Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 1142South Africa
Relta 25 (Pty) Ltd v Dalinjabo Technical Services CC (25902/2021) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1142 (8 November 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
8 November 2024
Headnotes
in SARFU:
Judgment
begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
>>
2024
>>
[2024] ZAGPJHC 1142
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## Relta 25 (Pty) Ltd v Dalinjabo Technical Services CC (25902/2021) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1142 (8 November 2024)
Relta 25 (Pty) Ltd v Dalinjabo Technical Services CC (25902/2021) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1142 (8 November 2024)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2024_1142.html
sino date 8 November 2024
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO:
25902/2021
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
08/11/2024
In
the matter between:
RELTA
25 (PTY) LTD
(Registration
No: 2014/182908/07)
PLAINTIFF
and
DALINJABO
TECHNICAL SERVICES CC
(Registration
No: 2009/093873/23)
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
Manoim
J
[1]
This case involves a claim and counter claim. Both claims arise from
a lease of business premises in Boksburg in Ekurhuleni
that the
plaintiff leased to the defendant.
[2]
The plaintiff is a property owning company. It alleges that the
defendant, a transport logistics company, owes it R885
088,46. This
amount is made up of arrear rentals and utility costs. A second claim
is for damages. The plaintiff alleges that the
defendant left the
premises in a state of disrepair on its departure and that it cost it
R 315 813 to restore the premises.
[3]
The defendant disputed the amount owing in respect of the first
claim, or Claim A, as it was described in the pleadings.
However,
during the course of the hearing, the parties settled claim A. I gave
order in respect of that claim on 6 November 2024.
[4]
The matter then proceeded only in respect of the plaintiff’s
claim B, the claim for damages and the defendant’s
two counter
claims. The plaintiff’s damages claim is made up of an amount
the plaintiff said it paid to a third party contractor
to repair the
premises after the defendant had departed, in either late April or
early May 2021.
[5]
The defendant denies liability in respect of the damages. In turn it
has counterclaimed for repayment of its deposit of
R 50 000
(“defendant’s claim A”) and for improvement to the
premises it says it effected, which amounted
to R 583 462.00
(“defendant’s claim B”). I will now consider each
of the respective claims.
Plaintiff’s
claim B
[6]
The lease agreement was from 1 September 2017 to 30 September 2020.
However, the defendant remained on the premises until
30 April 2021.
There is no dispute over this as the lease provided for a month to
month lease on the same terms once the original
lease period had
expired.
[7]
The plaintiff alleges that when the defendant vacated the premises it
had left them in a state of disrepair. In its pleadings
it alleges
that in terms of clause 10(iii) of the lease, or any extension of it,
the “…
Lessee shall make good and repair, at his own
expense all damages and breakages to same and shall be responsible
for all replacements
to the Lessor’s premises.”
[8]
The clause goes on to state that if the lessee does not do so within
21 days of being notified, the lessor is entitled
to carry out the
repairs and recover the costs from the lessee. There is a proviso to
this that this comes about only after the
lessee has been given an
opportunity to remedy the damages and has not done so within a
reasonable time.
[9]
The plaintiff’s pleaded case is that the defendant failed to
reinstate the premises to the condition that they were
in when it
took occupation, fair wear and tear excepted. The plaintiff enclosed
a quotation for the repairs with its particulars
of claim. The total
cost amounted to
R 315 813 (inclusive of
VAT). The
plaintiff alleged that despite demand the defendant
had refused to make payment.
[10]
There is no evidence that the plaintiff followed the procedure
required in clause 10(iii). There is no evidence that
it gave the
defendant the 21 days’ notice nor that it gave it the
opportunity to remedy the damages before undertaking them
itself.
[11]
However, none of these procedural points have been taken by the
defendant. In its plea the defendant pleaded a bare denial.
This, as
the plaintiff argued, amounts to non-compliance with Uniform Rule 22
which states that a defendant must clearly and concisely
state the
material facts on which it relies. The defendant did not do so. This
is not a mere technical quibble. The plaintiff would
thus not know if
the defendant was denying that any damage had been caused, or if it
had, it was fair wear and tear, or if the
proper process had not been
followed, or if the quantum was unreasonable.
[12]
When the plaintiff led its evidence, it did so without the benefit of
knowing the basis for the denial. It led the evidence
of one of its
directors Mr Naidu, who went through a series of photographs showing
the state of the premises on the date of departure.
These showed the
buildings in a state of disrepair; walls had partitions hammered into
them, toilets were broken, and in one place
a cistern was missing;
ceilings had been removed and electric wiring hung loose.
[13]
Naidu was led through a number of these photographs, and he was not
challenged on his description of what they depicted.
The plaintiff
then led the contractor who had made the repairs. His evidence again
was on the state of the premises which he saw
after the defendant had
already departed, what repairs had been done and their cost. In cross
examination he was not challenged
about either the extent of the
repairs or their cost. The only suggestion was that he was not in a
position to comment on their
state when the lease commenced. He
testified he was not. He had only viewed them after the premises had
been vacated.
