik be removed
from all
structures of the BRICS Council, with immediate effect.”
As
part of the “
Action
by Sub Committee
”
the report was to be submitted to the broader SABBC with the
recommendations of the sub-committee.
[21]
[32]
The
applicant was informed on 12 March 2020 by way of correspondence
[22]
headed “
TERMINATION
OF YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE BRICKS BUSINESS COUNCIL STRUCTURES
”,
thanking him for his written submissions and in-person contribution
in response to the complaint against him regarding
his conduct as a
member of the Aviation Working Group. He was further informed that
the Council had gone through a process of consultation
with him, the
Chair of the Working Group as well as other role-players and
following careful consideration of all inputs the SABBC
unanimously
concluded to terminate the applicant’s participation in the
Aviation Working Group as well as the SABBC at large,
formally
requesting him to abstain from attending any meeting or activity of
the SABBC or any of its Working Groups (“the
Decision”).
[33]
Thereafter
and on 20 March 2020 the applicant represented by Ramulifho attorneys
requested reasons for the decision, he being invited
on 23 March 2020
to commence with litigation and he threatening legal action in the
event of reasons not being provided on or about
27 March 2020,
[23]
with the Covid-19 pandemic coming to the fore.
[34]
Towards
the end of 2020 the applicant was advised to compel the first
respondent to provide reasons for the decision, he not having
finances do so. During the second quarter of 2021, more than 12
months after the Decision and after his financial position improved,
the applicant approached his current attorneys of record for advice,
being informed that reasons had to be requested prior to proceeding
to compel in order to save unnecessary costs being incurred, which
request was addressed to the first respondent on 16 July 2021,
requiring it to provide the requested documentation within 7 days
with the threat of an application to the High Court.
[24]
[35]
In
the absence of the documents being provided, further correspondence
was addressed to the first respondent on 29 July 2021 and
10 August
2021 with telephonic interaction on 17 August 2021 to obtain reasons,
with various documents and reasons being presented
on 2 September
2021,
[25]
the applicant also
demanding through his legal representatives to be reinstated, which
was rejected whereafter the applicant launched
this application on 18
February 2022 with service on the respondents on 1 March 2022.
Applicant’s
Submissions
[36]
The applicant seeks a declaratory order that the Decision of
12 March 2020 he declared unlawful,
ultra vires
and
inconsistent with the first respondent’s Constitution (Terms of
Reference) and be set aside, in the
alternative
that the
Decision be reviewed in terms of section 6 (1) of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”)
alternatively
, the common law and be rescinded and set aside,
with costs.
[37]
It
was argued on behalf of the applicant that the SABBC owes its
existence as well as its powers because of the Terms of Reference
[26]
also being described as a comprehensive Constitution setting out its
administrative functions, objectives, mandates and specific
procedures described in the execution functions to which the first
respondent and its members are bound, including the clause 4.3
“
Working
Group-Cessation of Office
”
provisions.
[38]
The
applicant claims that on a proper interpretation of the events that
may give rise to the termination of membership of the Working
Group
with reference to clauses 4.3.1 to 4.3.7, the termination and removal
would be automatic with mere notification being sufficient,
but for
clauses 4.3.2 and 4.3.7,
[27]
clause 4.3.2 containing a peremptory provision that the decision of
cessation must be supported by the written consent of the Minister
which had not been obtained. Consequently, the Decision being
ultra
vires
for going beyond the powers conferred on the first respondent.
[28]
In addition, the applicant expressed the view that the first
respondent should not be allowed to also rely on the clause 4.3.1
and
4.3.7 provisions which were expressed as an afterthought in that the
first respondent had recorded the reasons for termination
premised on
clause 4.3.2 only.
[39]
In
support of these contentions the applicant referred me to the
Decision / letter of termination dated 12 March 2020
[29]
and the reasons provided on 2 September 2021 by the SABBC legal
representatives by way of “
without
prejudice
”
correspondence included in the papers, its inclusion and referral not
being objected to.
[30]
[40]
In
the alternative the applicant seeks to review the Decision in terms
of the provisions of section 6 (1) of the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”),
[31]
alternatively
the common law on the basis that the Decision was administrative in
nature
[32]
and procedurally
unfair, arbitrary or capricious, the Decision not authorized by the
empowering provisions and it not rationally
connected to the reasons
given by the first respondent.
[41]
The
applicant described the first respondent as having a public function
receiving its powers and delegation from the second respondent,
the
Minister and being aligned with the Department under whose guidance
and authority it acts, acting in the interest of the public
as a
dominant body both nationally and internationally, requiring it to
exercise its decisions within the strict rules of national
justice as
its activities fall within the public interest domain, it being an
unincorporated voluntary association
[33]
in which the public at large has an interest, and in circumstances
where the first respondent’s discipline of its members,
or
working group members are in the public’s interest and member
of the first respondent is a prestigious position impacting
on the
good name of a member.
