KARICHI and Others v MUREHWA HIGH SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (277 of 2025) [2025] ZWHHC 277 (28 April 2025)

4 HH 277-25 Case No HCH 96/24 RUFARO KARICHI and NOREST SINARINGWA and JAMESON BWANALISA and THOMAS MUKANDIONA and TAFADZWA TSOKA and CHARLES KWARAMBA and RUSHMORE D. SHONHIWA and NEWS RUPONDO and LAMECK KWINJO and LOVEJOY CHINYERERE and ANNASTANCIA NYAMAYARO and TAFADZWA CHIMUSORO versus MUREHWA HIGH SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE MUSITHU J HARARE; 15 January 2025 & 28 April 2025 Opposed application – Registration of a decision/determination by a Designated Agent Mr S.M. Mandizha, for the applicants Professor L. Madhuku & Mr Muhlekiwa, for the respondent MUSITHU J: The applicants who all claim to be former employees of the respondent approached this court for the registration of a determination issued by the Designated Agent of the National Employment Council for the Welfare and Educational Institutions in Zimbabwe (hereafter referred to as the NECWEI) on 19 April 2023. In addition, the applicants also sought an order directing the respondent to pay them the sum of US$176, 640.32, determined by the Designated Agent to be due by way of damages for unlawful termination of their employment contracts. The applicants also claimed interest on the above sum at the prescribed rate effective August 2023 to the date of full and final settlement, as well as costs of suit. Factual Background and the Applicants’ Case The factual background to the applicants’ claim is set out in the first applicant’s founding affidavit. The second to the twelfth applicants deposed to supporting affidavits in which they associated themselves with the averments made in the first applicant’s founding affidavit. They also stated the capacities in which they were employed by the respondent and the individual amounts awarded to them by way of damages. The first applicant averred that she was employed by the respondent as a cook from 1995. The other applicants were employed in different capacities by the same respondent. The applicants claimed that their contracts of employment were unlawfully terminated by the respondent on 18 January 2022. Following the termination of the said contracts, they engaged their union which in turn communicated with the respondent without success. The dispute was referred to the NECWEI and a determination was issued on 23 March 2022. The determination highlighted that the termination of the applicants’ contracts of employment was unlawful. The respondent was ordered to reinstate all the applicants without loss of salary and benefits to their original positions with effect from the date of the unlawful termination. The parties were ordered to negotiate a damages settlement if reinstatement was no longer tenable. The matter was referred back to the designated agent for quantification of damages after the parties failed to reach an agreement. A determination was issued by the Designated Agent, Tawanda Chamisa on 19 April 2023. The effect of the determination was that the respondent was required to pay the applicants their backpay from January 2022 to February 2023, and 18 months damages in lieu of reinstatement. The payment was to be made within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the determination. A correction of the determination was made on 9 May 2023, as the main determination did not state the figures for the eighteen months damages in lieu of reinstatement in respect of each applicant. The cumulative total for all the applicants added up to US$176, 640.32. The applicants approached the court for the registration of the determination in terms of s 12 of Statutory Instrument 77 of 20211. The Respondent’s Case The opposing affidavit was deposed to by Tsunanai Mucheri, in his capacity as Chairman of the respondent. The opposing affidavit raised in limine the absence of locus standi on the part of the first applicant to represent the rest of the applicants. The argument was that the first applicant had not demonstrated that he was authorised to institute and prosecute the present application on behalf of the second to the twelve applicants. There was no legal nexus between the documents attached to the application and the first applicant’s founding affidavit. On the merits, the respondent denied that it fell under the jurisdiction of the NECWEI. The reference of the alleged dispute to the NECWEI was therefore of no consequence. The NECWEI had no jurisdiction to adjudicate and determine a dispute between the respondent and its employees for the following reasons. Firstly, it was a body corporate by virtue of s 3 of the Education (School Development Committees) (Non-Government Schools) Regulations2 (the Regulations). As such, it was capable of suing and being sued in its own name. Secondly, the respondent averred that it was different from Murehwa High School as a school or institution administered by the United Methodist Church. The church had its own employees who worked at the school who were not under the respondent’s control. Thirdly, the interests of NECWEI did not extend to school development committees established in terms of the regulations. It was also averred that the designated agent who heard and decided on the dispute referred by the applicant had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. The applicants were supposed to refer their dispute to the Ministry of Labour for dispute resolution. It was also averred that even if it was established that the designated agent had jurisdiction, he had no power to correct his determination as he did, since he was functus officio. It was further averred that even if it was found that the designated agent was not functus, still a determination of a designated agent could not be registered with this court as an order of the court for enforcement purposes. This was because there was no provision in the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] (the Act), for the registration of such an award. It was also averred that to the extent that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for the NECWEI provided for registration of a determination of a designated agent with this court, any provision to that effect contained in the CBA would be ultra vires the Act. This was because the CBA could not give jurisdiction to the court to register determinations of designated agents when the parent Act made no provision for the same. It was further averred that s 12 of the CBA for the NECWEI was ultra vires s 74 of the Labour Act in that the registration of a determination of a designated agent did not fall within the scope of CBAs as provided by law. The registration of a determination of a designated agent did not have anything to do with conditions of employment. The court was therefore urged to dismiss the application with costs on the legal practitioner and client scale. The Submissions At the hearing of the matter, Mr Madhuku for the respondent abandoned the legal points concerned with the first applicant’s locus standi to represent the rest of the applicants and the jurisdiction of the designated agent of the NECWEI to hear and determine disputes involving the applicants and the respondent. The only issue that remained for determination was whether a determination of a designated agent could be registered as a judgment of this court. It was submitted that s 31(12) of the CBA of the Welfare and Educational Institutions (Dispute Resolution), published in S.I. 102/14, being the instrument in terms of which the registration of the determination of the designated agent was sought, had the effect of conferring jurisdiction on the High Court to register a decision of the designated agent. It was submitted that such a provision was invalid as it sought to bring the courts to a CBA structure and to impose defined jurisdiction on the courts. A CBA could not go beyond what it was legally created to be, that is, an agreement on conditions of employment that are of mutual interest to the parties. It was further submitted that the publication of a CBA in terms of s 80 of the Labour Act did not convert a CBA into a law of general application. It was also argued that statutory instruments that published CBAs did not involve the Minister in any law-making function. The CBA was published as a schedule to the statutory instrument, which did not make it a law. Mr Madhuku submitted that parties to CBA do not have the power to determine which court had jurisdiction over their dispute. The parties have to find some other mechanism of enforcing their decisions. Only an Act of Parliament could confer jurisdiction on a court and not a Statutory Instrument. In his response, Mr Mandizha for the applicants submitted that s 74(3)(k) of the Labour Act permitted parties to a CBA to negotiate and include in their agreement, the procedures for dealing with disputes within an undertaking or industry. Section 80(1) of the Labour Act provided that upon registration of the CBA, the Minister was required to publish the agreement as a Statutory Instrument. That elevated the CBA to a statutory instrument. Mr Mandizha further submitted that CBAs were made in terms of the Labour Act. S 98(14) conferred this court with jurisdiction to register arbitral awards. The provisions of the CBA were therefore not inconsistent with s 98(14) of the Labour Act and s 134(c) of the Constitution. Analysis The issue that arises for determination is whether parties to a CBA may confer jurisdiction on the High Court in terms of that agreement. Section 2 of the Labour Act defines a CBA to mean “an agreement negotiated in accordance with this Act which regulates the terms and conditions of employment of employees”. In terms of s 74(3)(k), a CBA may make provision for procedures for dealing with disputes within an undertaking or industry. Section 80(1) of the Labour Act states that upon registration of a CBA, the Minister shall publish the agreement as a statutory instrument. It therefore assumes the status of a statutory instrument. The legal framework for the promulgation of statutory instruments is found in s 134 of the Constitution which states as follows: “134 Subsidiary legislation Parliament may, in an Act of Parliament, delegate power to make statutory instruments within the scope of and for the purposes laid out in that Act, but— (a) Parliament’s primary law-making power must not be delegated; (b) …………………………..; (c) statutory instruments must be consistent with the Act of Parliament under which they are made” (Underlining for emphasis) Upon its promulgation, a statutory instrument retains its status of subsidiary legislation, and it cannot be elevated to an Act of Parliament. The jurisdiction of this court is set out in s 171(1)(a)-(d) of the Constitution. Section 171(2) further states that “an Act of Parliament may provide for the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court and for that purpose may confer the