[14]
The significance of this cross examination only became apparent when
the defendant presented its case. Its only witness
was Mr Bhengu, a
director the defendant. Bhengu did not dispute the fact that the
premises were in a state of disrepair, as evidenced
by the
photographs. The most he did was to assert that some abandoned refuse
shown on one photograph, was not left by the defendant.
However, the
plaintiff has not claimed for the removal of this refuse. But what
Bhengu testified was that the premises were in
a state of disrepair
on the date they occupied. He testified that he had got a low rental
from the plaintiff precisely because
the premises which had been
vacated by a previous owner were in such a woeful state when
occupation commenced. Rather what had
happened is that the defendant
had made its own improvements to the premises which form part of its
claim.
[15]
The plaintiff objected to the leading of this evidence on the basis
that it had not been pleaded. I allowed it in provisionally.
[16]
In final argument counsel for the plaintiff argued that this evidence
could not be relied on for two reasons. It was
never pleaded, and the
version was never put to Naidu when he testified.
[17]
Counsel for the defendant conceded that the plea was a bare denial
but sought to take refuge in what was pleaded in the
counter claim.
The plaintiff he argued, would have known from the counter claim that
the claim the defendant was making for its
improvements meant that
the defendant’s version that the premises were defective from
the date of occupation was pleaded.
He cited some authority for this
proposition. But those cases deal with the rationale for hearing a
counter-claim at the same time
as the main claim.
[1]
They do not deal with the issue he had argued – that a
counter-claim can be used to bolster a deficient plea in the main
claim.
[18]
Moreover, even if such a generous reading could be given to the
counterclaim, its claim for improvements are different
from the ones’
the plaintiff seeks compensation for. To put it bluntly the
plaintiff’s claim B and the defendants counter
claim B do not
relate to the same alleged expenses.
[19]
After hearing final argument, I have decided that this evidence is
not admissible. First this version, as I have noted,
was never
pleaded. If it had the plaintiff would have been put in a position to
lead evidence on the state of the premises when
the defendant
commenced occupation. Secondly the version that the defendant now
sought to rely on was never put to the Naidu in
cross examination. As
was held in SARFU:
“
If a point in
dispute is left unchallenged in cross-examination, the party calling
the witness is entitled to assume that the unchallenged
witness is
testimony is accepted as correct.”
[2]
[20]
The defendant has therefore not raised any defence to the plaintiff’s
claim for improvements. This claim I conclude
has been established.
The
counter-claims
[21]
I now deal with the counterclaims. The first counterclaim, the
defendant’s claim A, is for the repayment of the
deposit of R
50 000. This can be dealt with easily. The plaintiff has
indicated that it has no objection to this amount being
set off
against the amount the defendant owes in terms of its Claim B. Since
I have found for the plaintiff on its claim B I will
credit the
defendant with this amount.
[22]
The defendant’s claim B is pleaded as follows:
“
The
Defendant has made major improvements and further maintenance on the
said leased property in the amount of +/- R 583 462.00”.
[23]
The claim is based on unjust enrichment. The defendant needed to do
so given that the lease had the standard clause that
no variation was
valid unless reduced to writing. There is no evidence that any such
variation was sought nor that consent was
obtained from the
plaintiff. The nearest the defendant got to this was an email it sent
to the plaintiff, stating it needed to
bring in plumbers to clear
drains and asked if the plaintiff would provide the plumbers or
whether it should do so itself. There
is no evidence as to how this
was resolved. Certainly, the document cannot be read as an attempt to
obtain consent for all the
expenses outlined, only some of which
related to plumbing.
[24]
The basis for this claim was pleaded as follows:
“
The Plaintiff
has been enriched by such improvements as the leased property is in a
better state than what it was before the Defendant
took occupation.”
[25]
The defendant then set out 21 separate expenses it had incurred in
that respect, from 4 December 2017 until 19 March
2021. Invoices were
provided for each one. Although some of the most recent appear
indistinct, I will give the defendant the benefit
of the doubt that
they were incurred on the dates and in the amounts alleged in the
counterclaim.
[26]
The first seven of these items were incurred more than three years
before the counterclaim was instituted. The plaintiff
took the point
that these claims had prescribed. The law is clear that unjust
enrichment claims prescribe in the way normal debts
prescribe. In
Blue Financial Services Limited v ABSA Bank Limited (Van Niekerk
as Third Party)
the court explained:
“
A debt arising
from unjust enrichment runs from the date when the debtor receives
the benefit to which he or she is not entitled,
and the creditor
acquires the right to claim restitution. Usually, the right to claim
restitution is acquired, under the condictio
indebiti, at the time
that the mistaken payment is made. The period of prescription is
three years. Section 12(3) of the Prescription
Act provides that a
debt shall not be deemed to be due until the creditor has knowledge
of the identity of the debtor and the facts
from which the debt
arises, provided that a creditor shall be deemed to have such
knowledge if he could have acquired it by exercising
reasonable
care.”