[42]
The
Decision was to be held procedurally unfair in that the 2 March 2020
notice failed to inform the applicant that he could be
removed as a
member of the Aviation Working Group
[34]
and although he was given an opportunity to respond to the
allegations he could not consider any witness statements, he was
unaware
of such statements, nor the identity of those that presented
statements, he not having reasonable opportunity make
representations.
[35]
[43]
In
addition, the 9 March 2020 termination notice was unclear, it merely
referring to an “
unanimous
”
decision,
[36]
he not being
informed of his right to review or any internal appeal
procedures,
[37]
he not
receiving notice of a right to request reasons
[38]
in circumstances where the common cause Terms of Reference did not
provide for these issued raised. The applicant further stated
that
there was no reasonable nor justifiable circumstances for the first
respondent to depart from the requirements of section
3(2) of
PAJA
[39]
and despite a written
request for reasons, the first respondent failed to provide it within
the 90 days period.
[40]
[44]
It
was further argued that there was a disconnect between the charges
and the Decision reached by the first respondent in that there
were
no facts on which the conclusion could have been based, there also
being no breach of the Terms of Reference, the Decision
thus being
rationally disconnected with the absence of facts.
[41]
[45]
Consequently, the applicant argued that the Decision stands to
be declared invalid and inconsistent with the first respondent’s
Constitution, or Terms of Reference, be set aside, alternatively to
be reviewed in terms of either PAJA or the common law.
[46]
The
applicant further argued that that there was no undue nor
unreasonable delay in the launch of the review proceedings, it to
be
instituted without unreasonable delay and not later than 180 days
after he was informed of the administrative action, or became
aware
of the action and the reasons for it, or might reasonably have been
expected to have become aware of the action and the reasons,
the
commencement date of the 180 days on his version being 2 September
2021 when he was provided with reasons.
[42]
First
Respondent Submissions
[47]
The first respondent raised three
In Limine
issues; i)
applicant’s unreasonable delay, ii) applicant’s reliance
on PAJA excludes reliance on the common law and,
iii) applicant’s
reliance on PAJA is misplaced.
[48]
The
first respondent argued that the Decision was taken on 12 March 2020
with the applicant being informed thereof on the same day,
the
applicant seeking reasons on 20 March 2020 (some 8 days later), the
application being invited on 23 March 2020 to launch an
application
[43]
and the
applicant threatening legal action in the event of reasons not being
received on or about 27 March 2020 (some 15 days later).
[44]
[49]
On
16 July 2021
[45]
(some 16
months after the Decision and being advised to proceed with legal
action) reasons were requested which were provided on
2 September
2021
[46]
(some 18 months
later) with the issue of the application on 18 February 2022 and the
service thereof on 2 March 2022 (some 23 months
after the Decision
and 181 days after reasons were provided), the delay causing
prejudice.
[50]
The prejudice claimed has its origin in the Council members
and Aviation Working Group members no longer being in office,
Crawford
having retired with the application being moot because the
term of office of the Council and Chairpersons of the Working Groups
came to an end with new appointments on and after 14 April 2022 with
Rammopo (one of the members requesting the applicant to be
removed
for his problematic, unprofessional and disrespectful stance) being
an interim Chair, and with a summons being served on
Crawford on 5
July 2022 by the applicant, seeking defamatory damages in the amount
of R 1,000,000.00.
[51]
Further,
it was submitted that is trite that if it is the applicant’s
case that the decision constitutes an administrative
action it must
be made in terms of PAJA which excludes the common law. Further,
reliance on PAJA was misplaced in that the SABBC
was not constituted
terms of legislation and it did not have any statutory framework, it
originating because of the Declaration,
[47]
the SABBC being an unincorporated voluntary association with members
not being renumerated and being nominated to sit on Working
Groups
with the acceptance of the nomination falling within the sole
discretion of the Council.
[52]
The applicant did not having a right to membership of the
Aviation Working Group, his rights not being adversely affected by
the
termination of his membership with the Decision only affecting
the applicant and not the public, the Decision to remove him thus
not
constituting an administrative action and not being subject to PAJA,
it also being trite law that a litigant cannot avoid the
provisions
of PAJA by relying on either section 33 of the Constitution, or the
common law with decisions constituting administrative
action falling
within the ambit of PAJA.
[53]
In
addition, it was argued that the decision to terminate the
applicant’s membership does not constitute an administrative
action and that the principles of natural justice do not form part of
the contractual Terms of Reference governing the relation
between the
parties, principles of natural justice not forming part of the Terms
of Reference preventing the applicant from insisting
that a
particular procedure was to be followed in the dispute resolution
process in determining and resolving the dispute on whether
or not
his membership could be terminated.
[48]
[54]
The Crawford complaint resulted in a
sub-committee being established to investigate the complaint and to
take the required action,
and because of a lack of process in the
Terms of Reference the Council designed a process to deal with the
complaint which it deemed
to be fair and transparent with the issue
of a notice of complaint containing allegations and allowing for both
written and oral
participation in the workings of the sub-committee
with the applicant requested to make suggestions on a solution, which
he could
not do.
