Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 1164South Africa
Els and Another v eMedia Investments (Pty) Ltd (25902/2021) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1164 (19 November 2024)
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Els and Another v eMedia Investments (Pty) Ltd (25902/2021) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1164 (19 November 2024)
Els and Another v eMedia Investments (Pty) Ltd (25902/2021) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1164 (19 November 2024)
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sino date 19 November 2024
FLYNOTES:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – Interdict
–
Media broadcast –
Right to privacy and prior
restraint – Lured into interview on camera without knowledge
or consent thereof – Footage
will show applicant getting up
and walking away to his car – What is likely to be aired is
performative not informative
– Allegations against applicant
are sufficiently grave to warrant claim of public interest –
No clear right –
Can sue in due course for damages for an
invasion of privacy – Application dismissed –
Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013
.
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO:
25902/2021
(1) REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED: YES/NO
19/11/2024
In
the matter between:
GREGORY
JOHN ELS
FIRST
APPLICANT
PRAXLEY
CORPORATE SOLUTIONS (PTY) LTD
SECOND
APPLICANT
and
eMEDIA
INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD
RESPONDENT
REASONS
Manoim
J
[1]
This is an urgent interdict where the applicants, Mr Gregory Els, and
his company Praxley Corporate Solutions (“Praxley”),
seek
to interdict the respondent, eMedia Investments (Pty) Ltd, from
broadcasting certain visual and audio material concerning
them (“the
footage”).
[1]
[2]
I heard the matter on Friday the 14 November, but the matter was
urgent because eMedia’s subsidiary, e.tv (Pty)
Ltd (“e.tv.”),
intended to broadcast this footage on Sunday night 17 November at
18h30. E.tv. was unwilling to give
Els an undertaking that they would
not broadcast the footage on Sunday or to postpone the broadcast to a
later date. The footage
was intended to be broadcast on what is
termed the ‘Devi Show’ which is broadcast on two
channels, ENCA and e.tv.
E.tv. describes the
Devi Show as “an investigative, current affairs programme
dealing with matters of public interest.”
It is hosted by Devi
Govender whom I will refer to from now on by her first name as both
parties have done.
[3]
I gave my order on 15
November dismissing the interdict.
My reasons for doing so now follow.
Background
[4]
Els is a businessman whose company Praxley, the second applicant,
provides corporate advisory services, inter alia in
in respect of
mergers, acquisitions, disposals, and various capital raising and
restructuring ventures. He has been in this business
for twenty-one
years. Praxley has provided these services to more than 430 customers
over this period.
[5]
On 24 October he was contacted by someone claiming to be a Mr Hendrik
Zowitsky who asked to meet with him to advise him
on a sale of a
business. They arranged to meet on 29 October at a coffee shop called
Tashas located in a shopping mall in Sandton.
Zowitsky requested that
they meet outside as he was coming with his client who was a smoker.
[6]
Els arrived there at the arranged time only to be confronted not by
Zowitsky but by a TV crew from e.tv. led by Devi.
Devi called Els by
name and then proceeded, with her camera crew following her and
filming, to ask Els questions about why he had
not refunded a certain
Dr Reza his money. Els did not respond and then walked to his car.
Devi and the TV crew followed filming
him climbing into his car. He
heard Devi remark “nice car.” He left and then tried to
contact the number on which Zowitsky
had called him, only to find
that the number was blocked. It is now common cause that e.tv. used
the name of Zowitsky and the possibility
that he was a potential
client, as a ruse to lure Els to Tashas so he could be filmed by
e.tv.
[7]
Shortly thereafter, on the same day, Els received an email from Maria
Wein on behalf of Devi. Wein had a list of questions
with allegations
made about his treatment of certain past clients of Praxley. There
were 14 questions, and he was given a week
to respond. He was told he
could either respond in writing or give a camera interview.