power to make rules for that purpose.” A similar provision also exists in respect of the Labour Court under s 172 (3) of the Constitution. The Labour Act makes provision for the registration of arbitral awards as orders of this court for enforcement purposes. The provision states that: “(14) Any party to whom an arbitral award relates may submit for registration the copy of it furnished to him in terms of subsection (13) to the court of any magistrate which would have had jurisdiction to make an order corresponding to the award had the matter been determined by it, or, if the arbitral award exceeds the jurisdiction of any magistrates court, the High Court.” (Underlining for emphasis) What is clear to me from a reading of the above provisions is that the conferral of jurisdiction upon a court is not a matter that can be relegated to a statutory instrument or in this case a CBA. It must be recalled that a CBA is essentially an agreement in connection with a particular undertaking. The Minister is only involved in the mechanics of CBAs to the extent of publishing the agreement as a statutory instrument. He is not involved in the whole process leading to the formulation of that instrument. His role is more administrative as he is not involved in any law making process. In my view, if the intention of the legislature was that this court must register decisions or determinations of designated agents for enforcement purposes, then it ought to have inserted a similarly worded provision in an Act of Parliament specifically to cater for such decisions or determinations. I subscribe to this view because in terms of s 82(1)(a) of the Labour Act, where a CBA has been registered, it shall, with effect from the date of its publication, be binding on the parties to the agreement, “including all the members of such parties, and all employers, contractors and their respective employees in the undertaking or industry to which the agreement relates.” The CBA is therefore industry specific. It follows that if parties to an undertaking were to be permitted in CBA to confer jurisdiction on their court of choice for purposes of registration and enforcement of their decisions, then nothing would preclude other players in different undertakings from choosing their own courts of choice which are different from the one chosen by the applicants herein for instance. I therefore concur with the submission by the respondent’s counsel that in terms of its scope, a CBA cannot stretch beyond what it was created to be, that is, an agreement to regulate the terms and conditions of employment of employees in a particular undertaking. It would be overstretching the scope of a CBA too far to extend it to the conferment of jurisdiction on the High Court to register decisions or determinations of designated agents for purposes of enforcement. Parties to a CBA cannot in that agreement randomly decide which court shall have jurisdiction to register decisions or determinations of designated agents as orders of the court for enforcement purposes. The same Act which provides the legal framework for CBAs does not accord the parties that authority, and neither does it clothe this court with jurisdiction to register such decisions or determinations. In terms of s 171(2) of the Constitution, it is only an Act of Parliament that may provide for the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court. It therefore stands to reason that it is only through an Act of parliament that this court can assume jurisdiction to register decisions or determinations of designated agents as orders of the court for enforcement purposes. Parties to a CBA cannot arrogate to themselves, under the authority of that agreement, powers that can only be exercised through an Act of Parliament. The conferment of jurisdiction on this court for the purposes of registering a decision, determination or order of the designated agent for enforcement purposes ought to have been made under the law that provides the legal framework for CBAs, and not the CBA itself. Considering the foregoing, the court determines that there is merit in the respondent’s submission that it is only an Act of Parliament that can confer jurisdiction on this court to register decision of designated agents for purposes of enforcement. This court has no jurisdiction to register a determination or decision of a designated agent for purposes of its enforcement. COSTS OF SUIT The court was urged to dismiss the application with costs on the legal practitioner and client scale. Once the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to register the determination of the designated agent, then it could not dismiss the application. Were the court to dismiss the application, then it would have effectively assumed jurisdiction and determined the merits of the matter. The matter raised an important legal question concerning the registrability of the determination of a designated agent by this court. It is befitting that each party be ordered to pay its own costs of suit. Resultantly it is ordered that: The court declines jurisdiction.Each party shall bear its own costs of suit. Musithu J:…………………………………………………………………………………… SadoweraKuwana, legal practitioners for the applicants Muhlekiwa Legal Practice, legal practitioners for the respondent 1 Being the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Welfare and Educational Institutions (Dispute Resolution) 2 Statutory Instrument 87 of 1992. 4 HH 277-25 Case No HCH 96/24 4 HH 277-25 Case No HCH 96/24 RUFARO KARICHI and NOREST SINARINGWA and JAMESON BWANALISA and THOMAS MUKANDIONA and TAFADZWA TSOKA and CHARLES KWARAMBA and RUSHMORE D. SHONHIWA and NEWS RUPONDO and LAMECK KWINJO and LOVEJOY CHINYERERE and ANNASTANCIA NYAMAYARO and TAFADZWA CHIMUSORO versus MUREHWA HIGH SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE MUSITHU J HARARE; 15 January 2025 & 28 April 2025 Opposed application – Registration of a decision/determination by a Designated Agent Mr S.M. Mandizha, for the applicants Professor L. Madhuku & Mr Muhlekiwa, for the respondent MUSITHU J: The applicants who all claim to be former employees of the respondent approached this court for the registration of a determination issued by the Designated Agent of the National Employment Council for the Welfare and Educational Institutions in Zimbabwe (hereafter referred to as the NECWEI) on 19 April 2023. In addition, the applicants also sought an order directing the respondent to pay them the sum of US$176, 640.32, determined by the Designated Agent to be due by way of damages for unlawful termination of their employment contracts. The applicants also claimed interest on the above sum at the prescribed rate effective August 2023 to the date of full and final settlement, as well as costs of suit. Factual Background and the Applicants’ Case The factual background to the applicants’ claim is set out in the first applicant’s founding affidavit. The second to the twelfth applicants deposed to supporting affidavits in which they associated themselves with the averments made in the first applicant’s founding affidavit. They also stated the capacities in which they were employed by the respondent and the individual amounts awarded to them by way of damages. The first applicant averred that she was employed by the respondent as a cook from 1995. The other applicants were employed in different capacities by the same respondent. The applicants claimed that their contracts of employment were unlawfully terminated by the respondent on 18 January 2022. Following the termination of the said contracts, they engaged their union which in turn communicated with the respondent without success. The dispute was referred to the NECWEI and a determination was issued on 23 March 2022. The determination highlighted that the termination of the applicants’ contracts of employment was unlawful. The respondent was ordered to reinstate all the applicants without loss of salary and benefits to their original positions with effect from the date of the unlawful termination. The parties were ordered to negotiate a damages settlement if reinstatement was no longer tenable. The matter was referred back to the designated agent for quantification of damages after the parties failed to reach an agreement. A determination was issued by the Designated Agent, Tawanda Chamisa on 19 April 2023. The effect of the determination was that the respondent was required to pay the applicants their backpay from January 2022 to February 2023, and 18 months damages in lieu of reinstatement. The payment was to be made within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the determination. A correction of the determination was made on 9 May 2023, as the main determination did not state the figures for the eighteen months damages in lieu of reinstatement in respect of each applicant. The cumulative total for all the applicants added up to US$176, 640.32. The applicants approached the court for the registration of the determination in terms of s 12 of Statutory Instrument 77 of 20211. The Respondent’s Case The opposing affidavit was deposed to by Tsunanai Mucheri, in his capacity as Chairman of the respondent. The opposing affidavit raised in limine the absence of locus standi on the part of the first applicant to represent the rest of the applicants. The argument was that the first applicant had not demonstrated that he was authorised to institute and prosecute the present application on behalf of the second to the twelve applicants. There was no legal nexus between the documents attached to the application and the first applicant’s founding affidavit. On the merits, the respondent denied that it fell under the jurisdiction of the NECWEI. The reference of the alleged dispute to the NECWEI was therefore of no consequence. The NECWEI had no jurisdiction to adjudicate and determine a dispute between the respondent and its employees for the following reasons. Firstly, it was a body corporate by virtue of s 3 of the Education (School Development Committees) (Non-Government Schools) Regulations2 (the Regulations). As such, it was capable of suing and being sued in its own name. Secondly, the respondent averred that it was different from Murehwa High School as a school or institution administered by the United Methodist Church. The church had its own employees who worked at the school who were not under the respondent’s control. Thirdly, the interests of NECWEI did not extend to school development committees established in terms of the regulations. It was also averred that the designated agent who heard and decided on the dispute referred by the applicant had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. The applicants were supposed to refer their dispute to the Ministry of Labour for dispute resolution. It was also averred that even if it was established that the designated agent had jurisdiction, he had no power to correct his determination as he did, since