[55]
In
addition, the three members of the Aviation Working Group also
participated in the process with an outcome formulated in a
Report
[49]
with
recommendations, the Decision by the unincorporated voluntary
association not falling under PAJA because of non-compliance
with the
definitional elements of administrative action.
[50]
[56]
The first respondent also argued that
the provision in clause 4.3.2 of the Terms of Reference requiring the
Minister to approve
the removal of the Working Group member was to be
ignored in that reference to the Minister was included in that clause
because
of an error in that clause 3.3.2 with reference to Council
members were incorrectly copied and inserted, the Minister having no
responsibility with reference to the Working Groups.
[57]
The first respondent further argued that
the SABBC is neither state owned nor state-funded and is not aimed to
facilitate interactions
between BRICS countries and it does not
representing the countries, acting in an advisory capacity relating
to BRICS matters with
the Minister not being beholden to, it not
exercising public powers with its members being nominated and
elected, they neither
representing South Africa nor the public in and
elected capacity, or otherwise in circumstances where decision to
expel a member
from a voluntary association is not an administrative
action or decision.
Considerations
Unreasonable delay
[58]
Applications
for review, under either PAJA or the common law must take cognizance
of the principle of the delay rule
[51]
having its origin in common law and also in section 7(1) of PAJA:
“
1. Any
proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1) must be
instituted without unreasonable delay and not later
than 180 days
after the date –
(a) . . .
(b) . . . on
which the person concerned was informed of the administrative action,
became aware of the action and the reasons
for it or might reasonably
have been expected to have become aware of the action and the
reasons.
”
[59]
Section 9(1) provides that the 180-day period “
may be
extended for a fixed period, by agreement between the parties or,
failing such agreement, by a court or tribunal, on application
by the
person or administrator concerned’ and section 9(2) provides
that such an application may be granted ‘where
the interests of
justice so require
”.
[60]
It
is important for the efficient functioning of public bodies, or
bodies to be subjected to review by way of a challenge to the
validity of their decisions, for judicial review proceedings to be
initiated without undue delay. The rationale for the undue delay
rule
appears to be twofold: First, the failure to bring a review within a
reasonable time may cause prejudice to the respondent.
Secondly,
there is a public interest element in the finality of administrative
decisions and the exercise of administrative functions.
[52]
[61]
The
public interest element in finality reflects on the inherent
potential for prejudice, both to the efficient functioning of the
public body and to those who rely upon its decisions, if the validity
of its decisions remains uncertain. It is for that reason
in
particular that proof of actual prejudice to the respondent is not a
precondition for refusing to entertain review proceedings
by reason
of undue delay, although the extent to which prejudice has been shown
is a relevant consideration that may even be decisive
where the delay
has been relatively slight.
[53]
[62]
The
common law application of the undue delay rule required a two stage
enquiry. First, whether there was an unreasonable delay
and, second,
if so, whether the delay should in all the circumstances be
condoned
[54]
with section 7(1)
of PAJA requiring the same two stage approach, but for the
legislature’s determination of a delay exceeding
180 days as
per se
unreasonable, and it follows that the court is only empowered to
entertain the review application if the interest of justice dictates
an extension in terms of section 9 of PAJA. In in the absence of such
extension the court has no authority to entertain the review
application at all. Whether or not the decision was unlawful no
longer matters in that the decision has been ‘
validated
’
by the delay, the applicant being obliged to seek condonation and an
extension.
[55]
[63]
The two year delay was not fully explained by the applicant
but for reference to the commencement of Covid and financial
constraints
suffered during some period in time. The applicant did
not provide an explanation as to why he did not commence with review
proceedings
after 23 March 2020 when he was requested to do so, nor
why he did not do so after he threatened to institute legal
proceedings
on 27 March 2020, in circumstances where the Constitution
/ Terms of Reference on which he relies does not create a procedure
as
alleged by him with reference to the obtaining of reasons for
review, nor notifications as referred to in the applicant’s
submissions.
[64]
Despite the aforementioned difficulties,
the application was eventually launched 181 days after the reasons
were provided, the matter
falling within the legislature’s
determination of a delay exceeding 180 days
per
se
being unreasonable and the court
then only being empowered to entertain the review application if the
interest of justice dictates
an extension, there being no request for
either condonation nor an extension, the court then having no
authority to entertain the
review application in the event of the
Decision falling within the ambit of PAJA, it being dismissed on this
ground alone, with
costs on the party-party scale.
The
Decision inconsistent with the first respondent’s Constitution
/ Terms of Reference
[65]
The
Working Group-Cessation of Office
[56]
provisions relevant to the Dispute, the “
Report
on Aviation Working Group Dispute Resolution
”,
[57]
the 12 March 2020 Decision
[58]
headed “
TERMINATION
OF YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE BRICKS BUSINESS COUNCIL STRUCTURES
”
and the first respondents legal representatives letter dated 2
September 2021
[59]
reflect
various breach occurrences of the Terms of Reference as read with the
principles of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
,
[60]
the principles of King IV Code and clause 11
[61]
three provisions of clause 4.3 being relevant hereto;
clause
4.3.1, clause 4.3.2, clause 4.3.7
which
included clause 11.
[62]
[66]
Only clause 4.3.2 requires third party
supervision in the Cessation process by majority consent, the
Minister having to provide
written consent, it being common cause
that clause 4.3.1 does not require supervision. The applicant argued
that clause 4.3.7 also
require supervision, but on a simple reading
of clause 4.3 only clause 4.3.2 requires the intervention of a
third-party granting
consent to the removal, by way of the Minister.
[67]
The
applicant further argued that on a reading of the content of the
termination notice
[63]
the
finding by the first respondent was limited to clause 4.3.2 in
removing him on the basis that he has done an action which
threatened, or which brought the SA BRICS Business Council to
disrepute, that not appearing from a reading of the Report and the
termination notice; “
Thank
you for your written submissions as well as your in-person
contribution in response to the complaint relating to your conduct
is
a member of the Aviation Working Group. The Council has gone through
a process of consultation with yourself, Chair of the Working
Group
as well as other role-players in this regard. Following careful
consideration of all inputs, the Council has unanimously
concluded to
terminate, with immediate effect, your participation in the Aviation
Working Group as well as the BRICS business Council
at large. We
hereby therefore formally request you to abstain from attending any
meetings or activities of the BRICS Business Council
or any of its
Working Groups.
”
[68]
The “
careful
consideration of all inputs
”
relating to the decision appears from the Report of the sub-committee
with reference to the evidence of the three Working
Group members,
they expressing the view that the applicant was “
continuously
disrespectful of the Chair of the Working Group and its core members,
displayed arrogance and was always referring
to himself and
historical leadership, is disruptive at meetings, relationships
between him and the rest of the Working Group members
is
unsatisfactory. All three members expressed their wish for Mr Malik
be removed from the Working Group to move forward.
”
[69]
Crawford “
The
Chair of the Working Group unpacked a pattern of disrespect,
arrogance and disruption displayed by Mr Malik, since his inclusion
in the Working Group, last October
”
with Crawford also expressing the view that “
to
ensure that the Working Group moves forward productively, she
advocates that Mr. Malik is removed from the Working Group.
”
The applicant denied all allegations against him and took “
grave
issue on being reallocated from one WG Sub Committee to another. Mr.
Malik shared with the meeting his perception of how he
is treated
meetings and submitted his assumption of the reason thereto.
”
[70]
The
conduct complained of and investigated by the sub-committee appears
not to be limited to clause 4.3.2 doing away with the criticism
that
the sub-committee and SABBC acted beyond the provisions of the Terms
of Reference and powers conferred upon it as a consequence
of the
Terms of Reference in terminating the membership of the applicant
without seeking the approval of the Minister.
[64]
[71]
SABBC
constituted a sub-committee to investigate the allegations which was
not a statutory tribunal but rather one created because
of contract
with its obligations derived from the express or implied terms of the
agreement between the parties affected. The test
for determining
whether the fundamental principles of justice are to be implied as
tacitly included in the agreement between the
parties is the usual
test for implying a term of the contract, subject to the express
terms of the agreement by which any or all
of the fundamental
principles of justice may be excluded or modified.
[65]
[72]
The Terms of Reference was described by
the applicant as a comprehensive Constitution tightly regulating the
first respondent, the
Terms of Referenced not containing any
provisions with reference to an investigation, inquiry and
disciplinary process to be followed
resulting in the creation of an
inclusive process of notification and interaction in the absence of
statements and cross-examination,
there also being no process nor
procedure to rely on internal appeal procedures, nor the right to
request reasons. However, once
reasons were requested, in the first
instance, the applicant was advised to launch his application
proceedings, reasons not being
given in the absence of a procedure.
[73]
The
applicant did not lay a factual basis that the principles of natural
justice should apply in this instance resulting in the
applicant
being entitled to a hearing before the termination of his membership,
and in circumstances where it is common cause,
and was supported by
the applicant’s representative that termination of membership
would be automatic with reference to the
provisions of clause 4.3,
with the exclusion of clauses 4.3.2 and 4.3.7, the court already
having found that clause 4.3.7 does
not require supervision.
Consequently, in these circumstances SABBC procedurally afforded the
applicant more than he was contractually
entitled to.
[66]
[74]
Consequently, the court cannot find that
the first respondent to remove the applicant as a member of the
Aviation Working Group
on 12 March 2020 acting unlawful and
inconsistent with its Constitution / Terms of Reference, the main
relief sought being dismissed
with costs on the party-party scale.
Application
of PAJA
[75]
In
the
Minister
of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and others,
[67]
on which both parties relied, the Constitutional Court identified
seven elements of the definition of administrative action as
set out
in section 1(i) of PAJA: “
there
must be: (a) a decision of an administrative nature; (b) by an organ
of state or a natural or juristic person; (c) exercising
a public
power or performing a public function; (d) in terms of any
legislation or an empowering provision; (e) that adversely
affects
the rights; (f) that has a direct, external legal effect; and (g)
that it does not fall under any of the listed exclusions
”.