[3]
[27]
The defendant’s response to this was that the claims despite
arising from separate items should not be considered
on a piecemeal
basis. Rather it argued the repairs which it made to the premises
over time, should be viewed as a continuous act
and given that the
whole claim included items that were incurred within the three-year
period prior to the institution of the counterclaim,
the claim had
not prescribed. Again, this is an unorthodox claim, and I was given
no authority for such an approach. The one case
cited was not in
point. It dealt with prescription allegations being made in vacuo but
that is not the case here.
[4]
[28]
But even if for some reason the later claims can pull the earlier
ones up by their bootstraps, the defendant has failed
to establish
the elements necessary for a claim of unjust enrichment. The elements
of an unjust enrichment claim are well-known:
[29]
They are:
a.
whether the plaintiff had been enriched by the improvements:
b.
whether the defendant has been impoverished by procuring them;
c.
whether the plaintiff’s enrichment was at the
expense of defendant;
d.
whether
the enrichment was unjustified.
[5]
[30]
Under cross examination Bhengu conceded that the defendant had
benefited from the improvements and that it could not
claim that the
plaintiff’s enrichment was unjustified. Nor was it clear from
the photographs that were shown to Bhengu that
any of the alterations
could be regarded as enriching the premises. At best, the earlier
claim for construction of a gate might
have. But that claim has
prescribed as the work was done more than three years prior to the
counter-claim. The elements for the
claim of unjust enrichment have
not been met. Nor is it necessary for this reason to consider the
plaintiff’s further argument
that the basis for the
condictio
on which the defendant relied had not been pleaded.
[31]
The defendant has thus not succeeded in proving the counter-claim.
Conclusion
[32]
The plaintiff’s is awarded damages of
R
315 813 in respect of its claim B. This amount is reduced by the
deposit of R 50 000, leaving the balance of R 265 813.
The
plaintiff had also claimed interest on this sum from date of mora.
However, this demand was only made when the action was instituted.
The particulars of claim was served on 4 June 2021. This would be the
date the defendant would first have been aware of the demand.
Thus,
interest should run on the sum of R 265 813 from that date.
Costs
[33]
The plaintiff has succeeded in proving both its Claim B and
dismissing the defendants’ Claim B. It seeks attorney
client
costs for both given that this is provided for in the lease. While
the lease provides for this, it applies when the plaintiff
acts to
enforce its rights; it is silent on whether it applies when the
defendant brings a claim that does not rely on the terms
of the
lease. Given that the two claims were heard together it would be
difficult for a taxing master to disentangle one from the
other. I
consider that an award of party and party cost on Scale B would
suffice for both.
ORDER:-
[34] In the result
the following order is made:
1. The defendant is
indebted to the plaintiff –
a. In the sum of
R
265 813; and`
b.
For
interest on the said sum in sub-paragraph (a) at the rate of prime
plus 2 %, from 4 June 2021 to date of payment.
2.
The
defendant’s counter claim B is dismissed.
3.
The
plaintiff is awarded costs in respect of its Claim B and for the
dismissal of the defendant’s Counter Claim B, on a party
and
party scale, in accordance with scale A.
N. MANOIM
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION
JOHNANNESBURG
Date of hearing: 04 to 06
November 2024
Date of Judgment: 08
November 2024
Appearances:
Counsel
for the Applicant:
Instructed
by.
C
Prinsloo
Eversheds
Sutherland KZN Inc
Counsel
for the Respondents:
Instructed
by:
RV
Mudau
Makuta
Attorneys
[1]
One of the cases cited was
Standard
bank of SA Ltd v SA Fire Equipment (Pty) Ltd
1984
(4) SA 693
(C) at 699C.
[2]
President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby
Football Union and Others
2000
(1) SA 1
(CC) Paragraph 61.
[3]
[2019] JOL 45871 (GJ)
[4]
MEC for
Health, Western Cape v MC
(1087/2019)
[2020] ZASCA 165
(10 December 2020)
[5]
See for instance
Kudu
Granite Operations (Pty) Ltd v Caterna Ltd
2003 (5) SA 193
(SCA)
sino noindex
make_database footer start
Similar Cases
SA Retail Properties (Pty) Limited v Black Panther Lounge (Pty) Limited and Another (2023/013774) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1115 (1 November 2024)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 1115High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
SA Retail Properties (Pty) Limited v Golden Tee Investments (Pty) Limited (2025/189819) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1338 (17 December 2025)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 1338High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
SA Retail Properties (Pty) Limited v Black Panther Lounge (Pty) Limited and Another (2023/013774) [2024] ZAGPJHC 588 (24 June 2024)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 588High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
R.L.M.K v M.G.M (20421/2016) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1243 (29 November 2024)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 1243High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
SA Retail Properties (Pty) Ltd v Paulshof Liquors CC and Another (2023/009622) [2024] ZAGPJHC 651 (5 July 2024)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 651High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar