Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 572South Africa
Khumalo v S (A272/2017) [2024] ZAGPJHC 572 (31 May 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
31 May 2024
Headnotes
SUMMARY:
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Khumalo v S (A272/2017) [2024] ZAGPJHC 572 (31 May 2024)
Khumalo v S (A272/2017) [2024] ZAGPJHC 572 (31 May 2024)
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IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE: A272/2017
1. Reportable: Yes/No
2. Of interest to
other judges: Yes/No
3. Revised:
In the matter between:
LUCKY
KHUMALO
Appellant
And
THE
STATE
Respondent
JUDGMENT
VAN DER WESTHUIZEN AJ:
INTRODUCTION
:
[1] This is an
appeal against the convictions and sentences imposed by the Regional
Court, Johannesburg.
[2] The Appellant
was convicted on the following Counts:
2.1 Count 1 Murder
2.2 Count 2 Rape
2.3 Count 3
Robbery with aggravating circumstances.
2.4 Count 4
Robbery with aggravating circumstances.
2.5 Count 5 Rape
[3] On 22 February
2013 the Appellant was sentenced as follows:
Count 1: Life
imprisonment.
Count 2: Life
imprisonment.
Count 3: Fifteen
(15) years imprisonment.
Count 4: Fifteen
(15) years imprisonment.
Count 5: Fifteen
(15) years imprisonment.
[4] It was ordered
that the sentences in respect of Counts 3, 4 and 5 should run
concurrently with the sentence imposed on
Count 1. It was also
ordered that his name should be entered in the register of sexual
offenders in terms of section 50 (2)(a)
of Act 32 of 2007.
THE TRIAL:
[5] The Appellant
pleaded not guilty on all the counts. The State called a number of
witnesses and the Appellant also testified
under oath.
[6] The only
eyewitness in the case was the Complainant in respect of Counts 2, 3
and 5. According to her, she and her boyfriend
Percy, the deceased
referred to in Count 1, were asleep in a supermarket (as the
prosecutor described it) in Jules Street, Johannesburg
on 27 October
2008 at approximately 03h15.
[7] For purposes of
Count 3 one can certainly find, and it was not disputed that all the
items in the shop were under their
control.
[8] Three men
entered the shop and one of them was carrying what appeared to her to
be a firearm. One of the men then started
to assault the deceased.
Another of the men with dreadlocks, came to her and demanded money.
She pointed at a bag on a table containing
money. The assailant with
the dreadlocks ordered “Mlung”, the third man, to take
it, which he did and he left the room.
[9] The Appellant
searched the trousers of the deceased and he also asked the
complainant about cellphones. On a question
by the Prosecutor whether
anything was taken from the deceased’s trousers, her response
was: “I do not know but the
only thing that I saw when Percy
came in was money that was inside his pocket but I do not know how
much was it.” On a further
question whether she at any stage
saw if the money was still there, she replied in the negative.
[10] After that,
she saw the assailant with the dreadlocks hit the deceased with a
hammer, in the presence of the Appellant.
On a question by the
Prosecutor whether the Appellant did anything to stop the assailant
with the dreadlocks hitting the deceased
with the hammer, her
response was: “No, he did not stop him because he said to the
guy with the dreadlocks they must stab
me and kill me as well.”
The one with the dreadlocks then ordered the Appellant to go and
fetch, to use her words, “the
cosmetics”. To us it seems
that it was not real cosmetics but balms, other types of items used
as remedies, and lotions.
[11] The assailant
with the dreadlocks then ordered the Complainant to take of her
panties, which she did and he then started
to rape her. Whilst still
busy raping her, he stopped, walked to the deceased and hit him once
again with a hammer on the side
of his face. She shouted at him and
asked him whether he wanted to kill the deceased in front of her and
his response was “yes”.
He then returned to her and
continued to rape her until he ejaculated.
[12] The assailant
with the dreadlocks got dressed and said to the Appellant that he is
going to leave, which he duly did.
The Appellant asked the
complainant to give him cartons of cigarettes, which she did. He
placed everything into a plastic bag.
[13] The Appellant
then approached her, took out his penis and put it in her mouth and
he ordered her to suck it. She did
not adhere to his request and he
started to make movements like having sex in her mouth. He took his
penis out of her mouth and
started to penetrate her vagina whilst she
was on her back. He stopped before he ejaculated. He tied her hands
with a stocking
behind her back and stuffed her panty inside her
mouth.
[14] The Appellant
then left the shop with only one bag containing a cellphone and
different kinds of soap. He also took two
pool cues. He forgot to
take the other plastic bag with the other items in it.
[15] During
cross-examination by the Defence, the following arose which is very
important for purposes of the judgment. The
question posed was what
was the position of the appellant when he was searching Percy. The
response by the complainant was: “He
was standing by the
trousers hanging on the chair”.
[16] She also
testified during cross-examination that the one with the dreadlocks
took the plastic bag containing the cigarettes
when he left.
[17] The
Complainant was a very important witness in this matter as will
become evident later on in this judgment. The learned
Magistrate was
correct in his finding that the Complainant was an honest and
reliable witness. He further correctly rejected the
Appellant’s
version as false beyond reasonable doubt.
[18] I do not deem
it necessary to deal with the rest of the evidence that was led
during the trial. I am of the view that
the learned Magistrate dealt
with the matter correctly. However, I am not satisfied with his
reasoning and resultant finding of
the Appellant guilty on all the
counts. Accordingly, this court must interfere therewith.
DISCUSSION:
[19] It is clear
that the three assailants that entered the room where the Complainant
and deceased were asleep, had the common
intent to commit certain
unlawful acts. However, not all of the counts that the Appellant was
convicted of, were committed with
one common intention.
[20] Firstly, the
count of murder. When the three assailants entered the room, one of
them had something in his possession
that looked like a firearm. That
was the last word in the record that we hear about a firearm. The
evidence of the Complainant
was that the deceased was bludgeoned with
a hammer. This was never disputed by the defence. It was not
canvassed with the Complainant
where the hammer could have come from.
The question arises whether or not that is not the weapon that she
saw when they entered
the room, which she perceived to be a firearm.
[21] The fact
remains that when they entered the room, they started to assault the
deceased with a hammer. None of the assailants
distanced themselves
from this assault and the evidence is clear that he died as a result
thereof. When the Complainant shouted
at the assailant with the
dreadlocks to stop the assault, the Appellant was the one that
proposed that they should also stab her
to death. He was clearly
content that the two of them should be killed. “Active
association with the acts of the person or
persons which caused the
death of the deceased can also justify a finding of his own mens rea
and his guilt”. See: S
v Memani
1990 (2) SACR 4
(TKA).
[22] The Magistrate
was correct in finding the Appellant guilty on Count 1 as charged.
[23] Count 2 which
the Appellant was convicted of is one of rape. It is clear that the
Complainant was raped by the assailant
with the dreadlocks. Whilst he
was doing that, the Appellant was busy in the shop collecting items
to steal. There is no indication
that there was a common purpose
between these two men to rape the Complainant. There is the evidence
that the Appellant also raped
the Complainant in her vagina, but on
the evidence before us, we cannot find that this charge refers or
relates to that rape. We
are of the view that this charge refers to
the rape by the assailant with the dreadlocks.
[24] The fact that
the Appellant was present when this rape took place, does not mean
that he had the common intent with the
assailant with the dreadlocks,
to rape the Complainant. The assailant with the dreadlocks committed
the rape out of his own volition.
For that reason, the conviction on
this count cannot stand.
[25] Count 3 is the
robbery with aggravating circumstances in that a hammer was used.
