Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 1199South Africa
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Koorbanally (4470/2020) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1199 (26 November 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
26 November 2024
Headnotes
well after the Koorbanallys remedied their default by paying their arrears. 7 When the matter was argued, Ms. Swandle was still unable to tell me what Standard Bank believed its reasonable costs of enforcement were. Nor had any effort been made to communicate that amount (whatever it is) to the Koorbanallys. For their part, on 2 October 2024, almost two months before the matter was called, the Koorbanallys offered to pay just under R57 000 towards Standard Bank’s enforcement costs in three equal monthly instalments. That offer was ignored for weeks on end, before finally being rejected on 20 November 2024. Having rejected the Koorbanallys’ offer, Standard Bank still refused to quantify its enforcement costs,
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Koorbanally (4470/2020) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1199 (26 November 2024)
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Koorbanally (4470/2020) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1199 (26 November 2024)
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sino date 26 November 2024
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE:
26 November 2024
Case
No.
4470/2020
In
the matter between:
STANDARD
BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED
Applicant
and
MARTIN
CHRIS KOORBANALLY
First
Respondent
LEEANN
REINOLDA KOORBANALLY
Second
Respondent
##### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
WILSON
J:
1
Section 129
(3) of the
National Credit Act 34 of 2005
enables
a consumer to reinstate a credit agreement on which they have fallen
into arrears “by paying to the credit provider
all amounts that
are overdue, together with the credit provider's prescribed default
administration charges and [the] reasonable
costs of enforcing the
agreement up to the time the default was remedied”.
2
The respondents, the Koorbanallys, took out a loan from the
applicant, Standard Bank, which was secured by way of a mortgage bond
against their home in Meyersdaal, to the south of Johannesburg. The
Koorbanallys fell into arrears on their repayments. On 7 February
2020, Standard Bank issued summons claiming payment of the full
amount outstanding on the loan agreement, together with an order
declaring the Koorbanallys’ home specially executable.
3
The Koorbanallys defended the proceedings. Their main object
in doing so appears to have been to buy the time necessary to bring
their loan account up-to-date. The action meandered through the trial
process, but an application to declare the Koorbanallys’
home
specially executable was eventually set down for hearing before me on
25 November 2024.
4
At some point in July or early August 2024 (it is not clear
exactly when), the Koorbanallys paid their arrears in full. They did
not, however, settle the costs to which Standard Bank had been put in
seeking to enforce the loan agreement. This is because it
was up to
Standard Bank to quantify the reasonable costs of enforcing the loan
agreement up to the time the default was remedied,
and to demand them
from the Koorbanallys (see
Nkata v First Rand Bank
Ltd
2016
(4) SA 257
(CC) (“
Nkata
”), paragraph 122).
5
For reasons I cannot fathom, Standard Bank refused to do this.
It insisted that the matter should be brought to a hearing, purely
for the purposes of obtaining a costs order on the scale as between
attorney and client against the Koorbanallys. Ms. Swandle,
who
appeared for Standard Bank, submitted that that Standard Bank’s
taxed bill would constitute its reasonable enforcement
costs.
6
This is the wrong approach. Standard Bank is only entitled to
the “reasonable costs of enforcing the agreement
up to the
time the default was remedied
”
(section 129
(3) of the NCA,
my emphasis). Those costs obviously do not include the attorney and
client costs associated with a hearing before
me, which was held well
after the Koorbanallys remedied their default by paying their
arrears.
7
When the matter was argued, Ms. Swandle was still unable to
tell me what Standard Bank believed its reasonable costs of
enforcement
were. Nor had any effort been made to communicate that
amount (whatever it is) to the Koorbanallys. For their part, on 2
October
2024, almost two months before the matter was called, the
Koorbanallys offered to pay just under R57 000 towards Standard
Bank’s
enforcement costs in three equal monthly instalments.
That offer was ignored for weeks on end, before finally being
rejected on
20 November 2024. Having rejected the Koorbanallys’
offer, Standard Bank still refused to quantify its enforcement costs,
or to make a counteroffer to the Koorbanallys in settlement of them.
8
As the Constitutional Court’s decision in
Nkata
makes clear, it is for the credit provider to quantify and demand its
enforcement costs at the point a consumer cures their default
by
paying their arrears. If the credit provider fails to do so, the fact
that the credit provider’s enforcement costs have
not been paid
constitutes no bar to the reinstatement of the agreement (see
Nkata
,
paragraphs 121 to 123). What a credit provider may not do is avoid
engaging with a consumer by keeping the litigation hobbling
along in
the hope of obtaining a costs order. Yet that was the course
Standard Bank chose.
9
That conduct was high-handed, inconsistent with the applicable
law and a waste of the court’s time. Mr. Patel, who appeared
for the Koorbanallys, submitted that Standard Bank should pay the
wasted costs of the hearing before me. That is the least that
should
happen.
10
For all these reasons –
10.1 The
application is removed from the roll.
10.2 The applicant
will pay the wasted costs of the hearing of 25 November 2024.
S
D J WILSON
Judge
of the High Court
This
judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties
or their legal representatives by email, by uploading
it to the
electronic file of this matter on Caselines, and by publication of
the judgment to the South African Legal Information
Institute. The
date for hand-down is deemed to be 26 November 2024.
HEARD
ON:
25
November 2024
DECIDED
ON:
26
November 2024
For
the Applicant:
L
Swandle
Instructed
by Van Hulsteyns Attorneys
For
the Respondents:
M
Patel
Instructed
by Fran Hackett Attorneys Inc
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