[76]
It
is further required that a determination of whether or not an action
is administrative action, should be decided on a case-by-case
basis
[68]
with “
the
focus of inquiring as to whether conduct is “administered
action” is not on the arm of government to which the relevant
actor belongs, but on the nature of the power he/she is exercising.”
[77]
Against
this, the SABBC came into existence because of the Declaration
[69]
and was not created by legislation, it not having a statutory
framework and it being an unincorporated voluntary association
neither
owned nor funded by Government, with the Minister
participating in the appointment of Council members and cessation of
membership,
as a courtesy.
[78]
The
powers of the SABBC are not assigned and delegated by the Minister
and does not aim to facilitate interactions between BRICS
countries,
it operating in accordance with its clause 2 objectives contained in
the Terms of Reference, the Minister not being
beholden to it and it
not being, nor acting in a regulatory capacity.
[70]
[79]
The
clause 2 main objectives of Terms of Reference
[71]
of the SABBC, provides for; i) facilitation and expediting
business-to-business interactions, ii) to raise funding for the
Council,
iii) encourage and support SMME participation and new
business, contributing to an inclusive economy, iv) to foster
alignment between
Government and business communities in relation to
commercial opportunities offered by the BRICS relationship, v) to
promote business
opportunities for South African businesses within
BRICS countries, vi) to ensure alignment in and support the
advancement of business
interests, and vii) further the trade and
investment objectives of South Africa, providing for alignment,
interaction, promotion
and furtherance of various interests, also
with the Minister and the Department, also providing advice on
policies and regulations
to promote, facilitate, diversify and
strengthen trade, business and investment relations amongst the BRICS
countries.
[80]
Further,
the various Working Groups conduct their functions subject to the
oversight of the Council and the Terms of Reference
[72]
with specific areas of work and with its main objectives to
facilitate interaction action among businesses with a view to better
understand the market opportunities and build synergies based on
their respective competitive strengths and to promote industrial
development and job creation, the Workings Groups not being
independent bodies of the SABBC and not being decision-making bodies
independent of Council with and all deliberations, discussions and
decisions of the working groups are subject to Council’s
approval.
[73]
[81]
The
Working Group members do not represent South Africa nor the public at
large, the members forming part of a voluntary association
in
circumstances where decisions to expel and terminate membership are
not administrative decisions.
[74]
[82]
The
termination of the applicant’s membership of the Aviation
Working Group does not effect his rights (none being shown as
adversely affected), members being voluntarily appointed with no
renumeration and he not having a right to membership of the SABBC
nor
any of its structures, he being appointed at the discretion of the
Council in accordance with the mandate of the Working Groups
and the
main objectives of the Council
[75]
to facilitate business interaction with a view to understand the
market opportunities and build synergies based upon respective
competitive strengths and to promote industrial development and job
creation.
[83]
The Decision and the actions and conduct
of the SABBC in terminating the membership of the applicant was not
in the exercise of
public power and did not fall within the
definitional elements of administrative action as set out in section
1(i) of PAJA, the
applicant being unsuccessful in the alternative
review relief sought, it being dismissed with costs.
Conclusion
[84]
In all the circumstances, I have come to
the conclusion, and find that there was an unreasonable delay in the
launch of the application
proceedings, the first respondent did not
act unlawful and inconsistent with its Terms of Reference and the
Decision does not fall
within the ambit of administrative action
under the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
, the
Decision not being reviewed.
[85]
As to costs, there is no reason why it
should not follow the result in terms of the general practice, costs
payable by the applicant
on the party-party scale.
ORDER
[86]
In the result the following order is made:
1.
The application is dismissed with costs.
H.
LOUW
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng
Division, Johannesburg
Heard
:
26 March 2024
Judgment
:
24 May 2024
Appearances
For
Applicant
:
JC Viljoen
Instructed
by
:
Stupel & Berman Inc
For
Respondent
:
HR
Fourie SC
Instructed
by
:
Friedland Hart Solomon & Nicolson
[1]
Act
3
of 2000
[2]
Annexure BM 6.1 Declaration dated and signed At Durban on 27 March
2013 by the then five-member country representatives
[3]
Annexure BM6.1
[4]
Annexure FA 1 clause 3.1.5
[5]
BRICS Business Council - South African Chapter of the BRICS Business
Council (SABBC) Terms of Reference clause 1, Annexure FA1
[6]
Annexure FA 1 clause 1
[7]
Annexure FA 1 clause 3
[8]
Annexure FA 1 clause 3.1
[9]
Annexure FA 1 clause 4
[10]
Terms of Reference Clause 4.1 to 4.8
[11]
Annexure FA 1 Terms of Reference Clause 4.2.2
[12]
Annexure FA 1 Terms of Reference Clause 4.3; "
clause
4.3.1 he/she becomes ineligible or disqualified for an event of
violating corporate governance, generally, in terms of
the
principles of the company And/or the King IV Code; clause 4.3.2
Members of the SABBC elect (by a majority consensus) to remove
him/her on the basis that he/she has done an action which threatens
to or which has brought the SABCC to disrepute, subject to
having
obtained the written consent of the Minister;
clause
4.3.3 he/she has or acquires, at any time, any personal interest, in
a service provider or any entity which enters into
or conducts any
commercial agreement with the SABBC; clause 4.3.4 he/she dies;
clause 4.3.5 he/she resigns by giving thirty (30)
days' written
notice to the SABBC; clause 4.3.6 he/she is declared delinquent by a
court, or placed on probation under conditions
that are inconsistent
with the continuation to be a member of the SABBC;
clause
4.3.7 he/she is otherwise removed in accordance with any provisions
of these Terms of Reference.
”
[13]
Clause 11: Code of Conduct of the SABBC and its Working Groups
11.1
All SABBC members and working groups shall adhere to the following
principles:
11.1.1
to participate in good faith and pursue the national interests of
the business community in South Africa
11.1.2
to act with honesty and integrity at all times
11.1.3
to maintain confidentiality regarding confidential matters raised
11.1.4
to act as a representative of Business South Africa and of the South
African Chapter when mandated
11.1.5
to ensure that the SABBC’s rules of diplomacy and courtesy are
maintained at all times1.1.6 to adhere to all decisions
that are
made by the SABBC and the working groups once adopted
11.1.7
to report to the constituencies as mandated by the SABBC
11.1.8
to serve and comply with all the SABBC’s rule, policies and
directives
11.1.9
to participate in all training requirements set by SABBC
11.1.10
only to engage with the media and public through formally mandated
representatives
11.1.11
it is specifically noted that the chairperson of the SABBC is the
sole right of contact for interaction with the media
and the public
(including the working groups) unless the chairperson specifically
delegates this duty to another person
[14]
Annexure FA 1 Terms of Reference Clause 11.1.6
[15]
Annexure BM7
[16]
Annexure BM12
[17]
Annexure FA2
[18]
Annexure FA3
[19]
Annexure FA4
[20]
Annexure BM13.1
[21]
Annexure FA9.2
[22]
Annexure FA5
[23]
Annexure FA6
[24]
Annexure FA7.1
[25]
Annexures FA8.1 to 9.2
[26]
Annexure FA 1 Terms of Reference Clause
[27]
clause
4.3.1 he/she becomes ineligible or disqualified for an event of
violating corporate governance, generally, in terms of
the
principles of the company And/or the King IV Code; clause 4.3.2
Members of the SABBC elect (by a majority consensus) to remove
him/her on the basis that he/she has done an action which threatens
to or which has brought the SABCC to disrepute, subject to
having
obtained the written consent of the Minister; clause 4.3.7 he/she is
otherwise removed in accordance with any provisions
of these Terms
of Reference
[28]
President
of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo
1997 (4) SA 1
(CC) At [65]
[29]
Annexure FA5: "
Thank
you for your written submissions as well as your in-person
contribution in response to the complaint relating to your conduct
is a member of the Aviation Working Group. The Council has gone
through a process of consultation with yourself, Chair of the
Working Group as well as other role-players in this regard.
Following careful consideration of all inputs, the Council
has
unanimously concluded to terminate, with immediate effect, your
participation in the Aviation Working Group as well as the
BRICS
business Council at large. We hereby therefore formally request you
to abstain from attending any meetings or activities
of the BRICS
Business Council or any of its Working Groups.
”
[30]
Annexure FA9.1 "
Our
clients terminated your client's position as Chairperson of the
Aviation Working Group and as a member of the Council in that
your
client
breached
the Terms of Reference
applicable to our client, which is the governing document of our
client and which is attached as ease of reference. Your client
was
furnished with the findings and attached hereto find the relevant
correspondence between your client and our client’s
report,
from which you will note that your client breached his fiduciary
duties as a detailed in the Terms of Reference, which
together with
the principles of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
……
Particular reference to
section 76
of the
Companies Act and
the
principles of King IV Code
.”
[31]
Section
6.
“
Judicial
review of administrative action: (1) Any person may institute
proceedings in a court or a tribunal for the judicial review
of an
administrative action.
”
[32]
President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby
Football Union and Others
2001 (2) SA 1
(CC) at [141] “
In
section 33 the adjective “administrative” not
“executive” is used to qualify “action”.
This suggests that the test for determining whether conduct
constitutes “administrative action” is not the question
whether the action concerned is performed by a member of the
executive arm of government. What matters is not so much the
functionary
as the function. The question is whether the task itself
is administrative or not. It may well be, as contemplated in
Fedsure
,
that some acts of a legislature may constitute “administrative
action”. Similarly, judicial officers may, from time
to time,
carry out administrative tasks. The focus of the enquiry as to
whether conduct is “administrative action”
is not on the
arm of government to which the relevant actor belongs, but on the
nature of the power he or she is exercising.”