From the charge sheet it appears that
only cigarettes, lighters, sim
cards and pool cues were taken. From the Complainant’s evidence
it appears that many more
items were taken including lotions, soap,
money and other items. The fact remains that the Appellant was there
to take as much
as possible.
[26] It is clear
that the Complainant was robbed of certain items but whether
aggravating circumstances were present is questionable.
Although
there was a hammer present in the room which was used to kill the
deceased, there is no evidence that the Complainant
was ever
threatened with the hammer to give up possession of any of the items
that were taken. For obvious reasons we accept that
she was scared
and a hammer had been used to kill her boyfriend. However, she was
never assaulted with the hammer or even threatened
with it. The
Appellant acted on a frolick of his own by taking the items that he
and the assailant with the dreadlocks wanted
[27] Robbery of the
items was proved, but not with aggravating circumstances.
Accordingly, we must intervene in the conviction
in that regard.
[28] Count 4
relates to the robbery with aggravating circumstances of the deceased
of an unknown amount of money and the aggravating
circumstances is,
once again, the use of a hammer.
[29] On this
charge, the evidence of the Complainant is very important. According
to her, when the deceased entered their
room, he had money in his
pocket. We do not know how long before the incident it was. We do not
know whether he went out again
or what he did with the money whilst
inside the room. We do not even know the amount of money that he
allegedly had.
[30] The other
concern is that the deceased’s trousers were hanging over a
chair. In other words, he was not wearing
his trousers so the money
was not taken from him by force. The hammer was not used in any way
to obtain the money from the deceased.
[31] In light of
the fact that we have little knowledge about the money, that the
trousers were hanging over a chair, and
that the hammer was not used
to dispossess the deceased of the monies, the conviction on this
count can also not stand.
[32] Count 5 is the
charge of rape where it is alleged that the Appellant had oral sex
with the Complainant, although her
evidence is that he also
penetrated her vaginally.
[33] The Appellant
ought to have been charged with two counts of rape. Here I would like
to refer to what was said in Ndlovu
v S
2017 (2) SACR 305
(CC) by
Kampepe J at par [58]:
“
When
even the most heinous of crimes are committed against persons, the
people cannot resort to self-help; they generally cannot
prosecute
the perpetrators of these crimes on their own behalf. This power is
reserved for the NPA. It is therefore incumbent upon
Prosecutors to
discharge this duty diligently and competently. When this is not
done, society suffers. In this case the Prosecutor
failed to ensure
that the correct charge was preferred against Mr Ndlovu. The
Prosecutor was from the outset in possession of the
J88 form in which
the injuries sustained by the Complainant were fully described. It
boggles the mind as to why the proper charge
of rape read with the
provisions of Section 51 (1) of the Minimum Sentencing Act was not
preferred. This can only be explained
as remisness on the part of the
Prosecutor that, further, should have been corrected by the Court.
This error is acutely unfortunate
– victims of crime rely on
Prosecutors performing their functions properly. The failings of the
Prosecutor are directly to
blame for the outcome in this matter”.
[34] The finding by
the Magistrate that the Appellant had oral sex with the Complainant
was correct. There is not reason to
interfere therewith.
SUMMARY:
[35.1] The appeal
against the convictions in respect of Counts 1 and 5 is dismissed.
[35.2] The appeal
in respect of Count 3 is partially successful in that the conviction
of robbery with aggravating circumstance
is replaced with a
conviction of robbery.
[35.3] The appeal
against the convictions in respect of Counts 2 and 4 is upheld.
AD SENTENCE:
[36] As already
mentioned, the Appellant was sentenced in respect of:
Count 1: Life
Imprisonment.
Count 3: Fifteen
(15) years imprisonment.
Count 5: Fifteen
(15) years imprisonment.
[37] According to
the learned Magistrate, the Accused was convicted of murder read with
Section 5 (1)(c) of Act 105 of 1997
in that the death was caused
whilst committing robbery with aggravating circumstances. This is not
how we understand his judgement.