[8]
Els consulted his attorney who wrote back to e.tv. requesting that it
not broadcast any footage of him alleging that its
usage would
constitute a violation of the Protection of Personal Information Act
4 of 2013 (“POPIA”). An exchange of
correspondence
between his attorney and e.tv. and subsequently its attorney followed
for several days thereafter. It is not necessary
to go into detail of
this correspondence, but the upshot was that each side firmed up on
its views. Although Els responded in writing
to some of the
allegations made against him, he insisted that the footage was not
screened. E.tv. was prepared to publish his replies,
and give him
airtime on camera, but it was not willing to give any undertaking
that it would not make use of the footage. E.tv.
took the view that
this was a matter of public interest, and that Els was a public
figure, something he denies.
[9]
In its answering affidavit it justifies itself in the following
terms:
“
Broadcasting
allegations against persons such as Els would empower other members
of the public to come forward with their own experiences.
This would
not only help validate the claims made against the applicants, but
also paint a comprehensive picture of the issues,
fostering a culture
where individuals feel supported and confident in reporting
misconduct. There is also a profound public interest
in the
ventilation of allegations of this nature, because they are relevant
to the administration of justice and public confidence
in the rule of
law.”
[10]
In its answering affidavit e.tv. first took several points before
dealing with the merits. The first point was that the
incorrect
entity for e.tv. has been cited but it nevertheless did not seek to
make anything further of this point. The next point
was that Praxley
the second applicant was wrongly joined as no relief is sought
against it. When I heard oral argument, this point
was not persisted
with and correctly so in my view. This point need not be considered
further.
[11]
The next point taken is one of urgency. E.tv argued that at best for
him Els ought to have known by 7 November
2024 that e.tv. was not
acceding to any undertaking that it would not broadcast the footage
and that he should have acted earlier.
[12]
Although it is correct that on 7 November 2024 e.tv. had indicated
that it would go ahead with the broadcast, it was
only on the 13
November 2024, that e.tv. ‘s attorneys informed Els’
attorneys that the broadcast would be made on 17
November 2024. I
consider that was the trigger event in this matter that created the
urgency. If Els had brought the application
earlier, he risked the
criticism that he had acted prematurely.
[13]
The application was then brought to this court on 14 November 2024
with electronic service on e.tv.’s attorneys
at 11h35 that day.
The matter was set down for 10h00 on the 15
th
of November
i.e. the following day. Although this time scale had given e.tv only
a day to respond, I am satisfied that Els had
no choice in the
circumstances and that the delay in bringing the application was not
abusive. Nor although it claims it needed
more time, was e.tv.
prejudiced. It put up a substantial response in its answering
affidavit despite the limited time frame, and
presumably had much
information on hand given that they had investigated Els for the
purpose of the program. I accept that given
more time e.tv. may have
been able to produce further information. This further information it
was argued during the hearing would
have further fortified their
papers in relation to the issue of public interest which I discuss
later in their reasons. On this
issue I indicated at the hearing I
would give them the benefit of the doubt. Once this was my approach,
I considered that e.tv.
was not otherwise prejudiced, and I decided
that Els had made out a case for urgency.
The
merits
[14]
It is common cause that this application is restricted to what I have
termed the footage. It does not seek to prevent
e.tv. from covering
serious allegations of alleged financial misconduct that certain of
its informants have made or will be making
against Els and Praxley.
Thus, whatever sting they entail be it defamatory or not, will be
aired despite the interdict, if it was
granted.
[15]
This then leaves the issue of privacy as the main right asserted by
Els for his relief. Since this is an application
for a final
interdict, Els had to establish that he has a clear right. Els
asserted his right to privacy on two bases. First his
general right
to privacy and secondly that the conduct infringes on his rights to
privacy in terms of POPIA.
[16]
I consider first the facts on which he relies and then the legal
basis.