## [33]Coetzee
v Comitis & Others2001 (1) SA 1254 (C) at [17.8];AAA
Investments (Proprietary) Limited v Micro Finance Regulatory Council
and Another2007 (1) SA 343 (CC) at [45] “The
SCA relied on the fact that the memorandum of association empowered
the Council to adopt its own rules for concluding that
the Council
was a mere private entity. This conclusion puts form above substance
and disregards the nature of the function that
the Council must
perform. It ignores the reality of almost absolute ministerial
control over the Council’s functions. The
provisions of the
memorandum and articles of association fade into insignificance as
an indicator of the nature of the Council
in light of the
overwhelming evidence of the true nature of the Council’s
functions. The fundamental difference between
a private company
registered in terms of the Companies Act and the Council is that the
private company, while it has to comply
with the law, is autonomous
in the sense that the company itself decides what its objectives and
functions are and how it fulfils
them. The Council’s
composition and mandate show that although its legal form is that of
a private company, its functions
are essentially regulatory of an
industry. These functions are closely circumscribed by the
ministerial notice. I strain to find
any characteristic of autonomy
in the functions of the Council equivalent to that of an enterprise
of a private nature. The Council
regulates in the public interest
and in the performance of a public duty. Its decisions and Rules are
subject to constitutional
control. The Council is subject to the
principle of legality and the privacy protection of our
Constitution. The SCA’s
decision therefore cannot be upheld.”
[33]
Coetzee
v Comitis & Others
2001 (1) SA 1254 (C) at [17.8];
AAA
Investments (Proprietary) Limited v Micro Finance Regulatory Council
and Another
2007 (1) SA 343 (CC) at [45] “
The
SCA relied on the fact that the memorandum of association empowered
the Council to adopt its own rules for concluding that
the Council
was a mere private entity. This conclusion puts form above substance
and disregards the nature of the function that
the Council must
perform. It ignores the reality of almost absolute ministerial
control over the Council’s functions. The
provisions of the
memorandum and articles of association fade into insignificance as
an indicator of the nature of the Council
in light of the
overwhelming evidence of the true nature of the Council’s
functions. The fundamental difference between
a private company
registered in terms of the Companies Act and the Council is that the
private company, while it has to comply
with the law, is autonomous
in the sense that the company itself decides what its objectives and
functions are and how it fulfils
them. The Council’s
composition and mandate show that although its legal form is that of
a private company, its functions
are essentially regulatory of an
industry. These functions are closely circumscribed by the
ministerial notice. I strain to find
any characteristic of autonomy
in the functions of the Council equivalent to that of an enterprise
of a private nature. The Council
regulates in the public interest
and in the performance of a public duty. Its decisions and Rules are
subject to constitutional
control. The Council is subject to the
principle of legality and the privacy protection of our
Constitution. The SCA’s
decision therefore cannot be upheld.
”
[34]
PAJA Section 3(2)(b)(i): “
(2)(b)
In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair
administrative action, an administrator, subject to subsection
(4),
must give a person referred to in subsection (1)—
(i)adequate
notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative
action;
”
[35]
PAJA Section 3(2) (b)(ii) “
a
reasonable opportunity to make representations
”
[36]
PAJA Section 3(2) (b)(iii) “
a
clear statement of the administrative action;
”
[37]
PAJA Section 3(2) (b)(iv) “
adequate
notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where applicable;
”
[38]
PAJA Section 3(2) (b)(v) “
adequate
notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5”
[39]
PAJA Section 3(2) (4)
[40]
PAJA Section 5(2)
[41]
Bato
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism and Others
[2004] ZACC 15
;
2004
(4) SA 490
(CC) at
[45]
“
What
will constitute a reasonable decision will depend on the
circumstances of each case, much as what will constitute a fair
procedure will depend on the circumstances of each case. Factors
relevant to determining whether a decision is reasonable or
not will
include the nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of
the decision-maker, the range of factors relevant
to the decision,
the reasons given for the decision, the nature of the competing
interests involved and the impact of the decision
on the lives and
well-being of those affected. Although the review functions of the
Court now have a substantive as well as a
procedural ingredient, the
distinction between appeals and reviews continues to be significant.
The Court should take care not
to usurp the functions of
administrative agencies. Its task is to ensure that the decisions
taken by administrative agencies
fall within the bounds of
reasonableness as required by the Constitution.
”
[42]
PAJA Section
7
Procedure for judicial review “
(1)
Any proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1) must be
instituted without unreasonable delay and not later than
180 days
after the date— (a) subject to subsection (2)(c), on which any
proceedings instituted in terms of internal remedies
as contemplated
in subsection (2)(a) have been concluded; or (b) where no such
remedies exist, on which the person concerned
was informed of the
administrative action, became aware of the action and the reasons
for it or might reasonably have been expected
to have become aware
of the action and the reasons.
”;
Fines
4 U (Pty) Ltd and another v Amos and others
[2017]
2 All SA 571
(GP) at [54] “
Counsel
for the applicants argued, correctly in my view, that the dates of
the alleged transgressions between December 2008 and
August 2013,
are irrelevant for purposes of deciding this issue. On a proper
reading of PAJA,
it
is
the
date
on
which
the
applicants
were
informed
of
the
reasons
for
the
rejection
of
the
representations which is relevant.