Clearly his judgement was based on
Section 51(1)(d) where the murder was committed whilst the Appellant
acted with a common purpose
with at least the assailant with the
dreadlocks. This does not impact upon the sentence that was imposed.
[38] On page 003 –
248 of the judgement the Magistrate says that the State did not prove
any previous convictions against
the Appellant. On page 003 –
253 the Magistrate says that it is not the first time the Appellant
collided with the law because
he was convicted of robbery on 1
September 2004 and on 15 August 2008 he was convicted of
housebreaking.
[39] It was not
easy to follow the judgement on sentence but we are satisfied that
the Magistrate took everything into account
that should be taken into
account before deciding on a suitable sentence to impose.
[40] The only
aspects that were raised by the defence in their heads of argument,
that would amount to substantial and compelling
circumstances, are
the age of the Appellant and the time spent in custody awaiting
trial, to wit four years. It is in actual fact
a few months less than
four years. The Magistrate did take this into consideration before
passing sentence – see page 003
– 258. He also took into
consideration the age of the Appellant – see page 003 –
258 and further.
[41] The Magistrate
found that if he takes the crimes and circumstances in which they
were committed into consideration, it
is difficult to find mitigating
features in favour of the Appellant. We have no problem with this
approach. It might seem that
he was overemphasizing the offences, but
we are of the view that he took everything into consideration before
he imposed the sentence.
As was set out in S v MASWATHUPA
2012 (1)
SACR 259
(SCA) at P261: “In determining an appropriate
sentence, the court should be mindful of the foundational sentencing
principle
that punishment should fit the criminal as well as the
crime, be fair to society, and be blended with a measure of mercy. In
addition
to that the court must also consider the main purpose of
punishment, which are deterrent, preventive, reformative and
retributive.
In the exercise of its sentencing discretion, a court
must strive to achieve a judicious balance between all relevant
factors “in
order to ensure that one element is not unduly
accentuated at the expense of and to the exclusion of others”.
[42] S v Malgas
2001 (1) SACR 469
(SCA) the following was said at P478: “A
court exercising appellate jurisdiction cannot, in the absence of
material misdirection
by the trial court, approach the question of
sentence as if it were the trial court and then substitute the
sentence arrived at
by it simply because it prefers it. To do so
would be to usurp the sentencing discretion of the trial court. Where
material misdirection
by the trial court vitiates its exercise of
that discretion, an appellate court is of course entitled to consider
the question
of sentence afresh”.
[43] We are of the
view that the court a quo did not misdirect itself by the sentences
that were imposed. This obviously does
not apply to Count 3 where the
appeal on conviction is partially upheld in that the conviction on
robbery with aggravating circumstances
is substituted with a
conviction on a count of robbery. On this count, the learned
Magistrate imposed the prescribed minimum sentence
which must be set
aside and substituted with a suitable sentence.
ORDER:
The following order is
made:
1. The appeal
against the convictions and sentences imposed in respect of Counts 1
and 5 is dismissed and the conviction and
sentences on these counts
are confirmed.
2. The appeal
against the convictions and sentences imposed in respect of Counts 2
and 4 is upheld and the convictions and
sentences on these counts are
set aside.
3. The appeal
against the conviction in respect of Count 3 is partially upheld in
that the conviction of robbery with aggravating
circumstances is set
aside and replaced with a conviction of robbery. The sentence of (15)
fifteen years imprisonment imposed by
the court a quo on this count
is set aside and replaced with a sentence of (5) five years
imprisonment.
FJ VAN DER WESTHUIZEN
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
I agree,
W A KARAM
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
Date:
Of hearing: 18 March 2024
Of judgment: 07 June 2024
Appearances:
For the appellants: Y J
Brits
Instructed by Legal Aid
South Africa
For the State: Adv. PJ
Schutte
Office of the Director of
Public Prosecution, Johannesburg
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