[17]
The first and obvious point is that Els did not consent to being
filmed. Second Els argues that he was never approached
by e.tv prior
to being ‘ambushed’ to comment on the allegations. Third,
he argues that he was lured to the coffee shop
by deception. Fourth
he contends he is a private businessman who maintains a low profile,
does not have an account on any social
media, and cannot otherwise be
considered a public figure. Finally, he seeks to rebut usage of the
footage because he argues it
does not fall within the realm of
material protected from prior restraint that our courts have
typically upheld. This is because
the footage contains no information
other than him being confronted and walking away to his car. It is
also common cause that he
remained silent throughout the encounter,
so the footage does not constitute an interview.
POPIA
[18]
POPIA protects what it describes as the data subject’s personal
information. It is an offence for someone to process
someone else’s
personal information. But even if we consider that broadcasting
constitutes processing as defined in the Act,
it is not clear what
personal information Els relies on. The footage will show him getting
up and walking away to his car. Although
it reveals his name, this
identification is part of the broadcast in any event which is not the
subject of the interdict. Nor is
his appearance an issue as it is
already in the public domain on Praxley’s website. At best for
him the processing of personal
information is somehow the difference
between his static image and the moving image of him as it appears on
the footage as well
as his make of car.
[19]
I do not consider that this difference is sufficient to distinguish
between what may appear in the impugned footage and
what might appear
in the non-impugned footage.
[20]
But even if I am wrong on this POPIA has a provision which provides
for inter alia a journalistic exclusion. This is
section 7 which
states:
“
7. Exclusions
for journalistic, literary or artistic purposes This Act does not
apply to the processing of personal information
solely for the
purposes of journalistic, literary or artistic expression to the
extent that such an exclusion is necessary to reconcile,
as a matter
of public interest, the right to privacy or the right to freedom of
expression."
[21]
The test in section 7 is similar to that for considering an ordinary
claim for a right to privacy which I will go on
to consider. Put
differently the balancing exercise required under section 7 of POPIA
between the respective rights of privacy
and freedom of expression
appears to be the same under POPIA as it would for an ordinary claim
of a right to privacy.
[22]
What a court needs to balance is the claim of the subject asserting
the right of privacy with the right of the publisher
to freedom of
expression.
[23]
It might be assumed that these competing rights weigh evenly on the
scale. But when it comes to a prior restraint on
publication, as in
the present case, they do not, and several decisions of our courts
make this clear.
[24]
It must be borne in mind that the reason courts so assiduously
protect freedom of expression from prior restraint, as
the Supreme
Court of Appeal expressed it in the
Midi Television
case, is
not for the benefit of the media alone:
“
To abridge the
freedom of the press is to abridge the rights of all citizens and not
merely the rights of the press itself. “
[25]
In
Hix
it was
held that applications for orders placing prior restraints on
publication ought to be approached with caution.
[2]
[26]
In
Print
Media South Africa and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another
the
Constitutional Court summed up the case law in this way:
[3]
“
The
case law recognises that an effective ban or restriction on a
publication by a court order even before it has "seen the
light
of day" is something to be approached with circumspection and
should be permitted in narrow circumstances only.”
[27]
A more in-depth treatment of the subject matter was made earlier in
the case of
Midi
Television
where
the court held:
[4]
“
Where it is
alleged, for example, that a publication is defamatory, but it has
yet to be established that the defamation is unlawful,
an award
of damages is usually capable of vindicating the right to reputation
if it is later found to have been infringed, and
an anticipatory ban
on publication will seldom be necessary for that purpose. Where there
is a risk to rights that are not capable
of subsequent vindication a
narrow ban might be all that is required if any ban is called
for at all. It should not be assumed,
in other words, that once an
infringement of rights is threatened, a ban should immediately ensue,
least of all a ban that goes
beyond the minimum that is required to
protect the threatened right.
[28]
Does the fact that this case is premised on protecting a right to
privacy worthy of a greater claim for protection by
prior restraint
than might the fear of defamation which is what most of these cases
were concerned with. For Els it was argued
that it does. However,
e.tv. argues that the reliance on claims for privacy to interdict the
broadcast is a fig leaf for what amounts
to prior restraint.
[29]
I agree with e.tv on this. This is because the same considerations
that may apply to the publication of allegedly defamatory
material
should apply to an alleged invasion of privacy. Before the footage
has in the words of the court in Print Media “seen
the light of
day” a court should be careful not to ban it.
[30]
Having considered the case law on prior restraint I now consider the
law on the protection of privacy. Both parties have
considered the
dicta in
Bernstein
the leading case in point. The case
summarises the degree of protection given to privacy in a continuum.
“
Privacy
is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves
into communal relations and activities such as business
and social
interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.”
[5]
[31]
If the right of privacy is constrained by its distance from the
personal outwards, and is thus a relative concept, what
is the
premise of the competing claim for freedom of expression. This is
best formulated In
Print Media
where the court stated:
“…
the
right cognises an elemental truth that it is human to communicate,
and to that fact the law's support is owed. In considering
the
comprehensive quality of the right, one also cannot neglect the vital
role of a healthy press in the functioning of a democratic
society.
One might even consider the press to be a public sentinel, and to the
extent that laws encroach upon press freedom, so
too do they deal a
comparable blow to the public's right to a healthy, unimpeded
media.”
[6]
[32]
Council for Els argued that this is not what Els seeks to restrain by
the proposed interdict. This is why he has limited
his interdict to
the footage not whatever else may be said about his dealings in the
program. The footage on this argument contains
no information that
press freedom concerns are premised on. What is likely to be aired is
performative not informative. Thus, in
weighing up the contesting
claims, Els is seeking not to deny the importance of freedom of
expression, but to claim that the likely
content of the footage does
not justify any claim for protection. At least not of they type that
freedom of expression is normally
premised on.
[33]
I accept that this is an interesting argument. Certainly, e.tv wants
to secure the dramatic effect of its footage and
the typical modus
operandi which is the essence of the Devi Show.
The feisty host of the program is known for what they term her door
stopping technique. The program thrives on Devi being seen
on camera
confronting an alleged exploiter of the innocent and holding him to
account on camera. This it says explains its insistence
on wanting to
screen the footage. This does have elements of the performative, but
it does not lack the purpose as well of being
informative. The two
are not always mutually exclusive and must be judged in their context
when considering an evaluation of the
subject’s right to
privacy.
[34]
Moreover, this approach when some material is not objected to whilst
others is, compels the court to engage in a piecemeal
assessment of
the facts. The fact that the footage may contain no communication
from Els does not detract from its claim to expression.
It must be
seen in the context of the overall report which because this is prior
restraint, is not before me. Even if it appears
that by walking away
from Devi, Els appears to be unable or unwilling to refute his
accusers, this remains a form of non-verbal
communication, albeit he
considers it very unfair to him. I am not therefore persuaded to
consider that the footage dilutes any
claim for freedom of expression
asserted by e.tv not only for itself but also for its viewers.
[35]
I return then to Els claims for privacy applying the
Bernstein
continuum. Els also maintains that there is no public interest in his
business affairs as he is not a prominent public figure and
has no
profile on social media. That may be so, but he has a profile on the
internet and accusations concerning the propriety of
his business
dealings have surfaced on the internet including on the website of a
private investigator.
[36]
The allegations of impropriety made against Els are not trivial. The
allegations against him involve him misappropriating
substantial sums
of money from erstwhile clients and have been made by a variety of
sources over a period of years according to
the version of e.tv. As I
mentioned earlier when I discussed the urgency issue, e.tv had
limited time to indicate all its sources.
Nevertheless, it is based
on information from at least six people and investigations with third
parties such as the IDC, which
had allegedly, according to what one
of these sources been told by Els, agreed to provide finance for some
of the projects. The
IDC had allegedly denied any knowledge of this.
[37]
This means that the allegations against him are sufficiently grave to
warrant a claim of public interest. On the
Bernstein
test the
footage was taken in a public place, concerned Els’ business
and hence how he interacts with the public. His business
on his own
claims is substantial – a claim to having had more than 430
clients over a 20-year existence. He offers his services
to the
public. If e.tv.’s allegations are correct or even partially
correct, members of the public may be at financial risk
in dealing
with his firm. This places his affairs in the public realm. Put
differently on the continuum his claims for privacy
have receded far
from the realm of the private affairs of someone in their private
home.
[38]
Nor does the fact that he was lured by deceptive means alter the
picture in his favour. Courts have not intervened in
even more
serious cases. In
Tshabalala-Msimang
v Makhanya
,
the respondent newspaper had unlawfully obtained the private medical
records of a cabinet Minister, but notwithstanding this,
the court
had refused to interdict the future use of the records in media
reporting because to do so “
may
suspend journalism in a manner too dangerous to accept”
[7]
[39]
I conclude that Els fails at the first hurdle for a final interdict–
he has not made out a case for a clear right.
He fails as well in
respect of one of the others - whether he lacked a satisfactory
alternative remedy.
[8]
[40]
He does - he can sue in due course for damages for an invasion of
privacy. Thus, I conclude that no case has been made
out for a final
interdict on either of these two grounds.
[41]
Els may well feel aggrieved at being door stopped in public after a
false inducement to attend a meeting. Whatever his
feelings in the
matter they do not justify a remedy of prior restraint.
[42]
I did indicate at the hearing that Els was concerned that the
identification of his car might expose him to risk. E.tv
undertook
not to reveal the licence plate on his car. I accept this but
nevertheless have made the undertaking an order of court
and have
extended it to include any other feature that might distinguish his
car.
[43]
I do not consider that this case warrants an award of attorney client
costs. The case was an unusual one and Els was
scrupulous about
limiting his relief to the footage only. An award of party and party
costs will suffice.
[44]
Although I gave my order on 15 November 2024, I set it out again
below.
ORDER: -
[45] In the result
the following order is made:
1.
The forms, service and time periods prescribed by the Uniform Rules
of Court are dispensed with and the application is
heard as one of
urgency in terms of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
2.
The application is dismissed.
3.
The respondent is ordered to take steps to ensure that the first
applicant’s vehicle is not identifiable by means
of its licence
plate or any other distinguishing feature in its broadcast concerning
the applicants on 17 November 2024.
4.
The applicants are ordered to pay the costs of the application on
party and party Scale B.
N. MANOIM
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION
JOHNANNESBURG
Date of hearing: 15
November 2024
Date of Reasons: 19
November 2024
Appearances:
Counsel
for the Applicant:
Instructed
by:
K.
Harding-Moerdyk
RHK
Attorneys Inc
Counsel
for the Respondent:
Instructed
by:
A.
Friedman
Rosengarten
& Feinberg Attorneys
[1]
The correct entity that should have been cited is e.tv (Pty) Ltd.
[2]
Hix
Networking Technologies v System Publishers (Pty) Ltd and Another
1997 (1) SA 391 (A)
[3]
2012 (6) SA 443
(CC) para 44
[4]
Midi
Television (Pty) Ltd t/a e-tv v Director of Public Prosecutions
(Western Cape)
[2007] ZASCA 56
;
2007
(5) SA 540
(SCA) at paragraph 19,
[5]
Bernstein
v Bester
[1996] ZACC 2
;
1996
(2) SA 751
(CC) at para 67,
[6]
Print
Media
,
supra, paragraphs 53-54.
[7]
[2007] ZAGPHC 161
;
2008
(6) SA 102
(W) at paragraph 56.
[8]
For the requirements see
Setlogelo
v Setlogelo
1914
AD 221
at 227A.
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