”
[43]
Annexure BM15
[44]
Annexure FA6
[45]
Annexure FA7.1
[46]
Annexures FA9-9.2
[47]
Annexure BM6.1 dated 27 March 2013
[48]
Turner
v Jockey Club of South Africa
1974 (3) SA 633
(A) at pages 54 and further,
Mullin
(Pty) Ltd
1952 1 SA 211
(AD) at page 214; Transman (Pty) Ltd vg Dick and
another
[2009] JOL 23374
(SCA) at [30]
[49]
Annexure "FA9.2” Report on Aviation Working Group Dispute
Resolution dated 9 March 2020
[50]
Minister
of Defense and Military Veterans v Motao and others
2014 (5) SA 69
(CC) at [33];
Diko
and others v Nobongoza and others
2006 (3) SA 126
(C) at pages 132-133;
President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby
Football Union and Others
2000 (1) SA 1
(CC) at [144)
[51]
Beweging
vir Christelik Volkseie Onderwys and others v Minister of Education
and
others
[2012]
2 All SA 462
(SCA) para 44
[52]
Gqwetha
v Transkei Development Corporation Ltd and others
2006
(2) SA 603
(SCA) paras 22-23
[53]
Opposition
to Urban Tolling Alliance v SA National Roads Agency
2013 4 All SA 639
SCA at [25]
[54]
Associated
Institutions Pension Fund and others v Van Zyl and others
2005 (2) SA 302
(SCA) para 47; Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance
v SA National Roads Agency at [26]
[55]
Camps
Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v Harrison
[2010]
2 All SA 519
(SCA) para 54;
Opposition
to Urban Tolling Alliance v South African National Roads Agency
Limited
[2013]
4 All SA 639
(SCA) at papa 26 Brand JA stated that the “
delay
exceeding 180 days is determined to be per se unreasonable,
but a delay of less than 180 days may also be unreasonable
and
require condonation
”.
The court held that in the “
circumstances,
and given the obvious widespread prejudice that would be caused by
any delay, [4 Africa’s] institution of
the review application
[after the lapse of time] was plainly unreasonable and is not in the
interests of justice
”
[56]
Annexure FA 1 Terms of Reference
[57]
Annexure FA9.2
[58]
Annexure FA5
[59]
Annexure FA9.1
[60]
Section 76: Standards of directors conduct
[61]
Clause 11: Code of Conduct of the SABBC and its Working Groups
[62]
Clause 11: Code of Conduct of the SABBC and its Working Groups
11.1
All SABBC members and working groups shall adhere to the following
principles:
11.1.1
to participate in good faith and pursue the national interests of
the business community in South Africa
11.1.2
to act with honesty and integrity at all times
11.1.3
to maintain confidentiality regarding confidential matters raised
11.1.4
to act as a representative of Business South Africa and of the South
African Chapter when mandated
11.1.5
to ensure that the SABBC’s rules of diplomacy and courtesy are
maintained at all times
11.1.6
to adhere to all decisions that are made by the SABBC and the
working groups once adopted
11.1.7
to report to the constituencies as mandated by the SABBC
11.1.8
to serve and comply with all the SABBC’s rule, policies and
directives
11.1.9
to participate in all training requirements set by SABBC
11.1.10
only to engage with the media and public through formally mandated
representatives
11.1.11
it is specifically noted that the chairperson of the SABBC is the
sole right of contact for interaction with the media
and the public
(including the working groups) unless the chairperson specifically
delegates this duty to another person
[63]
Annexure FA5
[64]
President
of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo
1997 (4) SA 1
(CC) at [65]
[65]
Turner
v Jockey Club
1973 (3) SA 633
(A) pages 54-55 read with
Mullin
(Pty) Ltd v Benade Ltd
1952 1 SAA 211 (80) at pages 214-215
[66]
Klein v
Dainfern CVollege and Another
2005 JDR 1177 (T) at [18], [23], [26]-[27]
[67]
2014 (5) SA 69
(CC) at [33], section 1 (i) of PAJA: “
there
must be: (a) a decision of an administrative nature; (b) by an organ
of state or a natural or juristic person; (c) exercising
a public
power or performing a public function; (d) in terms of any
legislation or an empowering provision; (e) that adversely
affects
the rights; (f) that has a direct, external legal effect; and (g)
that it does not fall under any of the listed exclusions
”.
[68]
President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby
Football Union and Others
2001 (2) SA 1
(CC) at [141] – [143]
[69]
Annexure BM 6.1 Declaration dated and signed At Durban on 27 March
2013 by the then five-member country representatives
[70]
AAA
Investments (Proprietary) Limited v Micro Finance Regulatory Council
and Another
2007 (1) SA 343 (CC)
[71]
Annexure FA 1 clause 3
[72]
Annexure FA 1 clause 4
[73]
Terms of Reference Clause 4.1 to 4.8
[74]
Diko
and others v Nobongoza and others
2006 (3) SA 126
(C) at pages 132-133
[75]
Terms
of Reference clause 4.1
sino noindex
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