he was functus officio. It was further averred that even if it was found that the designated agent was not functus, still a determination of a designated agent could not be registered with this court as an order of the court for enforcement purposes. This was because there was no provision in the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] (the Act), for the registration of such an award. It was also averred that to the extent that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for the NECWEI provided for registration of a determination of a designated agent with this court, any provision to that effect contained in the CBA would be ultra vires the Act. This was because the CBA could not give jurisdiction to the court to register determinations of designated agents when the parent Act made no provision for the same. It was further averred that s 12 of the CBA for the NECWEI was ultra vires s 74 of the Labour Act in that the registration of a determination of a designated agent did not fall within the scope of CBAs as provided by law. The registration of a determination of a designated agent did not have anything to do with conditions of employment. The court was therefore urged to dismiss the application with costs on the legal practitioner and client scale. The Submissions At the hearing of the matter, Mr Madhuku for the respondent abandoned the legal points concerned with the first applicant’s locus standi to represent the rest of the applicants and the jurisdiction of the designated agent of the NECWEI to hear and determine disputes involving the applicants and the respondent. The only issue that remained for determination was whether a determination of a designated agent could be registered as a judgment of this court. It was submitted that s 31(12) of the CBA of the Welfare and Educational Institutions (Dispute Resolution), published in S.I. 102/14, being the instrument in terms of which the registration of the determination of the designated agent was sought, had the effect of conferring jurisdiction on the High Court to register a decision of the designated agent. It was submitted that such a provision was invalid as it sought to bring the courts to a CBA structure and to impose defined jurisdiction on the courts. A CBA could not go beyond what it was legally created to be, that is, an agreement on conditions of employment that are of mutual interest to the parties. It was further submitted that the publication of a CBA in terms of s 80 of the Labour Act did not convert a CBA into a law of general application. It was also argued that statutory instruments that published CBAs did not involve the Minister in any law-making function. The CBA was published as a schedule to the statutory instrument, which did not make it a law. Mr Madhuku submitted that parties to CBA do not have the power to determine which court had jurisdiction over their dispute. The parties have to find some other mechanism of enforcing their decisions. Only an Act of Parliament could confer jurisdiction on a court and not a Statutory Instrument. In his response, Mr Mandizha for the applicants submitted that s 74(3)(k) of the Labour Act permitted parties to a CBA to negotiate and include in their agreement, the procedures for dealing with disputes within an undertaking or industry. Section 80(1) of the Labour Act provided that upon registration of the CBA, the Minister was required to publish the agreement as a Statutory Instrument. That elevated the CBA to a statutory instrument. Mr Mandizha further submitted that CBAs were made in terms of the Labour Act. S 98(14) conferred this court with jurisdiction to register arbitral awards. The provisions of the CBA were therefore not inconsistent with s 98(14) of the Labour Act and s 134(c) of the Constitution. Analysis The issue that arises for determination is whether parties to a CBA may confer jurisdiction on the High Court in terms of that agreement. Section 2 of the Labour Act defines a CBA to mean “an agreement negotiated in accordance with this Act which regulates the terms and conditions of employment of employees”. In terms of s 74(3)(k), a CBA may make provision for procedures for dealing with disputes within an undertaking or industry. Section 80(1) of the Labour Act states that upon registration of a CBA, the Minister shall publish the agreement as a statutory instrument. It therefore assumes the status of a statutory instrument. The legal framework for the promulgation of statutory instruments is found in s 134 of the Constitution which states as follows: “134 Subsidiary legislation Parliament may, in an Act of Parliament, delegate power to make statutory instruments within the scope of and for the purposes laid out in that Act, but— (a) Parliament’s primary law-making power must not be delegated; (b) …………………………..; (c) statutory instruments must be consistent with the Act of Parliament under which they are made” (Underlining for emphasis) Upon its promulgation, a statutory instrument retains its status of subsidiary legislation, and it cannot be elevated to an Act of Parliament. The jurisdiction of this court is set out in s 171(1)(a)-(d) of the Constitution. Section 171(2) further states that “an Act of Parliament may provide for the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court and for that purpose may confer the power to make rules for that purpose.” A similar provision also exists in respect of the Labour Court under s 172 (3) of the Constitution. The Labour Act makes provision for the registration of arbitral awards as orders of this court for enforcement purposes. The provision states that: “(14) Any party to whom an arbitral award relates may submit for registration the copy of it furnished to him in terms of subsection (13) to the court of any magistrate which would have had jurisdiction to make an order corresponding to the award had the matter been determined by it, or, if the arbitral award exceeds the jurisdiction of any magistrates court, the High Court.” (Underlining for emphasis) What is clear to me from a reading of the above provisions is that the conferral of jurisdiction upon a court is not a matter that can be relegated to a statutory instrument or in this case a CBA. It must be recalled that a CBA is essentially an agreement in connection with a particular undertaking. The Minister is only involved in the mechanics of CBAs to the extent of publishing the agreement as a statutory instrument. He is not involved in the whole process leading to the formulation of that instrument. His role is more administrative as he is not involved in any law making process. In my view, if the intention of the legislature was that this court must register decisions or determinations of designated agents for enforcement purposes, then it ought to have inserted a similarly worded provision in an Act of Parliament specifically to cater for such decisions or determinations. I subscribe to this view because in terms of s 82(1)(a) of the Labour Act, where a CBA has been registered, it shall, with effect from the date of its publication, be binding on the parties to the agreement, “including all the members of such parties, and all employers, contractors and their respective employees in the undertaking or industry to which the agreement relates.” The CBA is therefore industry specific. It follows that if parties to an undertaking were to be permitted in CBA to confer jurisdiction on their court of choice for purposes of registration and enforcement of their decisions, then nothing would preclude other players in different undertakings from choosing their own courts of choice which are different from the one chosen by the applicants herein for instance. I therefore concur with the submission by the respondent’s counsel that in terms of its scope, a CBA cannot stretch beyond what it was created to be, that is, an agreement to regulate the terms and conditions of employment of employees in a particular undertaking. It would be overstretching the scope of a CBA too far to extend it to the conferment of jurisdiction on the High Court to register decisions or determinations of designated agents for purposes of enforcement. Parties to a CBA cannot in that agreement randomly decide which court shall have jurisdiction to register decisions or determinations of designated agents as orders of the court for enforcement purposes. The same Act which provides the legal framework for CBAs does not accord the parties that authority, and neither does it clothe this court with jurisdiction to register such decisions or determinations. In terms of s 171(2) of the Constitution, it is only an Act of Parliament that may provide for the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court. It therefore stands to reason that it is only through an Act of parliament that this court can assume jurisdiction to register decisions or determinations of designated agents as orders of the court for enforcement purposes. Parties to a CBA cannot arrogate to themselves, under the authority of that agreement, powers that can only be exercised through an Act of Parliament. The conferment of jurisdiction on this court for the purposes of registering a decision, determination or order of the designated agent for enforcement purposes ought to have been made under the law that provides the legal framework for CBAs, and not the CBA itself. Considering the foregoing, the court determines that there is merit in the respondent’s submission that it is only an Act of Parliament that can confer jurisdiction on this court to register decision of designated agents for purposes of enforcement. This court has no jurisdiction to register a determination or decision of a designated agent for purposes of its enforcement. COSTS OF SUIT The court was urged to dismiss the application with costs on the legal practitioner and client scale. Once the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to register the determination of the designated agent, then it could not dismiss the application. Were the court to dismiss the application, then it would have effectively assumed jurisdiction and determined the merits of the matter. The matter raised an important legal question concerning the registrability of the determination of a designated agent by this court. It is befitting that each party be ordered to pay its own costs of suit. Resultantly it is ordered that: The court declines jurisdiction. Each party shall bear its own costs of suit. Musithu J:…………………………………………………………………………………… SadoweraKuwana, legal practitioners for the applicants Muhlekiwa Legal Practice, legal practitioners for the respondent 1 Being the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Welfare and Educational Institutions (Dispute Resolution) 1 Being the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Welfare and Educational Institutions (Dispute Resolution) 2 Statutory Instrument 87 of 1992. 2 Statutory Instrument 87 of 1992.